Woodward Bob. Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account of the Decision to Invade Iraq

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Since Bush was going to tell the U.N. either they solve the Saddam problem or the U.S. would, I asked

Rumsfeld, “It was really crossing the threshold, wasn’t it?”

“It was. It was,” Rumsfeld said. But, he added, “It was not the real threshold. The real threshold for me

was when people—other countries—started putting themselves at risk on your behalf.”

ONE OPTION FOR THE U.N.

speech that Rice thought they had to consider, the president later recalled, was issuing

an ultimatum that Saddam had 30 days to disarm or the U.S. would lead an attack. That would be a virtual

declaration of war. Bush, however, was strongly leaning toward asking for a U.N. resolution. Nevertheless,

meetings on the drafting of the U.N. speech continued for days. At one point a request for new resolutions came

out of the latest draft. The speech assailed the U.N. for not enforcing the previous weapons resolutions,

specifically over the four years since Saddam had forced out the inspectors.

“You can’t say all of this without asking them to do something. There’s no action in this speech,” Powell

argued. He knew that the appeal for action would resonate strongly with Bush. “It says, here’s what he’s done

wrong, here’s what he has to do to fix himself, and then it stops?” Powell asked in wonderment. “You’ve got to

ask for something.”

So the principals fought about what to ask for. What should the “ask” look like? They finally reached

consensus that they would simply ask the United Nations to act.

Powell, who was by now somewhat bewildered and beaten down, accepted that. He knew the only way

the U.N. acted was through its action arm, the Security Council, and that the only means were resolutions.

Calling explicitly for a new resolution would have nailed it, but the call to “act” was for Powell far better than a

30-day ultimatum or war.

On September 10, two days before the speech, Draft #21 landed on Powell’s desk with EYES ONLY and

URGENT stamped all over it. There was no call for the U.N. to act. The principals committee met. Cheney

restated his opposition to a resolution. It was a matter of tactics and presidential credibility, the vice president

said. Suppose the president asked the Security Council for a new resolution and the council refused? Where

would they be then? If Saddam ever used his WMD, he argued, especially on a large scale, the world would

never forgive them for inaction and giving in to the impulse to engage in semantic debates about U.N.

resolutions.

Rumsfeld argued for standing on principle, but he posed a series of rhetorical questions, and did not come

down hard about the language.

Powell had just about had it with Rumsfeld’s familiar technique of speaking in what Powell privately

called the “third-person passive once removed.” Rumsfeld said things like “One would think” or “One could

imagine” or “One might expect” or “Some would say” over and over and over. And no one ever called him on

it, including Powell. They just could not have the kind of conversations that led to direct answers about what

Rumsfeld really wanted. And Rumsfeld’s regard for the State Department was low and getting lower. To

Powell, it seemed almost that Rumsfeld was wearing rubber gloves, not wanting to leave fingerprints on policy

recommendations.

So Powell and Cheney went at it yet again in a blistering argument.

“I don’t know if we got it or not,” Powell reported to Armitage, referring to a call for the U.N. to act.

The night before the speech, Bush told Powell and Rice that he was going to ask for new resolutions. He

liked policy headlines to come directly from him, so he directed that near the top of page eight in the latest

draft, #24, lan

e be inserted which would ask the U.N. for the necessar

“resolutions.”

Later the president recalled, “I chose the resolution” option. “Blair had a lot to do with it,” he

acknowledged. He added that before his U.N. speech he also spoke with Australian Prime Minister John

Howard, who said, “I’m with you. We need a resolution.” Bush recalled that he received the same

recommendation from the Spanish president, José María Aznar.

AT THE PODIUM

in the General Assembly Hall on September 12, Bush reached the point in his speech where he

was going to ask for new resolutions. But the change had not been put into the copy on the TelePrompTer, so he

read the old line, “My nation will work with the U.N. Security Council

to meet our common challenge.

”

As he read along with Draft #24, penciling in any ad libs or deletions the president might make at the last

minute, Powell felt his heart almost stop. The sentence about resolutions had somehow vanished. The president

had not said it—the crucial line!

But as Bush read the old sentence, he realized that the fruit of his war cabinet’s heated debate was

missing. With only mild awkwardness, he added, two sentences later, “We will work with the U.N. Security

Council for the necessary resolutions.”

Powell’s heart began beating again.

“It was a big speech,” the president recalled fifteen months later. “I am coming off the anniversary of

[9/11]” the day before. “We were on the defensive. But this speech began to clarify to the American people,

first and foremost, what they were reading about” concerning military planning and other strategies for dealing

with Iraq. Previously he and the administration had not achieved “clarity” about where they were heading, he

said. “And the one other thing about this administration is that we’ve been able to define an agenda. Now

eople may not like it, but we’ve been good about defining agendas so that people understand it. This speech

did that. And it had a big effect in America.

“When I walked up there and stood in front of that group, and by the way there’s no expressions,” Bush

continued. The delegates sat mute, almost impolitely so. “It was dead quiet. And I can remember, the more

solemn they looked to me, the more emotional I was in making the case. Not openly emotional, the more firm I

was in making the case. It was a speech I really enjoyed giving.”

The reason he was able to lay down the if-you-don’t-we-will challenge to the U.N., he said, was the work

and war planning that had been done by Franks and Rumsfeld. “Had we not done that, had we not planned, had

I not had that option available, I could not have given that speech,” he said. He believed that the military threat

was a necessary condition to make diplomacy possible.

The speech was generally a hit. “It had a big impact around the world as well,” he noted. The soft-liners

liked it because the president was seeking international and United Nations support. Hard-liners liked it because

it sounded tough.

Powell stayed in New York to rally support for the policy, especially from Russia and France, who as two

of the five permanent members of the Security Council could veto any resolution.

Bush later said, “And I will tell you that there were times when I wasn’t sure we were going to get any

resolution.” He had promised the United States would act if the U.N. didn’t. “So I’m sitting there saying to

myself, you know, are you prepared to go?”

ROVE GENERALLY MET

with Bush in the morning after his intelligence briefing, NSC meeting or calls to foreign

leaders. It was usually with Card, Bartlett, the press secretary and some others. Occasionally, he had a few

minutes alone with the

resident, who mi

ht briefl

vent about somethin

. He reminded the

resident that all

the war talk was drowning out other things and not necessarily to their political advantage.

As the midterm elections approached, he told Bush that the one issue that was a winner was the Homeland

Security bill that would set up a new cabinet department as part of the biggest reorganization of the federal

government since the creation of the Defense Department. The Democrats were delaying the bill because they

wanted to guarantee that government workers could unionize. The president was asking for the authority to

make exemptions for national security concerns, which he said every president since John Kennedy had been

granted. He went out and campaigned hard, saying that he wanted to defend the country and the Democrats

wanted to defend the union bosses. Rove was convinced that the Homeland Security issue and the Senate’s

delay in voting on or confirming Bush’s nominees to federal judgeships would benefit the Republicans in the

elections.

SEVERAL TIMES A WEEK

Nick Calio arranged for congressmen or senators to attend intelligence briefings or

small ad hoc working group sessions, either on Capitol Hill or at the White House, even in the intimacy of the

Situation Room. The small-group selling forum worked better than the large sessions. In case anyone was

looking around for clues, one of the three red digital clocks marking time around the world was set for “Iraq.”

One of the first briefings was given by Deputy CIA Director John McLaughlin, Tenet’s No. 2. Afterward

Calio urged Tenet to come himself to conduct the briefings. “John can almost scare people he’s so balanced,”

Calio said. They needed to make sales, and McLaughlin was too low-key. They needed a fireball, so Tenet was

resent at more and more briefings.

Meanwhile the Homeland Security bill was being blocked in the Senate by a filibuster. Calio told the

resident that they were about to “vitiate” the filibuster.

“Nicky, what the fuck are you talking about, vitiate?” Bush asked. Cheney too wondered aloud what

vitiate meant.

The next day Calio brought in a two-page handout of definitions from the Webster’s and American

Heritage dictionaries describing that vitiate meant to void or render ineffective. Later the White House did

exactly that, securing the 60 votes needed to end debate and passing the bill.

On September 19, the president met with 11 House members in the Cabinet Room.

“The war on terrorism is going okay; we are hunting down al Qaeda one-by-one,” Bush began. “The

biggest threat, however, is Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction. He can blow up Israel and

that would trigger an international conflict.”

Delving into elements of the war plan, Bush told the group, “We will take over the oil fields early—and

mitigate the oil shock,” interrupting himself to issue the stern warning, “Nobody needs to be telling anybody

this!”

Bush also shared a tidbit from either the sensitive President’s Daily Brief (PDB) or Tenet’s daily oral

briefing. “This morning in my intelligence briefing I found out that the CIA has a poll stating that 71 percent in

France see Saddam Hussein as a true threat to world peace.”

No one asked why the CIA reported to the president about French polls. Though the political reaction in

France of a new U.N. resolution on Iraq weapons inspections was of concern as the president tried to win

international support, it probably did not require clandestine intelligence. A recent French newspaper poll

showed 65 percent opposed a war in Iraq even with U.N. backing.

Richard Burr, a North Carolina Re

ublican, said the

resident should kee

in his s

eeches that

Saddam gassed his own people.

“I am well aware,” Bush said, adding, “He tried to kill my Dad,” a reference to intelligence early during

the Clinton administration that Iraqi agents had plotted to assassinate Bush senior on a 1993 trip to the Middle

East. In response, Clinton had ordered a cruise missile attack on Baghdad.

“Our information gathering is strong. We need to talk to Saddam Hussein’s guards,” Bush continued.

“Unrest in Iraq will help with the rebuilding. Intrusive inspections might spark the Iraqi people.”

Bush left the meeting, leaving Calio to wrap up. “We will work in a bipartisan fashion but we want

maximum flexibility and we are looking to you all for your help,” he urged. “Also remember to speak up when

others say discouraging things.”

A few hours later, the president released the proposed language of a resolution granting him authority “to

use all means that he determines to be appropriate, including force” to deal with the threat posed by Iraq. A

front page story in

The Washington Post

the next day said that with the introduction of the resolution, President

Bush’s “rout of congressional Democrats was virtually complete.”

That day, September 20, Secretary Powell testified before the House International Relations Committee in

support of the resolution. “I’ve been known as a reluctant warrior. It doesn’t bother me. But the threat of war

has to be there,” he said. It was an argument that would be adopted by many Democrats who might have been

inclined to vote against a congressional resolution. Deterrence and containment of the Soviet Union during the

Cold War had been built around the threat of massive conventional and nuclear retaliation. It was a policy that

had succeeded and was the model for avoiding war. Bush was not necessarily asking for war on Iraq. He was

merely asking for congressional support as he threatened war. It was Rice’s version of coercive diplomacy.

ON SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER

21,

The New York Times

reported in its lead story that Bush had recently received a

highly detailed set of war plans on Iraq from General Franks. At a press conference in Kuwait where he was

meeting with his field commanders, Franks acknowledged, “We are prepared to undertake whatever activities

and whatever actions we may be directed to take by our nation,” adding, “Our president has not made a decision

to go to war.”

In an interview for the

Times

story, the president’s spokesman, Ari Fleischer, pointedly departed from

revious statements throughout the spring and summer that the president did not have war plans at the ready.

“I am not saying there is no plan on his desk.”

BUSH HAD

18 more House members to the Cabinet Room on Thursday, September 26. He opened by saying the

last thing he wanted was to put troops in harm’s way. “Believe me, I don’t like hugging the widows.”

Launching into a familiar indictment of the Iraqi leader, he said, “Saddam Hussein is a terrible guy who is

teaming up with al Qaeda. He tortures his own people and hates Israel.”

The lead story in the national media that day was an erupting war of words between Bush and Senate

Majority Leader Daschle, each alleging the other was politicizing Iraq and national security issues.

“Washington is an ugly town,” Bush said to the assembled group. “I am well aware of that. This is our

duty though.”

“If we use force, it will be fierce and swift and fast,” Bush said.

“First, I promise a good plan. I have been looking each general in the eye and asking them whether or not

they see any problems for a regime change. They do not.”

He said that nothing could be worse than the present situation. Saddam had two of his own security guards

killed to send a message to his inner circle, he maintained. Then, putting the most dire spin on the intelligence,

he stated, “It is clear he has weapons of mass destruction—anthrax, VX; he still needs plutonium and he has not

been shy about trying to find it. Time frame would be six months” to Iraq having a nuke if Iraq was able to

obtain sufficient plutonium or enriched uranium—one of the most difficult tasks.

“People always love a fight, especially in Washington,” Bush said, adding, “Yesterday’s story in

The

Washington Post

was a misquote.” The front page story had said, “Four times in the past two days, Bush has

suggested that Democrats do not care about national security.”

“I never say ‘Democrats’ in any speech I give,” Bush said.

Tennessee Democrat Bob Clement asked, “Have you given up on the U.N.?” and, as an aside, said, “The

economy is also unraveling—we have hit a six-year low in the stock market.”

“It’s four years!” Bush shot back, drawing laughter.

“I haven’t given up on the U.N., but sometimes it can be a diplomatic mud pit. I understand diplomacy,”

he said, and assured them he would not get caught up fighting over the U.N. resolution.

Chris Shays, an eighth-term Republican from Connecticut, said, “Some briefings have left me less

confident than before.”

The meeting adjourned to the Rose Garden where Bush, in a prearranged move intended to show

bipartisan solidarity, made a brief statement with the members standing behind him.

“The security of our country is the commitment of both political parties and the responsibility of both

elected branches of government,” Bush said, defusing though not retreating from the flap with Daschle.

Restating the new unequivocal charge about Iraq’s WMD programs he had adopted three weeks earlier,

Bush said, “The Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons. The Iraqi regime is building the

facilities necessary to make more.” Ratcheting up another notch, he added, “And according to the British

government, the Iraqi regime could launch a biological or chemical attack in as little as 45 minutes after the

order were given.”

Tenet and the CIA had warned the British not to make that allegation, which was based on a questionable

source, and almost certainly referred to battlefield weapons—not ones that Iraq could launch at neighboring

countries, let alone American cities. Tenet referred privately to this as the “they-can-attack-in-45-minutes shit.”

ON TUESDAY, OCTOBER

1, Bush and Cheney met with a dozen members of the House International Relations

Committee in the White House Cabinet Room. “We cannot let history judge us and ask where was George W.

Bush and Dick Cheney,” Bush said in making his case for action.

Cheney said, “The key things are that we have always underestimated this guy. He has lots of money

coming in from oil reserves.”

Shelley Berkley, a Nevada Democrat, asked what they would do about Saddam aiming at Israel.

“Su

er Patriots are a

ossibilit

. We have ver

technolo

icall

advanced wea

ons,” Bush said. He turned

to Cheney, “What am I allowed to say?”

“Not too much,” Cheney replied. “There are launch boxes in Iraq. [We] can fly Predators and preempt

strikes.”

The president then lit into Saddam. “This guy is a liar. He is playing the international community for a

fool. It’s like an international mosh pit. Australia, Slovakia, Czech Republic, England—these countries are all

on our side. You don’t read about this. You read about Germany and this guy winning an election by making

me look like a piñata,” referring to Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s anti–Iraq war rhetoric during his reelection

campaign.

Bush told the group that when he had spoken to the U.N. in September, “There were no facial expressions.

It was like a Woody Allen movie.” There was laughter.

“People out there say you cannot fight in Afghanistan and win in Iraq,” Bush continued. “Defeating two

enemies is ver

difficult, but we will do it.”

IX MONTHS EARLIER

, on May 9, 2002, I had dinner with Senator Bob Graham, the Florida Democrat who

chaired the Senate Intelligence Committee, at his townhouse on Capitol Hill. I brought the dinner and he

supplied the silverware and plates. It was the second such dinner we had had since 9/11.

In the world of the CIA, secret intelligence and covert action, the congressional intelligence committees

were the only outside monitor. Their oversight function was mandated by law, and the chairmen and ranking

members of the minority party were supposed to be informed of any significant intelligence activity, failure or

covert action. Sometimes the committees were bulldogs, other times lapdogs. Senator Barry Goldwater, the late

Arizona Republican, had chaired the Senate committee at a critical period during the reign of CIA Director

William J. Casey in the 1980s, and I had found Goldwater a good source of reliable information.

Graham, a small, pleasant but intense man of 65, had served eight years as Florida governor and was in his

third six-year term in the Senate. Graham had a family connection to

The Washington Post

where I work. His

half-brother was the late Philip Graham, the publisher of the

Post

until 1963 and husband of Katharine Graham.

Philip Graham’s son, Don Graham, currently is CEO of the Post Company, so Senator Graham thought it best

to talk on-the-record and only for my book and not the newspaper. I tape-recorded our lengthy dinner

conversations with his permission.

Graham wanted to talk about Iraq and he was deeply troubled. He said he had been briefed on the covert

lan, but declined to give details. The circumstances of the briefings—they took place in Cheney’s office—

articularly bothered him. For the most sensitive covert operations, the White House and the Congress had a

long-standing agreement that only eight members of Congress would be informed, the so-called Gang of

Eight—the Senate majority and minority leaders, the House speaker and minority leader, and the chairman and

ranking member of both the Senate and House Intelligence Committees.

“The theory of this new plan,” Graham said, “was that we have failed to achieve the objective of changing

a regime and that a primary reason for that failure was that we have relied on intelligence to accomplish this and

it can’t be done by intelligence alone. It’s going to require a little diplomacy, a little economic pressure and

maybe a lot of military.”

His reaction?

“Well, I am unconvinced that going into Iraq is the appropriate thing to do in the immediate future,” he

said. “And I’ll define the immediate future as bein

the next two or three

ears. I believe

ursuin

this war on

terrorism is a very important goal and that this could be the swamp that would keep us from

accomplishing that goal.

“The definition of a first-tier terrorist was somebody who was either involved in the events of September

the 11th or harbored and provided sanctuary to people involved. And there’s not evidence that Iraq fell into

either one of those two categories. And so I think it’s a stretch to call a war on Iraq another chapter in the war

on terrorism.

“Is Iraq a nation that is close to having militarily usable weapons of mass destruction?” he asked. “Again,

the answer is most analyses would say that it is some time, like five years, before they are going to be at that

oint unless they get substantial assistance from outside.” Graham said we ought to monitor Iraq so that “if

those numbers appear to be rapidly shortening, then we may—Iraq legitimately would go up higher on the list.”

He said he had not talked with Bush about Iraq but he had talked to Cheney. “He sort of glides over the issue of

terrorism and unites [it with] weapons of mass destruction. He would say that the war that we are now engaged

in is not just a war against terrorism, it’s a war against terrorism and those states which have the capability of

roviding terrorists with weapons through which they could escalate the nature of their violence.

“One of these findings is tighter than a Gang of Eight finding,” he said, because no staff was allowed. “All

the briefings on that take place at the White House and the ones I’ve participated in have primarily been in

[Cheney’s] office.”

Tenet was present but Cheney did most of the talking. The vice president was intent on Iraq, saying,

“We’ve got to do it because it’s the convergence of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.”

Graham asserted that the Bush administration, or at least Cheney, had changed the definition of the war on

terrorism. “Now, we’re defining a terrorist state as those states which might have the ability to provide weapons

of mass destruction, even if they themselves are not engaged in terrorist activities or providing sanctuary.”

THE CIA HAD NEVER

declared categorically that it believed Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction. The

formal 2000 National Intelligence Estimate concluded that Saddam “retained a small stockpile” of chemical

warfare agents—not actual warheads—perhaps up to 100 metric tons, and “might” have precursors for 200

metric tons more. This conclusion was drawn largely from accounting discrepancies between what Iraq had

reviously told U.N. weapons inspectors it possessed, and what records showed had been destroyed.

The classified December 2000 National Intelligence Estimate on biological weapons concluded that Iraq

“continued” to work on development and was poised to, but did not yet have them.

Significantly, in public testimony before Graham’s committee on February 6, 2002, on worldwide threats,

Tenet had not mentioned Iraq until page 10 of his 18-page testimony, devoting only three paragraphs to Iraq. He

said, “Iraq continues to build and expand an infrastructure capable of producing WMD.” Its chemical industry

was expanding “in ways that could be diverted quickly to CW production. We believe it also maintains an

active and capable BW program.”

“We believe Saddam never abandoned his nuclear weapons programs,” Tenet said, but he made no

suggestion that Saddam possessed or was on the verge of building a bomb. “Our major near-term concern is the

ossibility that Saddam might gain access to fissile material.”

After I saw him, Graham and other Senate Democrats pressed the administration to provide a new

comprehensive intelligence report or estimate on Iraq. He in particular wanted to see how the CIA covert plan

might relate to military plans, diplomacy and the global war on terrorism. What was the exact nature of the Iraq

threat? With what kinds of weapons or terrorism? How immediate was that threat? What would war mean to the

ion and what would the

ostwar landsca

e be like? These

uestions were formalized in a classified letter to

Tenet on September 11, 2002, the day before Bush’s speech to the United Nations.

Tenet refused the request on the grounds that Graham wanted an assessment of U.S. strategy and policy.

That was way outside Tenet’s purview. The CIA made assessments and formal National Intelligence Estimates

about foreign governments, not its own. Tenet, however, did agree reluctantly to do a rushed National

Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s WMD capability. This intelligence work was undertaken in the wake of Bush’s

and Cheney’s high-profile conclusions on the subject—the vice president’s August 26 declaration that, “Simply

stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction,” and the president’s

remark a month later that, “The Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons.”

The National Intelligence Council, a group of representatives from the key intelligence agencies, began

sifting, sorting and assessing the raw intelligence. The council includes the CIA, the National Security Agency,

which does communications intercepts, the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency, the State Department’s

intelligence bureau, the Energy Department’s intelligence arm, and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency,

which performs satellite and other overhead reconnaissance.

The group had a massive amount of material, much of it old and not very reliable. Iraq was still one of the

hardest intelligence targets. Saddam had improved his methods of deception and hiding his weapons

rograms—whatever they might be—underground. CIA human intelligence inside Iraq was still weak, and

aramilitary teams like those headed by Tim in northern Iraq had found nothing.

A National Intelligence Estimate is just that, an estimate. During the Cold War it became the document of

choice because it was designed to give the president and his national security team an overall assessment of the

capability and intentions of real threats, such as the Soviet Union and China. NIEs often include political

assessments of the endurance of, say, Colonel Qaddafi in Libya, the direction of the Balkans, famine in Africa,

the chances of war on the Korean peninsula or a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan.

The format is designed for busy policy makers. So a long NIE of 50 or 100 pages has a kind of executive

summary at the front called “Key Judgments” in which the intelligence analysts would try to give a bottom-line

answer. Would Castro be overthrown? Would Syria attack Israel? Would the Communists win in Nicaragua?

Over the decades there had been much criticism of NIEs by policy makers—and presidents—because the

authors hedge and because the “on-this-hand, on-the-other-hand” reports are littered with maddening

qualifications. No matter what happened, someone could find a sentence or phrase in the NIE that had covered

such a possibility.

Stu Cohen, an intelligence professional for 30 years, was acting chairman of the National Intelligence

Council when the Iraq assessment of WMD was being prepared. He confided to a colleague that he wanted to

avoid equivocation if possible. If the Key Judgments used words such as “maybe” or “probably” or “likely,” the

IE would be “pablum,” he said. Ironclad evidence in the intelligence business is scarce and analysts need to be

able to make judgments beyond the ironclad, Cohen felt. The evidence was substantial but nonetheless

circumstantial; no one had proof of a vial of biological agents or weapons, or a smoking vat of chemical warfare

agents. Yet coupled with the incontrovertible proof that Saddam had had WMD in the past—U.N. weapons

inspectors in the 1990s had found it, tested it and destroyed it—the conclusion seemed obvious.

The alternative view was that Saddam didn’t have WMD. No one wanted to say that because so much

intelligence would have to be discounted. The real and best answer was that he

probably

had WMD, but that

there was no proof and the case was circumstantial. Given the leeway to make a “judgment,” which in the

dictionary definition is merely an “opinion,” the council was heading toward a strong declaration. No pablum.

Analysts at the CIA had long discussed the issue of avoiding equivocation. At times, many, including

John McLaughlin, felt that they had to dare to be wrong to be clearer in their judgments. That summer

McLaughlin had told the NSC principals that the CIA thought they had a pretty good case that Saddam had

WMD, but that others would demand more direct

roof. The CIA did not have an anthrax sam

le, and didn’t

have a chemical weapons sample on hand.

Intelligence analysts and officials worked on the estimate for three weeks. On October 1, Tenet chaired

the National Foreign Intelligence Board, the heads of all the intelligence agencies that released and certified the

IEs. No one disputed the central conclusions. Tenet felt he had a group of smart people at the table and that

they knew how to craft the estimate properly.

The Top Secret 92-page document that was released said under the Key Judgments, without qualification,

“Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons.” From that attention-getting assertion, the NIE takes a slow

march back down the hill, with muted but clear equivocations. One hint of uncertainty was the second

aragraph in the Key Judgments. “We judge that we are seeing only a portion of Iraq’s WMD efforts.” It is the

kind of statement that might be included in any intelligence report—only a portion of anything is ever seen. In

the end, the hedging and backing off telegraphed immense doubt.

The NIE said the intelligence agencies “assess that Baghdad has begun renewed production of mustard,

sarin, cyclosarin and VX” but did not say Iraq actually had any, or that they had any sources who had seen any.

And the backup was thin. They had clandestine reporting that Iraq “has procured covertly the types and

quantities of chemicals and equipment sufficient to allow limited CW agent production.” Given the dual use of

many such chemicals—for legitimate nonweapons purposes and weapons—the conclusion was speculative.

“Although we have little specific information on Iraq’s CW stockpile,” the NIE said, suggesting they had

a problem coming up with numbers, it stated, “Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons and

ossibly as much as 500 metric tons of CW agents—much of it added in the last year.”

It was much the same on biological weapons. Some of the intelligence and conclusions come close to

contradicting the flat assertions in the Key Judgments. For example, the NIE said, “We judge that all key

aspects—R&D, production and weaponization—of Iraq’s offensive BW program are active.” Active elements

of a program do not necessarily mean actual weapons have been made, though it strongly suggests it. Though

there was powerful and troubling circumstantial evidence, it did not establish that Saddam “has” the weapons.

“We judge Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly producing and

weaponizing a variety of such agents.” Again, it did not state that Iraq had actual weapons.

The NIE sounded like a weather report on certain topics. “Chances are even that smallpox is part of Iraq’s

offensive BW program,” it said.

Deeper into the NIE the tentativeness grew. “We have low confidence in our ability to assess when

Saddam would use WMD,” the NIE said. With a string of qualifiers—could, might, probably, more likely and

robably again—the NIE laid out scenarios of chemical or biological attacks on U.S. forces, friends and allies.

After a triple set of qualifiers, the NIE addressed Cheney’s nightmare—Saddam assisting al Qaeda in a

WMD attack.

“Saddam, if sufficiently desperate, might decide that only an organization such as al Qaeda—with

worldwide reach and extensive terrorist infrastructure, and already engaged in a life-or-death struggle against

the United States—would perpetrate the type of terrorist attack that he would hope to conduct. In such

circumstances, he might decide that the extreme step of assisting the Islamist terrorists in conducting a CBW

attack against the United States would be his last chance to exact vengeance by taking a large number of victims

with him.”

Buried still later in the NIE is the statement that there is “low confidence” in this assessment. This

followed the statement: “We have no specific intelligence information that Saddam’s regime has directed

attacks a

ainst U.S. territor

.”