The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 3: Medieval Japan

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THE COLLAPSE 289

tance to the warriors incursions into the shorn. These upper-level

cultivators became known as jizamurai, or warriors of the land.

The cultivators' recalcitrance did not go unnoticed by the bakufu.

The Muromachi bakufu kept a vigilant eye on Kamikuze-no-sho and

Shimokuze-no-sho as likely places for a do-ikki to form. In 1459, the

bakufu investigated the shoen residents so as to suppress such an inci-

dent. According to the investigation, eleven residents of the two

shoen

were listed as samurai and eighty-nine persons from Kamikuze-no-sho

and fifty-six persons from Shimokuze-no-sho as cultivators.

Those

listed as samurai in the investigation most likely were retainers of the

shugo who had been recruited into the shugo's military organization.

This trend also meant that the cultivators' protests against the shoen

proprietors were taken up with an armed vigor. In fact, the agrarian

protests of this period were gradually connected with the shugo's ac-

tions and had a distinctly political flavor.

In 1441, a tokusei-ikki composed of cultivators from the Kyoto re-

gion succeeded in forcing the bakufu to issue a tokusei edict. The

outbreak of this ikki followed immediately on the heels of the assassina-

tion of Shogun Yoshinori by the Harima shugo, Akamatsu Mitsusuke,

and was tied to the conflict between two powerful shugo daimyo, the

Hosokawa and Hatakeyama. Vassal warriors connected with the

Hatakeyama lent their support to the ikki and used it in their battle

with the Hosokawa.

Given these circumstances, it is inappropriate to view do-ikki as

purely agrarian protests, as they also involved the military and politi-

cal actions of the jizamurai. Instead, it was the very complexity of

these events that was the primary characteristic of the do-ikki and

agrarian protests and that shook the foundations of the shoen system.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE SHOEN PROPRIETORS'

AUTHORITY

The

loss

of domain and

reduction

of tax

receipts

We shall next examine development relating to tax collection and con-

trol of the shoen, in order to show how both were undermined by the

agrarian protests that contributed to the increased intrusions of the

55 Kamikuze-no-shdlShimokuze-no-sho hyakusho kishomon, 1459, wo 14-jo, in Toji hyakugo monjo.

56 Concerning the relationship between the Kakitsu tokusei-ikki and the struggle between the

shugo daimyo Hosokawa and Hatakeyama, see Nagahara Keiji, "Kakitsu tokusei-ikki no

seikaku ni tsuite," in Nagahara, Nikon

chusei

shakai kozo no kenkyu, pp. 394-425.

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

290 THE DECLINE OF THE SHOEN SYSTEM

kokujin and

shugo

into the

shoen

system. Specifically, we shall look at

shoen

under the proprietorship of the Toji and their transition during

the Nambokucho period. The Shingon sect's Toji was a large temple

built at the end of the eighth century in Kyoto. It received strong

imperial support as well as the protection of the Muromachi bakufu,

which recognized the temple's military importance. Located in the

southern section of the capital, the temple could control the crucial

southern approach to Kyoto. In contrast with the holdings of the

nobility, those of religious establishments such as the Toji were to

some extent insulated from the incursions of the kokujin and

shugo

because of respect for and fear of their religious role. Consequently,

the erosion of the Toji's control over its

shoen

proceeded at a slower

pace than did that of the nobility.

The Toji had at least seventy-one

shoen

at the beginning of the

Nambokucho period. Among them were

shoen

for which Toji held

only the honke shiki and not administrative authority, such as the

twenty shoen of the Saishokoin-ryo,

and the twelve

shoen

of the

Hoshogon' in-ryo,

which originally had been imperial lands. The

Toji also held more comprehensive authority over some of its

shoen.

When the Kamakura bakufu was overthrown, Emperor Godaigo con-

fiscated the jito shiki of such

shoen

as Tara-no-sho in Wakasa Province

and granted them to the Toji. Thus there were no warrior jito on these

shoen.

There were also cases in which the Toji held only the

ryoke shiki

following a shitaji

chubun

settlement with a jito, as in the case of

Oyama-no-sho in Tamba Province and Niimi-no-sho in Bitchu where

shitaji chubun

had been carried out in the Kamakura period. Thus the

Toji held various types of authority over the

shoen

under its proprietor-

ship.

With this in mind, the

shoen

of the Toji can be divided into three

categories: those held by the Toji in name only, those from which the

delivery of tax rice continued despite the weakening of proprietor

authority, and those from which tax rice was regularly collected and

authority was maintained.

Of the Toji's domain, thirty-two of its seventy-one

shoen

were held

in name only. The majority were

shoen

to which the Toji held only the

honke shiki donated by the imperial family, as evidenced in a 1371

appeal from the Toji to the bakufu that stated, "In recent years the

57 Saishoko-in was built by Emperor Goshirakawa for Empress Kenshunmon-in and was

granted numerous shoen.

58 Hoshogon-in was built by Emperor Toba and was granted many shoen.

59 For a detailed discussion of the Toji's shoen, see Nagahara Keiji, "Shdensei kaitai katei ni

okeru Nambokucho nairanki no shioki," in Nagahara Nihon

chusei

shakai kozo no kenkyu, pp.

284-366.

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THE COLLAPSE 29I

honke have not been paid by any of our shoen."

Apart from the dues

to the honke shiki, nobles and religious establishments were also ryoke

with the right to administer the

shoen.

The honke's relationship to the

ryoke

was based on the receipt of a limited amount of tax rice from the

ryoke. When the ryoke had difficulty in collecting taxes, the role of the

honke as guarantor was rendered meaningless, and the honke shiki

became a right in name only. The shiki structure no longer operated

under these conditions. As explained at the beginning of this chapter,

the shiki system developed in response to the geographically scattered

and hierarchically ordered structure of shoen and kokugaryo. Conse-

quently, the emasculation of the honke shiki, the pinnacle of the shiki

structure, symbolized the collapse of the shoen system.

Based on a number of documents from the Nambokucho period, it

can be established that the proprietor's authority on some shoen was

imperiled, but the delivery of tax rice did not completely cease. In the

case of Shida-no-sho in Hitachi Province during the Kamakura pe-

riod, the seizure of tax rice by the jito became a severe problem.

Because the Toji's receipt of tax rice was based on a contract with a jito

(ukesho) in the case of its Okuni-no-sho in Ise Province, as the power

of the jito increased, the temple received less and less tax rice. Warfare

decreased the tax collected by the Toji from its Shihi-no-sho in

Echizen Province and Himono-no-sho in Omi. The Toji's authority on

these

shoen

was generally based on the ryoke shiki. The temple had the

right to administer the shoen, but income from it fell because of the

actions of the on-site jito. The Toji sent appeals to the bakufu and

dispatched envoys to the

shoen

in an attempt to regain its control, but

these attempts proved futile. There was little the temple could do to

regain its authority over the income from these shoen.

Some of the shoen under the Toji's proprietorship remained com-

paratively stable, and receipts were fairly well maintained during the

Nambokucho period. Although none of these shoen continued to de-

liver nengu in the amount stipulated, the Toji retained its administra-

tive rights. No warrior jito were installed on four of the fourteen

shoen

in this group (Tarumi in Settsu Province, Hirandono in Yamato, and

Hayashi and Kanno in Yamashiro), which were part of the Toji's core

holdings located near the temple. Although shitaji chubun had been

carried out in the Kamakura period in several

shoen

- Oyama in Tamba

Province, Yugejima in Iyo, Yano in Harima, and Niimi in Bitchu - the

remaining portions of each of these shoen continued to be important

60 Toji

moshijo,

1371, e 17-22, in Toji

hyakugo

monjo.

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

292 THE DECLINE OF THE SHOEN SYSTEM

holdings of the temple. The Toji also held both the jito

shiki

and

ryoke

shiki of Wakasa's Tara-no-sho and Yamashiro's Kamikuze-no-sho and

Shimokuze-no-sho. The Toji managed to protect its interests in these

holdings - crucial to maintaining its economic base - even during the

Nambokucho period.

On these

shoen,

warriors had been unable to undermine the Toji's

authority. But the temple could not collect

nengu

from these

shoen

the amount stipulated. Despite the cessation of hostilities and the

establishment of the Muromachi bakufu, the trend of declining

nengu

continued. As we saw earlier in the case of Kamikuze-no-sho, the

cultivators' protests resulted in an annual reduction of

nengu.

After the Nambokucho period, the Toji's Oyama-no-sho frequently

paid only a part of the

nengu

stipulated and even none at all. This

development was not unrelated to the great increase in

shugo

imposts

such as the

shugo busen

shugo

tansen,

paid in cash in lieu of corvee or

as an assessment per

tan

of paddy. The amount of

nengu

collected by

the

shugo

after the first quarter of the fifteenth century exceeded that

of the Toji.

The developments on Kamikuze and Oyama, even

though they were

shoen

from which the Toji still collected some

nengu,

indicate that the Toji's control was seriously threatened during the

fifteenth century.

As demonstrated in the developments on the Toji's

shoen,

only the

honke shiki was rendered completely meaningless during the

Nambokucho period. Even so, viable control was maintained only on

those

shoen

that were part of the temple's core holdings. There were

exceptions, of course, in the rate of decline in

shoen

control. The Zen

religious establishments of Kyoto's

gozan

(literally, "five mountains,"

the temples at the apex of the Zen sect's official hierarchy), two of

which were the Nanzenji and Shokokuji, received special support

from the Muromachi bakufu in the form of

shoen

donated as temple

domain (jiryo). These donations to the Zen sect were part of the

bakufu's plan to oppose the strong political influence of Hieizan which

was traditionally connected to the courtier government. During time

of financial crisis, the bakufu turned to these Zen temples and forced

them to make donations from the income derived from the donated

shoen which, in this manner, also served as bakufu domain

(chokkatsuryo).

As a result, the

shoen

of the Zen temples were pro-

tected from outside aggression through their relationship with the

61 Oyama

son-shi,

hombun hen (Tokyo: Hanawa shobo, 1964), p. 199.

62 Concerning the economic ties between the bakufu and Zen temples, see Imatani Akira,

Sengokuki

Muromachi bakufu, vol. 12 (Tokyo: Kadokawa shoten, 1975), pp. 11—18.

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

THE COLLAPSE 293

bakufu. But the Toji, which did not have such a relationship with the

bakufu, was not protected in this way.

Even

shorn

that were part of the shogun's domain, however, suf-

fered intrusion by the local kokujin and

shugo

during the fifteenth

century. The course of decline differed greatly by region. In eastern

Japan, for example, the power of the local notables (zaichi

ryoshu)

made it impossible for the

shoen

proprietors to retain administrative

control over the

shoen,

even in the Kamakura period. In the provinces

around the capital, however,

shoen

continued to survive even into the

fifteenth century. Proximity to the capital alone did not guarantee

security. Control depended on whether the

shoen

was under the propri-

etorship of

religious establishment or a noble family and whether or

not the

shoen

was the most important part of the proprietor's, such as

the Toji's, holdings. Generally, those

shoen

holders who made the

transition from holding only a part of the multilayered

shiki

rights in

geographically scattered

shoen

to those holding most of the

shiki

rights

shoen

located in geographical proximity succeeded in retaining at

least a part of their authority over their holdings and continued to

receive some income from them.

The

ukeoi daikan

system

As the power of the

shugo

and kokujin increased during the fifteenth

century, so did their control over the

shoen.

It became more difficult

for the

shoen

proprietors to exert their personal authority over the

shoen,

and the

shiki

structure was rendered meaningless. In response to

these worsening conditions, the

shoen

proprietors chose "contract stew-

ards"

(ukeoi

daikan) to represent their interests on the

shoen.

These

stewards worked outside the

shiki

structure and were chosen for their

special talents such as the ability to negotiate with the

shugo

kokujin

or for their contacts with bakufu officials who often received money

for their sympathetic attention. Basically,

ukeoi daikan

were collectors

nengu

who differed from the

shugo

and kokujin

ukesho

discussed

earlier.

Frequently, a monk from a Zen temple or Hieizan would be

chosen to act as an

ukeoi

daikan. This practice may seem somewhat

strange, but many monks of the religious establishments of this pe-

riod were skilled in the conduct of economic affairs. Those with a

Hieizan link often managed storehouses which also acted as pawn

shops

(doso)

in such places as Kyoto or Otsu, and among them were

moneylenders.

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

294

THE

DECLINE OF THE SHOEN SYSTEM

In the Zen temples were men skilled in conducting both the shoen's

and the temple's financial affairs.

In addition to managing the tem-

ple's finances, they built up personal fortunes and often lent money to

nobility and became ukeoi daikan on shoen held by the nobles. On the

back of stationery used to record daily financial entries, a courtier

named Madenokoji Tokiyoki, who became inner minister (naidaijin) in

1145,

recorded loans made by a Zen monk, Genyu. According to this

record, the monthly interest on the loans was as high as 8 percent.

These financially inclined monks contracted the amount of

nengu

be collected and, when appointed as ukeoi daikan, decided when it was

to be delivered to the shoen proprietor. They customarily took 20

percent of the contracted nengu as their own profit. After the contract

was drawn up, the daikan went to the shoen and negotiated with the

shugo and kokujin to collect the nengu which was then sold to local

merchants for cash and the shoen proprietor was paid his share.

When using this method of tax collection, the shoen proprietor de-

pended completely on the daikan's services for the collection of the

nengu and the receipt of his share in cash. His share depended primar-

ily on whether the daikan honored the contract and his effectiveness at

collecting the nengu. If the contract was broken, the proprietor's only

recourse was to replace the daikan or, abandoning the ukeoi method, to

manage the shoen directly. The latter option, however, differed little

from the ukeoi daikan method, as the

shoen

proprietor still had to send

an individual to negotiate with the shugo or kokujin.

As the shoen proprietors lost power and nengu receipts began to fall,

both the nobility and the religious establishments turned to money-

lenders. Typically this meant that the proprietor mortgaged the shoen,

using the following year's nengu as collateral. Because the shugo's and

the kokujin's intrusion into the shoen was not yet complete, both the

proprietor and the moneylender expected to be able to collect the

nengu. Even so, the moneylender did not wait passively, hoping that

the shoen proprietor would collect the nengu and pay back the debt he

owed to the moneylender. In cases in which payment was not forth-

coming, the moneylenders themselves did their best to the collect the

nengu from the mortgaged shoen. In one case, an influential Kyoto

shrine, Kamo, had a long-standing financial relationship with a money-

63 Ibid., pp. 47-60.

64 Nitta Hideharu, "Muromachi jidai no kuge-ryo ni okeru daikan ukeoi ni kansuru ichi

kosatsu," in Hogetsu Keigo sensei kanreki kinenkai, ed., Nikon shakai keizaishi kenkyu,

medieval vol. (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 1967).

65 The proprietors typically lived in Kyoto ; thus, this

ukeoi

was often known as kyosai, meaning

to be paid at the capital, or Kyoto.

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

THE COLLAPSE 295

lender named Yasui. Near the end of the fifteenth century, the Kamo

Shrine mortgaged its Tsuchida-no-sho in No to Province. One result

was that Yasui became the daikan on the

shoen

and collected the nengu

negotiated with the shugo.

Warriors also became ukeoi daikan. In 1401, a kokujin named Niimi

Kiyonao, a retainer of the Hosokawa shugo, contracted for 60 kanmon

of the income that the proprietor was to receive in Kyoto from Niimi-

no-sho, a holding of the Toji.

The ryoke's share of the nengu had

previously been 370 kanmon. The kokujin, therefore, had reduced the

ryoke's share to only 60 kanmon, from 185 kanmon: 370 kanmon minus

185 kanmon which had been lost as hanzei to the shugo. The Toji

repeatedly had problems with warrior daikan and frequently dismissed

them. For example, over the twenty years from 1441 to 1460, a re-

tainer of the Hosokawa named Yasutomi Tokiyasu, who became

daikan, failed to deliver most of the 150 kanmon contracted per year.

The records show that he delivered only 791 kanmon over the twenty

years out of the 3,000 kanmon (150 times 20) that the proprietor was to

receive under the contract.

The ukeoi daikan here was a warrior;

neither monks nor moneylenders were involved.

The ukeoi daikan system, as a method of nengu collection that

replaced the eroding shiki structure in the fifteenth century, was the

last attempt of the shoen proprietors to stave off the inevitable. The

monks, moneylenders, and warriors, in their role as ukeoi daikan,

further threatened the

shoen

proprietors' authority and income.

The daimyo domainal

system

and the shoen

The shoen system was further undermined by the eleven years of the

Onin War (1467-77). The power of the bakufu was undercut amidst

the fighting which originated over a succession dispute within the

Ashikaga family and also one involving such powerful kanrei (shogunal

deputy) houses as the Shiba and Hatakeyama. Even the powerful

shugo daimyo proved unable to control the seditious actions of the

shugo-dai

and kokujin in their domains. In order to weather the storm,

the shugo daimyo left Kyoto and returned to their respective prov-

inces,

pouring their energies into strengthening their military power.

Several political and social developments marked the period follow-

66 See Suma, "Doso ni yoru shoen nengu no ukeoi ni tsuite"; and Suma, "Doso no tochi shuseki

to tokusei."

67 Niimi-no-sho ryoke-kata shomu-shiki buninjo, 1401, yu

14-21,

in Toji hyakugo monjo.

68 Niimi-no-sho nengu mishin chumon, 1461, kei 16-24, in Toji hyakugo monjo.

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

296 THE DECLINE OF THE SHOEN SYSTEM

ing the Onin War. The

shugo

daimyo divorced themselves from the

bakufu structure and attempted to emerge as powerful, independent

sengoku

daimyo. Some

kokujin ryoshu

emerged from the chaos of the

Onin period as regional overlords who succeeded in making vassals of

many of their kokujin peers and rose as

sengoku

daimyo. Regional

leagues composed of

kokujin,

jizamurai,

and cultivators were formed,

as in Kaga Province, which were called

ikko-shu.

These organizations

were united by an underlying religious belief that fueled their resis-

tance to the

shugo.

In short, various paths were taken in pursuit of the

goal of regional control.

Even though the paths chosen were diverse, they all undermined

the shden system of land proprietorship. The

sengoku

daimyo, the

center of the new trend toward regional control, attempted to organize

as many kokujin and

jizamurai

as possible into their feudal retainer

organizations. In order to determine the amount of military service

(gunyaku) owned by each retainer, many

sengoku

daimyo used a

method whereby the retainer's fief (chigyo) was expressed in

kandaka.

Kandaka

—

an amount of cash expressed in

kanmon —

was a

means of designating the

nengu

imposed on agricultural land; the re-

tainer's military obligation was also based on this figure.

The

sengoku

daimyo consequently attempted to assign as high a

kandaka figure as possible to the retainers' land. The retainers, along

with the

shden

proprietors, resisted this drive by the

sengoku

daimyo

toward comprehensive control of the region. The daimyo, in an at-

tempt to establish a hierarchical system of land control in which their

superior political authority would be based on the right to grant

fief,

conducted cadastral surveys of the lands of the

kokujin

and religious

establishments. At the village level, the daimyos' surveys established a

new

nengu

unifying the old

nengu

and the

kajishi

into a single tax. In

those cases in which a wealthy cultivator's right to continue to collect

kajishi

was recognized, it was granted by the daimyo as benefice land

(kyuon).

In return, such cultivators were organized into the bottom

segment of the daimyo's retainer band and were known as

gunyakushu.

In addition, uncultivated land came under the aegis of

the daimyo. New fields that resulted from land development became

the daimyo's personal domain

(chokkatsuryo),

even if the fields were

69 Concerning the kandaka system, see Nagahara Keiji, "Daimyo ryogokuseika no kandakasei,"

in Nagahara Keiji, John Whitney Hall, and K020 Yamamura, eds., Sengoku jidai (Tokyo:

Yoshikawa kobunkan, 1978), pp. 1-21.

70 Katsumata Shizuo, "Sengoku daimyo kenchi no shiko gensoku," in Katsumata, Sengoku-ho

seiritsu

shiron, pp. 199-232.

THE COLLAPSE 297

located in the retainer's

fief.

These new fields, in turn, served as a new

supply of land with which to grant

fief.

These surveys were not carried out systematically, as most daimyo

did not have sufficient power to intrude their own survey teams onto

lands held fief by their vassals or by powerful religious proprietors.

There was, however, a significant variation in the success of these

surveys. In eastern Japan where the shoen system had all but col-

lapsed, sengoku daimyo such as the Gohojo, Takeda, and Imagawa

thrived. These daimyo conducted comprehensive cadastral surveys

and imposed their control throughout the entire domain. In western

Japan, however, daimyo such as the Mori of Aki Province found it

much more difficult to conduct such surveys. Kokujin in the Mori

domain managed to maintain a relatively high degree of indepen-

dence, and furthermore, the shoen proprietors' rights had not been

totally eradicated.

In the central provinces where the shoen system was most strongly

rooted, shoen continued to survive even into the civil war of the six-

teenth century. In many cases, warrior jito shiki had not been estab-

lished on these shoen, and the shoen proprietors maintained direct

control of the shoen throughout the medieval period. Even in those

cases in which local notables were present, they often were organized

into samurai status in service of

religious establishment or noble who

continued to hold shoen in these provinces. Thus daimyo such as the

Rokkaku of southern Omi, Matsunaga of Yamato, and Miyoshi of

Settsu tried to established a daimyo domainal system on the order of

their stronger eastern counterparts but proved incapable of developing

a sufficiently durable foundation.

Consequently, the

shoen

in central

Japan stubbornly persisted.

The

sengoku

daimyos' acquisition of comprehensive political author-

ity in their domains struck hard at the

shoen

system. This development

encountered important regional variations connected with the health

of the shoen in the area concerned. Despite the rise of the daimyo

domainal system in the sixteenth century, shoen continued to exist in

some form.

The rise of the sengoku daimyo not only struck at the proprietary

71 Nagahara Keiji, "Daimyo ryogokusei no kozo," in Iwanamikoza Nihon

rekishi,

vol. 8 (Tokyo:

Iwanami shoten, 1976), pp. 211-60.

72 Matsuoka Hisato, "Saigoku no sengoku daimyo," in Nagahara, Hall, and Yamamura, eds.,

Sengoku jidai, pp. 22-48.

73 For a discussion of the sengoku daimyo Rokkaku of Omi Province, see Katsumata Shizuo,

"Rokkaku-shi shikimoku no shomu rippo," in Katsumata, Sengoku-ho seiritsu shiron, pp.

153-74-

298 THE

DECLINE

OF THE

SHOEN

SYSTEM

rights of the

shoen

system but also undermined its social and economic

foundations, as seen in their organizations of craftsmen and their con-

trol of markets.

Under the

shoen

system, the markets' administration

was under the firm control of the religious establishment or zaichi

ryoshu. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, there was a

strong movement toward the local control of the markets in the hands

of the kokujin or temples. The

sengoku

daimyo, on the other hand,

established markets at locations under their direct control, such as the

main and satellite castles. By inviting merchants to the domain and

assuring them of market activities free of various restraints, the

daimyo undermined the local control of the markets by the

kokujin

and

religious establishments. Furthermore, the daimyo granted exemp-

tions from trade imposts in order to attract merchants from other areas

of the country. In this way, merchants gradually came under the con-

trol of the daimyo.

Similar developments occurred with regard to craftsmen. Under the

shoen

system, craftsmen

were

granted benefice land by

the shoen

propri-

etors as a means to both protect and control them. This benefice land

system, however, declined along with the

shoen

system in the four-

teenth and fifteenth centuries, and craftsmen became more indepen-

dent. In contrast, the

sengoku

daimyo granted fief to the foremen of

the various crafts, making them vassals who then controlled the rest of

the domain's craftsmen. Rather than grant them an exemption from

the payment of

nengu,

the daimyo required the craftsmen to deliver a

fixed amount of their specialty goods. As in their control over the

land, the

sengoku

daimyo exceeded the authority achieved by the

shoen

proprietors and

kokujin

over

the

merchants and craftsmen -

the

daimyo

achieved direct control over their actions throughout the domain. Con-

sequently, the self-sufficient

shoen

or land held by

kokujin

was replaced

by the daimyo domain, which became

single, self-contained economic

unit. This meant that

the shoen

lost their capacity for survival under the

daimyo domain system in all respects: the right to administer, land

ownership, and market control.

CONCLUSION:

THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE SHOEN

The waning of the

shoen

system advanced in several stages between the

fourteenth and sixteenth centuries. Ths first stage was the beginning

74 Fujiki Hisashi, Sengoku shakai shiron (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppanki, 1974);' and

Nagahara, "Daimyo ryogokusei no kozo."