Acknowledgements
I am grateful for permission to reprint material from the following publica-
tions:
Chapter 1: ‘Hegel’s Idealism’, The Cambridge Companion to Hegel and Nine-
teenth-Century Philosophy, ed. Frederick C. Beiser (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2008), 135–73.
Chapter 2: ‘Did Hegel Hold an Identity Theory of Truth?’, Mind, 102 (1993),
645–7.
Chapter 3: ‘Hegel’s Doppelsatz:ANeutralReading’,Journal of the History of
Philosophy, 44 (2006), 235–66.
Chapter 4: ‘British Hegelianism: A Non-Metaphysical View?’, European Journal
of Philosophy, 2 (1994), 293–321.
Chapter 5: ‘Hegel, British Idealism, and the Curious Case of the Concrete
Universal’, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 15 (2007), 115–53.
Chapter 6: ‘Coherence as a Test for Truth’, Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 69 (2004), 296–326.
Chapter 7: ‘Hegel and Pragmatism’, The Blackwell Companion to Hegel,edited
by Michael Baur and Stephen Houlgate (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009). (This is a
slightly shortened version of the paper published in this collection.)
Chapter 8: ‘Peirce on Hegel: Nominalist or Realist?’, Transactions of the Charles
S. Peirce Society, 41 (2004), 65–99.
Chapter 9: ‘Peirce, Hegel, and the Category of Secondness’, Inquiry 50 (2007),
123–55.
Chapter 10: ‘Peirce, Hegel and the Category of Firstness’, International Yearbook
of German Idealism, 5 (2007), 276–308.
Chapter 11: ‘James and Bradley on Understanding’, Philosophy, 68 (1993),
192–209.
Chapter 12: ‘Individual Existence and the Philosophy of Difference’, The Oxford
Handbook of Continental Philosophy, ed. Brian Leiter and Michael Rosen
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 379–408.
Material from these sources has been left largely unchanged, except to make
some minor corrections, and to standardize references and editorial style.