Schmitt C.B. (ed.) The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy
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THE
ORIGINS
OF
RENAISSANCE
PHILOSOPHY:
SCHOLASTIC
THOUGHT
AND THE
NEEDS
OF A NEW
CULTURE
Any
approach to the meaning of philosophy in the Renaissance requires
some preliminary qualification and explanation. How far, for instance, is it
permissible to speak
of
a specifically Renaissance philosophy
—
a philosophy
that
might be said to reflect the growing complexity
of
intellectual activity
in this particular historical situation? May the
term
be applied to
ways
of
thinking which, though
current
in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,
perpetuate
typically medieval thinking? Do the speculative
currents
which
emerged in the mid
thirteenth
century, above all in Italy, represent
continuity or a break with the past? How
closely
are scholastic
natural
philosophy and
logic
connected with the scientific revolution? Was
'humanist rhetoric' an obstacle to what might otherwise have been a
swift
and linear development? The historical significance of many of the issues
discussed in this volume cannot be assessed without considering those social
factors,
which
shattered
the ideological unanimity of western Christianitas
in the
thirteenth
century, emphasising the difference
rather
than
the
similarities between intellectual centres and ushering in new
ways
of
thought. There is little point in trying to define the Renaissance concept of
philosophy if no heed is paid to the cultural institutions emerging outside
the universities, the social class and
status
of
their members, their aims, their
rivalries and their audiences. From the early fourteenth century
there
was a
complex
interaction between scholasticism and humanism with the former
profiting from the methodological and linguistic advances made by the
latter.
The universities of Western and Central Europe shared a similar
organisation and the great Italian centres - Padua, Bologna, Pavia,
Florence, Sienna, Perugia and Naples - still flourished, despite falling to a
greater or lesser extent
under
political control. There were
three
main
faculties:
theology, law and medicine, as
well
as those devoted to
57
THE
RENAISSANCE
CONCEPT
OF
PHILOSOPHY
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58
The
Renaissance concept
of
philosophy
preliminary instruction in philosophy, the arts, astronomy and
astrology.
Those who mastered this learning were destined to become
senior
clergy,
lawyers, notaries, physicians and those natural scientists who
typically
eschewed practical research in favour of pure theory. The social,
political
and economic ferment of late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-
century Italy was generating new forms of government and public
institutions, and traditional professional training was becoming increasing-
ly
inadequate. The mercantile culture posed moral and theological
problems which could no longer be handled by theologians trained in
biblical
exegesis and by students of Peter Lombard's Sententiae and of the
various summae. The traditional legal education was insufficient for princely
secretaries and the chancellors of the new communes, particularly those of
more
than
local ambition. They needed training in history and some
literary and rhetorical polish. Medical training was also moving towards a
more critical analysis of the ancient authorities, increasingly demanding
empirical evidence. The more radical tendencies in scholastic thought
—
Ockhamism
and the like
—
were undermining the unified notion
of
sapientia
which
had so far resisted the
thirteenth
century's cultural transformations.
Analysis
of the language of
logic
and its semantic structures had abolished
the distinction between res and verba, between the individual's concrete and
intuitive awareness and the concepts or signs generated by the intellect. The
papacy
and the empire
—
the two fundamental authorities in the medieval
world
—
were in disarray. Authority was passing from the theoretically
indivisible
monolith of Christianitas to a medley of particular institutions
operative at all
levels
of
civic
life.
THE
DISPUTA
BELLE
ARTI
AND THE
PRIMACY
OF THE
MORAL
DISCIPLINES
University
teaching, founded invariably on the analysis and exegesis of
auctoritates and canonical texts (in the case of philosophy, for instance, the
corpus Aristotelicum and its commentaries), was encountering growing
criticism.
Irked by the narrow curricula of traditional scholasticism, its
opponents refused to believe, for example,
that
there
was no more to
philosophy
than
metaphysics and discussions of the premises of Aristotle's
Physics.
Even at the beginning of the
thirteenth
century university
professors and students, at Padua for example, were going directly to
certain classical texts for linguistic and stylistic models as
well
as rich sources
of
moral exempla.
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The Renaissance concept
of
philosophy
59
The
activity of these pre-humanists is instructive, revealing
that
it was
generally
thinkers with a legal training who were most critical of the
traditional approach and techniques of the Glossators. The most advanced
levels
of scholastic thought, so
important
to the prehistory of modern
formal
logic,
did far more
than
merely exacerbate the polemics against
scholastic jargon and sophistry: the cavillationes of the 'barbarous Scots and
Britons' whom Petrarch and others had already accused of polluting the
'holy'
Latin language. As far as the early humanists were concerned, the
incipient formalisation of
logical
techniques and scholastic language
confirmed the unbridgeable
gulf
between the language of the professional
scholastics,
which was comprehensible only to themselves, and the need for
a straightforward and
effective
language
of
civic
administration suitable for
political
and ethical discourse. The contrast between curricula was becoming
increasingly evident. The traditional type, tied to lectio, commentary and
quaestiones, differed markedly from
that
of the new schools. Invariably
developing
outside
official
academic institutions, these schools cultivated
grammar, rhetoric and such linguistic models as were appropriate to
political
office,
moral discourse and the deeper understanding of classical
language and literature. Behind the early criticisms of the scholastic
mentality and method, it is not difficult to detect the first signs of a new
notion of philosophy, its meaning, its purpose and its place in the new
learning. This is confirmed by the interminable disputes about the relative
importance of the faculties; whether or not jurisprudence was superior to
medicine,
natural
science to letters or history.
1
However, the contrast
between the philosophy
of
man championed by the early humanists and the
'futile curiosity' of physicians and
natural
philosophers should not be
regarded as a schematic dichotomy like
that
between ideas and letters,
between
natural
science and rhetoric, or between the philosophising
of
the
traditional teachers and the philological expertise of the new ones. The
assault on scholasticism's barbarous jargon and the argument
that
its
dialectic was irrelevant to genuine human concerns were also assertions
of
a
different way
of
thinking: one
that
promoted the artes useful to
civic
life
and
made them central to education and the basis for training new intellectual
classes
outside traditional academic hierarchies. The protagonists of this
new thinking were concerned with the ethical, religious and political issues
of
their time
—
issues aggravated by the institutional crises of fourteenth-
century Europe. For these individuals the only way out of centuries of
i.
See ha disputa
delle
arti
1947.
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60
The
Renaissance concept
of
philosophy
darkness, decadence and corruption was by
returning
to the ancient
sapientia and recovering its exemplary
ways
of
living
and thinking as
well
as
the language which was its
vehicle.
Thus the myth of renascentia and the
kindred notion of historical
cyclicity
lie at the
heart
of the
return
to the
ancients and the repudiation
of
what was seen as a moribund and barbarous
way of
thinking with its impenetrable thickets
of
comments and quaestiones,
its language and formalising
logic
so far removed from the models of
antiquity, its theology and jurisprudence shrunken to a handful of obscure
and sophistical contentions.
THE
RETURN
TO
ANCIENT
SOURCES
AND TO THE
UNIFYING
CONCEPT
OF
SAPIENTIA
It would be wrong, however, to
interpret
the humanist aversion to
scholastic methods and language as a radical rejection of philosophy. Even
less
was it an
attempt
to contain culture within a literary and rhetorical
formalism,
indifferent to the great problems of western thought. Since it
fails
to explain the deeper and more complex motives for this intellectual
reform, the
view
of humanism as merely an educational system based on
rarefied oratorical techniques, pedantic grammatical analysis and nascent
philology
must be regarded as unhelpfully unilateral. Admittedly, the first
generations of humanists ignored the arduous problems of metaphysics,
logic
and theology on which the scholastics continued to work. Nor did
they pay any
attention
to the increasingly problematic exegesis of the
natural
philosophy texts of Aristotle and the major texts of the
Greco-
Arabic
medical and scientific traditions. But even the most obsessive
advocates
of a
return
to the
pure
springs of
classical
learning and the studia
humanitatis
could not be unaware of the texts generated by Buridan and
Swineshead
which had spread as far as the Italian universities. Nor were
they unaware of the disputations on
logic
and physics which,
under
the
influence
of the calculators or other teachers like Oresme, had come to be
the principal activity in many scholastic circles.
2
Nor were they ignorant,
unless for purposes of argument
—
as has been shown to be the case with
Petrarch - of the work of contemporary physicians, logicians and
natural
philosophers, whose relations with humanist circles were by no means
always
strife-torn, as the examples
of
Peter
of
Mantua and Blasius
of
Parma
show.
3
Rather, the typical humanist approach to the philosophical tradition
2.
For sources, see in particular Medioevo e Rinascimento 1955, 1, pp.
217-53
(Dionisotti).
3.
See in particular the letter from
Coluccio
Salutati to Peter
of
Mantua in Salutati
1891-1911,111,
pp.
318-22;
for the relationship between Salutati's circle and Blasius of Parma, see Gherardi 1975, ad
indicem.
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The
Renaissance concept
of
philosophy
61
was
to seek out the most ancient sources unmuddied by centuries
of
dubious
exegesis
and to shift the
chief
focus of
attention
away from metaphysics
towards ethics and politics in search
of
virtues with good classical credentials
and yet relevant to the needs of their changing society.
No
wonder
then
that
philological analysis and literary exegesis become
an apologia for both an ancient and a modern model of wisdom. No
wonder also at the resurrection of the classical ideal, neatly caught in a
famous dictum
of
Cicero's,
of
a single sapientia which holds within itself'the
knowledge
of
all
things human and divine' and knows how to express them
with
all the persuasive powers of eloquentia. The same ambition motivated
even
the repeated appeals to Augustine as the corner-stone of a
true
Christian philosophy uncluttered with dusty theological formulae and
intricate dialectical sophistries. The humanists wished religiosity to rely
principally
on the individual's inner assurance
of
faith and to be experienced
as a continuing meditation on man's transcendent destiny. So, though
scholastic distinctions and divisions were rejected, the very conception of
philosophy was changing because its
chief
object was now man
—
man was
at the centre of every enquiry
—
and because the direct appeal to classical
models demanded the rejection of traditional epistemological methods.
Even
the humanist insistence on rhetoric and its techniques implicitly
emphasised a profound questioning of values. In this process philosophy
was
stripped of its ahistorical character and swept up in the transience and
mutability of human existence. For reasons such as this it is impossible to
find
a single definition of philosophy which holds for the 250 years
under
consideration. Probably the most typical characteristic of Renaissance
thought was its constantly changing notion of philosophy, its scope, its
purpose, its objects and its methods. Almost every generation of thinkers
produced new solutions, different both in content and approach, to the
great problems which have exercised the western philosophical tradition.
Contributions to these new solutions came from ethical and political
deliberations, from discussions about the worth
of
scientific
knowledge and
from
attempts
to find a theology in harmony with personal religious
experiences,
from debates about the meaning of art, from the honing of
dialectical
and rhetorical skills and the advances in philological technique
which
meant
that
new light could always be shed on even the most
well-
worn
problems. The rediscovery of the great philosophical schools of
antiquity - the revival
of
Epicureanism and Pyrrhonism, for instance - had a
pronounced theoretical influence over many thinkers. The critique of
traditional disciplines was no less influential: the
birth
of humanist
jurisprudence, the critique
of
Galenism,
the emergence
of
a medical theory
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62 The Renaissance concept
of
philosophy
still
heavily indebted to esoteric
beliefs,
the dissolution of the ancient
Ptolemaic-Aristotelian
imago
mundi,
the new importance
of
the artes and the
growing
prestige of mathematical methods — all these made their
contribution. Finally
there
were all the repercussions of the crisis in
Christianity which ran throughout the entire Renaissance period. So in the
Renaissance
there
was a disconcertingly complex variety of factors which
prevented rigid boundaries between such disciplines as theology, the
sciences
and political theory. This complexity was the fundamental
characteristic of a philosophy which was having to cope with rapidly
changing
mentalities and
ways
of
life,
new political, religious and
educational institutions and the particular problems associated with
emergent nationalism. Throughout this period, however, the dominant
philosophical
theme was the centrality
of
man, which was reinforced by the
preference
given
to techniques favouring communication and persuasive
methods, such as the dialogue, the epistle and the oration.
THE
PHILOSOPHY
OF MAN
FROM
PETRARCH
TO
VALLA
This
return
to a conception of philosophy rooted in the Greco-Roman
tradition can be understood by looking at the notion of sapientia
propounded by Petrarch, whom humanists regarded as their first master.
4
His researches into classical culture were inspired by the conviction
that
the
time had come 'to reveal man to himself once more'. He believed
that
neither human frailty nor time could diminish the perennial worth of a
philosophy which recognised man's destiny: a wearisome struggle against
accidia
in order to achieve supreme nobility as a creation
of
God.
Only in the
solitude and silentium of a mind
turned
inward upon itself away from
worldly
distractions could man find
that
divine link which united all men
and committed them to the service of their kind.
5
For this reason the new
and ancient sapientia, which Petrarch contrasted with the haughty doctrines
of
the recentiores, entailed the exercise of both caritas and the sermo through
shared human experience. Beyond earthly horizons
there
was a destiny far
greater
than
human virtue and glory, but the fervent readers of Augustine
4.
Some of Petrarch's philosophical writings are still only to be found in early editions (Venice 1501
and 1503; Basle 1554 and
1581).
I have used Petrarch 1554. For his letters, which are often mini-
treatises, see Petrarch 1933-42; for the
Rerum
senilium libri, see Petrarch 1554, but see also the Italian
translation with commentary in Petrarch 1869-70; his Epistolae sine nomine (very important in the
confrontation between Petrarch and the
Avignon
papacy) are edited in Piur 1925; good, but not
definitive,
texts
of
the Secretum, the De
vita
solitaria and the De sui ipsius et
multorum
ignorantia are in
Petrarch
1955»
which also contains some of the Seniles.
5.
Petrarch 1955, pp. 568-70 {De
vita
solitaria).
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The
Renaissance concept
of
philosophy
63
never
gave up hope
of
reconciling
Christ and literature,
of
achieving
in the
survival
of
their writings the immortality promised by the gospels.
6
In this
way
even the awareness of death transmuted itself into an unceasing quest
for
the simplicity and purity of a moral commitment whose ground rules
were
formulated in pagan classical antiquity. In his De sui ipsius et
multorum
ignorantia
7
and Invectiva contra medicum
8
Petrarch contrasted the knowl-
edge
of
the secrets
of
nature, which he saw as futile and misleading, with the
wisdom
of
the philosophers and poets, which could heal the maladies
of
the
soul.
Thus he found in Plato and
Cicero
the essentials of a doctrine which
would
restore to philosophy its moral dimension.
From Petrarch the early humanists learnt their conviction
that
the revival
of
humanae literae was only the first step in a greater intellectual renewal
which
would coincide with the highest achievement of man's
civic
and
cultural destiny. Consequently their philosophy tended to dwell not on the
personal virtues
of
the solitary ascetic but on those virtues which equip men
jointly
to defend their freedom from the looming menace
of
fate.
Typically
the humanists directed their knowledge of classical learning towards the
problems
of
civic
life,
the
arts
by which men may
live
well
and the sapientia
which
teaches how man may achieve perfection while still in this
life.
Coluccio
Salutati, Chancellor
of
the Florentine Republic during one
of
the
most dramatic periods of its history, saw philosophy as 'the empress and
mother of all
arts
and sciences', guiding man's earthly journey. Leonardo
Bruni,
also Chancellor
of
Florence
and deeply involved in the events
of
his
day,
theorised similarly in the introduction to his new Latin translations of
the
Politics
9
and the Nicomachean Ethics.
10
He assigned primacy to the
practical virtues
that
work for the common good, and considered an
education grounded on the studia
humanitatis
as the best way to inculcate
such virtues. In his De studiis et litteris,
11
however, he stressed
that
literary
studies were barren
if
they did not lead to cognitiones reales,
that
is, the study
of
philosophy and the sciences.
Poggio
Bracciolini, particularly in his
Contra
hypocritas
12
and De avaritia,
13
rejected the more extreme forms of
monastic asceticism, celebrating instead man's energetic and hard-working
commitment to humanise his world. He also acknowledged
that
all men
6. Ibid., pp.
72fF.
(Secretum). 7. Ibid., pp.
710-67.
8. Petrarch 1950; see also Petrarch 1949.
9. Bruni 1928, pp. 70-3 (Epistola super translatione Politicorum Aristotelis ad
dominum
Eugenium Papam
IV) and pp. 73-4 (Praemissio quaedam ad evidentiam novae translationis Politicorum Aristotelis).
10.
Ibid., pp. 75-6 (Praefatio in libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad
dominum
Martinum
Papam V) and pp. 76-81
{Praemissio quaedam ad evidentiam novae translationis Ethicorum Aristotelis).
11.
Ibid., pp. 5-19, especially
18-19.
12.
Poggio Bracciolini 1964-9,
11,
pp.
39-80
(Dialogus adversus hypocrisim).
13.
Ibid., 1, pp. 1-31 (Historia convivalis disceptativa de avaricia et luxuria).
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6
4
The
Renaissance concept
of
philosophy
might legitimately aspire to some moderate happiness in this
life
even
though some might be destined never to achieve it.
Poggio,
whose rediscovery
of
Lucretius'
De
rerum
natura
played a crucial
part
in the fifteenth-century revival of Epicureanism, was not the only
humanist to adopt such a secular
view.
Lorenzo
Valla's
De vero falsoque
bono
14
is a carefully weighed critique of the contamination of Christianity
by
Stoicism, which had transformed the promise
of
eternal
life
into a denial
of
the most natural desires. In Epicureanism
Valla
found a harmony
between
the Christian's pursuit
of
heavenly
joy
and the enjoyment
of
those
healthy earthly pleasures which the
natura
divina
itself
had instilled into us. In
his
view,
philosophy taught morality and an insight into man's desires,
needs and hopes. Though this ethical concern never attracted the greatest
humanists to metaphysics, it did not exclude an often deeply pessimistic
awareness of the tragic face of human destiny at both the personal and
historical
levels.
In his De varietate fortunae
15
and De miseria humanae
conditionis
16
Poggio argued
that
men were frail, inevitably and invariably
destined to
live
a
life
of pain and misfortune, endlessly repeating the same
mistakes and crimes.
The
Intercoenales
11
of the youthful Leon Battista Alberti have an even
greater cogency and dramatic tension, especially when they insist on the
futility
of existence and the absurdity of an irresistible destiny in a world
without providence, ruled only by an arbitrary fortune. Later, in his
Teogenio
18
and Momus,
19
he calls man the most ferocious of creatures,
'lethal to others and to himself, and proclaims the inherent fragility of his
every
achievement and the transience of earthly
life
where princes,
philosophers and ordinary men alike delude themselves into thinking they
can
comprehend an ever-changing reality.
THE
RELATION
OF PHILOSOPHY TO A NEW
APPRAISAL
OF
THE
ARTS
AND TO
PHILOLOGICAL
CRITICISM
Renaissance philosophy had therefore assimilated the classical and medieval
ethical traditions and did not restrict itself merely to the rhetorical
celebration of man's dignity. It also clearly reflected the bitter conflicts of
14.
L.
Valla
1970a.
15.
Poggio Bracciolini 1964-9, 1, pp. 131-7 (De fortunae varietate urbis Romae, et de ruina eiusdem
descriptio) and
11,
pp. 497-654 (Historiae de varietate fortunae libri quatuor).
16.
Ibid., 1, pp.
88-131.
17.
For the texts
of
the
Inter
coenales,
which have a complex history, see Alberti 1890, pp. 122-235, and
1964.
18. Alberti 1960-73,
11,
pp. 53-104. 19. Alberti 1942.
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The
Renaissance concept
of
philosophy
65
the age. Humanist philosophy was concerned as
well
with the
arts
and
instruments
which make it possible for man to exercise his precarious
dominion over things and events. There was frequent praise for jurispru-
dence and
laws,
which in Salutati's opinion constituted the 'mystic body' of
the human community,
20
and for poetry as the special medium of
truth.
Even
more frequent were the reappraisals of the
arts
and the techniques
which
permitted man some insight into the inner workings
of
nature
itself.
Alberti,
architect, mathematician and philosopher, is the key figure here.
In his specialised treatises, particularly the De re aedificatoria
21
the
artisan
-
constructor of buildings, machines and tools to extend man's powers
—
becomes
an artist-savant who strives unceasingly to
give
form to
matter.
Around
the middle of the fifteenth century Giannozzo Manetti in his De
dignitate et excellentia hominis
22
embroidered his rehearsal of the Hermetic
doctrine of the theosanthropos, the focus of all reality, with an eloquent
celebration of the
arts
and sciences from painting to sculpture, from
architecture to history, from astronomy to law, from poetry to sapientia, in
which
the 'great miracle of man' was revealed.
The
early fifteenth-century conception
of
philosophy,
while
closely
tied
to the development of philology, the linguistic disciplines and a new
historical consciousness, was capable
of
re-evaluating both past and present.
This
changing idea of the object of philosophy was profoundly influenced
by
the labours of the philologists. By discovering and editing partially or
indeed completely unknown scientific and philosophical texts they began
to separate antiquity and its traditions from myth and fable.
Valla's
works
23
show
how the
attempt
to apply linguistic analysis to
logical
procedures
developed
into an increasingly radical critique of metaphysical principles
and concepts, trespassing even into the sacred province of the scientia de
divinis. The philology at the
heart
of
Valla's
discussions of the most
heterogenous aspects of his culture was more
than
a reagent for dissolving
spurious and corrupt philosophical traditions. It was the principal
instru-
ment for evaluating the testimony of the past, be it legal exegesis or
scriptural commentary. The subordination of theology to the essential
auctoritas of God's word and the pruning out of centuries of maundering
exegesis
and dialectical logic-chopping were entirely consistent with the
main
thrust
of humanism.
24
20. Salutati 1947, P- 255. 21. Alberti 1966b. 22. Manetti 1975.
23.
See especially L.
Valla
1471, 1982, 1984. 24. See L.
Valla
1970b.
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66
The Renaissance concept
of
philosophy
SACRED
AND
PROFANE
PHILOSOPHY IN THE THOUGHT
OF
NICHOLAS
OF
CUSA
Contemporary with
Valla
but active in very different circles and still close
to certain typically medieval traditions (the Albertist School at Cologne,
Ockhamism, German mysticism), Nicholas
of
Cusa
contributed decisively
to the new metaphysico-religious conception
of
sapientia. His service to the
church in the dramatic years between 1435 and 1460
25
brought him into
close
contact with many of the greatest Italian humanists and gave him a
singularly acute insight into the emerging intellectual and religious crisis.
Unlike
many humanist thinkers of his time, Nicholas concentrated on
theological
issues: the oneness of God, the Trinity, the
nature
of Christ and
his role as the supreme mediator. However, an admixture of classical and
medieval
Neoplatonism and mathematical ideas
transmuted
these essen-
tially
theological concerns into an unconventional cosmology and into a
new way of conceiving the relationship between divine unity and the
world's multiplicity. Knowledge, according to Nicholas, consisted in
recognising the incommensurability between the ultimate object
of
human
enquiry and the conceptual and linguistic tools used in
that
enquiry,
that
is
to say, recognising
that
absolute reality could not be enclosed within the
limitations
of
logical
language.
26
Since the mind was finite and could only
deal with finite things, a given res was to be thought
of
both as a negation of
the infinite and as a sign
of
total being, initiating the via negationis which led
to the eternal and immutable bedrock
of
being.
In this way Nicholas could
move
from considering the mathematical laws
of
motion to contemplating
the divine wisdom which pervaded the universe and constituted the perfect
harmony which was always expressed in musical and geometrical terms.
Just
as by increasing the number
of
its sides a polygon could approach, but
never become, a circle, so human knowledge could approach its objects by a
process of approximation. It remained, however, uncertain and infinitely
distant
from its object and could never span the gap between infinity and the
finite.
27
Nevertheless,
docta ignorantia
—
the Socratic 'learned ignorance'
—
demonstrated the infinite wealth and potential of any positive knowledge,
showing
how procedures of a geometrical type permitted reason to move
unconstrainedly towards ever more complete
truths.
Consequently, since
25.
For the proceedings
of
the Council
of
Basle,
see Santacroce 1955, and Acta Graeca Concilii Florentini
1953-
26.
Nicholas of Cusa
1932-,
1, pp. 11-12 (De docta ignorantia, lib. 1, cap. 5).
27.
Ibid., pp. 54-6 (lib. 1, cap. 26).
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