The one consistent exception to this trend is the concern of both comparativ e
politics and Japanese politics with democracy and its viability. Democracy was a major
issue for both comparativists and Japan specialists from World War II until the mid-
1960s. Though studies of democracy and civil society remain relevant in Japanese
studies even now, comparative politics has returned to this topic in the past fifteen
years with a passion that far eclipses the limited attention this field now receives in the
Japanese context. Comparative politics and Japanese politics have also intersected in
their shared interest in explaining economic perfor mance. Despite this shared inter-
est, however, the focus of each set of studies has been quite different. In the 1970s,
comparativists studying economic performance focused on corporatist structures
while the scholars of Japan focused on Japan’s bureaucratic structures and compan y
practices. Similarly, the recent turn by Japan specialists to analyze the economic and
bureaucratic reforms of the 1990s has also lagged behind by more than a decade the
corresponding trend in comparative politics that addressed the earlier reforms of
Western Europe and North America.
In other topic areas, the disconnect between Japanese politics and comparative
politics runs much deeper. David Laitin mentions the importance of civil wars as one
of the prominent topics in comparative politics, but this topic would find little fruit to
be picked on the Japanese analytical tree. Similarly, Ronald Rogowski identifies
heterogenous states and interest groups as some of the prime topics of comparative
politics in the 1980s, and again the Japanese case proved only tangentially relevant for
such analysis.
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Yet even when the attention of both Japan scholars and comparative
politics scholars has coincided, there has been a noticeable lack of impact of the
Japanese example on the broader, disciplinary debate. This disconnect occurs, in part,
because of Japan’s status as an advanced industrial democracy located in Asia. For
many decades Japan did not fit the stereotypical politics of its Asian and communist
neighbors, and it was geographically, linguistically, and historically isolated from its
politically similar cousin nations in Western Europe and North America. Some
Japanese-speaking scholars have even accentuated these differences, promoting
their idea of Japanese uniqueness or Nihonjinron, but this viewpoint is largely
rejected in most English-lang uage studies of Japan.
Although it is easy to reject arguments of Japanese uniqueness, Japan’s special
political circumstances are ignored at a research er’s peril. Japan is, after all, the first
non-Western state to achieve levels of political and economic development equivalent
to those of Western Europe and North America. Japan is also the only democracy
with completely free elections to have had one dominant political party over a fifty-
year period. Japan has also been an outlier in the low numbers of women involved in
politics, and its media is arguably much more docile than the media of any other
advanced industrial state. On a variety of indices, whether it is per capita tax burdens
or the nature of Japanese capitalism, Japan has arguably been at the far end of the
continuum of advanced industrial democracies. Thus, Japan’s history and character-
istics exacerbate the disconnection between sc holarship about Japan and general
political science scholarship. If Japan is just an outlier, the work of Japan specialists
can be ignored as a bit of oriental obscurity, irrelevant to our understanding of the
rest of the world. Although scholars of Japanese politics have fought this trend
vigorously, either by specifically denouncing it
27
or going to great pains to include
Japan as a case with other Western European nations,
28
the specific characteristics of
288 RAY CHRISTENSEN