Rawls J. Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy

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Near the end of the Leviathan, Hobbes says, “Philosophy is...the

Knowledge acquired by Reasoning, from the Manner of the Generation of

any thing to the Properties; or from the Properties, to some possible Way

of Generation of the same; to the end to be able to produce, as far as mat-

ter, and human force permit, such Effects, as human life requireth” (Levia-

than, p. 367). The idea is that we would have philosophical knowledge of

something when we understand how we could generate from its parts the

properties of that thing as we now know it. Hobbes’s aim in the Leviathan

would be to give us philosophical knowledge of civil society, in that sense.

To accomplish this Hobbes considers society as if broken apart, dis-

solved into its elements, that is, human beings in a state of nature. Then he

examines in detail what that state of nature would be like, given the pro-

pensity and features of these human beings, the innate drives or passions

that motivate their actions, and how they would behave when they are in

that state. The aim is then to see how civil society with its government

could be generated and come about, given the State of Nature as he has de-

scribed it. If we can explain how civil society and the Sovereign could come

about from a state of nature, this then gives us philosophical knowledge of

civil society, in Hobbes’s sense. That is, we understand civil society when

we understand a possible mode of its generation that accounts for its recog-

nized and observable properties. On this interpretation, the idea of a Social

Contract presents a way in which civil society could have been generated—

not how it was actually generated, but how it could have been. There are

recognized properties of society and requirements of society—for example,

the necessary powers of the Sovereign, the fact that the Sovereign must

have certain powers if society is to cohere; that is a property of the great

Leviathan. We recognize these properties and account for them as things

that rational persons in a state of nature would regard as essential if the So-

cial Contract is to achieve its intended aim of establishing peace and con-

cord. Thus, the Social Contract grants these necessary powers to the Sover-

eign. He thinks that spelled out in full, all of this provides philosophical

knowledge of civil society.

So the idea again is that we should view the Social Contract as a way of

thinking about how the state of nature could be transformed into civil soci-

ety. We explain the present properties of the state, or the great Leviathan,

and understand why the Sovereign has to have the powers that he does by

seeing why rational persons in a state of nature would agree to the Sover-

eign’s having those powers. This is how we are to understand the properties

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of the state, from the process of its generation, and also understand why its

powers are as they are. On Hobbes’s deﬁnition of philosophical knowledge

that then provides philosophical knowledge of the nature of the state, or of

the great Leviathan. This is a much broader deﬁnition of philosophy or of

philosophical knowledge than now exists. Then it covered science, or “natu-

ral philosophy” as it was then called.

Now consider a second way to think of Hobbes’s social contract. In

Chapter 13 of Leviathan (p. 63), Hobbes recognizes the possible objection,

that there never was a state of nature. (“There never was such a time, nor

condition of war as this.”) To this he replies that at least Kings and Sover-

eigns are in a State of Nature with respect to one another: the State of Na-

ture obtains between nation-states. Moreover, he indicates that it is suf-

ﬁcient for his argument that the State of Nature be a state that would come

about now if there were no sovereign authority to keep people in awe.

this way, the state of nature is a condition that always would exist if effective

exercise of sovereignty were to break down. So conceived, the State of Na-

ture is an ever present possibility of degeneration into discord and civil war,

although in a “well-grounded” society it is very unlikely (improbable). Now

because the State of Nature is in effect a state of war, the constant possibil-

ity of a State of Nature provides for all sufﬁcient reason for wanting an effec-

tive Sovereign to continue to exist. We all have strong grounds for fearing

the collapse of our current arrangements, Hobbes thinks, and this yields a

sufﬁcient reason for everyone to support them. Thus, on this interpreta-

tion, the State of Nature is not some past state of affairs, or indeed any ac-

tual condition, but an ever present possibility to be avoided.

The second interpretation of the social contract is this: Suppose all are

fully rational and understand the human condition as Hobbes describes it.

Let’s suppose also that an effective Sovereign now exists with the requisite

powers to maintain current arrangements. Then Hobbes thinks that all

have a sufﬁcient reason based on their own self-preservation and fundamen-

tal interests to enter into a covenant with all to authorize the Sovereign to

continue to exercise his powers in perpetuity. Entering into such a covenant

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6. “It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of war

as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there are many

places, where they live so now....Howsoever, it may be perceived what manner of life

there would be, where there were no common Power to fear; by the manner of life, which

men that have formerly lived under a peaceful government, use to degenerate into, in a

civil War.” Leviathan, p. 63.

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is rational for all to do; it is (let’s say) collectively rational since rational for

each and all.

Looked at in this way, we don’t need to see the social contract as made

in the State of Nature. So we don’t need to consider whether a social con-

tract is enough to transform the state of nature into civil society. (For exam-

ple, how can we be sure that people’s promises will be honored?) Rather,

we can think of the social contract as a covenant that serves to secure and

renders secure an already existing stable government. Hobbes’s point is that

given the normal conditions of human life, and given the ever present dan-

ger of civil conﬂict and collapse into the State of Nature, every rational per-

son has a sufﬁcient and fundamental interest in supporting an effective Sover-

eign. And given this interest, every rational person would enter into the

Social Contract, should the occasion arise.

Here we should ask, must there be an actual social contract on

Hobbes’s view? Isn’t it enough to think of the social contract in this hypo-

thetical way, that all members of an existing society with an effective Sover-

eign would have sufﬁcient reason for entering into a covenant to authorize

this Sovereign, etc.? This suggestion regards the Social Contract itself, as well

as the State of Nature, as purely hypothetical: that is, as a covenant we

would have sufﬁcient reason to enter into if this were possible, etc. Now

certainly Hobbes doesn’t explicitly express his Social Contract doctrine in

this way. And we should be cautious in putting words into his mouth. Nev-

ertheless, you might consider the question whether this hypothetical inter-

pretation of the Social Contract sufﬁces to express what is essential to

Hobbes’s view. After all, the Social Contract, when understood in this way,

does give a conception of social unity and explains how civil society could

hang together and why once an effective Sovereign exists, citizens might

support current arrangements etc. While it may not explain how civil soci-

ety could be generated from its parts, it might explain why it doesn’t de

gener-

ate back into its parts. The Social Contract provides a point of view for

showing why everyone has an overriding and fundamental interest in sup-

porting an effective Sovereign. Why isn’t this enough for Hobbes’s aims,

seeing the social contract in this way?

This depends, of course, on what Hobbes’s aims were. I think he meant

to present a convincing philosophical argument to the conclusion that a

strong and effective Sovereign—with all the powers Hobbes thinks a Sovereign

should have—is the only remedy for the great evil of civil war which all per-

sons must want to avoid as contrary to their fundamental interests. Hobbes

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wants to convince us that the existence of such a Sovereign provides the

only way to civil peace and concord. And given this conclusion, and given

that the Fundamental Law of Nature is “to seek Peace, and follow it” (Levi-

athan, p. 64) and that the second Law of Nature is to “be contented with so

much liberty against other men, as [we] would allow other men against

[us]” we all have an obligation (not based on the Social Contract) to comply

with the Sovereign’s laws. The focus of Hobbes’s thought is the turmoil and

civil strife of his day; this is what immediately concerns him. He thinks an

understanding of the Sovereign’s necessary powers and a clear view of the

Laws of Nature as based on our fundamental interests can help to address

this situation. The Social Contract, interpreted purely hypothetically, en-

ables Hobbes to make his argument. For this purpose, the hypothetical in-

terpretation does seem to sufﬁce.

To sum up, there are three possible interpretations of the social con-

tract. First, it is an account of what actually happened and of how the state

actually was formed. This is not Hobbes’s intention as I interpret him. A

second, more plausible interpretation, for which there is a good deal of evi-

dence in the text, is that he was attempting to give a philosophical account

of how the state could arise. I say “could arise,” or how it might have come

about, and not how it actually did. He wanted to give us philosophical

knowledge of the state, by dissolving it into its parts and depicting human

beings as they are psychologically constituted, and then showing how the

state of nature could be transformed into the great Leviathan, or into a

society of people under a state. Finally, a third possible interpretation I

suggested is the following: Suppose that the great Leviathan actually exists

already. Then we should think of the state of nature as an ever-present

possibility that might come about if the effective Sovereign should cease

to be effective. Given that possibility, and in view of what he takes to be ev-

eryone’s fundamental interests in self-preservation, their “conjugal affec-

tions,” and their desire for the means of a commodious life, Hobbes is ex-

plaining why everyone has a sufﬁcient and overriding reason to want the

great Leviathan to continue to exist and to be effective. On this interpreta-

tion, Hobbes is trying to urge us into accepting an existing effective Sover-

eign. We can understand this intention in light of the climate of the times

and the English Civil War.

These two interpretations are suggestions as to how to understand the

social contract. I suggest these interpretations somewhat hesitantly. I am

never altogether satisﬁed that what I say about these books is correct. This

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is a very large and complicated view, and there are various ways it can be

read. We ought to be suspicious of any pat account of how it is supposed to

be taken.

Hobbes Lecture I: Appendix A

Handout: Features of Human Nature Which

Make the State of Nature Unstable

A. Two Introductory Remarks:

1. I shall discuss only The Leviathan and no other works of Hobbes; and

I assume that Hobbes’s Social Contract doctrine as presented in this work

can be fully understood apart from any theological or religious view. Nei-

ther the formal structure nor the material content of Hobbes’s doctrine is

affected by these background notions. This is, of course, debatable; and I

don’t argue the point. You should consider carefully Chapters 12, 31.

2. I shall also leave aside Hobbes’s materialism and his other metaphysi-

cal theses except insofar as occasional remarks may help to clarify his Social

Contract and how it is put together.

B. Two Ways of Regarding the State of Nature in Hobbes:

1. First, as the state of affairs that would come about if there were no

effective political authority, or Sovereign, with all the powers which on

Hobbes’s view, it is necessary for an effective Sovereign to have.

2. As a point of view which persons in society may assume and from

which each can understand why it would be rational to covenant with every

other person to set up an effective Sovereign (as Hobbes describes this Sov-

ereign). In this sense the Social Contract is collectively rational; from the

point of view of the State of Nature, the conditions which reﬂect permanent

(and so present) features of human nature, each member of society now has

a sufﬁcient reason to want the effective Sovereign to continue to exist, and

thereby to ensure the stability and viability of existing institutions.

C. Destabilizing Features of Human Nature (when taken together in a State of

Nature):

1. Human beings are sufﬁciently equal in natural endowments and

mental powers (including prudence), and also sufﬁciently vulnerable to one

another’s hostility, to give rise to fear and insecurity. 13: 60–62.

2. Human desires and needs are such that together with the scarcity of

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the means of satisfying them, people must ﬁnd themselves in competition

with one another. 13: 60–62.

3. Human psychology is in various ways self-centered and self-focused,

and when people take careful thought all tend to give priority to their own

preservation and security, and to gaining the means to a commodious life.

4. Human beings are in several ways unﬁt for peaceable association in

society:

i. They have a liability to pride and vainglory which association with

others arouses and which is irrational. That is, this liability often prompts

them to act contrary to the principles of right reason (the Laws of Nature),

and these passions tempt them to actions highly dangerous both to them-

selves and to others.

ii. They have, it seems, no original or natural desires for association,

or natural forms of fellow-feeling. What appears to be such feelings derive

from our self-concern. On the other hand, Hobbes does not think we’re

malicious, that is, enjoy the suffering of others for its own sake.

5. Defects and Liabilities of human reasoning:

i. Those arising from lack of a proper philosophical (scientiﬁc)

method: 5: 20–21. Note here Hobbes’s attack on the Schools (Aristotle via

scholasticism).

ii. Liability of human reasoning, presumably even when a proper phi-

losophy is known, to be distorted and undermined by our proneness to

pride and vainglory: 17: 86–87.

iii. Fragile nature of practical reason when it concerns the conduct of

human beings in groups and the appropriate social institutions. This form

of practical reason is fragile because Hobbes thinks it must be given a con-

ventionalist basis. That is, everyone must agree who is to decide what is for

the common good and everyone must abide by this person’s judgments.

There is no possibility of all freely recognizing by the exercise of reason what

is right and wrong, or for the common good, and abiding by this knowledge.

Social cooperation for the common good requires an effective Sovereign.

Hobbes Lecture I: Appendix B

[Rawls’s 1978 version of this lecture contained the following discussion,

which supplements section 2, “Hobbes’s Secular Moralism,” above from the

1983 lecture. —Ed.]

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Simpliﬁcations: I propose to make two simpliﬁcations in my discussion

of Hobbes:

1. First, I shall assume that the essential formal structure and content of

Hobbes’s political philosophy (as a Social Contract conception) can be un-

derstood as addressed to rational human beings who can grasp its sense and

interpretation by the correct use of their natural reason. Thus, I suppose

that Hobbes’s view is fully intelligible, as regards its structure and content

within a secular as opposed to a theological or religious view.

Thus for the most part I shall leave aside the disputed question of the

interpretation of Hobbes which is raised by the Taylor-Warrender thesis

that Hobbes’s account of political authority and obligation is tied at bottom

to natural laws as the laws of God, who has rightful authority over us.

Now by the secular character of Hobbes’s political philosophy I mean

roughly the following.

(a) The formal structure of concepts and deﬁnitions of Hobbes’s ac-

count of the Sovereign, etc., of right and liberty, etc., is independent from

theological presuppositions. This structure can stand on its own. For example,

as a deﬁnition of natural right, we can say:

α has a natural right to do x = df α’s doing x is in accordance (ini-

tially, i.e. prior to events or actions that limit the right) with right reason.

(b) The material content of Hobbes’s political conception and of his

supporting moral philosophy is likewise independent from theological pre-

suppositions. This content can also stand on its own and be understood by

natural reason given Hobbes’s psychological account of human nature. For

example, consider the material deﬁnition of natural right:

α has a natural right to do x = (material df ) α’s doing x is (conscien-

tiously believed by α to be) advantageous or necessary for α’s preservation.

There is no reason offhand, however, why Hobbes’s view cannot be sup-

plemented by theological doctrines. But if such assumptions are introduced,

there are two possibilities:

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7. A. E. Taylor, “The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes,” Philosophy 53 (1938); reprinted in

Hobbes Studies, ed. Keith Brown (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965); and

Howard Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957). The

point of view I follow is roughly that of David Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan (Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1969).

8. [“= df ” is standardly used to introduce deﬁnitional equivalences; it should be un-

derstood as “is deﬁned to mean.” Rawls’s sentence above should thus be read as: “‘α has a

natural right to do x’ is deﬁned to mean: ‘α’s doing x is in accordance . . . with right rea

son.’” —Ed.]

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(i) The ﬁrst case is this: the conclusions drawn when these doctrines

are adjoined to the system of formal structure and material content are not

fully compatible with the conclusions drawn from the secular system alone.

(Should this happen, the material conditions of the system would not be in-

dependent (in a suitably strong sense) from theological doctrine. Thesis (b)

above although not (a) would need revision.)

(ii) The second case is this: the conclusions drawn when theological

doctrines are adjoined are the same as those of the purely secular system

(without theological presuppositions). Should this happen, both (a) and (b)

hold. (cf. what Hobbes says: Leviathan, Book I: Ch. 12, 96–97; I: 15, last

paragraph, pp. 57, 80.)

Now the important point is that Hobbes accepts case (ii). In the secu-

lar system the conclusions drawn depend upon what institutions, etc., are re-

quired for the peace and concord of people living in society. In the theological

system the conclusions depend upon not only what is required for peace and

concord but also upon what is necessary for human salvation. The ﬁrst case

(i) would hold, then, only if what is necessary for peace and concord in soci-

ety is different from what is necessary for salvation.

I believe that Hobbes would deny the truth of any theological doc-

trine that made the prerequisites of salvation incompatible with conditions

of the preservation of people in groups. A religious view that declares

them incompatible is (on Hobbes’s view) a superstition and as such irratio-

nal. It is based on an unreasoning fear springing from a lack of true knowl-

edge of the natural causes of things. (See his whole discussion of the natu-

ral seeds of religion in I: 12—“Of Religion.”)

In Chapter 12 of Book I Hobbes discusses how “the ﬁrst Founders,

and Legislators of Commonwealths amongst the Gentiles, whose ends

were only to keep the people in obedience, and peace” took care “to make

it believed, that the same things were displeasing to the Gods, which were

forbidden by the Laws” (Leviathan, p. 57). There is every reason to sup-

pose that Hobbes approves of this policy of the ancient world (Greeks

and Romans) of using religion to strengthen the conditions necessary to

preserve social peace and concord. In this sense, Hobbes’s doctrine is secu-

lar. (See also II: 31, 528f re obedience to Laws of Nature as worship) [1st

edition, 192f].

One must be careful, however, not to question that Hobbes is (so

far as one can tell) a sincere and believing Christian. We must interpret

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his Christianity so that it is not incompatible with the secular structure

and content of his moral and political conception. In conclusion, the

whole order of Hobbes’s exposition seems to imply that the secular struc-

ture and content of his doctrine is regarded by him as basic. If theologi-

cal presuppositions were fundamental, he would, it seems, have started

with them.

So much then, for why it seems correct to focus on Hobbes’s view as

addressed to rational human beings, etc.

2. The second simpliﬁcation (about which I shall be brief ) is that one

can (perhaps) interpret Hobbes’s method in the Leviathan (and in his other

political works) as the application to a moral and political conception of a

general mechanistic doctrine of the workings of nature. Hobbes is often seen

as trying to work out a uniﬁed science (uniﬁed not only in general methodology

but also in its ﬁrst principles).

Thus we might interpret him as beginning with the study of bodies

and their motions in general (explained in some mechanistic fashion) and

then taking up the study of that particular kind of body—that of individual

human beings—and ﬁnally coming to the study of artiﬁcial bodies, namely

civil governments which are human-made. They are the result of human

artiﬁce. The Leviathan is the commonwealth, a human artiﬁce.

In studying artiﬁcial bodies—commonwealths and civic governments,

etc.—Hobbes’s method is to look at the parts

of these bodies which he

takes to be human beings (individuals with their faculties and desires, etc.).

He says in De Cive that everything is best understood by its constitutive

causes, and he illustrates this remark by noting that we understand a watch

by grasping how its various parts are put together and work mechanically.

Similarly, to understand a commonwealth, it is not necessary actually to

take it apart (for that is hardly possible, or can be done at too great a cost),

but we are to consider it as if it were dissolved: State of Nature.

That is, we want to understand what the features of human beings

are and in what ways these features (qualities, etc.) render people either ﬁt

or unﬁt for civil government. We want to understand also how people must

be agreed among themselves if their intention and aim to become a well-

grounded state is to be realized (EW, p. xiv; ed. Lamprecht, pp. 10f ).

I shall more or less leave aside the rest of Hobbes’s philosophy

and how far his moral and political philosophy ﬁts into his overall meta-

physics.

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Hobbes Lecture I: Appendix C

Passages Relevant to the Ideal of Generous Natures

[References to Head ed.]

A. Possibility of Affections:

Hobbes asserts the possibility of benevolence and it seems to man gen-

erally; when to men generally, it is “good nature” (26).

Recognizes various passions of love, including love for particular per-

sons (26).

Recognizes conjugal affections, as of second in order of importance

after self-preservation and before riches and means of living: 179.

B. Related to above: it is not to take pleasure in the misfortunes of others:

(said re cruelty): 28.

Curiosity as a delight in the continual generation of knowledge; dis-

tinguishes man from animals: 26, cf. 51, 52.

C. Generous Attitude Expressed in the Virtues:

1. On the “relish” of justice: when a man scorns to be beholden for

the contentment of his life to fraud and breach of promise: 74.

2. For great minds one of the proper works is to help people, and

free them from the scorn of others; such minds compare themselves only

with the most able: 27.

3. Two ways to secure that men honor their covenant: fear of con-

sequences of breaking them; or: “a glory or pride in appearing not to need

to break it.” But “this latter is a Generosity too rarely found to be presumed

on . . .” (70).

4. Honor of great persons is to be valued for their beneﬁcence, and

the aids they give to persons of inferior ranks; or not at all. Greatness

makes our violences, oppressions worse, as we have less need to commit

them: Ch. 30 (180).

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