The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 3: Medieval Japan

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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SHUGO AND KOKUJIN 259

of Akamatsu Mitsusuke, the shugo of Harima, Mimasaka, and Bizen

provinces, who had rebelled against the bakufu in the sixth month of

1441.

In only two and a half months he was destroyed, owing to the

desertion of his kokujin. Another example is Yamana Mitsuyuki, the

shugo

of Tango, who was defeated in the Meitoku disturbance of 1391,

again owing to the desertion of his kokujin.

But there are also exam-

ples of exactly the opposite situation. In the ninth month of 1460,

Hatakeyama Yoshinari, the shugo of Kawachi Province who had been

driven out of the bakufu, was able to hold out in his stronghold of

Hatakeyama Castle until the fourth month of 1463 - for two years and

eight months - owing to the solidarity of his kokujin vassals. There-

fore,

the lord-vassal relationship was not always weak.

In recent years, Japanese scholars have begun to reevaluate the

shugo's

authority within the entire power structure of the late medieval

period. In particular, as the research on the sengoku daimyo of nearly

all regions has become more complete,

the difficult problem of

where to draw the line between the shugo daimyo and the sengoku

daimyo once again comes to the fore. The fact that many of the

sengoku

daimyo could trace their lineage to shugo or deputy shugo has become

even more undeniable. The continuity between the Muromachi-

period shugo and the sengoku daimyo has thus been thrown into the

spotlight. For scholars, the axis of territorial power from the late

fifteenth through the early sixteenth centuries is none other than the

shugo.

Thus the power of the shugo reached its peak in the early

sixteenth century, and some even apply the term "Sengoku-period

shugo"

to the daimyo authority of this period.

At any rate, today we

are continuing to make efforts to understand better the relationship

between the

shugo

and the kokujin and cannot yet claim that the histori-

cal evidence refutes the earlier analyses based on the shugo domainal

system.

86 Nagahara and Sugiyama, "Shugo ryogokusei no tenkai," p. 19.

87 See Nagahara Keiji, ed., Sengoku daimyo ronshu (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 1986), an

eighteen-volume study by region or sengoku daimyo.

88 Imaoka Norikazu, Kawaoka Tsutomu, and Yada Toshifumi, "Sengokuki kenkyu no kadai to

tembo," Nihonshi kenkyu, no. 278 (October 1985). 42-62; Arimitsu Yugaku, ed., Sengokuki

kenryoku

chiiki shakai (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 1986), pp. 207-32, 521-78.

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

CHAPTER

THE DECLINE OF THE SHOEN

SYSTEM

The

shoen

system of landholding, one of the most important institu-

tions for organizing the economic life of medieval Japan, was trans-

formed at the end of the eleventh and the beginning of the twelfth

centuries. The transformation occurred when Minamoto Yoritomo,

who established the Kamakura bakufu, created the offices of

shugo

(military governor) and jito (military estate steward), introducing a

new layer of tenurial rights into the

shoen

hierarchy in 1185. Following

the Jokyu disturbance of

1221,

the shogunate confiscated the lands of

the nobles and warriors who had taken part in the incident and ap-

pointed its loyal retainers

(gokenin)

as jito to these lands.

Both of these

events served to establish firmly a lord-vassal relationship within the

proprietary rights structure of

the shoen

system and marked the begin-

ning of a long process that saw the emerging dominance of warrior

authority and the declining power of the central proprietor over the

land, its revenues, and inhabitants.

The appointment of jito by the Kamakura bakufu was intended to

supplement rather than supplant the land rights and political authority

of the shoen proprietors who traditionally possessed full fiscal and

administrative power over these "private lands." This policy did not

completely deny the

shorn

as a form of land proprietorship, nor did it

mean that the jito acquired exclusive proprietary rights on the

shoen

which they were appointed. In fact, the Kamakura bakufu struggled

to preserve the

shoen

system and to prevent the jito from extending

their authority beyond the scope intended by the bakufu.

Theyiw's

main duties, as envisioned by the Kamakura bakufu, were to maintain

the flow of income and services to the central proprietor and to keep

1 Following the defeat of the Taira in I185, Minamoto Yoritomo requested and received permis-

sion from the emperor to appoint jito to shoen and

kokugaryo.

Jito were appointed throughout

Japan after the Jokyu disturbance of 1221.

2 Throughout the Kamakura period, matters involving the control of

shoen

by jito and shoen

proprietors were adjudicated by the bakufu courts. The fact that the bakufu sought to extend

forcibly that authority is borne out by the judicial decisions known as saikyojo. See Seno

Seiichiro, Kamakura bakufu

saikyojo-shii,

vols. 1 and 2 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 1970).

260

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TURNING POINTS IN THE DECLINE 26l

peace. Once xhejito established themselves on the land, however, they

sought to extend their authority and control, usually at the expense of

the

shoen

officials appointed by the central proprietor to manage

shoen

affairs.

At the end of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth

centuries, important political and military events - the collapse of the

Kamakura bakufu in 1333 and the Nambokucho disturbances be-

tween 1335 and 1392 - spurred the decline of the shoen system as the

jito took advantage of these events to extend their personal control

over the shoen. By this time neither the civil government of the nobil-

ity nor the military government of the bakufu had sufficient power to

prevent the jito from extending their control.

I use the fourteenth-century Nambokucho disturbances, therefore,

as a springboard for examining the decline of the shoen system. Al-

though greatly weakened and changed in form, the shoen system did

not collapse entirely during the fourteenth century but continued to

function as a basis for land administration and control into the fif-

teenth and sixteenth centuries. The upheaval of the Onin period

(1467-9) further eroded the shoen system, but the shoen were not

completely eliminated as a form of landholding until Hideyoshi's

cadastral surveys (Taiko kenchi) were carried out in the late sixteenth

century. Although the focus of this chapter is the events of the four-

teenth century that led to the decline of the

shoen

system, my examina-

tion will extend also into the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

TURNING POINTS IN THE DECLINE OF THE SHOEN

Characteristics

of the shoen landholding

system

The shoen, which had developed by the mid-eleventh century, proved

to be an extremely successful way of securing a balance between the

demands of the ruling class for income and the demands of the popu-

lace for a stable means of livelihood. Not only did the

shoen

serve as the

primary means through which the ruling class tapped the wealth of the

countryside, it also provided the residence, workplace, and source of

sustenance for peasants and proprietors alike. The organization of

proprietary rights or tenurial hierarchy in the shoen system was com-

plex and multilayered. The most widespread means used to expand

the

shoen,

and the one that had the greatest impact on the development

of tenurial relationships, was commendation.

The shoen proprietors or overlords (tyoshu) were primarily court

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262 THE DECLINE OF THE SHOEN SYSTEM

nobles

who

resided in Kyoto (or influential religious establishments of

Kyoto and Nara patronized by the court nobility), who attained their

right to

shoen

revenue primarily through commendation. The local

notables who actually developed the land

(kaihatsu ryoshu)

were mainly

small local proprietors who held positions of influence in their area as

provincial or district officials of some sort. They used the power and

prestige of their offices to extend their landholdings. In doing so, they

faced recurrent disagreements with provincial authorities (kokuga)

over their assertion of fiscal authority over cultivators. Because of the

constant threat of provincial interference, these local proprietors

sought to protect their interests. The most common way of attaining

this protection was through the practice of commendation. The local

proprietor commended his rights of ownership to a powerful figure or

institution in the capital in return for political influence in securing

protection. Therefore, commendation was a means to bypass the

power of the provincial offices of the central government.

The

shoen

proprietors were noble-bureaucrats who did not live on

the

shoen

under their control; instead, they were absentee landlords

residing primarily in Kyoto. From their position as central noble-

bureaucrats they were able to supersede the power of the provincial

authorities on lands commended to them by a local notable. Conse-

quently, the proprietary rights structure of

the shoen

system

was

insepa-

rable from the bureaucratic structure of the central government.

The

shoen

held by these court nobles and religious establishments

were not necessarily located in a single region but were often scattered

throughout the country. The

shoen

held by the Konoe family in 1235,

for example, numbered at least 154 and were scattered from Mutsu to

Satsuma provinces.

The local notable who developed the land typically initiated the

commendation of the

shoen

to the central proprietor. In turning over

the title to his lands, he gave up little in terms of

income,

although he

relinquished the title of lord to the central proprietor. It was customary

for local proprietors to be appointed as manager of the

shoen

under the

3 Land development was carried out by local notables. Even though this land was privately held,

the kokushi tried to confiscate the land and designate it as

kokugaryo.

The local notable, to

avoid this, commended the developed land to

central noble and labored to turn it, along with

the nearby kokugaryo, into a

shoen.

The local notable often was appointed as a

shoen

official.

Collusion between the local and central nobility resulted in the partitioning of the

kokugaryo

and the spread of

shoen

throughout the entire country in the twelfth century.

4 Konoe-ke ryo shoryo mokuroku, 1253, in Konoe

Fumimaro

shozo

monjo.

For an analysis of this

form of landholding, see Nagahara Keiji, Nihon

chusei

shakai kozo

no kenkyu

(Tokyo: Iwanami

shoten, 1973), p. 57.

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TURNING POINTS IN THE DECLINE 263

terms of the commendation agreement and to continue to oversee local

administration as shokan or

jitd.

The court noble (or religious institution) to whom the land was

commended was known as the ryoke. The ryoke received a specified

share of the income from the estate in return for acting as the legal

protector of the shden, using his influence to maintain tax immunities

and intervening with government authorities when necessary. In order

to guarantee possession of the shden and to gain additional weight and

prestige from further

shden

interests, the

ryoke

would often commend a

portion of his income share to an even more influential court noble or

religious institution, such as the imperial family or the regents' family,

who was known as the honke, or guarantor. The honke acted mainly to

lend prestige to an estate's claim and generally took no interest in its

administration.

Although the shoen's authority structure varied widely, depending

on such factors as its location and the prestige of its proprietors, its

general organization can be viewed as a pyramid, with the peasant

cultivators at its base. Next came the

shden

managers who lived on the

shden, called shokan or local rydshu, who had developed and com-

mended the land. Above the shokan were the central proprietors, or

ryoke. At the peak of the hierarchy was the guarantor, or honke.

Thus,

the shden proprietor's authority - consisting of the right to

survey the land and to determine and collect the tax, and authority

over judicial affairs - was hierarchically fragmented. The shden sys-

tem, as a means to derive economic profit from the land, was not based

on direct proprietary control of the land but on its revenue. The total

income of the shden, which included all the goods and services pro-

vided by the cultivators, was divided according to the relationship of

each level in the hierarchy. These shares were called shiki and repre-

sented a specific amount of income due each rank in the

shden

hierar-

chy. Shiki were classified as honke shiki, ryoke shiki, gesu shiki, and so

forth, according to who owned the shiki right.

The shiki system was based on a relationship in which the holder of

a superior shiki right granted inferior shiki rights, although shiki could

change hands through sale, inheritance, or donation without disturb-

ing the shoen's economic function. Because shiki were alienable and

divisible, it was possible for the income from the shden to be widely

distributed. Although the shiki system was based on a hierarchical

structure, it was neither bureaucratic nor feudal but was a compara-

tively flexible union of superior and inferior rights that did not define

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

264 THE DECLINE OF THE SHOEN SYSTEM

a lord-vassal relationship regarding terms of duty and obligation.

Therefore, a resident

shden

manager

(gesu)

appointed to the

gesu

shiki

' by the

rydke

could, at the same time, be a

gokenin

of the Kamakura

bakufu.

It was difficult for the central proprietor, who usually accumulated

numerous shiki in many geographically scattered

shden,

to maintain

direct control over each

shden.

This system of proprietary rights dif-

fered dramatically from that of the daimyo of the Edo period, who

controlled contiguous domains and whose authority was backed up by

independent military forces. The central proprietors, lacking their

own military force, were forced to rely on powerful, local officials

(shokan).

They also relied on the family structure and the state struc-

ture formed by the nobility and the bakufu and the legal apparatus of

the civil and military governments to maintain the

shiki

system. Hnjitd

committed unlawful acts within the

shden,

the

shden

proprietor would

usually attempt to resolve the conflict through a legal appeal to the

court or bakufu.

Stages in the

collapse

of the shoen

The collapse of the

shden

system was closely connected to the tenurial-

proprietary structures that characterized the system. As the shiki

gradually became divorced from the specific tenure function to which

they were originally attached and changes occurred at the top of the

shden

hierarchy, important shifts were taking place at lower levels as

well.

Jitd and

shokan

gradually began to develop their own lordlike author-

ity within the

shden,

bypassing the

shiki

structure and undermining the

shden

proprietor's authority. The

shugo

began to usurp the power of the

provincial offices and to transform provincial lands

(kokugaryd)

into

lands under their personal control (shugo tyd). The

shugo

also at-

tempted to extend their authority into the

shden

of their respective

provinces. These two interrelated trends constituted a major shift

away from the fragmented shiki structure toward regionally contigu-

ous domains.

At a more basic level, the economic relationships that comprised the

5 For a more complete description of the shiki structure, see Nagahara Keiji, Nihon

chusei shakai

kozo no kenkyu, pp. 28-55.

6 For a general introduction to the

shoen

system, see Nagahara Keiji,

Shden

(Tokyo: Hyoronsha,

1978).

Also, for a general introduction to the social structure of

shden,

see Kuroda Toshio,

Shoen-sei shakai, vol. 2 of

Taikei

Nihon

rekishi

(Tokyo: Nihon hyoronsha, 1967).

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

THE GROWTH OF THE JITO AND SHOKAN 265

foundation of the shoen system were changing. This was most visible

in the actions of the shoen cultivators, the most conspicuous actions

being cultivator disputes known as do-ikki. In addition,

shugo

and jito

recruited upper-level members of the cultivator class as their military

vassals (hikan). The economic development of the village was at the

root of these changes.

As the shoen proprietors' control over the shoen became more tenu-

ous and the amount of tax rice

(nengu)

they actually collected declined,

they began to borrow money from moneylenders

(doso)

using the next

year's taxes as collateral. To collect even these reduced tax receipts,

the shoen proprietors enlisted local warriors or moneylenders, which

led to the development of

system of tax contracting called ukeoi and a

further decline in the

shoen

proprietors' authority. Their loss of control

over the shoen proper and the decline in tax receipts were critical

factors leading to the collapse of the

shoen

system.

The pattern of the shoen system's decline differed among regions.

In general, the expanding sphere of authority of the shugo and jito,

which undermined the position and authority of the shoen proprietor,

was more constrained in the Kinai region where cultivator rights

were most developed and cultivator protests prevalent. In the more

remote regions of eastern Japan and Kyushu, the shoen proprietor's

authority was undercut relatively early, and the jito., shokan, and

shugo succeeded in taking control of contiguous parcels of land. In

the Hokuriku, Tokai, Chugoku, and Shikoku regions, the strength of

the shoen proprietor was more balanced with that of the shugo and

jito.

In those areas, shugo often made the transition to daimyo, but

the shoen system was maintained for. a comparatively long time.

Regional differences, therefore, must not be overlooked when exam-

ining the decline of the shoen.

THE GROWTH OF THE JITO AND SHOKAN AS RYOSHU

The expansion of the jito's shoen

control

Jito shiki were established on

shoen

and kokugaryo in large numbers ir.

two stages. After the Gempei War (i 180-5), the emerging Kamakurs

7 The regional differences in the

shoen

system roughly followed the order of economic develop-

ment, with the Kinai, western Japan, and Kyoto being the most developed. In addition tc

economic development, the strength of the central government in a particular region was also a.

decisive factor. The authority of the

ritsuryo

state penetrated least in eastern Japan.

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

266 THE DECLINE OF THE SHOEN SYSTEM

shogunate secured authorization from the court to appoint

jito,

called

hompo

jito, to the lands confiscated from warriors associated with the

Taira. After the Jokyu disturbance of 1221, the shogunate again ap-

pointed jito to confiscated lands and termed them

shimpo,

or newly

appointed, jito. The authority of the

hompo

jito was not completely

systematized but instead was inherited from the

gesu

who managed the

shoen.

The

shimpo

jito, on the other hand, were granted benefice land

(kyuden).

amounting to the income produced by one-eleventh of the

land under their jurisdiction, in addition to the right to collect a

military surcharge

(kachomai)

five

sho

per

tan

of paddy.

This authority was not necessarily standardized. Although the jito's

authority was based on a shiki right, the jito did not have complete

control over the shoen or

kokugaryo

to which they were appointed.

Moreover, powerful bakufu retainers were often granted geographi-

cally scattered jito

shiki.

In order to maintain these scattered rights, the

gokenin

often dispatched family members to serve as deputies

{daikan)

in overseeing the

shoen.

They might choose a particular

shoen

to be

their home base and move their household there. After the Jokyu

disturbance and throughout the Kamakura period, eastern warriors

would often acquire jito shiki to

shoen

in western Japan. The Shibuya

family, for example, whose ancestral holdings were located in Sagami

Province, transferred to Satsuma's Iriki-in. The Mori family of

Sagami similarly moved to Yoshida-no-sho in Aki Province.

When jito moved to a new

shoen,

they held the rights indicated by

their

shiki

within an existing authority structure. They often came into

conflict, however, with the

daikan

dispatched by the

shoen

proprietor,

if they tried to increase their share of

shoen

revenue or assume other

elements of

shoen

control, such as police and judicial authority.

In one such confrontation between

a jito

and a

shoen

official, which

took place in 1238 on Sasakibe-no-sho in Tamba Province, which was

a holding of the Matsuno Shrine, the

shoen

official appealed to the

Rokuhara

tandai

- shogunal deputies stationed at Rokuhara in south-

eastern Kyoto by the Kamakura bakufu who supervised the political,

military, and judicial affairs of southwestern Japan - in regard to

illegal acts committed by the

jito.

The appeal charged that in order to

construct a new residence, the jito levied unreasonable labor corvee

on the shoen cultivators; he forced peasants to accompany him to

Kyoto under a levy known as the kyojofu; he forced cultivators to

work on his private lands without compensation, not even foodstuffs;

and furthermore, the jito was delinquent in his annual payments of

twenty-five koku of

nengu

from his jito myb, a delinquency that the

THE GROWTH OF THE JITO AND SHOKAN 267

appeal said amounted to a total of over three hundred koku over

seventeen years.

A similar confrontation between a jito and a shorn official occurred

in 1243 on the Daigoji's Ushihara-no-sho in Echizen Province. In this

case,

the jito disregarded custom by infringing on the traditional au-

thority of the shoen proprietor by assuming criminal jurisdiction.

Criminal jurisdiction was an important component of the

shoen

propri-

etor's authority; therefore, the jito's actions were a direct attack on

ryoshu

control over the shoen.

Incidents of this kind occurred repeatedly throughout the country.

In many cases, the shoen official appealed directly to the bakufu. The

bakufu generally sought to suppress these acts by jito that were outside

the bounds of jito shiki. Also, because the acts increased the friction

with the nobility in Kyoto, who were often the target of these illegal

actions, the bakufu's policy was aimed at controlling the jito's actions.

Despite the bakufu's policy, the jito continued to expand their control

within the shoen. As a result, the shoen proprietor, gradually losing

control of the

shoen

to the

jito,

would often turn to settlements known

as wayo (literally, "peaceful giving"), an out-of-court settlement be-

tween shoen proprietors and jito regarding the distribution of revenue

from the shoen.

Two other forms of conciliation, shitaji chubun and ukesho, posed an

even greater threat to the

shoen

proprietor's authority.

Shitaji chubun

involved the physical division of

shoen

lands into a part over which the

jito would have full authority and derive revenue, and a part under the

control of the central proprietor. In 1318, on Koyasan's Kanzaki-no-

sho in Bingo Province, in order to resolve an ongoing dispute between

the jito and the

shoen

proprietor, the land was divided equally, and each

controlled a half of the shoen." Although half of the

shoen

was handed

over to the jito, the remaining half was left free from jito interference.

This system of land division could be carried out in different ways but

was generally on a fifty-fifty basis, a major gain for the jito who was

originally entitled to only one-eleventh of the revenue.

Ukesho, also called jito uke, often represented an extension of the

8 Rokuhara saikyojo, 1238, in Higashi

monjo.

Rokuhara

gechijo, 1243, in

Hoon-in

monjo.

•

10 For more information on shitaji chubun, see Shimada Jiro, "Zaichi-ryoshusei no tenkai to

Kamakura bakufu ho," in Inagaki Yasuhiko and Nagahara Keiji, eds., Chusei no shakai to

keizai (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1962); and Yasuda Motohisa, Jito oyobi jito

ryoshusei

kenkyu

(Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppansha, 1961), pp. 426-60.

11 Ryoke jito wayojo, 1318, in Kongo

sanmai-in

monjo.

268 THE DECLINE OF THE SHOEN SYSTEM

jito's control after

shitaji

chubun.

In this instance the jito contracted

with the

shoen

proprietor to send annually a fixed amount of revenue

and services to him, regardless of the tax yield actually collected that

year. The actual control of the

shoen

was left to the jito and moved him

one step closer to being an autonomous local proprietor.

On Chibi-

no-sho in Bingo Province, the jito Yamanouchi Sudo, who had trans-

ferred to the

shoen

from the Kanto, had long been in dispute with the

shoen

proprietor over restoration of the authority to commend land

{shitaji

shinshi-ken).

In 1308, Sudo contracted to pay forty-five kan

annually to the

shoen

proprietor

jito uke.

The practice of jito uke

began early in the Kamakura period in the eastern provinces where the

bakufu's authority was strongest. By the end of the period, however,

ukesho

was increasingly being practiced on

shoen

in the western prov-

inces as well.

The jito's method of expanding their power over the

shoen

relative to

that of the shoen proprietor, by means of

shitaji chubun

or ukesho,

changed over the course of the Kamakura period. During the early to

middle Kamakura period, the;ito basically operated within the frame-

work of the shiki structure: They attempted to expand the amount of

benefice land granted to them as part of their

shiki;

in order to improve

the irrigation on their private lands, they altered the waterways for

their personal benefit, or they appropriated labor for the cultivation

their private land. Shitaji

chubun

and

ukesho,

on the other hand, gave

the jito the means to acquire their own proprietorlike authority over

the

shoen's

land and residents.

The shokan's

revolt

The jito were not the only ones to aggrandize the authority of the

shoen

proprietor. The

shokan,

especially the powerful

gesu,

also attempted to

usurp greater control over the

shoen.

On Kuroda-no-sho in Iga Prov-

ince,

a holding of the Todaiji, the

gesu,

a family named Oe, had held

the

gesu

shiki since the twelfth century. At the end of the Kamakura

period, Oe Kiyosada, the current

gesu

of the

shoen,

began to increase

his military strength by enlisting local warriors. Kiyosada then seized

control of taxation on the

shoen.

The Todaiji appealed this act to the

Rokuhara tandai, and Oe Kiyosada was arrested and exiled to Izumo

province. The Todaiji's control over the

shoen,

however, depended on

12 Concerning ukesho, see Yasuda, Jito oyobijito

ryoshusei,

pp. 339-55.

13 Rokuhara geckijo 1308, in Yamanouchi-Sudo monjo.