Van Huyssteen J.W. (editor) Encyclopedia of Science and Religion

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CREATIONISM

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In contemporary culture, however, the term has

taken on a number of substantially different mean-

ings that need to be distinguished. For the purposes

of this entry, the term theological creationism des-

ignates the basic belief, held by members of many

religious communities, that the universe is not self-

existent but is a creation; that is, the universe has

being only because a self-existent creator-God

gives it being. The existence of a creation is held to

be dependent on the effective will of a creator not

only to give it being at a beginning but also to sus-

tain it in being from moment to moment.

But the term creationism usually entails more

than this basic belief that the universe is a creation.

The term now ordinarily designates the conviction

that the creator-God of which the Bible speaks has

both (1) brought the basic material of “the heavens

and the earth” into being from nothing at the be-

ginning of time, and (2) conferred specific forms

on that basic material in the course of time through

occasional episodes of divine intervention. Be-

cause of its strong emphasis on the need for sev-

eral episodes of form-conferring supernatural ac-

tion, this perspective will here be called episodic

creationism to distinguish it from theological cre-

ationism as defined above. Episodic creationism

has historically been called special creationism be-

cause of its idea that each basic kind of creature

was specially created (given a specific form) to

function in its environment.

Within the category of episodic creationism,

however, there are numerous and vastly differing

concepts of the particular manner and timetable of

the creator’s form-conferring interventions. Fol-

lowing are the basic tenets of the most common

versions of these creationist portraits of God’s cre-

ative action.

Young-earth episodic creationism

Young-earth episodic creationism is committed to

the belief that the universe was brought into being

recently (usually taken to be six thousand to ten

thousand years ago) and that God’s form-confer-

ring interventions (or “acts of creation”) were per-

formed during a week of six twenty-four-hour days

immediately following the beginning. The primary

basis for this perspective is the belief that this por-

trait of the creation’s formational history is the clear

teaching of the Bible and that all faithful believers

of biblical faiths must accept it.

Bible inerrancy. Understanding the creationists’

beliefs concerning the nature and authority of the

Bible is essential for understanding all forms of

episodic creationism. The Bible (made up of the

Hebrew Scriptures plus the New Testament writ-

ings of the early Christian era) is generally taken to

be not only a trustworthy guide for faith and prac-

tice, but also an inerrant source of information on

any topic that it addresses. How does the Bible

come to have this remarkable character? The Bible

has this quality because, inerrantists believe, the

Bible is the inspired Word of God. The Bible is be-

lieved to be the product, not of human knowledge

or of human experience alone, but of divine reve-

lation of information and divine guidance in the

writing of the text. As God’s revelation and as the

product of divine inspiration, what the Bible says

can be trusted to be true and unblemished by error

of any sort.

This concept of the Bible, combined with an

interpretive approach that favors “the plain reading

of the text,” has led many to insist upon a literal in-

terpretation of biblical narratives unless there is

strong reason (derived from the Bible itself) to read

it in a more figurative or artistic sense. The appli-

cation of this belief to the first three chapters of

Genesis has led a large proportion of the Christian

community (at least in the past century) to treat the

creation narratives of Genesis 1–3 as literature that

is more like a documentary photograph than an

artistic portrait. Consequently, Genesis 1–3 is taken

to be a chronicle of God’s acts of creation—a con-

cise account of what happened and when during

the first week of time. Young-earth episodic cre-

ationists read Genesis 1 as a divine revelation that

God not only brought the universe into being at

the beginning of time but also performed a series

of form-conferring interventions over the next six

days. Similarly, Genesis 6–9 is taken to be a chron-

icle of a catastrophic global flood event that oc-

curred within human history, perhaps four thou-

sand to five thousand years ago.

Creation science. Furthermore, if the Bible is

the inspired Word of God, it must be true. And if it

is true, then it must be open to empirical confir-

mation. Empirical confirmation of the recentness

and episodic character of divine acts of creation is

the task of a science-styled enterprise known as

creation science. Creation science stands in the

tradition of flood geology, which presumes that the

major structural features of the earth’s surface were

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formed as a consequence of the great flood of

Noah. In both cases, selected empirical evidence is

reinterpreted in such a way as to reach the con-

clusions that: (1) the age of the universe is not

fourteen or fifteen billion years—as conventional

science has concluded—but more like six thou-

sand years; (2) new forms of life could not have

evolved in the manner that most biologists believe,

but must have been specially created by supernat-

ural means; and (3) the Noachian flood can ac-

count for all of the major geological structures that

characterize the surface of the earth.

There are several societies and institutions that

actively promote young-earth episodic creationism,

flood geology, and creation science. The Creation

Research Society (CRS), for example, was founded

in 1963. Its members must subscribe to a statement

of belief that affirms, in the order listed:

(1) that the Bible, as the inspired Word of God,

is historically and scientifically true;

(2) that all basic types of life forms were made

by direct creative acts of God in six days;

(3) that the Noachian flood was a worldwide

historical event: and

(4) that salvation through Jesus is necessary be-

cause of Adam and Eve’s fall into sin.

The CRS has published its technical journal,

the Creation Research Society Quarterly, since 1964

and now supports a variety of “creation-related re-

search” projects at its Van Andel Creation Research

Center in north central Arizona.

Creation science is taught in many conservative

Christian schools and colleges. Graduate degrees

in creation science can be earned at the Institute

for Creation Research (ICR) in Santee, California.

The ICR maintains an extensive resource center for

books, pamphlets, research monographs, text-

books, and videos prepared for a variety of age

and educational levels. Its educational outreach

programs include Back to Genesis regional semi-

nars, Good Science workshops at a variety of grade

levels, creation science camps, Case for Creation

community seminars, and creation/evolution de-

bates in which biochemist Duane Gish defends

young-earth creationism against various represen-

tatives for evolution. Programs of this sort are pre-

sented not only throughout the United States but in

countries around the world.

The ICR supports research expeditions to lo-

cate the remnants of Noah’s Ark on Mount Ararat

in Turkey and to study catastrophic phenomena at

Mount St. Helens in Washington. It sponsors both

research trips and public tours in the Grand

Canyon—research trips “looking for evidence to

support a young-age creation interpretation of the

formation and history of the Canyon,” and Grand

Canyon outreach tours that are “devoted to reach-

ing pastors, teachers, professionals, and business

leaders with the creation message” and designed to

give its participants “an opportunity to see evi-

dences for the Genesis Flood firsthand.”

Other forms of creationism

Creationism has many variants. Three of the most

prominent interpretations are old-earth episodic,

progressive, and Intelligent Design creationism.

Old-earth episodic creationism. The tenets of

old-earth episodic creationism are very similar to

those of young-earth creationism with the excep-

tion of the timetable. The Bible is taken to be the

inspired and scientifically inerrant Word of God.

The formational capabilities of the created world

are presumed to be inadequate to sustain biotic

evolution, so that a succession of episodes of form-

conferring supernatural intervention remains an

essential feature of the creation’s formational his-

tory, and the Noachian flood was a historical event

within human history. However, the “days” of the

Genesis 1 creation narrative could have been ex-

tended periods of time so that the scientifically-de-

rived timetable for the universe’s formational his-

tory may be accepted without fear of contradicting

the Scriptures.

Progressive creationism. Like old-earth

episodic creationism, progressive creationism is

open to the contributions of science on such mat-

ters as the timetable of the creation’s formational

history. It also gives recognition to the idea, rooted

in the Augustinian tradition, that the creation was

provided by God with the formational capabilities

needed to actualize the structures and life forms

that God intended to appear in the course of time.

Progressive creationism envisions God giving

being at the beginning to the raw materials of the

universe and generously providing them with for-

mational powers. Then, in a progressive manner,

the Spirit of God is thought to have stimulated and

enabled these causal powers to actualize a vast

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array of preordained physical structures (like dry

land and seas) and life forms (like plants, cattle,

fish, and birds). The formational history of the cre-

ation is envisioned as a progressive and coopera-

tive venture in which both divine and creaturely

action contribute to the outcome.

Intelligent Design creationism. The Intelligent

Design movement is a recent entry into this arena

of creationist perspectives on the character and

role of divine action in effecting the assembly of

new creaturely forms—especially new life forms—

in the course of time. Proponents of Intelligent De-

sign argue that there is empirical evidence that the

universe’s system of natural capabilities for forming

things is inadequate for assembling certain infor-

mation-rich biological structures. And if the system

of natural capabilities is inadequate, as Intelligent

Design proponents argue, then these biological

structures must have been assembled by the action

of some non-natural agent, usually taken to be di-

vine. Exactly how and when this divine action

might have occurred is not specified. Little or no

appeal is made to the biblical text to support the

theological implications of this concept.

See also CREATION; CREATION SCIENCE; DESIGN;

ESIGN ARGUMENT; DIVINE ACTION; GOD;

NTELLIGENT DESIGN; SCOPES TRIAL; SCRIPTURAL

INTERPRETATION

Bibliography

Behe, Michael J. Darwin’s Black Box: The Biochemical

Challenge to Evolution. New York: Free Press, 1996.

Dembski, William A. Intelligent Design: The Bridge Be-

tween Science and Theology. Downers Grove, Ill.: In-

terVarsity Press, 1999.

Gilkey, Langdon. Maker of Heaven and Earth: A Study of

the Christian Doctrine of Creation. Garden City, N.Y.:

Doubleday, 1959.

Johnson, Phillip E. Defeating Darwinism by Opening

Minds. Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1997.

Morris, Henry M. The Modern Creation Trilogy. Green

Forest, Ark.: Master Books, 1996.

Numbers, Ronald. The Creationists: The Evolution of Sci-

entific Creationism. New York: Knopf, 1992.

Ramm, Bernard. The Christian View of Science and Scrip-

ture. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmanns, 1956.

Ross, Hugh. Creation and Time: A Biblical and Scientific

Perspective on the Creation-date Controversy. Col-

orado Springs, Colo.: NavPress, 1994.

Young, Davis A. Christianity and the Age of the Earth.

Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmanns, 1982.

Young, Davis A. The Biblical Flood: A Case Study of the

Church’s Response to Extrabiblical Evidence. Grand

Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmanns, 1995.

HOWARD J. VAN TILL

CREATION SCIENCE

Creation science is a science-styled activity dedi-

cated to the goal of providing observational, ex-

perimental, and theoretical support for the basic

tenets of young-earth episodic creationism. These

tenets are: (1) that the world was brought into

being recently (a few thousand years ago); and (2)

that the basic types of physical structures (like the

sun, moon, and stars) and the basic kinds of living

creatures were formed by episodes of supernatural

intervention during the first week after the begin-

ning. On the basis of its interpretation of selected

empirical data, creation science argues that the uni-

verse cannot be as old as the natural sciences have

concluded, and that the full array of life forms

could not possibly be the outcome of uninter-

rupted evolutionary development.

See also CREATIONISM; DESIGN; DESIGN ARGUMENT;

NTELLIGENT DESIGN; SCOPES TRIAL

HOWARD J. VAN TILL

CRITICAL REALISM

Critical realism is a philosophical view of knowl-

edge. On the one hand it holds that it is possible to

acquire knowledge about the external world as it

really is, independently of the human mind or sub-

jectivity. That is why it is called realism. On the

other hand it rejects the view of naïve realism that

the external world is as it is perceived. Recognizing

that perception is a function of, and thus funda-

mentally marked by, the human mind, it holds that

one can only acquire knowledge of the external

world by critical reflection on perception and its

world. That is why it is called critical.

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History

Critical realism arose in German philosophy in the

late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a

reaction to idealistic and phenomenalist types of

philosophy. German critical realists took account

of Immanuel Kant’s (1724–1804) view of the sub-

jectivity of knowledge but denied that this pre-

cludes access to “things-in-itself.” In American phi-

losophy, critical realism designates a movement

initiated by Roy Wood Sellars (1880–1973) in 1916.

It purported to integrate insights of both idealism

and new realism, which was a naïve realist reaction

to idealism. Through the work of Wilfrid Sellars

(1912–1989), Roy Wood Sellars’s son, critical real-

ism influenced scientific realism, which arose in

the 1950s in opposition to positivistic phenome-

nalism. Scientific realism basically claims that ma-

ture scientific theories are approximately true (in

the sense of corresponding to the external world)

and that their postulated central entities really exist.

The term critical realism was introduced into

the dialogue between science and theology in 1966

by Ian Barbour. Barbour used the term to cover

both scientific realism and a theological realism

that takes seriously the cognitive claims of religion,

that is, religion’s claims to convey knowledge of a

mind-independent divine reality. Subsequently

Barbour pointed to the cognitive role of meta-

phors, models, and paradigms in scientific as well

as religious language. His ideas were later assimi-

lated and elaborated by Arthur Peacocke, John

Polkinghorne, J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, and oth-

ers. Actually, critical realism has been the domi-

nant epistemology in the dialogue between sci-

ence and theology for several decades. However,

since the 1990s the transfer of critical realism from

science to theology has increasingly been dis-

puted, mainly on the ground that it does not, or

does not sufficiently, do justice to the specific na-

ture of theology.

Analysis

On closer inspection, critical realism as a view of

scientific and theological knowledge comprises

three theses:

(1) Metaphysical realism, which holds that there

exists a mind-independent reality. In scien-

tific realism this reality is the material world;

in theological realism this reality is the mate-

rial world and also, primarily, God.

(2) Semantic realism, which holds that science

and theology contain propositions, that is

statements capable of being true or false in

the sense of correspondence to the reality to

which they refer. In scientific realism the

focus is on propositions about unobservable

entities; in theological realism the focus is on

propositions about God.

(3) Epistemic realism, which holds that it is pos-

sible to put forward propositions that are ap-

proximately true, that some propositions ac-

tually are approximately true, and that belief

in their approximate truth can be justified. In

scientific realism this applies primarily to the-

ories and theoretical propositions about un-

observable entities; in theology it applies to

propositions and theories about God.

The first thesis distinguishes critical realism

from idealism and positivism, but also from Hilary

Putnam’s (b. 1926) “internal realism,” which de-

fines reality as a function of human conceptualiza-

tion of the world. The second thesis distinguishes

scientific realism from an instrumentalism that re-

gards statements about unobservable entities as

useful fictions without propositional content. Simi-

larly, it distinguishes theological critical realism

from the Wittgenstein-inspired view of religious

language as mere expression or recommendation

of a way of life. The third thesis distinguishes crit-

ical realism from a skepticism that affirms the first

and second theses but denies that it is possible to

acquire justified approximate knowledge of a

mind-independent reality. On the other hand, the

qualification “approximate” entails a dissociation

from the naïve realist claim that reality is as it is

perceived.

Discussion

The main arguments in favour of scientific realism

are:

(1) The fact that observation and experiments

again and again compel scientists to change

their prior ideas points to a substantive ex-

ternal input into science.

(2) The predictive success of mature theories

can only (or at least best) be explained by

the view that the processes, structures, and

entities postulated by those theories approx-

imate reality.

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(3) The effectiveness of science-based technol-

ogy can only (best) be explained by the view

that mature scientific theories match nature

to a substantive degree.

The main arguments against scientific realism

are:

(1) Scientific theories are underdetermined by

the empirical data; that is, the same data

permit different theories that explain them.

Therefore, empirical success is not a suffi-

cient reason to assume that a theory is true.

(2) The history of science abounds with once

empirically succesful theories that are now

abandoned (e.g., a whole cluster of nine-

teenth-century theories assuming the exis-

tence of ether as a central entity). Therefore,

empirical success is not a sufficient reason to

assume that a theory is true.

(3) Scientific realism claims that those theories

that offer the best explanation of the data

are (approximately) true. This claim is

thought to be supported by the argument

that realism is the best explanation of the

predictive success of science. However, this

argument is viciously circular because it em-

ploys the kind of reasoning the validity of

which it has to vindicate.

The main arguments in favour of transferring

critical realism from science to theology are:

(1) Like science, theology makes cognitive

claims.

(2) Science seeks to explain sense-experience

with reference to the natural world, just as

theology seeks, or should seek, to explain

religious experience with reference to a di-

vine reality.

(3) Both science and theology employ meta-

phors and models as approximative descrip-

tions of an external reality.

The main arguments against transferring criti-

cal realism from science to theology are:

(1) Religious language has an expressive or rec-

ommending function, rather than a cognitive

one. Therefore, theology should not be con-

cerned with an external divine reality.

(2) Theology concerns itself with God, who is

wholly different from the natural world,

which is the subject matter of science.

(3) Theology cannot refer to a similar predictive

success as science. Therefore, theology lacks

a counterpart of the principal reason for a

realistic view of science.

In evaluating a critical realist view of science

and theology it may be useful to realize that the

discussion of scientific realism has focused on sci-

entific theories, especially on unobservable theo-

retical entities. One should not forget, however,

that science is more than theories. It comprises

also a wealth of observation statements and state-

ments of primary relations, such as the statement

that the specific gravity of lead is approximately

11.4. Although such statements are not theory-free,

they will often have a realist plausibility that will

even be acknowledged by most instrumentalists.

As a consequence, a realist understanding of large

parts of science seems to be a plausible option.

However, scientific realism can hardly be a global

view of science. Realistic plausibility has in princi-

ple to be established for each proposition and the-

ory in particular. It would seem that this specifica-

tion lessens the force of those arguments against

scientific realism that aim at a global view.

As for the plausibility of transferring critical re-

alism from science to theology, it should be real-

ized that there are great differences between the-

ology and science. As a reflection on religion,

theology is primarily concerned with the question

of the meaning of life, which implies that theol-

ogy, unlike science, has an existential dimension.

This does not, however, alter the fact that theo-

logical statements, insofar as they are propositions

about God, make cognitive claims. Hence, critical

realism is at least a logically possible view of the-

ological propositions. But since God is not acces-

sible to sense experience and experimental con-

trol, critical realism can hardly have the same

rational plausibility for theology as for science. It

would seem that a critical realist view of theology,

or rather of particular theological propositions

about God, is only a viable option within the con-

text of faith.

See also COHERENTISM;EPISTEMOLOGY;KANT,IMMANUEL;

EALISM

Bibliography

Barbour, Ian G. Issues in Science and Religion (1966).

New York: Harper and Row, 1971.

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Barbour, Ian G. Myths, Models, and Paradigms: A Com-

parative Study in Science and Religion. New York:

Harper and Row, 1974.

Leplin, Jarrett, ed. Scientific Realism. Berkeley: University

of California Press, 1984.

McMullin, Ernan. “Enlarging the Known World.” In Physics

and Our View of the World, ed. Jan Hilgevoord. Cam-

bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Peacocke, Arthur. Intimations of Reality: Critical Realism

in Science and Religion. Notre Dame, Ind.: University

of Notre Dame Press, 1984.

Polkinghorne, John. One World: The Interaction of Science

and Theology. London: SPCK, 1986.

Psillos, Stathis. Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks the

Truth. London: Routledge, 1999.

van Huyssteen, J. Wentzel. Theology and the Justification

of Faith: Constructing Theories in Systematic Theol-

ogy. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1989.

van Kooten Niekerk, Kees. “A Critical Realist Perspective

on the Dialogue Between Theology and Science.” In

Rethinking Theology and Science: Six Models for the

Current Dialogue, eds. Niels Henrik Gregersen and J.

Wentzel van Huyssteen. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerd-

mans, 1998.

KEES VAN KOOTEN NIEKERK

CULTURE,ORIGINS OF

The dawn of culture may be the single most im-

portant development in human evolution. Some-

times people find their dependence on culture

frustrating, but overall it is far more an enabler

than a limitation. The human ability to think would

be grossly constrained without language, however

often people find themselves at a loss for words.

Humans would not be human without culture to

mediate their relationships with the environment,

with other humans, with spirits and deities, and

with abstract or imagined worlds like mathematics

and the future.

Despite many suggestions, the definition E. B.

Tylor used when introducing the term culture to

anthropology is still popular: “that complex whole

which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, cus-

tom and any other capabilities and habits acquired

by man as a member of society” (p. 1). Lee Cronk

and others have preferred not to include behavior,

seeing culture as socially transmitted information

or, as Clifford Geertz, puts it, patterns for behavior,

not patterns of behavior.

Most traditional peoples have explanations of

cultural origins, myths about the first fire or the gift

of corn. Intensifying this quest for knowledge of

cultural origins with new information about cultures

all over the world, Enlightenment philosophers tried

to imagine an original “state of nature.” The seven-

teenth-century philosopher Thomas Hobbes envi-

sioned perpetual war, concluding that individuals

would gladly give up unbounded liberty for the pro-

tection of government. The eighteenth-century

philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s vision was a

celebration of freedom, equality, and the unfettered,

uncorrupted individual. But whatever life can or

should be it is clear that for humans the “natural”

state is within society, enveloped by culture.

What is known about the prehistory of cul-

tural origins is easily outlined. The following sce-

nario is primarily derived from Richard Klein, with

insights from Merlin Donald on the interrelation of

culture and cognition. The data suggest brief peri-

ods of rapid transition, which is one reason many

paleoanthropologists prefer the Eldredge-Gould

punctuated-equilibrium model of evolution to

neo-Darwinism.

The appearance of flaked stone tools 2.5 mil-

lion years ago, the earliest known evidence for cul-

ture, coincides with the appearance of the first

people with brains proportionally larger than apes.

This is Donald’s mimetic stage of cognitive devel-

opment, representing emergence of the ability to

mime, to imitate, and to re-enact events. The ap-

pearance of the first people with fully human body

proportions about 1.7 million years ago was prob-

ably coincident with invention of the hand axe and

the first hominid movement out of Africa.

A rapid increase in brain size about six hun-

dred thousand years ago correlates with develop-

ments in lithic technology and the appearance of

archaic Homo sapiens. This development corre-

sponds to Donald’s mythic stage, in which the in-

creased pace of technological innovation is evi-

dence of true human language. The timing of

language, however, remains deeply contentious.

The “creative explosion” or “Big-Bang” of

human cultural development occurred about forty-

five to fifty thousand years ago with the appear-

ance of the fully human creative use and manipu-

lation of culture. This development corresponds to

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Donald’s theoretic or modern culture stage, which

was marked by the ability to enhance what is pos-

sible with the brain alone through externalization

of memory.

When did human culture first appear?

One could legitimately place culture’s origins at

any of these stages. One could even place the ori-

gin of culture earlier, since stone tools may not be

the first products of culturally based behavior; this

would place the origins of culture well before the

appearance of the human species. As recently as

the 1970s it was a virtual truism that only humans

had culture. But by 1973 Jane Goodall had

recorded thirteen forms of tool use and eight social

activities distinguishing the chimpanzees of

Gombe in Tanzania from those at other study sites.

Goodall proposed a cultural origin for these varia-

tions, and recent work has amply reinforced that

view. Andrew Whiten and Christophe Boesch

argue that chimpanzees display not only individual

cultural traits but sets of distinctive behaviors that

can be thought of as, for example, “Gombe cul-

ture” or “Teï culture.”

Nonhuman culture or proto-culture is wide-

spread among primates. Indeed, John Bonner pro-

vides many examples of animals, including birds,

that are capable of behavioral transfer of informa-

tion. But human culture is cumulative and makes

use of symbolism. Human culture is also uniquely

creative, flexible, diverse, and capable of both

rapid change and remarkable stasis, even in chang-

ing environments. The “creative explosion” or “Big

Bang” of human development likely represents the

move from proto-culture to a truly human sym-

bolic and cumulative culture. Human culture has

become a newly emergent property of life that no

longer needs to wait generations for genetic

changes but can rapidly effect behavioral changes.

Sources, causes, and correlates of culture

What follows is a sampling of major contemporary

theories of cultural origins, beginning with models

of cultural evolution. Though not strictly theories

of origins, they are essential for understanding

how culture works and how cultural diversity

came about.

For sociobiologists, natural selection is central,

controlling even the details of human thought. Cul-

tural origins and contemporary diversity are based

on genetic differences in human populations. A re-

cent variant, evolutionary psychology, accepts the

criticism that genetic change cannot even remotely

keep pace with cultural change, but retains the

view that what people believe and do is based on

genetic adaptations. Thus, how contemporary hu-

mans think is constrained by genes selected for the

ways of life of earlier humans. Contemporary hu-

mans are basically hunter-gatherers ripped from

the savanna, with mind ill suited and ill at ease

with city life—a modern “expulsion from the gar-

den” myth that attributes deep human dilemmas to

gene-environment mismatch. With great clarity

Holmes Rolston presents many important reasons

why strong versions of these theories do not suc-

ceed. Early humans lived under varying conditions,

not a single environment of adaptedness, and be-

haviors are not directly programmed by genes.

Further, ideas can be transmitted to unrelated, even

unknown, individuals.

Some scholars prefer to understand culture as

radically separate from biology. This is the tradi-

tional anthropological perspective; Alfred Kroeber’s

influential “superorganic” notion views culture al-

most as having a life of its own, molding each indi-

vidual far more than individuals mold culture.

Memetics proposes a new kind of replicator, the

meme an element of culture passed on by non-ge-

netic means. Culture is a meme’s way of replicating

itself; beliefs and opinions are survival tricks memes

use for self-perpetuation. Strict forms of these theo-

ries, however, would only work if cultures were

composed of genuinely distinguishable units. In ad-

dition, the transmission processes (analogies with

disease organisms abound) presume an unreason-

able passivity in human communication.

Recognizing that human lives are influenced

both by genes and by culturally transmitted ideas,

gene-culture co-evolution or dual inheritance

models ask how these influences relate. Impor-

tantly, it can be acknowledged that beliefs and be-

haviors are selected and transmitted by various

means; it is only the overall mix that must be adap-

tive. William Durham demonstrates in, for exam-

ple, his lactose tolerance case study that culture

can be a causal force in human genetic evolution.

Sexual selection. Geoffrey Miller believes much

of human culture (e.g., the arts, ritual, ideology)

makes more sense as courtship display than as sur-

vival adaptation. Mate choice selects for indicators

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of fitness, which can explain interesting features of

humanity. For example, because courtship displays

need only indicate fitness, belief systems could de-

velop that “work” even though they do not accu-

rately depict the world.

Causal events, triggers, and mechanisms.

Another approach is to isolate one or a few vari-

ables as causes for the development of culture.

Distinguishing human labor from animal behavior,

the nineteenth-century social scientist Friedrich En-

gels proposed production as the primary factor,

while Randall White and others suggest a trend to-

ward increased group size. Social groups com-

prised of more people required more complicated

social organization than do small, family-size

groups, creating demands on communication.

Michael Pfieffer has proposed an environmental

change as the causal event. Rick Potts argues that

the human innovation was to develop flexible cog-

nitive abilities to face regular climate changes.

Richard Klein argues that a single genetic mutation

completed the modern brain, triggering the human

capacity for culture. There is growing reason to

believe genes are only indirectly connected to phe-

notype, yet there is also evidence that one change

can make a dramatic difference. Michael Tomasello

believes that a new form of social cognition, the

ability to see other humans as intentional beings,

triggered cognitive-cultural co-evolution.

Cooperation, altruism, and love. Elliott Sober

and David Sloan Wilson argue in Unto Others

(1998) that self-giving behaviors may benefit a

group enough to compensate evolutionarily for any

harm caused to individuals within the group. And

Adrienne Zihlman points to the great importance of

mother-infant interaction in the development of pri-

mate sociality. This emotional closeness and com-

munication prepares individuals for culturally

based cooperation and self-giving better than if so-

ciety is, as alternative interpretations suggest, an

endless power struggle. For Catherine Key and

Leslie Aiello as well, cooperation defines humanity.

Blood relations. The developing human brain

came with great costs especially to females whose

reproductive strategy would have emphasized

helping offspring reach maturity. The primate male

strategy would have been to fertilize as many fe-

males as possible. Culture began, Chris Knight ar-

gues, when females obtained male energetic in-

vestment by confusing the males about the

female’s fertility state, thus tricking the males into

sticking around. Menstruation is an obvious clue to

pending fertility, and males, with only one thing

on their minds, would turn away from nursing fe-

males to more fertile females just when most

needed. Solution? Females could paint themselves

red and all would appear equally fertile.

Relevance to science-religion dialogue

Whatever else one may conclude, Knight’s pro-

posal suggests that human agency and purpose are

part of what needs to be explained. From this brief

survey of theories of cultural origins, it is clear that

human thought is probably not genetically deter-

mined in detail. And because cultural origins and

transmission are quasi-independent of genetics,

one can ask of an idea not just whether it spreads

genes but how well it describes the world. Humans

regularly create new ideas and pass them on non-

genetically. One implication is that, to the extent

values and virtues are culturally based, they do not

need to be explained by natural selection on genes.

It would still be valuable to know whether al-

truism and true other-regarding love can arise by

natural selection. John Polkinghorne and his col-

leagues have argued that love may be a deep fea-

ture of the universe itself, not just of human cul-

tural beliefs. The study of human cultural origins

may have something to contribute to this debate.

Understanding human cultural origins is also

important for the science-religion dialogue because

it raises important issues for understanding each of

these elements of culture. For example, to the ex-

tent that human culture and behavior are only

loosely tied to our genetic variation and to our

evolutionary history, the religious and scientific

quests could do more to put us in touch with a re-

ality outside of our individual subjective selves

than some existing models of human nature allow.

As another example, religion and ethics are very

likely human universals, originating early in human

cultural evolution. If love is a significant feature of

reality and to the extent that human culture

evolved out of cooperation and self-giving as Zil-

man suggests, religion and ethics could be more

central to and indicative of human culture than we

usually allow. Their origins could, in turn, be im-

portant in cultural origins. Could it be that the ori-

gins of the human religious, spiritual and ethical

sense was an essential piece in the puzzle of the

origins of human culture and so of humanity itself?

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