Ridling Zaine. Philosophy: Then and Now. A look back at 26 centuries of thought

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.

Ridling, Philosophy Then and Now: A Look Back at 26 Centuries of Thought

958

considerable disagreement among scholars on this whole issue – on how to

state precisely the bodily criterion; on whether there is a psychological

criterion as well and, if so, how it is to be formulated; on what is the basic

criterion of personal identity; and on what to say about instances in which

criteria conflict.

Personal Immortality

Many people believe that when the human body ceases to be a living

system, there is not total annihilation of the person but that in some respect the

person continues to exist. The philosopher of mind can put aside the various

watered-down versions of immortality in which the person continues to exist

in the remote sense that people still remember him or his works or that his

influence continues through history. The philosopher does look with interest,

however, on the claim that there is an immortality in which a person, in his

survival, meets the psychological criteria of personal identity, of inheritance

of memory, beliefs, habits, and personality characteristics.

It is clear that a person’s view of immortality will be affected by

opinions that he holds about the relation of mind to matter. Given the versions

of Materialism that urge the elimination of mental terms or their definition in

bodily terms or that take bodily identity to be the basic criterion of personal

identity, the very notion of survival after death is completely unintelligible.

Many philosophers, however, reason that, since the notion of survival is

intelligible, such versions of Materialism cannot be accepted. Central-state or

identity theorists would admit survival to be an intelligible notion but would

view it, like lightning without electricity, as something that never happens;

Ridling, Philosophy Then and Now: A Look Back at 26 Centuries of Thought

959

they would thus be in agreement with many dualists, in particular

epiphenomenalists and psychophysical parallelists. Even an interactionist

would be free to accept or reject survival, as would a neutral monist.

If a philosopher holds that survival is an intelligible notion, he is still left

with the further question of whether it ever happens. In the past there have

been various a priori arguments for survival after death. Arguments based

upon the nature of the self, such as its indivisibility, can be found in Plato’s

Phaedo. Kant argued that man’s moral principles require survival as a

postulate. But among those today that hold that survival is intelligible, it is

widely agreed that a priori arguments will not do. If there is survival, they say,

it is a contingent fact and not a necessity; one must thus look to empirical data

for guidance. A survey of the evidence shows that the case against survival,

though strong, is by no means conclusive. One thing is clear: if there is

survival, the survivors can theoretically give firsthand testimony to it, whereas

if there is no survival, there will be no one to give such testimony.

Knowledge of Other Minds

An important problem in the theory of knowledge has been the status of

the belief in other minds, the belief that one’s own consciousness is not the

only consciousness in existence. Though few, if any, sane persons have

seriously accepted solipsism (the view that one’s own is the only

consciousness), the grounds for rejecting it are not at all clear.

Again, as with the problems of personal identity and personal survival,

one’s view of the relation of mind to matter is relevant. On various

Materialistic views, the problem reduces itself to that of justifying the belief in

Ridling, Philosophy Then and Now: A Look Back at 26 Centuries of Thought

960

an external world that contains other bodies of the appropriate sort and with

the appropriate behavior. But for dualists and immaterialists, who hold that

mental phenomena are something irreducibly different from the physical,

there is the further question of whether that something is unique to oneself or

whether there are other instances of it in the world.

Some scholars claim that individuals sometimes have direct awareness

of the conscious states of others, either in telepathic experiences, moments of

empathy, or even in everyday social intercourse. There is, moreover, a

transcendental argument, found in Kant and defended by Strawson, holding

that, unless a person could be confident of the existence of other minds, he

could not be confident of the existence of his own mind. A different line of

reasoning, the so-called argument from analogy, is based upon the similarities

between one’s own body and its behavior, on the one hand, and other human

bodies and their behavior on the other. To pursue the argument, since a mind

is known to be associated with one’s own body, it is reasonable to conclude

that another mind is associated with the body of another person. Finally, there

is the view that the best way to explain the complex behavior of other bodies,

especially their ability to behave rationally and in particular to speak and

communicate information, is to postulate other minds at work.

None of these arguments compels strong conviction, certainly not the

degree of conviction that all persons feel concerning the existence of other

minds. Whether stronger arguments will be found, whether philosophers must

admit that there is a considerable amount of faith required here, or whether

they will reformulate their concepts of the mind in a more Materialistic way to

bring them in closer accord with observable data remains to be seen.

Ridling, Philosophy Then and Now: A Look Back at 26 Centuries of Thought

961

Artificial Intelligence

Remarkable progress in the development of high-speed electronic

computers has led many philosophers to conclude that a suitably programmed

computer with a sufficient memory capacity would have an actual mind

capable of intelligent thought. The term artificial intelligence denotes the area

of investigation that aims to develop computers with such capabilities.

Two questions are intensely debated in this field. First, what are the

theoretical limits to what can be achieved in the way of artificial intelligence?

Despite phenomenal progress in recent years, no computer yet devised even

approximates in its capacity the multiplicitous powers of the human mind.

However, it would be most unwise at present to make dogmatic predictions

about future developments. Second, assuming that the optimistic hopes of

artificial intelligence researchers are realized, would such devices literally

have minds or would they be mere imitations of minds? It is already common

linguistic practice to describe computers as having memories, making

inferences, understanding one language or another, and the like, but are such

descriptions literally true or simply metaphorical? One group holds that

computers will never be more than tools employed by the human intelligence

to aid its own thinking. Another group holds that human intelligence itself

consists of the very computational processes that could be exemplified by

advanced machines, so that it would be unreasonable to deny the attribution of

intelligence to such machines. The issue may remain unresolved until

researchers in artificial intelligence have had more time to determine the

limits of computer capabilities.

Ridling, Philosophy Then and Now: A Look Back at 26 Centuries of Thought

962

Ethics

Introduction

How should we live? Shall we aim at happiness or at knowledge, virtue,

or the creation of beautiful objects? If we choose happiness, will it be our own

or the happiness of all? And what of the more particular questions that face us:

Is it right to be dishonest in a good cause? Can we justify living in opulence

while elsewhere in the world people are starving? If conscripted to fight in a

war we do not support, should we disobey the law? What are our obligations

to the other creatures with whom we share this planet and to the generations of

humans who will come after us?

Ethics deals with such questions at all levels. Its subject consists of the

fundamental issues of practical decision making, and its major concerns

include the nature of ultimate value and the standards by which human actions

can be judged right or wrong.

The terms ethics and morality are closely related. We now often refer to

ethical judgments or ethical principles where it once would have been more

common to speak of moral judgments or moral principles. These applications

are an extension of the meaning of ethics. Strictly speaking, however, the term

refers not to morality itself but to the field of study, or branch of inquiry, that

has morality as its subject matter. In this sense, ethics is equivalent to moral

philosophy.

Although ethics has always been viewed as a branch of philosophy, its

all-embracing practical nature links it with many other areas of study,

including anthropology, biology, economics, history, politics, sociology, and

theology. Yet, ethics remains distinct from such disciplines because it is not a

Ridling, Philosophy Then and Now: A Look Back at 26 Centuries of Thought

963

matter of factual knowledge in the way that the sciences and other branches of

inquiry are. Rather, it has to do with determining the nature of normative

theories and applying these sets of principles to practical moral problems.

The Origins of Ethics

Mythical Accounts

Introduction of Moral Codes

When did ethics begin and how did it originate? If we are referring to

ethics proper – i.e., the systematic study of what we ought to do – it is clear

that ethics can only have come into existence when human beings started to

reflect on the best way to live. This reflective stage emerged long after human

societies had developed some kind of morality, usually in the form of

customary standards of right and wrong conduct. The process of reflection

tended to arise from such customs, even if in the end it may have found them

wanting. Accordingly, ethics began with the introduction of the first moral

codes.

Virtually every human society has some form of myth to explain the

origin of morality. In the Louvre in Paris there is a black Babylonian column

with a relief showing the sun god Shamash presenting the code of laws to

Hammurabi. The Old Testament account of God giving the Ten

Commandments to Moses on Mt. Sinai might be considered another example.

In Plato’s Protagoras there is an avowedly mythical account of how Zeus

took pity on the hapless humans, who, living in small groups and with

inadequate teeth, weak claws, and lack of speed, were no match for the other

Ridling, Philosophy Then and Now: A Look Back at 26 Centuries of Thought

964

beasts. To make up for these deficiencies, Zeus gave humans a moral sense

and the capacity for law and justice, so that they could live in larger

communities and cooperate with one another.

That morality should be invested with all the mystery and power of

divine origin is not surprising. Nothing else could provide such strong reasons

for accepting the moral law. By attributing a divine origin to morality, the

priesthood became its interpreter and guardian, and thereby secured for itself a

power that it would not readily relinquish. This link between morality and

religion has been so firmly forged that it is still sometimes asserted that there

can be no morality without religion. According to this view, ethics ceases to

be an independent field of study. It becomes, instead, moral theology.

There is some difficulty, already known to Plato, with the view that

morality was created by a divine power. In his dialogue Euthyphro, Plato

considered the suggestion that it is divine approval that makes an action good.

Plato pointed out that if this were the case, we could not say that the gods

approve of the actions because the actions are good. Why then do the gods

approve of these actions rather than others? Is their approval entirely

arbitrary? Plato considered this impossible and so held that there must be

some standards of right or wrong that are independent of the likes and dislikes

of the gods. Modern philosophers have generally accepted Plato’s argument

because the alternative implies that if the gods had happened to approve of

torturing children and to disapprove of helping one’s neighbours, then torture

would have been good and neighbourliness bad.

Ridling, Philosophy Then and Now: A Look Back at 26 Centuries of Thought

965

Problems of Divine Origin

A modern theist might say that since God is good, he could not possibly

approve of torturing children nor disapprove of helping neighbours. In saying

this, however, the theist would have tacitly admitted that there is a standard of

goodness that is independent of God. Without an independent standard, it

would be pointless to say that God is good; this could only mean that God is

approved of by God. It seems therefore that, even for those who believe in the

existence of God, it is impossible to give a satisfactory account of the origin

of morality in terms of a divine creation. We need a different account.

There are other possible connections between religion and morality. It

has been said that even if good and evil exist independently of God or the

gods, only divine revelation can reliably inform us about good and evil. An

obvious problem with this view is that those who receive divine revelations,

or who consider themselves qualified to interpret them, do not always agree

on what is good and what is evil. Without an accepted criterion for the

authenticity of a revelation or an interpretation, we are no better off, so far as

reaching moral agreement is concerned, than we would be if we were to

decide on good and evil ourselves with no assistance from religion.

Traditionally, a more important link between religion and ethics was that

religious teachings were thought to provide a reason for doing what is right. In

its crudest form, the reason was that those who obey the moral law will be

rewarded by an eternity of bliss while everyone else roasts in hell. In more

sophisticated versions, the motivation provided by religion was less blatantly

self-seeking and more of an inspirational kind. Whether in its crude or

sophisticated version, or something in between, religion does provide an

answer to one of the great questions of ethics: Why should I do what is right?

Ridling, Philosophy Then and Now: A Look Back at 26 Centuries of Thought

966

As will be seen in the course of this article, however, the answer provided by

religion is by no means the only answer. It will be considered after the

alternatives have been examined.

Prehuman Ethics

Nonhuman Behavior

Can we do better than the religious accounts of the origin of morality?

Because, for obvious reasons, we have no historical record of a human society

in the period before it had any standards of right and wrong, history cannot

tell us the origins of morality. Nor is anthropology able to assist because all

human societies studied have already had, except perhaps during the most

extreme circumstances, their own form of morality. Fortunately there is

another mode of inquiry open to us. Human beings are social animals. Living

in a social group is a characteristic we share with many other animal species,

including our closest relatives, the apes. Presumably, the common ancestor of

humans and apes also lived in a social group, so that we were social beings

before we were human beings. Here, then, in the social behavior of nonhuman

animals and in the evolutionary theory that explains such behavior, we may

find the origins of human morality.

Social life, even for nonhuman animals, requires constraints on

behavior. No group can stay together if its members make frequent, no-holds-

barred attacks on one another. Social animals either refrain altogether from

attacking other members of the social group, or, if an attack does take place,

the ensuing struggle does not become a fight to the death – it is over when the

weaker animal shows submissive behavior. It is not difficult to see analogies

Ridling, Philosophy Then and Now: A Look Back at 26 Centuries of Thought

967

here with human moral codes. The parallels, however, go much further than

this. Like humans, social animals may behave in ways that benefit other

members of the group at some cost or risk to themselves. Male baboons

threaten predators and cover the rear as the troop retreats. Wolves and wild

dogs bring meat back to members of the pack not present at the kill. Gibbons

and chimpanzees with food will, in response to a gesture, share their food with

others of the group. Dolphins support sick or injured animals, swimming

under them for hours at a time and pushing them to the surface so they can

breathe.

It may be thought that the existence of such apparently altruistic

behavior is odd, for evolutionary theory states that those who do not struggle

to survive and reproduce will be wiped out in the ruthless competition known

as natural selection. Research in evolutionary theory applied to social

behavior, however, has shown that evolution need not be quite so ruthless

after all. Some of this altruistic behavior is explained by kin selection. The

most obvious examples are those in which parents make sacrifices for their

offspring. If wolves help their cubs to survive, it is more likely that genetic

characteristics, including the characteristic of helping their own cubs, will

spread through further generations of wolves.

Kinship and Reciprocity

Less obviously, the principle also holds for assistance to other close

relatives, even if they are not descendants. A child shares 50 percent of the

genes of each of its parents, but full siblings too, on the average, have 50

percent of their genes in common. Thus a tendency to sacrifice one’s life for