Barnes Jonathan. Truth, etc
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190 What is a Connector?
SOME OFF-BEAT CONNECTORS
Nor is the idea that connectors connect parts of speech merely eccentric:
it appears to count as connectors a number of items which are surely not
connectors at all. For example, the word ‘from’ in
The boys from Brazil
seems to connect two parts of speech—two names. But ‘from’ is a preposition,
not a connector.
Well, the Stoic Posidonius included prepositions among connectors; and
the view that prepositions are a sort of connector is frequently ascribed to the
Stoics in general: according to the grammarians, the Stoics called preposi-
tions ‘prepositive connectors’ and connectors ‘subordinative connectors’—so,
for example, the Greek commentators on Dionysius Thrax (356.13–15,³⁶
519.26–32); and also Priscian (inst ii iv 17 [ii 54.20–22]; xiv ii 18 [iii
34.23–25]).
The grammatical commentators rehearse a few feeble reasons in favour of
the Stoic thesis, reasons which they briskly refute. Apollonius says that
the Stoics called prepositions prepositive connectors, thinking it better to name them
from their peculiar construction than from their force.
(synt iv 5 [436.13–437.1])³⁷
And a little later:
We have said that in certain other juxtapositions too the prepositions come to show a
connective construction. That gave the Stoics the impulsion to call them prepositive
connectors. ‘On account of what is he in pain?’ and ‘Because of what is he in pain?’
are equivalent; and ‘From idleness’ and ‘On account of idleness’ are equivalent.
(iv 27 [457.12–458.3])³⁸
Semantically speaking, ‘because of [διά]’, which is a preposition, functions
just like ‘on account of [ἕνεκα]’, which is a connector. Hence ‘because of ’
³⁶ … ὑφ᾿ ἓν πρόθεσις καὶ σύνδεσμος, τὴν μὲν προθετικὸν σύνδεσμον προσαγορεύοντες, τὸν
δὲ ὑποτακτικὸν σύνδεσμον.
³⁷ ἔνθεν γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς προθετικοὺς ἐκάλουν συνδέσμους τὰς προθέσεις, ἄμεινον
ἡγησάμενοι ἀπὸ τῆς ἐξαιρέτου συντάξεως τὴν ὀνομασίαν θέσθαι ἤπερ ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως.
³⁸ ὡς μὲν οὖν καὶ κατά τινας ἄλλας παραθέσεις αἱ προθέσεις συνδεσμικῆς συντάξεως
γίνονται παρεμφατικαί, λέλεκται ἡμῖν. ἐξ ὧν καὶ ἡ ἀφορμὴ εἴληπται παρὰ Στωϊκοῖς τοῦ
καλεῖσθαι αὐτὰς προθετικοὺς συνδέσμους· τὸ γὰρ ἕνεκα τίνος λυπῇ καὶ διὰ τί λυπῇ ἐν ἴσῳ
ἐστί, καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῆς ῥᾳθυμίας ἐν ἴσῳ ἐστὶν τῷ ἕνεκα τῆς ῥᾳθυμίας.
Some Off-beat Connectors 191
shows a connective construction—and that, according to Apollonius, led the
Stoics to identify it as a connector.
It is an odd argument. And in any event, the Stoics had a far better reason
for counting prepositions as connectors; for connectors surely are ‘caseless
parts of sayings which connect the parts of sayings’—and that is the Stoic
definition of what a connector is. The word ‘from’ is caseless, and it connects
‘the boys’ and ‘Brazil’.
Why did Apollonius disagree with the Stoics? According to the Dionysian
Art, a preposition is
an expression preposed to any part of sayings both in composition and in construction.
(18 [70.2–3])³⁹
The commentators found fault with that; and they proposed—as they usually
did—something better:
A preposition is a part of sayings, uttered in one form only, prepositive to any part of
sayings in juxtaposition or in composition (except when it is uttered in conversion).
(scholiast to Dionysius Thrax, 91.20–22)⁴⁰
(Prepositions ‘in composition’ are verbal prefixes; prepositions are ‘uttered
in conversion’ when they follow the expression which they govern.) There
is reason to ascribe this definition to Apollonius: Priscian asserts, of his
own account of prepositions, that ‘I have thought that the authority <of
Apollonius> is to be followed in all matters’;⁴¹ and he immediately offers
a definition of ‘preposition’ which translates the Greek of the commentator
(inst xiv i1[iii 24.7–8]). And Apollonius himself says that
while the other parts of sayings have a single construction …, prepositions have two
constructions, one with names and also one with verbs.
(synt iv 9 [440.7–14])⁴²
That is how prepositions are distinguished from connectors: prepositions
can, and connectors cannot, form verbal prefixes.
And that is why, in the eyes of the grammarians, ‘ἕνεκα’ or ‘on account of ’
is a connector and not a preposition. It is so classified, without a murmur, by
³⁹ λέξις προτιθεμένη πάντων τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν ἔν τε συνθέσει καὶ συντάξει.
⁴⁰ μέρος λόγου καθ᾿ ἕνα σχηματισμὸν λεγόμενον, προθετικὸν πάντων τῶν τοῦ λόγου
μερῶν ἐν παραθέσει ἢ συνθέσει, ὅτε μὴ κατὰ ἀναστροφὴν ἐκφέρεται.
⁴¹ … Apollonius, cuius auctoritatem in omnibus sequendam putavi.
⁴² τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα μέρη τοῦ λόγου μίαν ἔχει σύνταξιν, ... αἱ μέντοι προθέσεις δύο
συντάξεις ἀναδεξάμεναι, τήν τε πρὸς τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ ἔτι πρὸς τὰ ῥήματα ...
192 What is a Connector?
the Art (20 [93.2]), and also by Apollonius—who has two short discussions
of the word, neither of which even considers the suggestion that it might
be a preposition (synt ii 67 [174.14–175.6]; conj 238.22–239.8). True,
Apollonius hesitates over ‘χάριν’, which is a synonym of ‘ἕνεκα’—but only
because he thinks it might be better to classify ‘χάριν’asanamethanasa
connector (conj 246.28–247.20). And in general, he has no qualms about
connectors which take cases—on the contrary, he claims that ‘we shall show
that connectors do not take more than one case’ (synt i 85 [73.10–11]).⁴³
The Apollonian definition of the connector surely ought to have been
modified in order to make it clear that, unlike the Stoics, the grammarians
did not wish to count prepositions as connectors. But prepositions were not
the only off-beat items which were sometimes classified as connectors. The
Aristotelian commentators distinguished prepositions from connectors; but
they treated the copula as a connector. Simplicius puts it directly:
When I say that this is white, I say nothing other than that this has whiteness—so
to be and to have have the powers of connectors.
(in Cat 42.22–24)⁴⁴
In
Barkis is willing
or
Barkis has willingness,
‘is’ and ‘has’ are connectors. After all, they serve to connect two parts of
sayings—two names.
The point is made more than once by Ammonius, who elaborates it:
Since the predicated term too in such propositions is a name (e.g. ‘just’) and cannot,
when coupled with the subject, in itself produce a complete saying, they needed as it
were a sort of bond to connect them one to the other and make the saying complete;
and that is what ‘is’ does.
(in Int 160.10–14)⁴⁵
‘Man’ and ‘just’ are each names, and a couple of names will not stick together.
They need a connector, and the need is supplied, in this case, by the word
⁴³ δείξομέν τε ὡς καὶ σύνδεσμοι οὐκ ἐπὶ πτώσεις φέρονται διαφόρους.
⁴⁴ ὅταν δὲ λέγω ὅτι τόδε λευκόν ἐστιν, οὐδὲν ἕτερον λέγω ἢ ὅτι τόδε λευκότητα ἔχει· τὸ
οὖν εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἔχειν συνδέσμων ἔχει δυνάμεις.
⁴⁵ ἐπεὶ γὰρ καὶ ὁ κατηγορούμενος ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις προτάσεσιν ὄνομά ἐστιν, οἷον τὸ
δίκαιος, καὶ οὐ δύναται καθ᾿ ἑαυτὸν συνδυασθεὶς τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ τέλειον ἐργάσασθαι λόγον,
ἔδει αὐτοῖς ὥσπερ δεσμοῦ τινος τοῦ συνδέοντος αὐτοὺς πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ τέλειον ποιοῦντος
τὸν λόγον, ὃ ποιεῖ τὸ ἔστι.
Some Off-beat Connectors 193
‘is’. ‘I’ and ‘you’, the grammarians tell us, are members of the same class of
expression and will not hold together: they need the glue of ‘and’. So too
‘man’ and ‘just’ need the bond of ‘is’.
Philoponus agrees with Ammonius that the copula is a connector; and he
goes further:
Why does Aristotle say that propositions dissolve into subject and predicate
alone?—We say that strictly speaking these two items—that about which the
saying is and that which is said about it—are the only parts of a proposition, and
that the other items which are included in a proposition play the r
ˆ
ole of connectors.
(in APr 24.30–25.4)⁴⁶
Modal adverbs, for example, are connectors, and in
Necessarily the sun rises
the word ‘necessarily’ is a connector, or at least plays the r
ˆ
ole of a connector.
Not that it is a one-placed connector: rather, in Philoponus’ view, it
connects—or helps to connect—the predicate term to the subject term.
There seems to be a powerful objection to that analysis. For surely ‘is’ and
‘has’ are not connectors but verbs? No, they are not verbs—or at least, they
are not fledged verbs. For verbs, according to Aristotle, signify something
which holds of something: ‘walks’, for example, signifies walking, which
holds of all and only walking items. But ‘is’ and ‘has’, when they are used to
copulate subject and predicate, are not like that: in
Socrates is white
the word ‘white’ may perhaps signify something which holds of Socrates; but
the word ‘is’ does not.
Even so, ‘is’ and ‘has’ surely have something verb-like about them: they
indicate a time (in this case, the present time), and the indicating of time is a
mark of the Aristotelian verb. Now, according to the ancient commonplace,
it is indeed verbs which indicate times; but it is far from evident that the
copulative ‘is’ does so. For according to one understanding of
Socrates was pale,
the subject is ‘Socrates’ and the predicate is ‘an item which was pale’. The
word ‘was’ in
Socrates was pale
⁴⁶ τί δήποτε τὴν πρότασιν εἴς τε τὸν ὑποκείμενον καὶ κατηγορούμενον διαλύεσθαί φησι
μόνους; καὶ λέγομεν ὅτι κυρίως ταῦτα τὰ δύο εἰσὶ μόνα τῆς προτάσεως μέρη, τό τε περὶ οὗ ὁ
λόγος καὶ τὸ περὶ ἐκείνου λεγόμενον, ὅσα δὲ ἄλλα παραλαμβάνεται ἐν τῇ προτάσει συνδέσμου
χρείαν πληροῖ.
194 What is a Connector?
certainly does co-signify a time, and it is—among other things—a verb. But
in fact, it is an amalgam of a copula and a verb; and the verbal part of it
belongs with one of the terms. You might try to make the point clear by
writing, say,
Socrates is pale-in-the-past.
Similarly, of course, for
Socrates is pale
you should really write
Socrates is pale-in-the-present.
In those two pseudo-sentences, ‘is’ is not a verb: it signifies nothing which
holds of anything, and it indicates no time. Its sole function is to link the
two terms of the proposition.
That understanding of the copula was promoted among modern philo-
sophers by some logicians. It is already present, in nuce, in certain ancient
texts. It is not, of course, the only way in which the copula may be construed,
and it is not without its problems. But that is enough of the matter here.
Here is another off-beat connector. According to Simplicius, Lucius
held that
articles … too are a sort of connector, signifying in addition gender, masculine and
feminine, and doing so indefinitely.
(in Cat 64.30–65.1)⁴⁷
The Greek feminine article ‘ἡ’, for example, indicates a gender—but it does
so indefinitely inasmuch as it does not in itself reveal what item named or
nameable by a word of feminine gender is on the table.
Why Lucius thought that articles are connectors is unclear; but his thesis
may perhaps be linked with the view later taken by Priscian, according to
whom what he calls subordinative articles—that is to say, certain anaphoric
pronouns—are connectors (inst xvii viii 56 [iii 142.4–6]). Priscian here
adapts—and bowdlerizes—Apollonius, who argued the point thus:
As we said, the subordinative article is attached to a verb of its own, being connected
by anaphora to a preceding name, and for that reason it does not produce a simple
saying in virtue of its construction with two verbs (I mean, the verb which goes with
the name and the verb which goes with the article itself ). The same holds for the
connector ‘and’: it takes the preceding name as something held in common, and by
knitting on another saying it necessarily also takes another verb. So
⁴⁷ καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα οἷον σύνδεσμοί εἰσιν τὰ γένη προσσημαίνοντες τό τε ἄρρεν καὶ τὸ θῆλυ
ἀορίστως.
Some Off-beat Connectors 195
The grammarian who was talking was present
has the same force as
The grammarian was present and was talking.
And the nomenclature of the parts of sayings is similar—‘to be dependent’ and ‘to
be connected’ are not far from synonyms.
(synt i 144 [117.12–118.8])⁴⁸
A subordinative article, in Apollonius’ view, is not a connector—but it
connects.
I might mention here a few off-beat non-connectors—I mean, items which
the grammarians did not classify as connectors even though they apparently
ought to have done. For example, of the word ‘ἵνα’ Apollonius says that
this particle has three varieties, two of them connective and one of them—the
one which indicates place—adverbial. When it is connective, it changes the verbs
constructed with it into the so-called subordinative inflection (just as the dubitative
‘ἐάν’ does) … but adverbially it retains the indicative inflection.
(conj 243.11–16)⁴⁹
Something similar is said of ‘ὅπως’(conj 243.26–30), and of the archaic
‘ὄφρα’ (244.6–8); and Apollonius held the same view about ‘ἐπεί’(synt iv
61 [483.3–9]). So too the Latins took ‘ut’ to be a connector in some of its
uses and an adverb in others (e.g. Diomedes, ars gramm i 408.10–24); and
Priscian, having classified ‘quando’ as an adverb, takes pains to add that ‘it is
indeed also found as a causal connector’ (inst xv vi 38 [iii 88.26–27]).⁵⁰
The words in question are all ambiguous: in certain of their senses, they are
connectors; but when they mean ‘when’ or ‘where’ they are not connectors
but adverbs. Yet surely ‘when’ and ‘where’ satisfy the improved definition of
connectors? And in any case, is it not perverse to deny that in, say,
⁴⁸ ὡς ἔφαμεν, τὸ ὑποτακτικὸν ἄρθρον ἐπὶ ῥῆμα ἴδιον φέρεται, συνδεδεμένον διὰ τῆς
ἀναφορᾶς τῷ προκειμένῳ ὀνόματι, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἁπλοῦν λόγον οὐ παριστάνει κατὰ τὴν
τῶν δύο ῥημάτων σύνταξιν, λέγω τὴν ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἄρθρῳ. ὅπερ
πάλιν παρείπετο τῷ καί συνδέσμῳ· κοινὸν μὲν παρελάμβανεν τὸ ὄνομα τὸ προκείμενον,
συμπλέκων δὲ ἕτερον λόγον πάντως καὶ ἕτερον ῥῆμα παρελάμβανεν. καὶ οὕτω τὸ παρεγένετο
ὁ γραμματικὸς ὃς διελέξατο δυνάμει τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποτελεῖ τῷ ὁ γραμματικὸς παρεγένετο καὶ
διελέξατο, ἐγγιζούσης καὶ τῆς ὀνομασίας τῶν μορίων· τὸ γὰρ συνηρτῆσθαι καὶ συνδεδέσθαι
οὐ μακρὰν τῆς συνωνυμίας πέπτωκεν.
⁴⁹ διαφορὰς ἔχει τὸ μόριον τρεῖς, συνδεσμικὰς μὲν δύο καὶ ἐπιρρηματικὴν μίαν, τόπου
δηλωτικήν. συνδεσμικὸν μὲν οὖν καθεστηκὸς τὰ συντασσόμενα ῥήματα μετατίθησιν εἰς τὰ
καλούμενα ὑποτακτικά, καθότι καὶ ὁ ἐάν ἐπιζευκτικός ...· ἐπιρρηματικῶς δὲ φυλάσσει τὴν
ὁριστικὴν κλίσιν ....
⁵⁰ quando autem etiam et pro coniunctione causali invenitur.
196 What is a Connector?
Where the bee sucks, there suck I
the word ‘where’ serves to connect two sentences? Does it not connect ‘the
bee sucks’ to ‘there suck I’?
That was not the view of Apollonius: he held that ‘where’ and ‘there’ were
correlatives; that ‘there’ is evidently a local adverb; and hence that ‘where’ is
also a local adverb. (There is a third member of the party: the interrogative local
adverb ‘where’.) Apollonius was not being perverse. After all, the syntax of
Where the bee sucks, there suck I
is parallel to the syntax of
Whom the gods love die young.
As Apollonius recognizes, the ‘whom’ in that sentence does, in a sense,
connect—it has a connective syntax. But it is not a connector. The sentence
may be crudely paraphrased as follows:
Take anyone you like—if the gods love him, he dies young.
The work done by ‘whom’ in the original sentence is divided in the paraphrase
between a quantifier, ‘Take anyone you like’, and a connective ‘if ’. The word
‘whom’ is, as it were, a conflation of quantifier and connector. So too, in
Ariel’s verse, the ‘where’ is an amalgam of connector and quantifier.
Nonetheless, it remains true that ‘where’ satisfies the improved ancient
definition of the connector:
A connector is an uninflected part of sayings, connective of the parts of sayings, with
which it co-signifies, determining either order or force or both order and force.
(scholiast to Dionysius Thrax, 102.15–18)
Just as the definition ought to have been modified so as to exclude prepositions,
so too it ought to have been modified to exclude adverbs.
ORDER AND FORCE
Even if we set aside the off-beat cases, the improved definition of connectors
still looks eccentric insofar as it refers to parts of sayings. What is more,
it seems also to be incoherent. For on the one hand it explicitly rules that
connectors connect parts of sayings, and on the other hand one of its clauses
appears to presuppose that connected items are sentential. I refer to the
obscure clause which decrees that a connector determines either order or
force or both order and force.
It is clear, at least, that the order must be an order among the items which
the connector connects. It is clear, too, that the order must be something to
Order and Force 197
do with the meaning of the connector, or with the meaning of the connected
sentences. From the examples which the commentators supply something
like the following idea emerges. If you want to connect a number of items
by means of a connector, the order in which you take the items sometimes
matters and sometimes does not matter; that is, the order sometimes makes
a difference to the sense of the connected item and sometimes makes no
difference. So a connector is said to determine an order if and only if
the order in which the connected items are taken makes a difference to
the sense. Thus if you want to connect a couple of items by way of the
connector ‘if ’, it makes a difference whether you say ‘If P, Q’ or ‘If Q,
P’: ‘if ’ determines an order. On the other hand, if you connect the same
items by ‘or’, the order makes no difference: ‘Either P or Q’ says the same
as ‘Either Q or P’. The disjunctive connector ‘or’ does not determine an
order.
If that is order, then what is force? What is the force which a connector
may or may not determine? ‘Force’ translates ‘δύναμις’or‘vis’, and those
words—at least when they are found in grammatical contexts—most often
mean ‘meaning’ or ‘sense’. In that case, the definition appears to mean that
some connectors have a meaning but do not determine an order, that some
determine an order but do not have a meaning, and that some do both things.
But that is close to nonsense: how could a connector determine an order
unless it had a meaning? Surely it is precisely the meaning of the connector
‘if ’ which makes it determine an order?
It is true, as we shall shortly see, that some ancient theorists did deny
meaning to some, or even to all, connectors; but Apollonius certainly did not,
and neither did the late grammarians. In any event, the ancient commentators
explain the pertinent notion of force in a very different way. First, they observe
that, just as the order which a connector determines is the order of the items
which it connects, so too the force which a connector determines is the
force of the items which it connects. Secondly, they explain that ‘force’ here
means ‘holding’ or ‘being the case’. So, for example, while the connector ‘if ’
determines an order,
it does not also announce a force, which is the holding of the object—for the utterer
is in a state of doubt.
(scholiast to Dionysius Thrax, 102.31–32;⁵¹ cf. 283.32)
⁵¹ οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ δύναμιν ἐπαγγέλλεται, ὅ ἐστιν ὕπαρξιν τοῦ πράγματος· διστάζει γὰρ ὁ
λέγων.
198 What is a Connector?
And more generally Priscian remarks that a connector indicates a force
when it means that certain items hold at the same time.
(inst xvi i1[iii 92.4])⁵²
The connector ‘if ’ does not determine a force inasmuch as ‘If P, Q’ entails
neither that P nor that Q. The connector ‘and’ determines a force insofar as
‘P and Q’ entails that P, and also that Q.
To use the word ‘force’ in that sense strikes me as peculiar; but I suppose
we should accept that the commentators understood things aright—indeed,
I daresay that Priscian’s explanation comes from Apollonius himself.
Thus ‘if ’—for the reasons given—determines an order but not a force; and
‘and’ determines a force but not an order. The stock examples of connectors
which determine both an order and a force are ‘since’ and ‘because’: ‘Since P,
Q’ does not say the same as ‘Since Q, P’, so that ‘since’ determines an order;
and ‘Since P, Q’ entails that P and, also that Q, so that ‘since’ determines a
force. Similarly for ‘because’.
The improved definition of connectors requires that all connectors determ-
ine either an order or a force or both. But what about disjunctive connectors?
They do not establish an order, since ‘P or Q’ says the same as ‘Q or P’.
Nor—according to the account on the table—do they establish a force;
for ‘P or Q’ does not entail that P and does not entail that Q. So the
account needs to be modified. The ancient texts are not very clear on
the matter; but they seem to suggest that a connector will be said to
determine a force if and only if it requires that at least one of the connec-
ted items holds. Although ‘P or Q’ does not entail that P and does not
entail that Q, it does require that at least one of the two connected items
holds—and so it does determine a force. Even so, there are—or there may
be—connectors which escape the net. Consider, say, ‘Neither … nor … ’,
or ‘Not both … and … ’. But it is not worth pursuing that hare any
further.
Rather, let me insist on a consequence of any such account of force: insofar
as connectors are defined as items which may or may not determine a force,
they are conceived of as sentential connectives. For if a connector connects x
and y, then you may ask whether or not x and y hold, whether or not it is the
case that x and the case that y. And for that to make sense, the places of ‘x’
and ‘y’ in that schematic sentence must be taken by indicative or assertoric
sentences.
⁵² … quando simul esse res aliquas significat.
What do Apollonian Connectors Connect? 199
That conclusion is unwelcome; for it threatens the improved definition with
inconsistency: it explicitly requires that connectors connect the parts of say-
ings, and it implicitly requires that connectors connect whole sayings—and
whole assertoric sentences at that. The menacing inconsistency might, in
principle, be warded off by one device or another; but no ancient text even
hints at any such device—indeed, no ancient text even notices the menace.
Now it will be allowed that the late grammarians were—to judge by what
is left of them—a pretty pedestrian lot, and that the ancient grammarian’s
stone was quite capable of turning gold into base metal. But Apollonius was
a better alchemist. Perhaps, then, the revised definition of the connector is
not, after all, Apollonian? Perhaps it is a transmuted version of the definition
which Apollonius actually gave?
WHAT DO APOLLONIAN CONNECTORS CONNECT?
James Harris, the eighteenth century English savant and eccentric, remarked
that
Grammarians have usually considered the Conjunction as connecting rather single
Parts of Speech than whole Sentences, and that too with the addition of like with like,
Tense with Tense, Number with Number, Case with Case, &c. This Sanctius justly
explodes.
(Hermes [London, 1751], p. 238 n.(a))
I do not know who Sanctius was, nor how he manufactured his explosion.
But Harris confidently follows Sanctius—and he goes on to assure us that,
in following Sanctius, he is returning to the correct doctrine of Apollonius
Dyscolus.
Harris is right when he says that most grammarians made connectors
connect parts of speech; but one or two ancient texts have been thought to
recognize the centrality of sentences. For example, Plutarch writes as follows
in his essay on the parts of speech:
He affirms that a connector is not a part of sayings but rather a sort of connective
tool—as its name suggests—and something which holds together not any items
whatever but non-simple expressions.
(quaest Plat 1011ab)⁵³
⁵³ οὐ μέρος λόγου τὸν σύνδεσμον ἀλλ᾿ ὄργανόν τι συνδετικὸν ἀποφαίνει, καθάπερ ὠνό-
μασται, καὶ συνεκτικὸν οὐ πάντων ἀλλὰ τῶν οὐχ ἁπλῶς λεγομένων.