Woodward Bob. Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account of the Decision to Invade Iraq

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Phase Two: 16 days of air attacks and Special Forces operations.

Phase Three: 125 days of decisive combat operations. At the beginning of the 125 days, they would try to

get a division inside Iraq, and within a week another division of ground forces.

Phase Four: Stability operations of unknown duration.

Rumsfeld and Franks made it clear that the beginning of the 11-day force deployment was not a point of

no return, but that the flow would be seen and known, and could trigger a move by Saddam.

Displaying another slide, Franks described the advantages of the Hybrid concept. Time could be

optimized, the quicker force posturing would improve short-term capabilities in the region, and the increased

ressure on the Iraqi regime could enhance diplomacy, Franks said.

So the Hybrid was a 5-11-16-125-day plan. Renuart noticed that Bush’s body language, the nods and the

forward-leaning attentiveness, suggested he was pleased.

“I like the concept,” Bush said.

“Best-seller,” Renuart wrote in the Black Book of Death.

We need to have humanitarian assistance on the battlefield from day one, the president said.

Slide 35 was titled, “Examining Things That Could Go Wrong: Strategic Risks.” One was an early missile

attack by Saddam on Kuwait. The way to mitigate that was to make sure that Kuwait had some counter-

ballistic-missile capability, such as the Patriot missiles. More would have to be done to protect Israel.

Franks listed as another risk the possibility of early success. Suppose Saddam walked away or fled, and

hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops were flowing into the area? Did they have a legal basis to occupy the

country? What if Saddam folded and retreated with his Republican Guard to Baghdad and “circled the

wagons”?

Bush once again expressed particular concern about this possibility. Baghdad had more than 5 million

eople.

Franks reminded them that he had briefed the president three times already on this and was still working

the problem.

Yeah, the president said, I know, but some of our guys are still concerned.

Also under “Managing Strategic Risk”: What could Saddam do to spoil their preparation? One was to

interrupt the oil flow to Iraq’s neighbors, especially Turkey, Syria and Jordan.

Powell agreed to address this and talk to the Saudis about providing oil, particularly to Jordan.

Other unanswered questions included: What if Syria attacks Israel? What if Iraq just sort of implodes and

someone kills Saddam? What would the U.S. do?

It was pretty much agreed that the U.S. would still have to enter Iraq with the military because they would

not know who the new Iraqi leader might be. Could they trust someone new? Probably not. Did they want to

deal with that chaos? The

would have to continue the flow of forces and

ut a militar

force in to maintain

stability.

Another question was put on the table: When should they go to Turkey to seek a firm commitment that

some U.S. forces could transit through?

We’re late already, Franks said. We need to have Turkey commit, but with their national elections coming

up, the Turks would not make a decision. Should we go in and ask anyway and risk getting a no? The decision

was put off.

Discussion turned to the Phase Four stability operations after combat was completed, not the strategy or

the philosophy of occupying a post-Saddam Iraq, but the numbers of troops it would take. Franks noted that if

the military attack was carried out, they might have up to 265,000 troops in the country. Over time he would

want to draw that down to about 50,000. That would be governed by events in Iraq but he anticipated the

drawdown would occur over 18 months after the end of combat.

Lastly, Franks provided an “Iraq Targeting Primer.” The imperatives included: 1. The significance of the

target, 2. A description of the target and any critical elements, 3. If there was a collateral damage issue in which

civilians might be killed, 4. What kind of weapon might be used.

Using an overhead satellite photo of the Baath Party headquarters in Baghdad as an example, he

explained: 1. Its significance was that it was their headquarters and Saddam used the party as one instrument of

control, 2. The headquarters is a multistory building with extensive communications and security, 3. There is a

residential facility nearby that could be damaged, 4. Any number of weapons could be used, including cruise

missiles and laser-guided bombs.

POWELL WAS VERY MUCH

on edge. The discussions of Iraq were increasingly focused on military planning, a

continuing, escalating series of ideas, concepts, detailed sequences, scenarios and worries. The packet of Top

Secret slides grew with each of Rumsfeld’s and Franks’s briefings. Like a proctor at a boys’ prep school,

Rumsfeld handed out the packets of slides or multicolored sheets and collected them afterward. The president’s

acket often contained more backup material. Rumsfeld ordered those present not to take notes. He took all the

copies back to the Pentagon and had his military assistant lock them in a safe in the defense secretary’s suite of

offices.

For the first 16 months of the administration, Powell had been “in the refrigerator” or worse, as he and

Armitage called his frequent isolation. It gnawed at him when stories appeared in the press suggesting that he

was going to resign, what he privately called the “Powell’s-on-his-way-out-again mode.” Armitage had been

ushing hard for Powell to request private time with the president to build a personal relationship. Rumsfeld

regularly had such sessions.

Several months earlier, Powell had asked for and received private time with Bush, though Rice sat in on

the 20-to 30-minute Oval Office sessions. On one occasion the president invited Powell in alone and the two

had about 30 minutes together. “I think we’re really making some headway in the relationship,” Powell later

reported to Armitage. “I know we really connected.”

In the days before the latest Franks briefing unveiling the Hybrid concept, Powell had been in Asia

making his rounds. He could almost hear the war tom-toms across the ocean. A great deal of momentum was

now building. On the long trip back he had started to collect his thoughts on Iraq. Brent Scowcroft, who had

been national security adviser to Bush’s father during the Gulf War, had declared on a Sunday morning talk

show that an attack on Iraq could turn the entire Middle East into a “cauldron and thus destroy the war on

terrorism.”

Powell basicall

reed with that blunt warnin

. He realized that he had not laid out his own anal

sis to

the president directly and forcefully. And at least he owed Bush his understanding and his views on all the

ossible consequences of war.

Powell talked with Rice. It was impossible to have a complete policy discussion about Iraq during a

meeting that was essentially a military briefing, he said. “I really need to have some private time with him to go

over some issues that I don’t think he’s gone over with anyone yet,” he insisted.

Bush invited Powell and Rice to the residence the evening of Franks’s August 5 Hybrid briefing. The

meeting expanded to include dinner in the family dining room and then continued in the president’s office in the

residence.

Powell’s notes filled three or four pages. War could destabilize friendly regimes in Saudi Arabia, Egypt

and Jordan, he said. It could divert energy from almost everything else, not just the war on terrorism, and

dramatically affect the supply and price of oil.

What of the image of an American general running an Arab country, a General MacArthur in Baghdad?

Powell asked. How long would it be? No one could know. How would success be defined? War would take

down Saddam and “You will become the government until you get a new government.”

By the time they were in Bush’s office, Powell was on a roll.

“You are going to be the proud owner of 25 million people,” he told the president. “You will own all their

hopes, aspirations and problems. You’ll own it all.” Privately, Powell and Armitage called this the Pottery Barn

rule: You break it, you own it.

“It’s going to suck the oxygen out of everything,” the secretary continued. So as not to sidestep the

olitics of it, he added,

“This will become the first term.”

The clear implication was: Did the president want to be

defined this way? Did he want to run for reelection on an Iraq war?

Powell thought he was scoring. Iraq has a history that is quite complex, he said. The Iraqis have never had

a democracy. “So you need to understand that this is not going to be a walk in the woods.”

“It’s nice to say we can do it unilaterally, except you can’t,” he said. The geography was formidable.

General Franks had said it was imperative that he have access to bases and facilities from allies in the region

and beyond. Powell was unusually blunt. “If you think it’s just a matter of picking up the phone and blowing a

whistle and it goes—no, you need allies, you need access, you need what-not. You need to understand not just a

military timeline but the other things that are going to be facing you.” He did not feel the downsides had been

brought out in sufficient, gory detail.

Saddam was crazy and in a last desperate stand he might unleash weapons of mass destruction. Worse, the

U.S., in perhaps the largest manhunt in history, had not found Osama bin Laden. Saddam has more at his

disposal, an entire state. They did not need another possibly fruitless, ongoing manhunt. On top of all this,

Powell said, such a war would tie down most of the American army.

The president listened, asked some questions but did not push back that much. Finally he looked at

Powell. “What should I do? What else can I do?”

Powell realized he needed to offer a solution. “You can still make a pitch for a coalition or U.N. action to

do what needs to be done,” he said. The U.N. was only one way, but some way had to be found to recruit allies,

to internationalize the problem.

Bush said he had loved building an international coalition for the Afghanistan war. What would the

Russians or the French do?

Powell said he thought the U.S. could bring most countries along. There was an additional consideration,

he said. “If you take it to the U.N., you’ve got to recognize that they might be able to solve it. In which case

there’s no war. That could mean a solution that is not as clean as just going in and taking the guy out.” In

needing and seeking international cover, Powell said, “The international cover could also result in a different

outcome.” Though the conversation was tense several times, Powell felt that he had left nothing unsaid. There

were no histrionics. The president thanked him after two hours, an extraordinary amount of time for Powell

without static from Cheney and Rumsfeld.

Rice thought the evening’s headline was, “Powell Makes Case for Coalition as Only Way to Assure

Success.”

In fact Powell had been trying to say more, to sound a warning that too much could go wrong. The

Reluctant Warrior was urging restraint, but he had not tossed his heart on the table. He had not said, Don’t do it.

Taken together the points of his argument could have been mustered to reach that conclusion. Powell half felt

that, but he had learned during 35 years in the Army, and elsewhere, that he had to play to the boss and talk

about method. It was paramount to talk only within the confines of the preliminary goals set by the boss.

Perhaps he had been too timid.

“That was terrific,” Rice told him the next day in a phone call. “And we need to do more of those.”

Andy Card called Powell and asked him to come over and go through the whole case, notes and all.

Powell felt he had hit a home run. But he was also not sure that the president had fully taken aboard the

meaning, the consequences of going to war. Sixteen months later in the office where Powell had made his case,

I asked the president about Powell’s argument that a military solution would mean he would own Iraq.

“He sure did,” Bush replied. “He did say that.”

“Your reaction?” I asked, expecting him to articulate an understanding of the case against war.

“And my reaction to that is, is that my job is to secure America,” the president said. “And that I also

believe that freedom is something people long for. And that if given a chance, the Iraqis over time would seize

the moment. My frame of mind is focused on what I told you—the solemn duty to protect America.”

I sat there somewhat nonplussed as the president discussed the issues of freedom and security, which were

very much beside the points Powell had made. “And he’s talking tactics though,” I began to ask.

“That’s his job,” Bush answered, “to be tactical. My job is to be strategic. Basically what he was saying

was, was that if in fact Saddam is toppled by military [invasion], we better have a strong understanding about

what it’s going to take to rebuild Iraq.”

That was certainly true, and it was part of Powell’s message, but as I listened I glimpsed what Powell had

apparently seen—uncertainty that the president fully grasped the potential consequences. Events had rendered a

number of Powell’s concerns moot by December 2003 when I interviewed the president—Egypt, Jordan and

Saudi Arabia appeared stable, oil prices hadn’t spiked, and the U.S. had found allies for basing in the region.

But Powell was right that the war would dominate Bush’s presidency and it was still unclear when or if Iraq

could become a stable democracy and U.S. troops could come home. Those facts were very much a part of the

resident’s daily business 16 months after Powell had raised them.

Of the August 2002 period, the president also said, “We had yet to develop our diplomatic strategy. There

were certain people in the administration that were hopeful we could solve this diplomatically. And there were

some that basicall

said we can’t solve it di

lomaticall

. Therefore let’s be realistic.

“Colin felt very strongly that the United Nations was the route to go. And some in the administration had

seen how feckless the United Nations had been on this issue and were uncertain as to whether or not the United

ations would be able to get it done.” He acknowledged that one of those was the vice president.

THE DAY AFTER

Bush’s dinner with Powell and Rice, August 6, Franks issued an order to his commanders to

make the transition from the Running Start to their new best-seller—the Hybrid concept—a faster war.

That afternoon, the

resident left for his Crawford ranch for nearl

a month-lon

vacation.

EDNESDAY

, A

UGUST

14, Rice chaired a principals meeting without the president, who was in

Crawford. They had a working draft of a National Security Presidential Directive, or NSPD, that had been

approved by the deputies. It was entitled, “Iraq: Goals, Objectives and Strategy.”

With the president on vacation, now was the time for the principals to review the directive line-by-line and

make changes so they would have a full consensus to present the president for signature. An NSPD is not the

Ten Commandments, though Rice felt it was a good way to make sure everyone was operating with the same

instructions.

They met at 8

A.M.

and worked for some time, reviewing it line-by-line. The Top Secret document they

agreed on stated:

“U.S. goal: Free Iraq in order to eliminate Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and

associated programs, to prevent Iraq from breaking out of containment and becoming a more dangerous threat

to the region and beyond.

“End Iraqi threats to its neighbors, to stop the Iraqi government’s tyrannizing of its own population, to cut

Iraqi links to and sponsorship of international terrorism, to maintain Iraq’s unity and territorial integrity. And

liberate the Iraqi people from tyranny, and assist them in creating a society based on moderation, pluralism and

democracy.”

Under the next section, the document listed: “Objectives: To conduct policy in a fashion that minimizes

the chance of a WMD attack against the United States, U.S. field forces, our allies and friends. To minimize the

danger of regional instabilities. To deter Iran and Syria from helping Iraq. And to minimize disruption in

international oil markets.”

It stated that the elements of the strategy would include “employing all instruments of national power to

free Iraq,” including diplomacy, the military, the CIA and economic sanctions.

In seeking regime change the U.S. would be “pursuing our goals and objectives with a coalition of

committed countries, if possible, but acting alone if necessary.”

Going back decades, U.S. presidents had routinely adopted such an approach in securing national security

interests, a kind of coalition-if-

ossible-alone-if-necessar

strate

. Rarel

, however, had there been such dee

division within a national security team as between Cheney and Powell. Each had a fundamentally

different definition of what was possible, and what was necessary.

Another element of the strategy was “to work with the Iraqi opposition to demonstrate that we are

liberating, not invading, Iraq, and give the opposition a role in building a pluralistic and democratic Iraq,

including the preparation of a new constitution.” A further objective was “to establish a broad-

ased democratic

government that would adhere to international law and respect international norms, that would not threaten its

neighbors, that would respect the basic rights of all Iraqis, including women and minorities, that would adhere

to the rule of law, including freedom of speech and worship.”

The final element of the strategy was “to demonstrate that the United States is prepared to play a sustained

role in the reconstruction of a post-Saddam Iraq with contributions from and participation by the international

community, that rapidly starts the country’s reconstruction, that preserves but reforms the current Iraqi

bureaucracy and reforms the Iraqi military and security institutions.”

Preserving something can be very different from reforming it. What to keep? What to change? There was

a lot of hope that the Iraqis wanted democracy and change. But since no one knew what they might find in Iraq

after Saddam, they included both notions.

Powell then said they had to think about how to build a coalition, get some kind of international cover at

least. The Brits would be with us, he said, but their support could falter in the absence of some international or

United Nations–sanctioned coalition. The rest of Europe was unsure, as were U.S. friends in the Middle East.

The first high-profile opportunity for the president to address the Iraq situation formally was a scheduled

speech at the U.N. General Assembly in less than a month, September 12. Gerson had provided the president an

outline for a speech about American values, democracy and human assistance programs—the softer side of

Bush’s agenda. But Iraq had become Topic A in Washington and the country. Every living former national

security adviser or former secretary of state who could lift pen to paper or type on a keyboard had weighed in

with ideas and critiques.

Powell said that the president had to speak at the U.N. about Iraq. “I can’t imagine him going there and

not speaking about this,” he said.

Rice, who had not wanted a tough speech about Iraq at the U.N., now agreed. In the atmosphere of

continuing public and media debate and speculation, to refrain from addressing Iraq might suggest that the

resident was not serious about the threat, or that he was operating in total secrecy. And Bush liked to provide

ublic explanations, at least in a general sense, and make news about his own policies.

Powell believed he had Cheney boxed in, and to a lesser extent Rumsfeld. He argued that even if anyone

felt that war was the only solution, they could not get to war without first trying a diplomatic solution. It was the

absolutely necessary first step. Without the attempt, nobody would be with them—no Brits, no bases, no access

or overflight agreements, European and Middle East allies all on the other side. Powell believed he had them,

although he sensed that Cheney was “terrified”

ecause once the diplomatic road was opened up, it might work.

But the logic of trying was impeccable, Powell believed.

Possibility had now become necessity.

Cheney harangued about the United Nations. Going to the U.N. would invite a never-ending process of

debate, compromise and delay. Words not action.

Powell listened, almost chuckling to himself. Cheney so much did not want to go down that road, so

wished to shut it down, but he could not.

“I think the speech at the U.N. ought to be about Iraq,” the vice president said, but with one additional

element. The U.N. itself ou

ht to be made the issue since it had failed for more than a decade, unable and

unwilling to enforce its own resolutions that directed Saddam to destroy his weapons of mass destruction

and to permit weapons inspections inside Iraq. The U.N. had to be challenged. “Go tell them it’s not about us.

It’s about you. You are not important.” The U.N. was running the risk of becoming irrelevant and a mockery, he

said.

Rice liked that. Put the monkey on the U.N.’s back. It had become too much like the post–World War I

League of Nations—a debating society with no teeth.

In short order all the principals agreed that they recommend that the president speak about Iraq at the U.N.

Certainly he should not ask for a declaration of war. That was quickly off the table, but there was not agreement

about what he should say.

LATER THAT DAY

, August 14, Franks and Renuart took the now well-worn path to Rumsfeld’s office. The

urpose was to give a planning update on the Hybrid option, but in fact the secretary wanted to talk about

targeting. He was fascinated with the process, eager to understand the crucial relationship between the military

value of a target, and the willingness or unwillingness to accept collateral damage to civilians.

Renuart, the air war expert, did a good deal of the talking. In basic terms, each possible target gets an

intelligence assessment of its operational value, he said. For example, an Iraqi communications facility would

have three uses: as a hub for passing information to Iraqi military forces in the field; for broadcasting

ropaganda and information to the world; and for linking with worldwide Iraqi embassies where their

intelligence agents operated. So it would be an obvious target. But the cost of striking the target would include

an assessment of the number of Iraqi civilians who work there. Are they truly civilians or are they tied to some

regime structure? What about the daily routines? Not as many civilians would be there at night.

Well, Rumsfeld asked, how do you know how many people are in that building?

Franks and Renuart suggested a hypothetical case where they had overhead imagery of a 10-story building

and its parking lot. The analysis suggested that there were about 10 offices per floor, three people to an office,

so on any given day during normal business hours, there would be about 300 people. At night, it might be down

to caretaker status with only about 50 or less—suggesting a night strike if it was the facility, and not the

ersonnel, they were targeting.

In all, there were at this point some 130 potential targets that might have high collateral damage, which

was defined as possibly killing 30 or more civilians.

How sure are we of the intelligence and the analysis? Rumsfeld asked.

The answer was that it varied.

Go back and review and reassess, Rumsfeld directed. He wanted to minimize collateral damage. If it was

unavoidable, he wanted them going in with their eyes open.

Franks attempted to explain that it was an ongoing process of refinement, and that the number of high

collateral damage targets would go down.

Rumsfeld wanted a complete review—everything put under the microscope again—“refreshed,” as he

called it.

To destroy the 4,000 possible targets, the generals explained, would require some 12,000 to 13,000

separate weapons. A large building or complex might have 4 to 12 individual “aim points” for individual

wea

ons—

ombs or missiles.

Rumsfeld wanted them to work with the intelligence people to make sure collection and analysis of targets

were made better and better. In the background was the disaster during the 1999 Kosovo war when the Chinese

embassy in Belgrade was bombed because someone at the CIA had an old map. Franks and Renuart went on

briefing him for hours.

FROM HIS OFFICE ON

17th Street in downtown Washington, three blocks from the White House, Brent

Scowcroft, President George H. W. Bush’s national security adviser and Rice’s boss when she had been an

SC staffer, was getting bits of intelligence about the Iraq debate inside the administration. Though he was

working as a private consultant, few outsiders were as close to the major players in the current Bush

administration as Scowcroft.

Scowcroft was troubled because he thought the real threat to the United States was not from Saddam but

from al Qaeda. He was baffled that Cheney and Rumsfeld were so focused on Saddam. He had remarked, “The

only thing that Osama and Saddam Hussein have in common is they hate the United States. Saddam is an anti-

clerical socialist. With all of Saddam’s capabilities there are very few terrorist footprints.” An associate

suggested he write an op-ed piece.

Scowcroft wrote that Saddam’s vision of dominating the region was contrary to U.S. interests, but went on

to say, “There is scant evidence to tie Saddam to terrorist organizations, and even less to the September 11

attacks. Indeed, Saddam’s goals have little in common with the terrorists who threaten us, and there is little

incentive for him to make common cause with them.

“There is virtual consensus in the world against an attack on Iraq at this time,” he warned. “So long as that

sentiment persists, it would require the U.S. to pursue a virtual go-it-alone strategy against Iraq, making any

military operations correspondingly more difficult and expensive.” He recommended that Bush should try to get

the U.N. monitoring teams back in for rigorous, no-notice inspections.

No one was as close to Bush senior as companion, loyalist and foreign policy soul mate. Scowcroft had

coauthored the former president’s memoirs. He sent him an advance copy of the article and received no

reaction. That meant it was okay.

The Wall Street Journal

ran his article on August 15 under the provocative headline, “Don’t Attack

Saddam.”

Scowcroft received two important calls.

“Thanks,” said Powell, “you gave me some running room.” Scowcroft knew that Powell was careful not to

stir up the right-wing Republicans, who didn’t think he was a Republican anyway. So Powell always had to lean

forward on Iraq without supporting war. Now he was making his move, hoping to be careful yet persuasive.

“This is my opportunity,” the secretary of state confided, “and I’ve got to be organized.”

Rice also phoned Scowcroft and they had sharp words. Scowcroft’s pronouncement made it look as if the

resident’s father had weighed in. At minimum it was a slap at the president.

Scowcroft replied that the piece was no different than what he had said on television 10 days before and

no one had complained. “I don’t want to break with the administration,” he said, apologizing if it had had the

impact she described.

There was a deeper concern. Scowcroft realized that Bush senior did not want to leave the impression with

the public or with his son that he was looking over his shoulder. It could demean the son, reduce public respect

and su

ort, even undermine the

residenc

. It was also ver

ersonal, as Scowcroft well knew.

Neither Scowcroft nor Bush senior wanted to injure the son’s self-confidence. So Scowcroft largely shut

up in public, though he did not change his view.

ON THE SECOND FRIDAY

of his Crawford vacation, August 16, the president met with the NSC via secure video.

The sole purpose was for Powell to make his pitch about going to the U.N. Powell repeated all his arguments.

The president asked for comments from each of the principals. There was support for giving the U.N. a

shot, at least in the upcoming speech, even from Cheney.

Fine, Bush finally said, approving the general idea of a speech to the U.N. about Iraq. It should not be too

shrill, he cautioned them, or require so much of Iraq that it would look as if they were not serious.

Just before noon, the president appeared at the Crawford Community Center and answered several

questions from reporters. He said that he was “aware that some very intelligent people are expressing their

opinions about Saddam Hussein and Iraq. I listen carefully to what they have to say.” He also said carefully that

Saddam “desires weapons of mass destruction,” making no suggestion that he possessed them.

The president called Gerson, with Rice on the line, about the U.N. speech. “We’re going to do something

a little different,” Bush instructed. “We’re going to tell the U.N. that it’s going to confront this problem or it’s

going to condemn itself to irrelevance, okay?”

Gerson went to work.

POWELL HAD LEFT

the secure video NSC meeting feeling they had a deal. He had them—at least Cheney and

Rumsfeld, and perhaps even the president. He went to the Hamptons on Long Island, New York, for a vacation.

There he met privately with British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, who had wanted to come over for a day since

Iraq was heating up. In Blair’s conversations with Bush, it was increasingly clear to the prime minister how

committed Bush was to action. Straw had some of the same concerns as Powell. His message was in essence, If

you are really thinking about war and you want us Brits to be a player, we cannot be unless you go to the United

ations.

Powell knew this would add to the pressure on Bush, who absolutely had to have Blair on board.

ON AUGUST

20, I interviewed the president in Crawford for two hours and 25 minutes about the response to 9/11

and the war in Afghanistan for

Bush at War.

He talked in sweeping, even grandiose terms about remaking the

world. “I will seize the opportunity to achieve big goals,” he said. And each move had to fit in the overall

urpose of improving the world, making it peaceful, he maintained. “You see it’s like Iraq,” he volunteered.

“Just as an aside—and we’ll see whether this bears out—clearly there will be a strategic implication to a regime

change in Iraq, if we go forward. But there’s something beneath that, as far as I’m concerned, and that is, there

is immense suffering.” Saddam was starving his people in the outlying Shiite areas, he said. “There is a human

condition that we must worry about. As we think through Iraq, we may or may not attack. I have no idea, yet.

But it will be for the objective of making the world more peaceful.” He did not mention weapons of mass

destruction, or any threat Saddam posed to the United States.

“Well, we’re never going to get people all in agreement about force and use of force,” he said, strongly

suggesting that an international coalition or the U.N. was unlikely to solve the rogue-state problem. “But action,

confident action that will yield positive results provides kind of a slipstream into which reluctant nations and

leaders can get behind and show themselves that there has been—you know, something positive has happened

toward

eace.”