Woodward Bob. Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account of the Decision to Invade Iraq

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stationed in the Arabian Sea with a crew of 5,000. Jets from the giant flight deck were being catapulted of

for bombing missions still into Afghanistan.

The vice president told thousands of welcoming crewmen and women what was on his mind. “Our next

objective is to prevent terrorists, and regimes that sponsor terror, from threatening America or our friends and

allies with weapons of mass destruction. We take this threat with great seriousness. That is our duty as

responsible officers of the American government. The United States will not permit the forces of terror to gain

the tools of genocide.”

On one leg of Cheney’s tour it was three countries in a single day, including Qatar, a key ally that would

rovide staging and a headquarters. It was a blur, and it was hard. Lynne Cheney, the vice president’s wife, had

a two-hour lunch with the favorite wife of the emir of Qatar.

When do kids start school here in Bahrain? Mrs. Cheney inquired.

This isn’t Bahrain, the wife replied.

THE TRIP WAS SOMETHING

of a wake-up call for the vice president. The leaders pounded on him not about Iraq,

or the threat of Saddam Hussein, or terrorism, but about the Middle East peace process. He kept hearing that the

resident had better get involved and throw his weight around to set the region on some process to resolve the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This was a message that Powell had been sending to the White House nonstop.

Franks was of like mind. Cheney’s other conclusion was that the Middle East was not going in the right

direction. Long-term peace was not possible if Yassir Arafat remained leader of the Palestinians.

The vice president had an early morning breakfast with the president on March 21. At about 8:15

A.M.

they took questions from reporters in the Oval Office. One asked about what the Arab leaders had said about

supporting strong action against Iraq.

Cheney stuck to the cover story. “I went out there to consult with them, seek their advice and counsel, to

be able to report back to the President.”

Bush stepped in. “I think one other point that the vice president made, which is a good point, is that this is

an administration that when we say we’re going to do something we mean it; that we are resolved to fight the

war on terror; this isn’t a short-term strategy for us; that we understand history has called us into action; and

we’re not going to miss this opportunity to make the world more peaceful and more free. And the vice president

delivered that message. I was grateful that he was able to do so. It is very important for these leaders to

understand the nature of this administration so there’s no doubt in their mind that when we speak, we mean

what we say, that we’re not posturing. We don’t take a bunch of polls and focus groups to tell us what—how

to—to what we ought to do in the world.”

That day, March 21, and the next, Franks gathered the component commanders of the services—Army,

avy, Air Force and Marines—at Ramstein Air Base in Germany, a large U.S. and NATO airlift installation.

These were the on-the-ground commanders who would be in charge of the war. Included was the Special

Operations commander, Brigadier General Gary Harrell. In addition, a special covert Task Force 20 had been

set to be commanded by Major General Del Dailey.

Franks was poised for war. He was convinced that they were going to do this. By “do this,” he meant

either Saddam Hussein and his family were going to leave and turn his country over, or the president was going

to war. Would Saddam and his family leave? As a practical matter, he concluded that the answer was no.

“Fellas, there’s a burglar in the house,” Franks told his commanders in a closed session. It was a Special

erations term that meant if

ou’re an airman,

ou need to

o back and be sure that

ersonall

are aware

of the target sets and the timing. If you’re on the land, you need to be absolutely sure that when you say

you can deliver X force on Y day that the transportation will actually permit it, that the timelines that you

advertise are timelines with which you can live. In other words, this was not an abstract planning exercise. He

conveyed a sense of urgency. Don’t advertise something that you can’t deliver. “Go to work now.” One way or

the other, it was going to be done. “Don’t let yourself believe that this won’t happen.”

Franks also offered his vision of the desired operation—smaller, lighter, faster. He said he hoped for a 90-

45-90 plan, a 225-day war. He outlined the seven lines of operations and the nine slices of regime power.

Franks did not believe it was important to brief his commanders on all of his contacts with Rumsfeld. But

the work with the president was critical to establish that what was on the table had standing with the

commander in chief. It would underscore the seriousness. So Franks described in detail each of the briefings he

had gone through with Bush, including the post-Christmas session in Crawford and the one-hour-and-10-minute

briefing the previous month. In other words, their commander in chief was both behind this planning and

involved with the details. To some extent the burglar in the house was George W. Bush.

A DAY LATER

, March 23, the JCS began an exercise called Prominent Hammer, a so-called tabletop paper drill

without actual movement of forces. It was designed to assess the feasibility of the large Op Plan 1003. If it were

executed, would the transportation plan work, and what would the impact be on U.S. forces worldwide? What

would it do in Korea where the U.S. maintained a force of some 37,000? What might be the impact on the war

on terrorism? U.S. homeland security?

Nothing leaked about the exercise at the time, but two months later

The New York Times

reported on the

drill’s findings, saying a war on Iraq “would place severe strains on personnel and cause deep shortages of

certain critical weapons.”

DURING THIS PERIOD

Saul went to Tampa to brief Franks on the covert action program the CIA would be

undertaking against Iraq.

“You know,” Franks said, “I fought these people before.” As a brigadier general, he had been assistant

division commander (maneuver) of the 1st Cavalry Division in the Gulf War. “I took my measure of them. I’m

not worried.”

“Okay,” Saul replied, “you know your business. That’s what you get paid for.”

At another meeting with the component commanders, Franks urged them on. “This is fucking serious.

You know, if

s think this is not

oin

to ha

en,

ou’re wron

. You need to

et off

our ass.”

ARCH

, Tenet met secretly with two individuals who would be critical to covert action inside Iraq:

Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, the leaders of the two main Kurdish groups in northern Iraq. The two men

controlled separate areas of a Kurdish region roughly the size of Maine. The areas were effectively autonomous

from Saddam’s Baghdad regime, but Iraqi military units were stationed just miles from the Kurdish strongholds

and Saddam could easily send them to fight and slaughter the Kurds as he had done after the Gulf War when

they had risen up expecting U.S. protection. Saddam had brutally crushed them, killing thousands and

rompting over a million refugees to flee to neighboring Iran and Turkey. The Kurds had an extremely hostile

relationship with the Turkish government, which historically did not recognize the large minority group or its

language.

Tenet had one message for Barzani and Talabani: The United States was serious, the military and the CIA

were coming. It was different this time. The CIA was not going to be alone. The military would attack.

President Bush meant what he said. It was a new era. Saddam was going down. Of course, Tenet did not know

if what he was saying was true, whether war was going to happen. But he had to raise the expectations of the

Kurds to win cooperation and engagement. He was about to send some of his paramilitary and case officers into

a very dangerous environment. His attitude as the DCI was simple: He would sell fucking tea to Chinamen to

make sure his officers got protection.

There was no way anyone, especially tribal leaders, could avoid bumping into Tenet’s personality. It is

large, passionate, combustible. He gets in faces. It is almost tribal itself. Tenet knew that in that part of the

world everyone was selling something. They wouldn’t be surprised that he too was selling. It was a world of

wanton exaggeration. He needed protections, guarantees and commitments, and he was offering the same. This

was survival. And this was another one of the dilemmas he faced—making promises that might not be kept. As

some of his predecessors had learned and often said, the agency does not play by the rules of the Marquess of

Queens-berry, who had introduced gloves and time limits to boxing in the 19th century. CIA covert actions

were the dirty side of the ring.

Tenet, however, had a giant lever: money. He could pay millions, tens of millions of dollars in U.S. $100

bills. If Defense Department civilians or officers, or State Department diplomats paid money to get anyone to

act or change policy, it could be illegal bribery. The CIA was the one part of the U.S. government that was

authorized to pay off people.

Tenet had told Bush that some money was going to be paid on speculation in order to establish

relationshi

s and demonstrate seriousness. And that not all of it mi

ht look like it had been well s

ent. It was

like chum, small pieces of fish scattered on the water to attract the big ones. In intelligence, you often had

to chum far and wide. It was one more thing the president and Tenet bonded over. Bush, one of the biggest

olitical fun

-raisers of all time, and Tenet, the U.S. government covert-money man, knew the restorative

ower of money. So he was asking a lot and offering a lot. Just wait, he told the Kurdish leaders,

was

coming—the military, the CIA and money.

ON MARCH

29, General Franks marched into hostile territory—the Tank, the secure meeting space of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, the heads of each of the four services. In many respects the Joint Chiefs are an anachronism.

Under Title X of the U.S. Code, which deals with the military, the four heads—the chief of staff of the Army,

the chief of naval operations, the chief of staff of the Air Force, and the commandant of the Marine Corps—

have the responsibility to recruit, train and equip their own services. But the chiefs command no forces in

combat. The forces are assigned to combatant commanders such as Franks himself.

Since Franks reported directly to the secretary of defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was not

his boss, and the service chiefs were damn sure not his bosses—though by technical measurements of seniority

they all outranked him. In fact, Franks just about considered himself out of the Army. He was a joint war

fighter. “I am absolutely purple,” he once said, purple being the color that would emerge if you put a uniform

from each service in a blender.

The tension between Franks and the chiefs was palpable. The previous year, during the height of the

Afghanistan campaign, the chiefs, as is their tendency, were pushing for more of their own in the war—the

avy for one more aircraft carrier, the Army another brigade, and the Air Force another squadron.

Franks one day blew up half jokingly at the chiefs, “You Title X motherfuckers! Let me tell you

something. At the end of the day, combatants, and that’s either me or the boss I work for [Rumsfeld], are going

to put together a joint and combined operation here and it is not going to scratch the itch of any one of the

services.”

Several of the chiefs remember Franks’s outburst as less confrontational and more in a humorous vein,

though they vividly remember being called “Title X motherfuckers.”

So now Franks had to update them on his Iraq planning. It was a long briefing with 70-plus slides. He

tried to present it mostly as a concept of operations, the latest on the Generated Start—probably 180,000 to

200,000 troops or half of Desert Storm.

Franks said he had six months to be ready to execute by October 1 if the president demanded it. But no

sooner than October 1.

One of the chiefs thought it was hard to tell how serious this discussion was. Part of it seemed like a drill

to scare Saddam. They had a ton of questions.

Franks had, at one point, used five Navy aircraft carriers for the Afghanistan operation, so how many

would be needed for Iraq? How do you refresh or rotate the force in a long war? What about presumed weapons

of mass destruction? What would the Iraqi response be? What would Israel do if it was attacked? How do you

take Baghdad, the capital, with a population of 5 million?

The Army chief, General Eric K. Shinseki, expressed concern about the logistical support for a massive

invasion of a country the size of Iraq. How would the force on the ground be sustained? What size of force

would really be needed to be successful?

Wolfowitz and the policy crowd thought war with Iraq would be relatively easy, one chief said. Did

Franks a

ree?

Another question was, What do you do with the force between now and then?

Franks tried to answer their questions but the chiefs did not seem happy. The “Title X motherfuckers” had

been sidelined since the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols reform legislation, which gave most of the significant

advisory power to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

THE BUSHES HOSTED

British Prime Minister Tony Blair and his family at their ranch in Crawford over the

weekend of April 6–7. In an interview with the United Kingdom’s ITV Television Network, reporter Trevor

McDonald pushed the president about Iraq. “I made up my mind that Saddam needs to go,” Bush said. “That’s

about all I’m willing to share with you.”

“Then Saddam must go?” McDonald asked.

“That’s what I just said,” Bush said testily. “The policy of my government is that he goes.”

“People think that Saddam Hussein has no links with the al Qaeda network, and I’m wondering why you

have—”

“The worst thing that could happen would be to allow a nation like Iraq, run by Saddam Hussein, to

develop weapons of mass destruction, and then team up with terrorist organizations so they can blackmail the

world. I’m not going to let that happen.”

“And how are you going to achieve this, Mr. President?”

“Wait and see.”

McDonald questioned him about the weapons inspectors. Bush said he wanted them back in Iraq. “But

this is not an issue of inspectors. This is an issue of [Saddam] upholding his word that he would not develop

weapons of mass destruction.”

“So whether he allows the inspectors in or not, he is on the list to be attacked?” McDonald asked. “He’s

the next target?”

“You keep trying to put—” Bush said, then restarted his sentence. “You’re one of these clever reporters

that keeps trying to put words in my mouth.”

“Far from that, Mr. President.”

“Well, I’m afraid you do, sir. But nevertheless, you’ve had my answer on this subject.” The prodding took

Bush into dangerous territory as he added, “And I have no plans to attack on my desk.” Though technically true,

it obscured the direct and personal nature of his involvement in the war planning.

FRANKS GAVE RUMSFELD

an update on April 11 by secure video, focusing on the specific war preparations that

could be taken without attracting much public notice. Since the concept called for a unilateral U.S. attack from

the south through Kuwait, they had work to do to upgrade various airfields in the Gulf countries such as Oman,

U.A.E. and Kuwait itself. More and more pre-positioned equipment and supplies were moving in, requiring the

construction of concrete pads for storage.

In addition, they would need access to vast quantities of fuel as forces would eventually move forward

from Kuwait into Iraq. How could the U.S. tap into existing fuel lines that the Kuwaitis would support but

would not be known to other nations?

Such initial preparations—and this was only the beginning—would cost in the range of perhaps $300

million to $400 million. Reacting to the sticker shock, Rumsfeld wondered aloud if there were any way to get

other countries to foot some of this bill?

The secretary said he wanted to look ahead. Rephrasing the president’s earlier question, he asked, How

would they respond if Saddam took some action that was a spoiler?

This evolved into a discussion of Operation Southern Watch, which, with the onset of the U.S. bombing in

Afghanistan six months earlier, had been placed in a holding pattern of sorts. While poised to respond to

rovocations, its intent was really to collect intelligence and monitor the no-fly zones. Would it now be possible

to be more intrusive with the intelligence collection? Should they fly more? Could such operations be a wedge

to incrementally improve the U.S. position before a war?

JUST MORE THAN A WEEK LATER

, April 20, Franks briefed the president in a Saturday session at Camp David.

I am feeling a little bit better about the small, lighter, more accelerated concept, Franks said. It seemed to

be coming together. Mr. President, I am probably going to be able to reduce the time about one-third from what

I thought initially. At the end of that period they would have about 180,000 people deployed. If they did not

meet with immediate success, the force would grow to about 250,000 by the end of Phase Three, decisive

combat operations.

“I’m not yet satisfied with this,” Franks said. They had war gaming going on to figure out the time and

distance problems. “Don’t take these numbers, Mr. President, to be what we’ll execute. This just happens to be

where we are right now.”

“It’s really important for us that we don’t leave ourselves open in the region,” Bush said. He noted that the

longer the fighting might go on, the more susceptible the U.S. would be to the political dynamics in the region.

He wanted it done as efficiently and in as short a time as possible. At the same time, the president told Franks

that he should not let the discussion or his interest in ways to compress time schedules and combat operations

lead him to believe that anyone was going to do this with anything less than what was required.

“You tell me, Tommy, what it takes to do this,” the president said. “Obviously I want to make sure we do

this right and quickly.”

Franks saw the problem. Of course, “right” and “quickly” might not be the same thing. Making it quick

might, in fact, be wrong. He took this as what he called “a presidential hint” and a very loose one at that.

The general said, “I am going to have to balance risk before I tell you that I have a plan that I’m ready to

execute.” Key questions, he said, were, “How much force is necessary to be built up over what period of time so

that when it begins it doesn’t last long?” and, “How long does it have to go before you are decisive and get it

finished?”

“Yep,” the president said, “exactly right. Tommy, you are my expert. You got to tell me what it takes to

do it. Anything you need, you’ll have.”

At another point Bush added, “If this goes a long time, Dick Cheney says that the region—it’s going to be

roblematic.” That was a nice word for disaster. Another presidential hint. The president then added, “It’s going

to have to go however long it’s going to go, but I just thought I’d say that.”

LATER BUSH RECALLED

that he was indeed trying to send hints. “Very important for a president not to

micromana

e a war

lan to suit, 1. domestic

olitics and, 2. the international

olitics. On the other hand, as

Tommy planned, I wanted him to understand some of the nuances, or understand issues in a nuanced way. The

worst thing a president can do is to say, Oh, no, the war plan must conform to a political calendar.

“It is very delicate for the president to deal with his generals. He must be very careful. They take

everything—” the president said, and then restarted, “This is a command structure where when the president

says something, it is taken extremely seriously by everybody up and down the chain of command. And so I am

mindful of that.” So he was sending hints without “jeopardizing” what Franks wanted to do. “Remember this: If

a president tries to design a war plan, he puts his soldiers at risk, because I’m a lousy war plan designer.”

ON APRIL

24, Franks huddled again with his major commanders, this time in Doha, Qatar. The number of

reparatory tasks seemed endless, lots of seemingly small details that if not dealt with could delay or even break

art or all of an operation. He had concluded that there were two ways to get things done as a combatant

commander: 1. Ask Washington to do it or grant permission for him to do it, or 2. Just do it. Bush clearly had

given him extraordinary authority, declaring that the cost would be whatever it was.

Franks told his commanders to inform him as to what they needed, because henceforth they would no

longer make financial requests to Washington. So if they needed to do work on a combat vehicle ramp in

Kuwait that would cost several million, just do it. Same with extending a runway in Oman. Or pouring concrete

in Jordan. Do it.

Later Franks reported to Rumsfeld: The bills are coming. The Pentagon comptroller had the money,

Rumsfeld said, so let’s go ahead.

ON MAY

9, Franks formally asked his commanders to develop a plan for a second or northern front option for an

attack into Iraq through Turkey. He was not convinced that Turkey would go along, so all planning had focused

on the southern or Kuwait-only attack. But since cooperation by Turkey was at least possible, Franks wanted it

examined. If feasible, the 100-mile Iraq-Turkey border could be used for the introduction of a division-size

force of some 15,000 to 20,000 troops. With all the support personnel, Franks initially calculated it might mean

a footprint inside Turkey of 25,000 to 30,000. The Turks would be skittish about that. Nonetheless, he figured it

was worth a try.

THE NEXT DAY

, May 10, Franks summarized these discussions to Rumsfeld. The secretary was in search of a

clean formulation. What were all the angles? What could surprise them? What had they overlooked, not

anticipated? There were so many variables and unknowns. What was it they were not seeing that was in front of

their eyes? Saddam’s propensity and ability to provoke in a major way was a “known unknown.” More

worrisome were the “unknown unknowns” Rumsfeld spoke of so often, the things they might be completely

blind to.

The unanswered question that loomed was, Suppose Saddam forced the U.S. into war before they were

ready?

For the time being, all they had in the way of a response were the Air Force and Navy aircraft already in

lace. The routine Southern Watch/Northern Watch operations included an aircraft carrier battle group with

about 70 planes plus an additional 120 land-based Air Force planes. In all that was about 200 aircraft. They

called this the Blue Plan—what would be available on four to six hours’ notice for a come-as-you-are response

to buy time.

How could that air component be increased into a graduated series of air operations that would allow

enou

h time for

round forces to flow into the re

ion for a land attack?

Initial calculations were that a White Level of aircraft—about 450 planes—could be in the region within

seven days of a provocation. Then in another two weeks they could build to what was called the Red Plan of

about 750 to 800 airplanes.

This was about half the combat airpower of the 1991 Desert Storm operation.

Later that day, Franks took his brief on the latest Generated Start Plan to the NSC principals at the White

House. In this briefing without the president, Franks displayed a map of Iraq and its surrounding neighbors. He

reviewed where they stood with the various clearances with each country—where he thought they would get

access or assistance, and where he was not sure.

Since the latest plan, the 90-45-90, called for a 225-day buildup and war, Rice asked if there were a

quicker way to do this, to shrink the front end. Time was the vulnerability.

Franks said he was working it. He introduced them to the Blue, White and Red Plans for air operations if

Saddam provoked.

Powell had lots of questions about the support that might realistically be expected from some of the

countries that were playing two sides—one in public and one in private. The implications for the region were

incalculable, so these countries were hedging. Powell wanted to put some additional issues on the table.

Looking at the map, he pointed out that there was only a single seaport in Kuwait through which all the combat

units and supplies would have to flow. In Desert Storm they had had several.

“Tommy,” he said, “you’re an expert in this now, and I’m not, but from what I understand…” He then

raised the planning, the possible tactical play. “Have you thought about the logistics? Can the through-put”—a

logistics term for the transit point that Powell intentionally used—“handle this, and do you have what you need

and can you get what you need through that one port?”

Franks considered Powell “a little bit of a friend,” and the commanding general saw that the former

general was wearing kid gloves. It was a reasonable question apparently asked with two purposes: one, to get it

out in front of the others and ultimately the president, and two, as a subtle hint to Franks that he ought to watch

logistics carefully.

Franks gave a confident answer but insisted, as in everything else, that they were working it hard and did

not have all the answers, not even close, not even all the questions.

In addition, Franks surmised that Powell had concerns that were not articulated. Franks was not designing

an overwhelming force operation of the kind Powell had used in the Gulf War, but was moving toward a lighter,

quicker plan that was more complex, with lots of moving pieces. Perhaps Powell felt there was too much risk.

Powell believed in maximum military force at the point of decision and he was going to ask questions and

offer comments, whether invited or not. What do you think about the sufficiency of the forces involved? he

asked.

Franks said he was working toward the right number.

What about the costs?

Franks said that the total operational costs were an unknown at this point because he was still continuing

to think about, adjust and shape the size of the force.

On Saturday, May 11, Franks took his map and briefings to Camp David for a long session with the

resident. He

resented the attack

lan in a different wa

, sa

it would consist of five fronts. First was a

western front where he would send Special Operations Forces to prevent the launching of Scud missiles.

Second was a southern front—the main avenue of attack from Kuwait; this would consist of two-plus Army

divisions and about two Marine divisions. The third front would be all the information operations. The fourth, a

vertical attack into Baghdad. And a fifth would be through Turkey if they won agreement with the Turks.

Franks described the strength of the enemy force. In the north, Saddam had 11 regular army divisions and

2 Republican Guard divisions. In the south, he had 5 regular army divisions and the remaining Republican

Guard and Special Republican Guard divisions around Baghdad.

Rice and Card expressed concern about a “Fortress Baghdad” scenario with Saddam hunkering down and

forcing ugly urban warfare that could go on and on.

The president also had questions about Fortress Baghdad. Franks thought that the president was echoing

an anxiety felt by the others, that he had almost been prompted to ask about it.

There’s no way, Franks said, given the 300 miles from the borders of Kuwait, Turkey and Jordan to

Baghdad that this guy can be preempted from bringing all his forces into Baghdad if that’s what he chooses to

do. Especially, he added, if the U.S. decided to attack with a lesser force and do it very quickly. Saddam would

have time to move into Baghdad if he wanted. “If he chooses to do that, it’s a difficult proposition for us, but at

the end of the da

, we win.”

“S

TOP BOTHERING ME

!” the president said to Karl Rove that Saturday, May 11. Rove had alerted him to a

story

The New York Times

was preparing on Rove’s increasing involvement in foreign policy decisions. It was

always best to keep Bush from being surprised by news stories about internecine warfare. Rove insisted he had

not provoked the story and was not cooperating with the reporters. “Don’t worry about it,” the president said.

“Condi’s territorial,” he joked. “She’s a woman.”

“Mr. President,” Rove replied, also tongue-in-cheek, “that’s a sexist remark.”

Instead of Rice, Rove’s recent tussles had been more with Powell, one of the most territorial. Rove’s

office vetted all the administration appointees, and in three recent instances the State Department had tried to

ut career people into jobs designated for political appointees. These political appointees were Rove’s

atronage and his leverage into the departments. He followed them like a hawk. Powell’s latest three efforts to

circumvent the system were: filling a noncareer slot at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

with a career person; another to a full ambassadorship; and the third to put a Democrat as a scheduler in

Armitage’s office. Rove sent back the following message: “We’re never going to say no to you…. What are you

going to do for us?”

But the

Times

was not on to any of this. Rove had declined to be interviewed and had responded by e-mail,

“I’m not deeply involved in foreign policy!”

On Sunday, the president called Rove to tease him. “I didn’t see the story about you.” It ran the next day,

Monday, May 13, on the front page under the headline: “Some in Administration Grumble as Aide’s Role

Seems to Expand.” The story said Powell was “put off” by Rove’s assertion that the war in Afghanistan should

be used to benefit Bush politically. But it had few specifics, and had no indication that Rove was in conflict

with Rice.

Rove was in his second floor West Wing office about 6:30

A.M.

Monday when Powell rang.

“It’s a bunch of horseshit,” said the secretary of state. “We’re friends. And I’ve always felt we had a good

relationship.” If anyone understood there were political ramifications that needed to be weighed in everything, it

was Powell. “And you’re the president’s political adviser and you’re supposed to advise him.”

“Well, thanks,” Rove re

lied. “And I a

reciate it, Mr. Secretar

.”