Tsutsui W.M. A Companion to japanese histоry

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households of the prewar period was the live-in maid (jochu

), one of the most

common job descriptions into the immediate postwar period, when this form of

personal servitude began rapidly to disappear. The experiences of members of dispar-

ate social classes were also homogenized by common wartime and postwar travails of

the labor and military draft, eva cuation to the countryside, and hunger. Accumulated

wealth was destroyed by American bombing (although the bombing concentrated, as

in Germany, on densely settled working-class districts) and Japanese inflation. The

newly ub iquitous rhetoric of ‘‘the people,’’ ‘‘the masses,’’ and ‘‘revolution’’ was at

once normative and descrip tive of new realities. War and occupation thus initiated a

leveling process that was subseque ntly carried to its fullest extent by high-speed

economic growt h. The result was that a society characteriz ed by ferocious social

and economic inequality was converted into one of the most socially and economic-

ally egalitarian in the capitalist world.

In these ways among others, what Tsuru Shigeto called Japan’s ‘‘creative defeat’’

contributed, after a period of conflict, to the creation of a new domestic consensus

and a mass domestic market, enabling Japan’s conversion into Asia’s first mass

consumption society in the 1950s and 1960s.

Zaibatsu dissolution and economic

deconcentration also had an aspect of ‘‘creative destruction.’’ Seen by American

planners as a way to democratize Japan’s economy and to take Japan down a notch

industrially, economic deconcentration contributed to the ‘‘capital strike’’ and col-

lapse of industrial production during the early years of the occupation. Accordingly, it

was drop ped after 1948, when American policy shifted to a pro-business line of

rebuilding Japanese industry. The period of disorder also opened the way for the

rise of new companies in what amounted to an entrepreneurial revolution, another

subject that is awaiting an integrated treatment. Also critical here was the fact that,

like the civil bureaucracy (see below), banks were largely undisturbed by the re-

forms.

They were thus in place to serve as the core institutions of the bank-centered

keiretsu that reconstituted the old zaibatsu groupings in the 1950s.

Like World War I, World War II was followed by a worldwide inflation, which

verged into hyperinflation in the defeated countries. Price statisti cs at the time

became arbitrary and chaotic, b ut even officially controlled prices increased by annual

rates in the triple digits during the first half of the occupation. While Japan’s inflation

did not approach that of Germany after World War I or of contemporary Republican

China, it was an overriding fact of daily life and business decisions. Hyperinflations by

their nature are moments when economic time is speeded up – to save money and

plan in terms of a long-term monetary horizon is meaningless when money loses its

value by the day; the only rational response is to make the interval between getting

money and spending it as brief as possible, and to deal in goods rather than in money.

The other side of price controls and rationing was the diversion of goods into the

black market, a for m of illegality to which almost everyone resorted, which has

recently gotten attention in studies by John Dower and Owen Griffiths.

Inflation

and the black market were material foundations of the ephemeral, overheated

lifestyles reflected in the work of the ‘‘rogue’’ or ‘‘decadent’’ (burai-ha) writers

such as Sakaguchi Ango and Tamura Taijiro

Their consciousness and the frantic

round-the-clock lifestyles of their milieu also had a pharmacological dimension:

black-market amphetamines, not illegal until 1951, were in demand as a means to

overcome exhaustion (and to dull hunger); they were also one of few goods in ample

THE OCCUPATION 269

supply, owing to the vast amounts produced for the war effort. The crazed charact er

of the final years of the war and the first yea rs of the occupation, for many military and

ex-military men especially, can thus be understood as a mass speed psychosis. Nor

could the war itself be entirely left behind in the battle zones of Asia and the Pacific –

the safety and stability of the long postwar era makes people forget that occupation-

era Japan was filled with veteran murderers, rapists, and thieves and could not always

find an easy path back. The black markets and the gangs that burgeoned from

them drew on these men and on others displaced and orphaned by the war, a

development of lasting importance for the underground side of postw ar Japan’s

political economy.

Japan’s own liberation from Japanese militarism was simultaneously one of the final

episodes of Western colonialism in Asia. Seen from an outer, policy level, a first

impression is that America’s occupation – whether as the ‘‘phase one’’ reformist

exercise in democratization or as the ‘‘phase two’’ rehabilitation of conservative

Japan within an American alliance – was utterly different from colonialism. At a

close-up, personal level, when the character of the occupation as a racialized hierarchy

is brought to the foreground, the look and feel of occupation was much like coloni-

alism, a dimension that emerges strongly in recent work by John Dower, Yukiko

Koshiro, Michael Molasky, and Mire Koikari.

Partially for this reason, the ideas of

anti-colonial national liberation fed into a new kind of identification with Asia on the

Japanese left.

The Japanese People under Occupation

Policy history has formed the mainstream of English-language occupation historiog-

raphy, which has been a history of America’s occupation of Japan, in which the

experiences and thin king of Japanese people have been nearly invisible. Again,

Dower’s Embracing Defeat provided the first comprehensive alternative account.

Amid the desolation and disorder of the early occupation came a burst of cultural

creativity, mome ntarily experienced almost as a cultural revolution, at once enabled

by SCAP’s lifting of former police-state restrictions and restricted by SCAP’s own

pervasive censorship of film, radio, and print media. Positively, the occupation’s

media and cultural policy was expressed in ‘‘guidance’’ applied to drama, literature,

and the visual arts (though the latter was of little concern), and efforts we re made to

root out ‘‘feudal’’ aspects of Japanese culture, ranging from the martial arts to

samurai dramas and kabuki. The literature of the occupation era especially opens a

vista of subjective experiences and imaginations of the hellish and futile experiences of

war and defeat, the nervous collapse that followed, and the bursting forth of the

formerly suppressed themes of revolution and love.

The outpouring of the erotic,

grotesque, and self-consciously decadent added to the widespread feeling – even

among those who knew better intellectually – of the loss of ‘‘wholesome’’ state-

centered morality. Communist writers offered an alternative ‘‘proletarian’’ morality,

and revolutionary allegiances and Communist Party membership were for a time a

literary fad, into which J. Victor Koschmann’s Revolution and Subjectivity in Postwar

Japan provides insight. Caught in between were the ‘‘victims of a transitional period

of morality,’’ in the words of the ‘‘decadent’’ writer Dazai Osamu, who himself flirted

270 MARK METZLER

with communism but is better known for his dep iction of the decaying of the old

social elite and for his sensational double love suicide in 1948.

Often suggested in literature, the moral and spiritual transformations of the era are

sometimes touched on in historical work but rarely approached as a whol e. In 1945,

MacArthur saw defeated Japan – as did many Japanese – as ‘‘a spiritual vacuum,’’

which he imagined must be filled by either Christianity or by communism.

The

collapse of the old state-centered official morality was furthered by SCAP’s guarantee

of freedom of religion and disestablishment of state Shinto

. The dismantling of the

emperor-centered ‘‘kokutai cult,’’ which several generations of Japanese had been

taught to accept as the moral core of their national being, and the revelation of its

hollowness suddenly diminished both state and patriarchal authority. The flurry of

interest in Christianity, promoted by MacArthur, was less conspicuous than the

interest in commun ism or the interest in Japanese ‘‘new religions,’’ which suddenly

proliferated after a period of harsh repression. A bottom-up social-cultural history of

religions during the occupation era is still needed, as is a greater understanding of the

occupation’s total moral and spiritual context, which includ es also the influence of

Marxism.

‘‘Feudalistic’’ patriarchal family relations were weakened also by the legal trans-

formation of the family system, perhaps the most comprehensive and intimate in its

social effects of any of the occupation reforms. The vertically oriented big family (ie)

system, in which the household head had considerable legal power over family

members, was replaced with the small family system centered on the conjugal tie,

now established on the legal basis of female equality.

The rewritten family code also

resulted in a temporary surge of divorces, another aspect of social relations that was

‘‘restabilized’’ during the latter years of the occupation. The deep linkages of the

multi-generation ie system to the old family-state ideology made the reform of family

law a profound political question as well. The conne ctions between legal provisions

and actual family relations are complex and non-obvious, and the effects of these

changes are in need of deeper research.

The larger subject of women’s occupation and the occupation as a phase in gender

history is, despite its pivotal importance, only recently opening up as a field of active

research. Susan Pharr’s brief but significant 1987 study explained the adoption of

highly progressive women’s rights legislation as the outcome of a policy alliance

between Japanese feminist activists and lower-ranking female officials within

SCAP.

Dower focused attention on both the gender and specifically sexual aspects

of the occupation, and Koikari’s forthcoming study opens up the subject further by

applying ideas adopted from studies of colonialism, gender, and cold war cultural

studies.

Women’s liberation was bound up with the idea that American women

were the world’s most liberated and that carrying American women’s freedom to

others was part of a historical mission, a complex of ideas and practices recently

deployed to justify the invasio n and occupation of Muslim countries. Granting

equal rights to Japane se women can also be seen, and was seen by many Japanese

men, as American men taking Japanese men down another notch, as an effort ‘‘to

destabilize existing Japanese male dominance in order to establish their own domin-

ance,’’ in the words of Mire Koikari. This impression was strengthened by the way

that SCAP ignored requests by Japanese women’s groups to reform prostitution,

which might have reduced American sexual access to Japanese women, and it

THE OCCUPATION 271

conformed to the racialized and sexualized terms in which many occupiers under-

stood the entire undertaking.

American culture itself suddenly went from being banned to being encou raged

and emulated. American wealth, power, and self-confidence contrasted in the

starkest way with Japanese misery, and the widespread yearning (akogare) for America

that is so conspicuous in postwar Japanese popular culture developed in a rush

of American food, big band music, and Hollywood movies. The impression in

Japan of the brightness of the American culture of the era was furthered by SCAP’s

banning of American works that depicted the darker sides of American life, such

as The Grap es of Wrath. Hunger combined with the availability of American food to

change dietary customs, one facet of what Dower called ‘‘horizontal westernization,’’

an unprecedented mass encounter between non-elite Americans and non-elite Jap-

anese quite different from a past history of international contacts mainly at the level

of well-educated elites. This encounter was also highly sexualized, as most of the

occupiers were men, and it was Japanese women who often experienced the

most personal interactions. Children who had learned to sing military songs in school

now learned Stephen Foster songs like ‘‘Old Black Joe,’’ taught as democratic

American minka (people’s songs). For Japanese musicians, jamming with American

GIs was another form of horizontal Westernization, and the cultural explosion of

the occupation years also encompassed music, especially jazz.

Many American

practices impor ted then have been naturalized and their exotic origin has

become invisible; many cultural ‘‘borrowings’’ were merely temporary; here and

there, in the bowling alleys or in the watery ‘‘Amerikan’’ coffee and egg salad

sandwiches served in old-fashioned coffee shops, are oddly preserved fragments of

mid-twentieth-century Middle American culture. Despite the fact that this was a

military occupation involving hundreds of thousands of American troops (and

many British Commonwealth personnel as well), historians’ focus on policy has

meant that the experiences of ordinary GIs have gotten little study. More neglected

still has been the Japanese side of the encounte r. Oral histories are especially needed,

and given the time-consuming nature of oral history research, there is a danger that it

will not get done before the generation who fully experienced the occupation passes

away.

While the cold war context of American policy has now been outlined in convin-

cing detail, the story of the ‘‘cold war’’ inside Japan, unfolding amid expectations of

impending world revolution, remains to be grasped as a social, cultural, and political

whole. Dower’s Embracing Defeat is one of few works to convey the feeling of

revolutionary excitement of the era. Factory seizures and production control by

workers’ councils, a high point in the postwar revolutionary su rge, have been detailed

by Joe Moore.

The radical student movement that absorbed the energies of much

of a generation is part of the experience of the educated elite of the high-speed

growth era that is rarely brought into historical consciousness. And most historical

understandings of the role of the minority but influenti al Communist Party remain

caught up in cold war categories. The most detailed English-language studies were

themselves part of the anti-communist project, while more sympathetic accounts

often show a reflexive ‘‘anti-anticommunism,’’ glossing over the party’s Leninist

character and the role of the Cominform, and failing to convey either the grandeur

or the pettiness and pathos of revolutionary politics.

272 MARK METZLER

The Japanese State under Occupation

The occupation was above all a political event, and the central focus of occupation

historiography, properly, has been on the occupation’s political reforms. The most

important of these was the new constitution adopted in November 1946. Because

these reforms have been so well studied, I pass over them here, and refer the reader

again to the works of Dower and Takemae Eiji.

Recent studies have clarified the role

of Japanese policy input and the role of the Japanese bureaucracy in implementing

and partially reshaping the reforms, although the fact that many Japanese government

archival materials remain closed continues to keep these processes obscure. These

questions are closely connected to the survival and modification of the reforms into

the post-occupation period.

Despite so much attention to the reforms initiated by SCAP, the English-language

historiography is underdeveloped when it comes to the Japanese political history of

the period, which is extraordinarily dense and complex. Except for Dower’s 1979

study of Yoshida Shigeru, most of the work in English is by Japanese scholars, of

which Masumi Junnosuke’s translated volume Postwar Politics in Japan is the most

fundamental.

The purge of politicians associated with the wartime regime after

January 1946 radically reordered the political parties and brought the ‘‘early’’ ap-

pearance of a new generation of political leaders. The partisan politics of the period

thus shows the same kind of flux and recrystallization seen in other social domains,

although in this case the lasting shape of Japan’s postwar party system emerged only

three years after the lifting of the purge restrictions and the end of the occupation.

The flux in the political parties contrasted to the relative lack of disturbance in most

branches of Japan’s civil bureaucracy, purged of its top leaders but essentially con-

tinuous across the divide of war and occupation. Thus, under indirect occupation, the

Japanese state persis ted without administrative rupture. SCAP further enhanced the

place of the civil bureaucracy by eliminating the rival claims to power by military and

aristocratic circles, and Chalmers Johnson has forcefully argued that the occupation

reforms served in the end to provide a democratic facade masking bureaucratic

hegemony.

The Diet, despite being officiall y made the highest organ of the state

in the 1946 constitution, remained under the occupation what it had been during the

prewar period – peripheral. This makes it all the more important to understand the

extraordinarily complex intra-bureaucratic politics of the period, dur ing which the

Japanese state was overlaid by the occupation superstate to form a double bureau-

cracy. SCAP itself encompassed left-leaning New Dealers and rightists such as

MacArthur’s intelligence chief Charles Willoughby, who already in September 1945

was reassuring the Japanese army’s vice chief of staff that he too was a ‘‘militarist’’ and

that they ought to work together.

Thus a set of transnational US–Japanese alliances

emerged, as detailed especially by Takemae – whether reformist alliances between

SCAP New Dealers and progressive Japanese bureaucrats, politicians, and civil

groups; or alliances for course reversal and restoration between SCAP conservatives

and Japanese conservatives. The task of understanding is eased by the fact that

occupation imposed a brief and unprecedented transparency on the usually opaque

Japanese bureaucracy. But foreign occupation also made dissimulation into a principle

of organizational survival and forced much of the real politics to become more than

THE OCCUPATION 273

ever covert and informal. SCAP’s relations with Washington were also complex;

MacArthur’s jealous protection of the autonomy of ‘‘his’’ occupation ended after

1948–9 when Washington reasserted its authority (and as Wall Street regained

influence in Washington).

When conservative leaders were purged in 1946, the Japanese conservative main-

stream itself was forced underground. Underground conservative politics were par-

alleled by and profitably intertwined with the underground economy, suddenly

bloated by the organized looting of military stores immediately after the surrender.

The tangled web of underground connections that developed between purged mem-

bers of the governing elite, organized crime, and unrepentant ultranationalists

remained in place when the purgees resumed open political activity after the occupa-

tion. In a detailed study of the police under occupation, Christopher Aldous argued

that, despite being disarmed and temporarily decentralized, the police continued to

look to their ‘‘traditional masters,’’ an alliance of politicians and bureaucrats who

constituted a ‘‘shadow government,’’ now connected to organized crime groups and

the black market, which itself was ‘‘a support for the old regime.’’ In this domain –

which like the educational system, was a point at which the state impinged most

directly on daily life – the authoritarian, centralized prewar system remained the real

essence of the postwar system, Aldous concluded, and the occupation reforms were

tatemae, a conventional facade.

The picture of occupation politics is incomp lete without a full account of the place

of leftist–progressive forces, who often had a vital role in realizing occupation reforms

and were even more important in maintaining and defending the reforms and

ultimately in limiting the scope of the conservative reverse course. Japan’s highly

centralized education system, for example, like the national police system, was recen-

tralized under the conservative Ministry of Education in the 1950s, but the leftist

teachers’ unions formed during the occupation continued to resist the reverse course

and served as a core of the postwar progressive opposition.

After World War I, postwar economic stabilization as an international project had

failed, yielding the Great Depression. After World War II, economic stabilization

succeeded, also internationally. In Japan’s case, the process of economic stabilizatio n

was overlaid on and inseparable from the dynamic of reform and course reversal.

During the first phase of the occupation, the chief economic policy initiatives – labor

reform, land reform, economic deconcentration – were undertaken to further the

political goals of democratization and demilitarization. Otherwise, even as American

authorities engaged in active political and social ‘‘engineering,’’ they left the eco-

nomic engineering to the Japanese government, which directed massive subsidies to

the vital coal, electrical power, steel, and fertilizer industries. T hese industrial subsid-

ies were funded by inflationary means (in effect, by taxing Japanese consumers). At

the same time, owing in part to MacArthur’s determination to keep American

companies out, SCAP engaged in no concerted effort to exploit Japan economically

(beyond the sheer fact of making the Japanese people pay the cos ts of the occupation

itself). The relatively hands-off American approach to macroeconomic policy changed

in February 1949 when SCAP economic advisor Joseph Dodge took direct control

over Japanese government budgeting and imposed a deflationary ‘‘overbalanced’’

budget. Dodge’s price stabilization succeeded in closing the gap between official and

free (‘‘black’’) market prices; or, to put it another way, brought a return to

274 MARK METZLER

re-legalized, re-regulated marke t activity. At the same time, to enable the recovery of

Japanese foreign trade, the Japane se yen was fixed at 360 yen to the dollar, placing the

yen on a de facto US dollar standard, another foundation of America’s postwar

international hegemony.

In the end, however, full economic stabilization came

only with the Korean War, when massive US military procurements in Japan ended

Dodge’s stabilization depression and – after four and a half years of postwar economic

disorder – initiated a robust economic recovery. Korean War spending in Japan was

thus the functional equivalent of American Marshall Plan aid in Wester n Europe. The

Korean War also meant Japan’s conversion into a kind of giant US military base,

bringing Japan into the hardening cold war system, formalized in September 1951 by

the San Francisco Peace Treaty and US–Japan Security Treaty. Thus, the period of

fluidity from August 1945 to 1947–8 ended with a phase of recrystallizat ion that was

equally decisive for establishing the shape of the postwar institution al order and in

some ways remains less well understood.

The Ongoing Occupation

The formal occupation of the Japanese mainland ended on April 28, 1952, but the

occupation persisted in certain respects through the 1950s, as post-independence

Japan continued to be seen by both Japanese and Americans as an informal US

protectorate. The US–Japan Security Treaty in its initial form from 1952 until

1960 was an ‘‘unequal treaty’’ that provided for the presence of hundr eds of thou-

sands of US troops in Japan and provided for possible US military intervention in

Japanese domestic conflict; the pact could be terminated only with American agree-

ment. Outright US military government in Okinawa laste d to 1972, and the ongoing

heavy basing of US troops there means that a kind of occupation continues to the

present.

The occupation also indisputably opened a new histo rical era, the ‘‘present age’’

(gendai) in Japanese historiography, even if this sense of a new beginning serves also

to obscure the substantial continuities of the prewar regime into the present. The

remarkably stable institutional framework that was solidified in the early 1950s was

the concrete social condition of the peace and prosper ity of the ‘‘long postwar’’ era

that followed, and this manifestly robust social settlement was established during the

occupation and the years immediately after. For the generation who built the postwar

‘‘economic miracle,’’ the occupation was a personal departure point, a generationally

formative experience of hunger, difficulty, and hope. Politics too, from the advent

after 1960 of Prime Mini sters Ikeda Hayato and Sato

Eisaku until the end of

uninterrupted Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) hegemony in 1993, was dominated

by the generation who entered politics during the occupation. At the same time,

efforts to settle accounts with the occupation – meaning primarily efforts to revise

Japan’s American-authored constitution – have been a feature of conservative polit ics

since the 1950s and have recently taken on a renewed insistence. Conversely, a central

task of leftist–progressive politics has been to preserve intact the constitution and

other liberal occupation reforms – a picture of ‘‘revisionist’’ conservatives and of

defensive progressives upholding the constitutional status quo. In the United States,

the occupation was also an origin point for the new academic field of Japanese studies

THE OCCUPATION 275

and for postwar American understandings of Japan. The wider issues at stake in these

understandings are revealed in the way that America’s remaking of Japan inspired the

occupation of Iraq in 2003. The consequences of that occupation will surely color

future writing on Japan’s own occupation.

It may also be that the occupation’s historical place will dim inish with time. Pivotal

as the occupation was, American accounts sometimes exaggerate its effects, causing a

mistaking of surfaces for realities in Japan’s postwar politics and economics. The

counterpart of such exaggeration is the minimizing of the occupation’s effects in

many Japanese accounts, which suggest that occupation reforms merely completed

efforts that were already under way domestically. The logic of national histo riography,

national amour propre, and the renaturalizat ion of the occupation into the stream of

Japanese history all seem likely to further such tendencies toward minimization. Even

if minimized and elided, however, the occupat ion continue s to present the historical

spectacle that the Meiji Restoration once did – of an incomplete task, whether of

incomplete democracy, or of the incomplete reconstruction of a self-respecting Japan

that can reclaim its place among the powers.

NOTES

1 Quoted in Barshay, The Social Sciences in Modern Japan, p. 61.

2 The volume of English-language writing and the amount of it written during or soon after

the occupation itself can be gauged by the 867-page mass of Ward and Shulman’s

indispensable 1974 annotated bibliography (The Allied Occupation of Japan, 1945–

1952), which lists 3,167 items (though part of the bulk consists of poorly informed

magazine articles whose main value is to illustrate American attitudes at the time). Shul-

man added a 47-page supplement summarizing more recent scholarly work in 1980

(Bibliography on the Allied Occupation of Japan), supplemented further in his 1989

annotated bibliography of Japan (Japan, pp. 109–16). A 37-page bibliography that lists

more recent work is Dower, with George, Japanese History and Culture (pp. 375–414),

which also includes a listing of published archival materials. Critical reviews of the

literature at various points in its development have been written by John Dower, ‘‘Occu-

pied Japan and the Cold War in Asia’’; Ray Moore, ‘‘The Occupation of Japan as

History’’; and Carol Gluck, ‘‘Entangling Illusions.’’ Key primary sources are located in

American archives, above all the massive Records of the U.S. Occupation of Japan, held in

the National Archives, College Park, Md. (Microfiche copies are also held in the Kensei

Shiryo

shitsu of the National Diet Library, Tokyo.)

3 The Allied powers whom SCAP formally represented were excluded from the actual

business of government and, unlike the divided occupation of Germany, the occupation

of Japan was a nearly unilateral American show. British and British Commonwealth troops

also participated, in a mainly unsuccessful effort to retain some influence in the undertak-

ing (see Buckley, Occupation Diplomacy).

4 Dower, Empire and Aftermath; Schonberger, Aftermath of War; Schaller, The American

Occupation of Japan.

5 The most important of these official histories are in the 55-volume series, History of the

Nonmilitary Activities of the Occupation of Japan.

6 An exchange on the subject can be found in Williams, ‘‘American Democratization Policy

for Occupied Japan’’ and the accompanying replies by John Dower and Howard Schon-

berger.

7 See Mercado, The Shadow Warriors, pp. 174–80, 203–4.

276 MARK METZLER

8 The land reform is examined in Dore, Land Reform in Japan, a work that seems unlikely

to be superseded.

9 Tsuru, Japan’s Capitalism, pp. 7–65.

10 Tsutsui, Banking Policy in Japan.

11 Dower, Embracing Defeat; Griffiths, ‘‘Need, Greed, and Protest.’’

12 See Rubin, ‘‘From Wholesomeness to Decadence.’’

13 Dower, Embracing Defeat; Koshiro, Trans-Pacific Racisms; Molasky, The American Oc-

cupation of Japan and Okinawa; Koikari, Pedagogy of Democracy.

14 Rubin, ‘‘From Wholesomeness to Decadence’’; Molasky, The American Occupation of

Japan and Okinawa; and Orbaugh, The Japanese Fiction of the Allied Occupation, provide

introductions. On the arts in general, see Burkman, ed., The Occupation of Japan, which

includes an extended discussion of SCAP censorship, and discussions of radio by Marlene

Mayo and of satire and political cartoons by Sodei Rinjiro and John Dower. These and

related themes are developed further in Sandler, The Confusion Era, and in Mayo and

Rimer, eds., War, Occupation, and Creativity. Best known internationally are the films of

the era, a subject explored in the pioneering work of Hirano, Mr. Smith Goes to Tokyo, who

explicates the movies themselves, occupation censorship and guidance, and the labor

struggles in the film industry.

15 Woodard, The Allied Occupation of Japan, pp. 243–4. Woodard’s 1972 study remains the

standard work on Japan’s religious reformation.

16 Steiner, ‘‘The Occupation and the Reform of the Japanese Civil Code.’’

17 Pharr, ‘‘The Politics of Women’s Rights.’’

18 Dower, Embracing Defeat; Koikari, Pedagogy of Democracy.

19 Atkins, Blue Nippon, pp. 170–84.

20 Moore, Japanese Workers.

21 Dower, Embracing Defeat; Takemae, Inside GHQ.

22 Masumi, Postwar Politics in Japan. The essays in Ward and Sakamoto, eds., Democratizing

Japan, provide briefer introductions.

23 Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle.

24 Atkins, Blue Nippon, pp. 180–214 (quotation on p. 196).

25 Aldous, The Police in Occupation Japan, pp. 216–17. Academic historians have mostly

shied away from the subject of organized crime, for which see Whiting, Tokyo Underworld,

pp. 7–38, and Kaplan and Dubro, Yakuza, pp. 31–55.

26 Duke, Japan’s Militant Teachers .

27 Teranishi and Kosai, eds., The Japanese Experience of Economic Reforms, brings together a

set of studies of economic reform, stabilization, and deregulation, presented as lessons

that Japan’s occupation-era experience may provide for the contemporary reform of

postsocialist economies. My own present research explores the postwar inflation and

deflationary stabilization. Forthcoming work by Scott O’Bryan examines the simultan-

eous formation of a new economically oriented growthism.

28 See Schaller,

Altered States; Molasky,

The American Occupation of Japan and Okinawa.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aldous, Christopher. The Police in Occupation Japan: Control, Corruption and Resistance to

Reform. London: Routledge, 1997.

Atkins, E. Taylor. Blue Nippon: Authenticating Jazz in Japan. Durham, NC: Duke University

Press, 2001.

Barshay, Andrew. The Social Sciences in Modern Japan: The Marxian and Modernist Traditions.

Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004.

THE OCCUPATION 277

Buckley, Roger. Occupation Diplomacy: Britain, the United States, and Japan, 1945–1952.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

Burkman, Thomas, ed. The Occupation of Japan: Arts and Culture. Norfolk, Va.: General

Douglas MacArthur Foundation, 1988.

Cohen, Theodore. Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal. New York: Free

Press, 1987.

Dore, Ronald. Land Reform in Japan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959.

Dower, John. Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878–1954.

Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979.

Dower, John. ‘‘Occupied Japan and the Cold War in Asia.’’ In John Dower, Japan in War and

Peace: Selected Essays. New York: New Press, 1993.

Dower, John. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II. New York: Norton, 1999.

Dower, John, with George, Timothy. Japanese History and Culture from Ancient to Modern

Times: Seven Basic Bibliographies, 2nd edn. Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1995.

Duke, Benjamin. Japan’s Militant Teachers: A History of the Left-Wing Teachers’ Movement.

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