Ridling Zaine. Philosophy: Then and Now. A look back at 26 centuries of thought
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Ridling, Philosophy Then and Now: A Look Back at 26 Centuries of Thought
168
The 17th century
In the history of Atomism the 17th century occupies a special place for
two reasons: it saw the revival of Democritean Atomism, and it saw the
beginning of a scientific atomic theory.
The revival of Democritean Atomism was the work of the ambiguous
Epicureo-Christian thinker Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655), who made his
contemporaries not only better acquainted with Atomism but also succeeded
in divesting it of the materialistic interpretation with which it was hereditarily
infected. This reintroduction of Democritus was well timed. Because of its
quantitative character Democritus’ Atomism invited for its elucidation the
application of mathematics and mechanics, which in the 17th century were
sufficiently developed to answer this invitation. In point of fact, the 17th
century was more interested in the possibilities that Atomism offered for a
physical theory than it was in the philosophical differences between the
different atomistic systems. For this reason it saw, for example, hardly any
difference between the systems of Gassendi and Descartes, although the latter
explicitly rejected some of the fundamentals of Democritus, such as the
existence of the void and the indivisibility of the atoms, as noted above
In the case of scientists mainly interested in the chemical aspects, the
same shift of emphasis from philosophical to scientific considerations can be
discerned. According to the physician and philosopher of nature Daniel
Sennert (1572-1637), Democritus’ Atomism and the minima theory really
amounted to the same thing. As far as philosophy was concerned, Sennert was
only interested in the general idea of Atomism; the precise content of an
atomic doctrine in his view ought to be a matter of chemical experimentation.
His own experience as a chemist taught him the specific differences existing
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between the atoms. In this respect Sennert continued the minima tradition. His
own contribution to the chemical atomic theory lay in the clear distinction that
he made between elementary atoms and the prima mista, or atoms of chemical
compounds.
The early modern experimentalist Robert Boyle (1627-91) followed the
same line of thought as Sennert, but he was much more aware of the
discrepancy between Democritus’ Atomism and an atomic theory suitable for
chemical purposes. Boyle’s solution to this problem was the thesis that the
atoms of Democritus were normally associated into primary concretions,
which did not easily dissociate and which acted as elementary atoms in the
chemical sense. These primary concretions can combine to form compounds
of a higher order, which may be compared to Sennert’s prima mista and to the
molecules of modern chemistry.
Founding of Modern Atomism
The 17th century had laid the theoretical foundations for a scientific
atomic theory. For its further development it was in need of better chemical
insights, especially concerning the problem of what substances should be
considered as chemical elements. Boyle had shown conclusively that the
traditional four “elements” were certainly not elementary substances, but at
the same time he confessed that he did not yet see any satisfactory method to
determine which substances were true elements. This method was provided by
another of the principal founders of modern chemistry A.-L. Lavoisier (1743-
94): a chemical element is a substance that cannot be further analyzed by
known chemical methods.
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John Dalton (1766-1844), usually regarded as the father of modern
atomic theory, applied the results of Lavoisier’s chemical work to atomistic
conceptions. When Dalton spoke of elementary atoms, he did not have a
merely theoretical idea in mind but the chemical elements as determined by
Lavoisier. Dalton held that there are as many different kinds of elementary
atoms as there are chemical elements. The atoms of a certain element are
perfectly alike in weight, figure, etc.; and the same point applies to the atoms
of a certain compound. As weight was the decisive characteristic in
Lavoisier’s theory, Dalton stressed the importance of ascertaining the relative
weights of atoms and the number of elementary atoms that constituted one
compound “atom.” As to the question of the way in which the atoms are
combined in a compound, Dalton conceived this combination as a simple
juxtaposition with each atom under the influence of Newtonian forces of
attraction. The atoms retain their identity through a chemical reaction. In this
one point the founder of the chemical atomic theory did not differ from
Democritus.
Recent and Contemporary Scientific Atomism
Until its development in the third decade of the 20th century, the
scientific atomic theory did not differ philosophically very much from that of
Dalton, although at first sight the difference may appear large. Dalton’s atoms
were no longer considered to be immutable and indivisible; new elementary
particles sometimes appeared on the scene; and molecules were no longer
seen as a mere juxtaposition of atoms – when entering into a compound atoms
became ions. Yet, these differences were only accidental; the atoms revealed
themselves as composed of more elementary particles – protons, neutrons, and
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electrons – but these particles themselves were considered then as immutable.
Thus the general picture remained the same. The material world was still
thought to be composed of smallest particles, which differed in nature and
which in certain definite ways could form relatively stable structures (atoms).
These structures were able to form new combinations (molecules) by
exchanging certain component parts (electrons). The whole process was ruled
by well-known mechanical and electrodynamic laws.
In contemporary atomic theory the differences from Dalton are much
more fundamental. The hypothesis of the existence of immutable elementary
particles has been abandoned: elementary particles can be transformed into
radiation and vice versa. And when they combine into greater units, the
particles do not necessarily preserve their identity; they can be absorbed into a
greater whole.
Atomism in the Thought of India
It is interesting to note that atomistic conceptions are not restricted to
Western philosophy and science. Examples of qualitative Atomism, based
upon the doctrine of the four elements, are also found in Indian philosophy. In
some Indian systems the atoms are not absolutely indivisible but only
relatively so. In certain aspects Indian Atomism is, therefore, more related to
the minima doctrine than to the Atomism of Democritus. Indian Atomism has,
however, not developed into a scientific theory.
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Foundational Issues Posed By Atomism
Atomism as a Metaphysical System
In discussing Atomism, one particular system, that of Democritus, has
been here distinguished as Atomism in the strict sense because of the fact that
in no other system have the foundational issues of Atomism been so clearly
expressed. Atomism in the strict sense is not merely one of the historical
forms of Atomism, one of the many possible scientific attempts at explaining
certain physical phenomena; it is, first of all, a metaphysical system: it has
been presented as the only possible explanation of change and multiplicity.
And as a metaphysic it is rationalistic, mechanistic, and realistic.
It is rationalistic because it has so much confidence in reason that, in
order to explain observed phenomena, it does not hesitate to postulate the
existence of unobservable atoms: i.e., of things that are in principle
unobservable by the human senses and can be known only by a process of
reasoning. Atomists go even further, for they not only are convinced of the
existence of atoms but they also think it possible to deduce in a rational way
their fundamental properties. Moreover, the description of these properties in
mechanistic terms is not just a matter of convenience; it is supposed to be the
adequate expression of reality.
This rationalistic and mechanistic metaphysics is not only characteristic
of Democritus’ Atomism but also of the early forms of scientific Atomism.
The clearest expression of this metaphysics is found in Descartes. For
Democritus mechanistic concepts are clear and distinct ideas, so that any
further experimental investigation is superfluous. It should be stressed that the
atomistic assumption that the human mind, by mere reasoning, can know the
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properties of the atoms is a necessary consequence of the idea that atoms are
not subject to internal change; for the changeless can never be a subject of
experimentation. The great weakness of the mechanistic concept of immutable
atoms was that it forced the analyzing experiments to stop at the atoms; but
this weakness could reveal itself only after, in the course of the further
development of science, the fundamentally experimental character of human
knowledge had become evident.
This weakness, in fact, was precisely one of the reasons why Aristotle
rejected the Atomism of Democritus, viz., that the latter had postulated atoms
that were not subject to change. For Aristotle the very essence of matter was
its being subject to change; hence to him the concept of immutable atoms was
a contradiction in terms.
Aristotle’s criticism of Atomism was clearly directed against its
mechanistic metaphysics, not against its realism. This latter characteristic was
the target, however, of an attack launched by the incomparable 18th-century
epistemologist Immanuel Kant. In a famous argument, known as the antinomy
of the continuum, Kant tried to prove that the acceptance of the reality of
spatial extension, the cornerstone of Atomism, led to contradictions. His
argument can be summarized as follows: It is possible to prove that any
compound must be composed of simple things (for if not, there would be
nothing but composition). On the other hand, it also is possible to prove that
no material thing can be simple, for the very reason that a part of an extended
being is always extended and is thus open to division. Hence, every allegedly
simple part is at once simple and nonsimple. Consequently, spatial extension
cannot be real. Extension is therefore not a property of the material world
itself; it is a form imposed upon reality by man’s perception.
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By his argument Kant did not intend to reject atomic theories as such; he
rejected only their realistic pretensions. Kant was deeply convinced that man
had to think of nature by way of analogy with a mechanism, but he denied that
knowledge construed in such a fashion could reach reality itself.
In the 19th century, scientists were, as a rule, hardly impressed by
Kant’s attack on the realistic pretensions of human knowledge. Scientists had
already learned to go their own way and no longer worried about
philosophical considerations. Only when an internal crisis in science itself
arose were they prepared to reflect upon their presuppositions. Such a crisis
occurred in the 20th century when science was forced to accept the relativity
of both classical models: the wave and the particle models.
To a certain extent, the problem of whether a scientific model is nothing
but a subjective construct in which the scientist unites his experience is the
same as the problem that Kant had in mind. One of the differences, however,
is that in Kant’s time science was still rather exclusively theory. Its close
connection with praxis (practice, doing) had not yet been discovered. For this
reason the Kantian epistemological (or human knowledge) problem could
center on such a question as: what guarantee does the knowing subject have
that his “models” of reality reflect reality itself? Inasmuch as, in an
exclusively theoretical science, the only contact that one has with reality is
afforded by means of one’s knowledge, the problem seems to be insoluble.
The development of science from a theoretical to an experimental
discipline forces philosophy to view the epistemological problem in a new
way. For in an experimental science man is in a twofold contact with reality,
viz., by his knowledge and by his experimental praxis. Modern atomic theory
is one of the best examples to illustrate this point. It was this theory that was
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most directly confronted with the problem of the realistic value of its models.
It could take up this challenge because of the theory’s effectiveness for
experimental praxis, which is the final judge of the realistic value of the
theoretical models. It has confirmed the audacious rational speculations of
ancient Atomism; but at the same time it has revealed that, in order to be
really effective, reason is in need of experimental assistance.
Ancient Greek Atomism versus Contemporary Scientific Atomism
In comparing Greek Atomism and modern atomic theories, it should be
recalled that in Greek thought philosophy and science still formed a unity.
Greek Atomism was inspired as much by the desire to find a solution for the
problems of mutability and plurality in nature as by the desire to provide
scientific explanations for specific phenomena. While it is true that some of
the Greek Atomists’ ideas can rightly be considered as precursors of later
physics, the main importance of the old atomistic doctrines for modern
science does not lie in these primitive anticipations. Much more important is
the attempt to take seriously the variety and mutability discerned by sense
experience and yet to reconcile it with the thesis of Parmenides about the
unity and the immutability of matter. In its search for universal and
unchangeable laws, modern science is to a great extent inspired by the same
idea as Parmenides, since universal laws presuppose a certain unity in the
material world and unchangeable laws cannot be established without the
presupposition that something unchangeable must be hidden behind all
changes. By the same token, without this latter presupposition experiments
would not make any sense at all. For if the diversity of reactions occurring
under different conditions is to reveal anything, these reactions must be the
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expression of an immutable nature. The differences have to indicate
something about that which remains the same. The great achievement of the
Greek philosophers was, therefore, that they took a general view of nature as a
whole that made a scientific attitude possible. To this, both the quantitative
and the qualitative forms of Atomism contributed, the former drawing
attention to the mathematical aspects of the problem, the latter to the
observational.
A comparison of ancient Greek Atomism with scientific Atomism
merely on the basis of their respective scientific contents would therefore do a
great injustice to Greek Atomism; it would in fact misjudge its main value.
Such a comparison would, however, also take too narrow a view of modern
scientific Atomism. It would imply the philosophical irrelevance of the latter.
It has here been shown, however, that the later development of the scientific
atomic theory has clarified many philosophical problems that, as basic issues,
divided Atomism in the strict sense from other forms of Atomism. To mention
only a few examples: the development of the scientific atomic theory has
deepened man’s insights into the relationship between a whole and its
components, into the relative character of ultimate particles, and into certain
fundamental epistemological problems.
Evaluation of Atomism
The success of the atomic theory shows the value of the idea of
Atomism: the explanation of the complex in terms of aggregates of fixed
particles or units. Its history also shows, however, the inherent danger of this
idea, namely, that of absolutism. History has corrected this absolutism: the
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unitary factors have to be conceived as ultimate only with respect to the
complex under consideration, and their union into aggregates need not occur
only by way of juxtaposition.
Eleaticism
One of the principal schools of ancient Pre-Socratic philosophy was
Eleaticism, so called from its seat in the Greek colony of Elea (or Velia) in
southern Italy. This school, which flourished in the 5th century BCE, was
distinguished by its radical monism; i.e., its doctrine of the One, according to
which all that exists (or is really true) is a static plenum of Being as such, and
nothing exists that stands either in contrast or in contradiction to Being. Thus,
all differentiation, motion, and change must be illusory. This monism is also
reflected in its view that existence, thought, and expression coalesce into one.
The sources for the study of Eleaticism are both archaeological and
literary. Archaeologists have ascertained that, at the time of Parmenides, the
Rationalist who founded the school, Elea was a large town with many
temples, a harbour, and a girdle of walls several miles long. They have also
unearthed a site presumed to be that of the medical school that Parmenides
founded and an inscription bearing Parmenides’ name.
The literary sources consist of fragments preserved by later classical
authors – 19 from Parmenides, four from his pupil Zeno, renowned for his
paradoxes of motion, and 10 from another pupil, Melissus, an admiral of
Samos – of which all but three from Parmenides and two from Melissus are 10
lines or less in length. The interpretation is also affected by the weight of
scholarly opinion that now holds (as against Karl Reinhardt, an early 20th-