The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 13: Republican China 1912-1949, Part 2
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STATE AND SOCIETY IN THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS 51
subsequently followed tax and other policies that encouraged the break-up
of large manors in North China and curbed landlord power in the south.
The unplanned results of these two policies were that the government
was willing to allow elites considerable latitude because they did not
control large concentrations of economic (and potentially military) power,
elites were willing to support a government generally favourable to their
interests, and the tensions between rich and poor that had been building
up during the late Ming were defused.
9S
Third, the early Manchu rulers kept taxes low and maintained a rather
small, underfinanced bureaucracy that did not penetrate below the county
level. This policy, inherited from the Ming, was supported by Confucian
ministers both on ideological grounds and because it was in the interest
of their landholding families. In the early Ch'ing the smallness of the
bureaucracy was partly offset by an efficient system of official post routes
and bureaucratic reporting supplemented by a personal information-
gathering network centring on the emperor.
96
But these devices circumvented rather than squarely addressed the
growing problem of administrative superficiality. The Yung-cheng
Emperor in the early eighteenth century made a serious attempt to provide
adequate financing for local government and official salaries but had to
move very slowly in the face of considerable opposition.
97
By the late
eighteenth century demography was playing havoc with the balance
between the bureaucratic apparatus and society. Population growth,
commercial and urban expansion outran the ability of the bureaucracy to
supervise the populace or provide necessary services. Breakdown of the
granary system was one symptom. In these circumstances the bureaucracy
could not remain static. The number of regular civil officials remained
fairly stable, at about 20,000, half of whom served in the capital, but they
were supplemented by a far larger body of low-prestige clerks, runners,
and personal servants with official functions and by more prestigious
private secretaries. The number of clerks varied with the size of the
county.
98
Government efforts to control the numbers and activities of this
sub-bureaucracy and of the secretaries were ineffectual, because population
95
See Marks, 'Peasant society',
ch. 2,
and
the
theories
of
Juzo Kawachi
set
forth
in
Grove
and
Esherick, 412. Other authors variously emphasize peasant revolts
or see
little balance between
state, gentry, and peasant interests. See additional citations
in
Grove and Esherick (404-12)
on
landholding and tax reform.
96
Fairbank and Teng, Cb'ing administration: three studies, 23-8, 44-8: Jonathan Spence, Ts'ao
Yin
and the K'ang-bsi Emperor: bondservant and master, ch.
6;
Silas
H. L.
Wu, Communication and imperial
control in China. Evolution of the palace memorial system, 1693-173 J.
57
Madeline Zelin, 'Huo-hao kuei-kmg: rationalizing fiscal reform and
its
limitations
in
eighteenth-
century China' (University
of
California, Berkeley, Ph.D. dissertation, 1979), 90-132, 348-467.
58
Chang Chung-li, The Chinese gentry, no;Ch'uT'ung-tsu, Local government in China under the Cb'ing,
39.
59"
60
-
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
52 INTRODUCTION: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
increase required larger numbers of low-level functionaries to carry out
necessary business. Throughout the nineteenth century the sale of
examination degree status added to the ranks of nominal degree holders.
In the latter part of the century the civil bureaucracy was expanded still
further by the addition of officials specializing in foreign, commercial,
industrial or military affairs, by the frequent employment of deputies
{wet-yuan) to conduct official business, and by the addition of new
specialized bureaus. The rate of this expansion was, of
course,
dramatically
increased by the reform policies of the first decade of the twentieth
century.
Particularly in the last half of the nineteenth century, an effort was made
to restructure government finances by raising land-tax surcharges, and
there was a marked increase in the percentage of revenue derived from
commercial taxes including customs duties on foreign trade. One estimate
is that government revenues in current taels approximately quadrupled
between 1753 and 1908 (or doubled in real terms if one adjusts for price
changes).
99
This was not enough, however. The Ch'ing state simply failed
to extract an adequate share of the increased national product resulting
from the growth of the economy. Serious attempts at reform were
undertaken only after the military costs of suppressing rebellions had badly
strained finances in the middle of the nineteenth century. Thereafter the
central government appears never to have brought its fiscal situation
under control. Local government remained equally underfinanced. At the
end of the dynasty, large indemnities severely strained a financially
straitened government that was suddenly attempting to expand its
functions. Increases in surcharges and new forms of taxation to finance
local reform expenditures after 1900 contributed more to political and
social unrest than to financial stability.
Aside from the structural problems besetting Ch'ing fiscal policy, there
is a large body of literature suggesting that the bureaucracy was
undermined by corruption, and the monarchy by the degeneration of the
emperors in the nineteenth century. Allowing for some exaggeration, it
nonetheless appears that the corruption inherent in tax-farming, with
officials living on their take, had become so embedded in tax-collection
and many other aspects of local government that it could not be eradicated
short of the most drastic restructuring. On the higher level, however,
corruption did not seriously threaten to engulf the entire bureaucracy
except during the late Ch'ien-lung period. Administrative checks and
regulations stifled initiative but kept the machinery functioning. During
the eighteenth century the Grand Council had gradually changed from
99
Wang Yeh-chien, Load taxation,
80, 131.
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STATE AND SOCIETY IN THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS 53
an informal means
by
which
the
emperor could circumvent
the
regular
bureaucracy to a major policy-making institution
in
its own right, capable
of keeping government going even when emperors weakened
at the end
of
the
dynasty.
100
Reorganization
of the
Grand Secretariat
at the
beginning
of the
nineteenth century
by
officials determined
to
prevent
a recurrence
of
massive corruption at the court actually improved the flow
of documents
and
gave high officials more leverage vis-a-vis
the
court.
Moreover, during much
of
the nineteenth century,
the
throne
was
able
to enlist the services
of
some remarkably able officials ranging from Juan
Yuan
to
Chang Chih-tung. This success was due more
to the
seriousness
of crises
in the
nineteenth century than
to the
abilities
of
the emperors
whom they served. Even so,
the
nineteenth-century Manchu rulers were
not pernicious,
and
other elements
in the
court appear
to
have exercised
a really disastrous influence
on
policy only during
the
last
two or
three
decades
of
Manchu rule.
The Ch 'ing government structure was riddled with flaws,
but
collapse
came
not so
much from internal bureaucratic inadequacy
or
court
degeneracy
as
from failure
to
adjust
to
societal developments. Massive
mid-century rebellions demonstrated the existence
of
problems,
but
failed
to overturn
the
political
and
social structures.
To
understand
the end of
the imperial system
one
must look
at the
political challenges that came
from
the
elite layer
of
society.
The rise
of
elite
activism
This movement stemmed naturally from the fusion
and
fragmentation
of
traditional elites, noted above. By the beginning
of
the
nineteenth century
expanding societal initiatives were evident
in a
growth
of
non-official
economic, social, and managerial activities, but an autocratic government
blocked any corresponding growth of political expression or redistribution
of political power. This situation
was
exacerbated throughout
the
nineteenth century
by
further expansion
of
societal organizations, while
the number
of
lower-level bureaucratic functionaries also increased.
The
demands
for
redistribution
of
power
did not
follow European patterns.
In
the
integrated
and
centralized Chinese state,
no
militarily powerful
group comparable
to
feudal barons,
no
peripheral
but
economically
essential class like European burghers, could demand concessions from
the state.
The
Manchu court remained extremely sensitive
to the
danger
100
Beatrice
S.
Banlett,
'The
vermillion brush:
the
Grand Council communications system
and
central government decision-making
in
mid Ch'ing China' (Yale University, Ph.D. dissertation,
1980),
296-308.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
54 INTRODUCTION: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
of internal military challenge. Despite
the
deterioration
of
the
old
military
forces,
it was
able
to
maintain control over commanders
of the new
regional/provincial armies built
up to
suppress mid-nineteenth-century
rebellions. Initial challenges
did not
arise through direct political
confrontations. They came rather through exercise
of
initiative
and
expression
of
opinion
by men in
peripheral positions,
who
accepted
the
existing system,
but
were assuming more active roles
to
meet recurrent
crises.
Tensions developed between political insiders and outsiders
in
three
areas within
the
existing state structure: extra-bureaucratic scholarly-
managerial
(or '
gentry') circles, lower levels
of
the metropolitan bureau-
cracy,
and the
treaty ports. They pressed
for
redistribution
of
power
outward from government
to
societal leaders
and
downward within
the
administrative structure.
In the
1890s
and
1900s this slowly maturing
opposition merged
and
mounted a frontal attack
on
the existing authority.
Gentry management
of
public services arose because
the
bureaucracy
was unable
to
provide necessary services
in
such fields
as
water control,
order,
and
welfare
at the
local level. Dike administration,
for
instance,
had been
a
service obligation during
the
Ming dynasty,
but
after
the
collapse
of the
li-chia system
a new
system
had to be
devised.
101
Management
by
yamen underlings
was
fraught with problems, arising
both from corruption
and
from inadequate financing. Elite management
and contributions offered
an
alternative solution. There
are
isolated
references
to
gentry participation
in
public works management
in
such
areas
as
Shanghai
and
Ningpo during
the
seventeenth century. During
the second half
of the
eighteenth century, local elites appear
to
have
participated more frequently
in
public management,
and by the
early
nineteenth century
one
begins
to
find specific references
to
'gentry
managers' (jhen-tung,
tung-shih).
102
'Gentry management' grew
up at
different speeds
in
different places, depending upon local needs
and the
vigour
and
wealth
of
local elites,
but by the
mid-nineteenth century
it
appears
to
have been
a
widespread phenomenon. Merchants,
as
well
as
gentry, managed public institutions. Guilds
in
cities like Hankow
expanded
the
services rendered their members
to the
community
at
large.
103
Autonomous management grew rapidly
in
three phases during
the
second half
of the
nineteenth century.
The
first impetus came during
the
101
Elvin,'Market
towns',
457.
102
Ibid.
462—3,
472; Shiba, 'Ningpo', 442.
•°3 For an example involving riot-suppression, see William
T.
Rowe,
'
Rebellion and its enemies
in
a late Ch'ing city: the Hankow plot
of
188}',
Select papers from the Center for
Far
Eastern Studies,
4
(1979)
71-111.
More broadly: William
T.
Rowe,
Hankow:
commerce
and
society
in
a
Chinese
city,
1746-1889.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
STATE AND SOCIETY IN THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS 55
mid-century rebellions, when local elites organized militia and assumed
taxing and other local powers usually reserved to officials. The second
arose from the need for reconstruction after rebellion. Local men, who
assumed the chief responsibility for relief and rebuilding, expanded their
activities in education and welfare to the point where extra-bureaucratic
management was an essential part of the local civil government structure.
These activities were financed mainly by endowments, by elite and
business contributions, and by commercial taxes over which officials did
not have complete control. The final phase of expansion began in the
mid-1890s as degree holders and gentry managers began to engage in
self-strengthening activities in education and industry. After 1902 gentry
managerial functions were formalized in associations, chambers of
commerce, and bureaus mandated by the Ch'ing government as part of
its reform policies.
104
The nineteenth-century managerial explosion upset the balance between
the local elite and the bureaucratic state. Gentry have often been pictured
as brokers between officials (particularly magistrates) and local society,
sharing some interests with both, combining sometimes with one side and
sometimes with the other, and sometimes mediating between them.
I05
The
new managerial elites did not forsake this role in the nineteenth century,
but they increasingly supplanted the bureaucracy in local government at
a time when magistrates were becoming less effectual.
106
Although elites
were given a formally defined role in local government only with the
establishment of elective councils and assemblies in 1909, managers
selected by elite community consensus had actually been an essential part
of some local administrations for the previous fifty years.
This phenomenon has been seen as related both to local militarization
and the decentralization and localization of power. There was, however,
no simple trend as long as the Ch'ing dynasty existed. Some areas
continued to be militarized after the rebellions, with guns spread about
the countryside in an active competition between militia and bandits. But
some officials were firm and successful in trying to disband militia and
control gentry assumptions of police or military power. Meanwhile
104
On
the Taiping period see Kuhn, Rebel/ion. For the second and third phases see Mary Rankin,
'Elite activism and political transformation
in
China: Zhejiang province, 1865—1911'. For
an
analogous process
in
the Middle Yangtze, see Rowe, Hankow.
105 Edwin
O.
Reischauer and John
K.
Fairbank, East Asia, tbe great tradition, 311-13. For data
on
local gentry-official relationships, that stress disruptive and self-seeking gentry behaviour,
see
Msiao Kung-chuan, Rural China.
A
summary of components in the gentry's local political/social
roles
is
in Frederic Wakeman, Jr. The fall of imperial China, 27-34. On Chinese views
of
the local
control and autonomy problem, see
P. A.
Kuhn, 'Local self-government under the Republic',
in Frederic Wakeman, J r. and Carolyn Grant, eds. Conflict and control in late imperial China, 2
5
7-98.
106
Faure, 'Local political disturbances', 251-9,
ch. 7;
Robert Weiss, 'Flexibility
in
provincial
government on the eve
of
the Taiping rebellion', CSVPT 4.3 (June 1980)
17.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
56 INTRODUCTION: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
significant new accretions of
local
elite power came in civil pursuits related
to scholarly, business and community interests.
This tendency arose most strongly in core economic and cultural areas,
epitomized by the Lower Yangtze. In that area rural unrest did not simply
result in movement of elites to cities, it also inspired managerial activities,
aiming not only at local police control but at alleviating some of the causes
of trouble. This was neither an exclusively rural nor urban movement,
because wealthy, educated ' rural' elites had business interests in the cities
and high-level bureaucratic ties. They conceived of an upward flow of
civilian initiative that would modify national policies and bring them into
public service outside their native areas. This evolution had several
features.
First, rivalry with officialdom. Elites became convinced of the superiority
of their own autonomous management over bureaucrat-run activities.
Their chief animosity was directed against the sub-bureaucracy. Most
higher officials approved of managerial activities that contributed to public
organization and order, but disagreements could erupt when vigorous,
reform-minded officials came into contact with equally vigorous, publicly
active gentry managers who were convinced that they were the best judges
of local needs. A governor like Ting Jih-ch'ang, who sought to curb
local elites and strengthen magistrates as part of administrative reform,
inevitably was suspicious of initiatives outside the bureaucracy. Tensions
with officials might be aggravated when merchants opposed likin taxation,
for instance, or when landlord gentry sought to take over supervision
of land-tax collection from yamen clerks and runners.
I07
Second, patriotism. Many managers viewed their activities as a statecraft
response to the needs of the age, related to broader problems. Men who
had been shaken by the experience of rebellion and whose education (and
often careers) had been aimed toward public responsibilities, were quite
capable of seeing their activities in a national framework. This generalizing
tendency was reinforced in the late nineteenth century by patriotic
response to the foreign danger.
Third, social cohesion. Elite managers belonged to informal scholarly-
mercantile, managerial-official social networks that cut across marketing
107
On
this process
see
Rankin, 'Elite activism', chs. 2—6.
On
Ting Jih-ch'ang
see
Jonathan Ocko,
Bureaucratic reform in provincial China: Ting ]ib-cb'ang
in
Restoration Kiangsu, iS6j-i$yo, 145-4. Ocko
suggests
a
competition between elite and official reformism at the local level during the T'ung-chih
restoration.
For
examples
of
gentry invasion
of
tax-collection
and
conflicts over tax-collection
see James Polachek, 'Gentry hegemony: Soochow
in the
T'ung-chih Restoration',
in
Wakeman
and Grant,
eds.,
244-;; Tsung Yuan-han, I-ci'ing kuan
wen-hio
cbi (Illustrious collection from
the
1-ch'ing
Hall), 3.6b-!
ia;
T'mg-bsiang
bsien-cbib
(Gazetteer
of
T'ung-hsiang district),
ch. 6.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
STATE AND SOCIETY IN THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS 57
structures
and
regional boundaries.
In the
Lower Yangtze surviving
members of the badly fractured old academic community, like Ting Ping,
redirected their energies into management, officials retired
to
devote
themselves
to
the problems
of
their home areas, and wealthy merchants
managed local institutions
as
well
as
funding them. Elite-managed
institutions were established at various levels of the urban hierarchy, down
to
the
market town level,
but
often with high-level official connections.
In short, local management did not develop
in
isolation.
108
Fourth, proliferation. Managerial activities tended
to
be expansive and
not restricted
by
locality
or
level
of
urban hierarchy. Some individuals
managed autonomous institutions
in
different places
at
different stages
of
their business
or
academic careers. Other managers
in
county capitals
travelled about
the
county supervising subsidiary institutions
in
towns
and villages. Managerial skills acquired
in one
place could
be
used
elsewhere,
and
local institutions could
be
used
as
bases
for
activities
in
other areas.
These features were impressively illustrated
in the
mobilization
of
Lower Yangtze welfare institutions to provide relief to victims
of
serious
floods and
the
great famine
in
North China
in the
late 1870s. Relief
committees, inspired
by
the foreign example, were established
by
gentry
and merchants
in
Shanghai and three other major cities
of
Chekiang and
Kiangsu. Welfare institutions
and
publicly active individuals collecting
in smaller cities
and
towns forwarded money
to
these centres.
The
proceeds were then sent
to
representatives
of the
committees,
who
dispersed relief
in the
famine area.
A
rough accounting
of
income
and
expenditures and reports
of
relief activity were published in the Shanghai
newspaper
Shen-pao.
In
this effort local institutions raised funds
for
autonomous activities that took place
in an
entirely different region
of
the country,
in
response
to a
crisis that Lower Yangtze managers
considered
to be of
nationwide importance. Organization
was
entirely
outside the bureaucratic structure (although there was close cooperation),
and these elite-run organizations were considerably more successful than
officials
in
raising funds. Finally,
the
press played
a
crucial part
in
promoting public awareness of the magnitude of the famine, in encourag-
ing contributions by such devices as printing names of individual donors,
and
by
providing
a
forum
for the
committees. Participants were well
I0S
E.g.
Nan-bsun cbib
(Gazetteer
of
Nan-hsun), zi.iob-i ia, i8a-2oa, 22b; 34.2b, 4b, 8b, 10b, and
chs.
21 and i4,pastim;
Tmg-bsiangbstm-tbib,
4:
sbu-juan,
ib;
sban-t'ang,
ib-2b, 5a, 13a;
Wu-Cb'ing
cben-tbib (Gazetteer
of
Wu
and
Ch'ing towns), 29.25a—b; Ching Yuan-shan, Cbu-i cb'u-cbi (First
collection while dwelling quietly), 2.41a—42a, 48aH>3b; 3.66a-<>9b
and
Sbang-ju bsien-cbib
(Gazetteer
of
Shang-yu district), 35.18a.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
58 INTRODUCTION: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
aware
of the
autonomous character
of
their activities, which were
described by
Shen-pao
as' popular contribution and popular management'
-
a phrase also used
for
local managerial activities.
100
This kind
of
apolitical participation
in
public affairs,
as
elites assumed
more responsibilities
and
believed their views should
be
consulted,
eventually fostered political demands. However,
by
1900 there were still
no mechanisms other than personal contacts
and
patronage networks
to
convey public demands
to the
government.
Alienation and demands
for
wider participation
in
decision-making also
spread within
the
bureaucracy
in the
last decades
of the
nineteenth
century,
but the
origins
go
back
to the
late eighteenth. Although
the
Chia-ch'ing Emperor managed
to
regain
the
loyalty
of
officials disil-
lusioned
by the
corruption
of
the late Ch 'ien-lung period, constant crises
in the nineteenth century kept alive doubts about the vitality
of
the system,
and fuelled demands
for
broader consultation
to
seek solutions
to
problems. Such demands were inherent
in the
flow
of
suggestions
and
criticisms from
the
lower levels
of the
metropolitan bureaucracy, where
underemployed officials lacked effective ways
to
make their views known
to influence policy. Even in the early nineteenth century
it
was impossible
to rebuild consensus over how government should work, and by the 1830s
patriotism was encouraging divisive activism,
as
groups
of
officials called
for the end
of
the opium trade and criticized leaders who could
not
defeat
the British.
110
After Chinese provincial leaders loyal
to the
throne
had
saved
the
dynasty from
the
mid-century rebellions,
the
central power over
the
provinces
had to be
rebuilt
on a
less autocratic basis. The Ch 'ing banner
forces having been eclipsed
by the new
regional armies,
the
Ch'ing
monarchy faced again,
as it had in the
mid-seventeenth century,
the
necessity
of
securing collaboration from high provincial officials
in a
marriage
of
convenience.
1
" Weakness
of
the court made
it
easier
for the
foreign policy discussions culminating
in the Hi
crisis with Russia
and
the Sino-French
and
Sino-Japanese Wars
to
break
out of the
bonds
previously circumscribing opinion-expression within
the
bureaucracy.
The 'pure criticism'
(ch'ing-i)
voiced
in
these crises marked
the
beginning
of oppositional public opinion within
the
government. However unfair
some
of
the criticisms and ill-judged some
of
the attacks, their legacy was
a growing conviction that some major officials could
not be
trusted, that
Iog
See Sben-pao, 1878-9,passim,
e.g.
8 June 1878,
4; zo
July 1878 1;
4
Dec. 1878,
3; 21
Feb.
1879,
3;
10 Aug. 1879, 3; 14 Aug. 1879, 3.
1
Io
James Polachek, The inner opium war, ch.
2.
111
On
regional armies
see
Kwang-Ching Liu, 'The Restoration
in
perspective', CHOC 10.477-90;
and
Liu and
R. J.
Smith, 'Ch'ing armies
of
the post-Taiping era', CHOC
11.202—11.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
STATE AND SOCIETY IN THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS 59
the Ch'ing dynasty could not protect the country, and that the solution
lay in broadening political participation, so that upper-class public opinion
could be heard. Militant patriotism in the capital was thus wed to concepts
of elite-led social mobilization and institutional reform."
2
The third major contribution to an oppositional public opinion and
broader political participation came from men who lived in the treaty-port
cities,
together with a smaller number who travelled abroad. They were
among the first to introduce Western methods, ideas and values into China.
Treaty ports attracted not only socially marginal compradors but also
scholars and merchants, who flourished in these urban centres without
cutting ties with kin and native place. Such men provided money,
organizational impetus, and sometimes direct leadership for autonomous
local management. They also led the way in questioning arbitrary
government practices, from which the foreign-run concessions gave them
some freedom.
113
Their alienation and the confrontation between the state
and elite society were hastened, and in part denned, by the treaty-port
press after the mid-1870s. Wang T'ao, who had been impressed by foreign
newspapers, began publishing in Hong Kong at this time. Equally
significant was the establishment of the first successful daily newspaper
in Shanghai,
Shen-pao.
Henceforth the press provided news of and
rationales for autonomous managerial activities. It was a source of
knowledge about foreign alternatives, a forum for criticizing officials, and
a powerful catalyst of patriotic sentiment, nourishing distrust of
Ch
'ing
officials and welding together opposition arising from different quarters
by expressing attitudes common to all.
Reform and
revolution
at the end of
the
Ch'ing
The 1898 Reform Movement was the first climax of this growth of public
opinion and political demands. Politically oriented study societies and
other associations that sprang up after the Sino-Japanese War were a
genuinely new departure, heralding the end of the Ch 'ing ban on overt
public policy activity. Certain aspects of the Reform Movement have
received particular attention, notably the One Hundred Days of
1898
when
111
On the political significance of cb'ing-i see Mary Rankin, '"Public opinion" and political power:
qingyi in late nineteenth-century China", ]AS 51.3 (May 198Z) 463-77. Effects of cb'ing-i on
policy-making ate suggested in Lloyd Eastman, 'Cb'ing-i and Chinese policy formation during
the nineteenth century', JAS 24.4 (Aug. 1965) 609—11.
113
On establishment of the treaty ports and the men involved see John K. Fairbank, Trade and
diplomacy on the China coast: tbt
opening
of the treat) ports,
1S42—1SJ4,
passim, 394—8; Paul Cohen,
Between
tradition and modernity: Wang T'ao and
reform
in late Cb'ing China; also Jung-fang Tsai, 'The
predicament of the compradore ideologists: He Qi (Ho Kai, 1859-1914) and Hu Liyuan
(1874-1916)', Modern China 7.2 (April 1981) 191-225.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
60 INTRODUCTION: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
the reform party controlled policy
in the
capital,
the
reform movement
in Hunan,
and the
ideas
and
activities
of
a group centring about K 'ang
Yu-wei
and
Liang Ch'i-ch'ao.
In
reality
the
movement
was
more
widespread
and had a
broader elite constituency. Gazetteer
and
press
accounts show considerable pressure from gentry
and
merchant circles
in Chekiang,
for
instance, although
it is not
usually included among
centres
of a
significant reform effort.
In
provinces like Chekiang, where
reform leaders emerged from
the top of
local elite society, there
was
little
ideological resistance
to
reform.
At the
outset
the
issue
was not
reform
perse,
but
the kinds of reforms
to
be pursued, and whether the bureaucratic
monarchy could accept
new
political initiatives from outside
its
structure.
Where
the
most extreme reformers achieved prominence
-
mainly
in the
capital
and
Hunan
-
they alienated moderates
by
pushing
for
very rapid
change
and by
attacking basic Confucian family principles.
The
govern-
ment
at the
centre waited
for
moderates
to
become doubtful
and
then
refused
to
broaden access
to
political power.
The
entrenched leaders
in
the bureaucracy
and
court were
too
strong
to
eliminate without military
force.
The
1898 anti-reform coup
in
Peking
was
engineered
by men who
were
not
only conservative,
but
also predominantly Manchu
or
dynasty
oriented, concerned
to
preserve both their
own
positions
and
autocratic
control over society. They rejected,
as it
turned
out,
their last chance
to
accommodate societal initiatives within
the
existing political structure.
114
The anti-reform coup sent shock waves through
the
publicly active
segment
of
elite society, increasing distrust
of and
alienation from
the
dynasty.
At
first
it was not
clear
how far
arrests were going
to go - and
where elites had been broadly engaged
in
reform activities, as
in
the Lower
Yangtze, many
had
reason
to be
uneasy. Further antagonism
was
aroused
by
a
policy
of
replacing high Chinese provincial officials with Manchus.
Soon thereafter, court support
for the
Boxers, executions
of
officials
who
protested
it, and the
disastrous international consequences
of
irrational
racism
in 1900
alienated still wider circles
of
elites
who
were extremely
sensitive
to the
danger
of
encouraging social disorder
and
disgusted with
a government that
had
provoked still another foreign invasion.
At
the
turn
of the
century metropolitan officials were resigning
and
returning home
in
disillusionment, scholars outside were confirmed
in the
belief that they could
not
serve
the
Ch'ing government. Anti-Manchuism,
which
had
been
a
latent, elusive attitude throughout
the
century,
now
became overtly political, joined with hostility
to
autocratic oppression.
114
On the 1898
Reform Movement
see
Chang Hao, CHOC n.*74-}}8; T'ang Chih-chun,
Wu-bsu
pien-fa
sbib
lun-ts'ung
(Collected essays
on the 1898
Reform Movement). This interpretation
is
from
Rankin, 'Public opinion',
470-2.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008