Rawls J. Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy

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hobbes i

Hobbes’s Secular Moralism and the

Role of His Social Contract

§1. Introduction

Why do I begin a course in political philosophy with Hobbes?

It isn’t that

Hobbes began the social contract doctrine, of course. That goes back to the

classical Greeks, and then in the sixteenth century there was a marvelous

development of it by the later Scholastics, by Suarez, de Vittoria, Molina,

and others. By Hobbes’s time it is a quite highly developed doctrine. My

reason is that in my own view and that of many others, Hobbes’s Leviathan

is the greatest single work of political thought in the English language. By

saying that, I don’t mean that it comes the closest to being true, or that it is

the most reasonable. Rather, I mean that taking everything together—in-

cluding its style and its language, its scope and its acuteness and interesting

vividness of observation, its intricate structure of analysis and principles,

and its presentation of what I think is a dreaded way of thinking about soci-

ety which almost might be true and which is quite a frightening possibil-

ity—adding all those together, the Leviathan makes, to me, a very over-

whelming impression. Taken as a whole, it can have a very overwhelming

and dramatic effect on our thought and feeling. There are other writers one

might prize more. In a way, I tend to value J. S. Mill’s work more highly

than Hobbes’s, but then there is no single work of Mill’s that can be com-

pared to the Leviathan. There isn’t anything he did that begins to have this

overall effect. Locke’s Second Treatise may be more reasonable, more sensi-

ble, in some ways, and one might think closer to being accurate, or true.

But again, it lacks the scope and power of presentation of a political con-

ception on the order of Hobbes. And while there are other impressive writ-

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1. [Transcription of February 11, 1983 lecture, with additions from John Rawls’s hand-

written lecture notes of 1979 and 1983. —Ed.]

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ers, like Kant and Marx, they did not write in English. In the English lan-

guage this is, I think, the most impressive single work. Therefore it would

be a shame to have a class on political philosophy and not try to read it.

A second reason for opening with a study of Hobbes’s work is that it is

useful to think of modern moral and political philosophy as beginning with

Hobbes, and with the reaction to Hobbes. Hobbes wrote the Leviathan dur-

ing a period of great political upheaval. He published it in 1651, during the

period of transition between the English Civil War (1642–48), which de-

feated Charles I, and the restoration of the monarchy with the crowning of

Charles II in 1660. Hobbes’s work called forth a strong intellectual reaction.

Hobbes was regarded by his critics to be the chief representative of modern

inﬁdelity to Christian beliefs. That was a Christian age, and Christian ortho-

doxy saw their opposition to Hobbes along a number of very important

and sharp lines (see Figure 1).

For example, orthodoxy would, of course, hold a theistic view, while

they regarded Hobbes as atheistic. Orthodoxy holds a dualist view, making

a distinction between soul and body, whereas they regarded Hobbes as a

materialist. Orthodoxy also believed in freedom of the will, freedom of the

soul and mind, but they regarded Hobbes as a determinist who would re-

duce the will to a sequence of appetites or some sort of cultural change.

Orthodoxy also held a corporative conception of human society (it would

not be correct to call it “organic”). They regarded society as intrinsically

an aspect of human nature, whereas they regarded Hobbes as having an

individualist conception of society. He is still regarded as having a rather

radically individualistic view. Orthodoxy also held to a view of eternal and

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Figure 1.

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immutable morality. That is to say there were certain moral principles

based on God’s reason that were possible for us, in virtue of our reason, to

grasp and to understand, and there was but one interpretation of these

principles. Moral principles were like the axioms of geometry in that they

could be grasped by reason alone. Hobbes, on the other hand, was seen as

relativistic and subjectivistic, totally the opposite view. To make a ﬁnal

point, orthodoxy regarded persons as capable of benevolence and being

concerned with others’ good, and also as capable of acting from moral

principles of eternal and immutable morality for their own sake; whereas

Hobbes, as they thought, presumed persons to be psychological egoists and

concerned only with their own interests.

I don’t think that this picture of Hobbes, this interpretation of his view,

is particularly accurate, but I mention it because it was what people in

Hobbes’s time, even a number of sophisticated people, took Hobbes to be

saying. It explains why he was so severely attacked and even dreaded. It was

a matter of personal affront in some circles if someone took you to be a

Hobbist. That was an accusation against which many felt they had to de-

fend themselves, much as people felt around 1950 in this country that they

had to defend themselves from being thought to be a communist. Locke

thought that Newton took him for a Hobbist, and this was something that

they had to straighten out before they could be friends. It was a very serious

matter to have others regard you in this light.

What one will ﬁnd is that immediately after Hobbes there are two lines

of reaction against him. One is the orthodox reaction by Christian moral

philosophers, those who belonged or were sympathetic to the church. Per-

haps the most important among them were Cudworth, Clarke, and Butler.

They attacked what they took to be Hobbes’s leading views, e.g.:

1. his presumed psychological and ethical egoism;

2. his relativism and subjectivism and denial of free will;

3. and what they took to be the result of his doctrine: the idea that po-

litical authority is made legitimate by superior power or else by agree-

ments made when confronted by such power.

They also rejected the idea that political authority could rest on anything

like a social contract at all.

The other line of reaction was the utilitarian line: Hume, Bentham,

Hutcheson, Adam Smith, and on down. They did not disagree with

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Hobbes for orthodox reasons, and they on the whole, with the exception of

Hutcheson, took a secular standpoint. The utilitarians wanted to attack

Hobbes’s egoism. They wanted to argue that the principle of utility is an

objective moral principle, and in that way attack Hobbes’s presumed sub-

jectivism or relativism. And they also argued for the principle of utility as a

principle that could decide between and justify and explain the grounds of

political authority. One of the ways in which Hobbes was interpreted was

that he based political obligation and political authority on superior power.

Again, I am not saying that any of these things are what Hobbes actually

said, but that they are what he was widely regarded as saying.

So Hobbes was attacked then from all sides—by the orthodox and the

non-orthodox—and because the Leviathan is such a tremendous work, it ini-

tiated a kind of reaction: his system of thought was something in regard to

which one had to decide where one stood. Given these circumstances, it is

useful to think of Hobbes and the reaction to Hobbes as the beginning of

modern British political and moral philosophy.

§2. Hobbes’s Secular Moralism

In order to have time to discuss some of the essential points in this work, I

shall focus on what I shall call “Hobbes’s Secular Moral System.” I am going

to omit certain things, and I will explain why I am going to do so. The ﬁrst

thing I am going to ignore are Hobbes’s theological assumptions. Hobbes

often talks as though he were a Christian believer, and I don’t question or

deny that in some sense he was, although as you read the work you will un-

derstand why there are some who did deny that. At any rate they wondered

how he could say the things he did and yet believe, in any orthodox sense.

So I am going to leave these orthodox theological assumptions aside and as-

sume that there is within the book a secular political and moral system.

This secular political and moral system is fully intelligible as regards its

structure of ideas and the content of its principles when these theological

assumptions are left aside. In other words, we do not need to take these as-

sumptions into account in order to understand what the secular system is.

Indeed, it is precisely because, or in part because, we can leave these as-

sumptions aside that his doctrine was an offense to orthodoxy of his time.

In orthodox thought, religion ought to play some essential part in under-

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standing the political and moral system of ideas. If it does not, then that it-

self is a troublesome matter.

Religion, the orthodox thought, played no essential role in Hobbes’s

view. I believe, then, that all the notions that Hobbes uses, for example the

notion of natural right, of natural law, the state of nature, and so forth, can

all be deﬁned and explicated apart from any theological background. And

the same is also the case in regard to the content of the moral system,

where by the content I mean what its principles actually say. This means

that the content of the laws of nature, which right reason bids us to follow,

and also the content of the moral virtues, such as the virtues of justice,

honor, and the like, can all be explained without resorting to theological as-

sumptions and can all be understood within the secular system.

Hobbes thinks of a law of nature as “a Precept, or general Rule, found

out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive

of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same” (Leviathan,

p. 64 in the original 1651 edition).

These precepts, when generally fol-

lowed, are the means of achieving peace and concord, and are necessary for

the “conservation” and defense of “men in multitudes” (Leviathan, Ch. 15,

p. 78). The laws of nature can all be understood without mentioning theo-

logical assumptions. This does not mean, however, that we cannot add cer-

tain theological assumptions to Hobbes’s secular scheme; and when such

assumptions are added they may lead us to describe parts of this secular

system in a different way. For example, Hobbes says that in the secular system

(my term) the laws of nature are properly speaking “dictates of reason,”

conclusions or “theorems” concerning what is necessary for our conserva-

tion and for the peace of society. They are properly called “laws” only when

we think of them as the commands of God who has by right legitimate au-

thority over us (Leviathan, Ch. 15, p. 80). But the crucial point is this: think-

ing of these dictates of reason as the Laws of God in no way changes their

content—what they direct us to do; they still say exactly the same thing to us

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2. Page references are to the ﬁrst edition of Hobbes’s Leviathan, the Lionshead (or

“Head”) edition of 1651 [these are included within the text of the Penguin edition edited

by C. B. MacPherson, which was used by Rawls in his course]. Pagination from the Head

edition is included in the margins of all principal modern editions of Leviathan. “The prin-

cipal modern editions (those of A. R. Waller in 1904, the Oxford University Press in 1909,

Michael Oakeshott in 1946, and C. B. MacPherson in 1968) all based themselves, correctly,

on the Head edition,” as did Molesworth in his 1839 edition. Richard Tuck, p. xviii from his

edition of Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

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about what we ought to do as they said before. Nor does it change the con-

tent of the virtues. Nor does thinking of them as God’s laws change the

way in which we are bound to follow them. We are already bound by right

reason to follow them (at least in foro interno) and justice and covenanting is

a natural virtue.

As God’s laws, the dictates of reason simply acquire a pe-

culiarly forceful sanction (cf. Leviathan, Ch. 31, pp. 187f ). In other words

there is another forceful and compelling reason, the threat of God’s punish-

ment, for why they ought to be followed. But the sanction does not affect

the content and the notions involved.

The background theological system would change the content and for-

mal structure of Hobbes’s secular scheme only if what is necessary for our

salvation from a religious standpoint is different from and would conﬂict in

some way with the dictates of reason about what is necessary for the peace

and concord of society. If the theological view were that you had to do cer-

tain things that would conﬂict with the precepts of the laws of nature, or

the dictates of reason, in order to be saved, then you would have a conﬂict.

But Hobbes does not I think believe this. He would say that any religious

view that is incompatible with the dictates of reason, regarded as theorems

for what is necessary for the conservation of men in groups, is a supersti-

tion and irrational. In Chapter 12 (pp. 54–57) he discusses religion, and here

he notes how the ﬁrst founders and legislators of the commonwealth

among the ancients took pains to make it publicly believed that what is nec-

essary for the peace and unity of society is also pleasing to the gods, and

that the same things were displeasing to the gods that were forbidden by the

laws. It is clear that Hobbes approves of this policy and thinks that this is

what they ought to have done.

Later in Chapter 15 Hobbes gives an answer to the so-called fool who

believes that there is no justice (Leviathan, pp. 72f ). He has the fool say,

among a number of other things, that the secure and perpetual felicity of

heaven may be gained by not keeping covenants (for instance, with here-

tics). (It was a common practice at the time to say that we are not obligated

to keep our covenants with heretics, that they are an exception.) Hobbes re-

plies that this idea is frivolous. He says that there is no imaginable way to

attain salvation except by honoring our covenants (Leviathan, p. 73). Then

he goes on to reject the views of those who think that covenants with here-

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3. “The Laws of Nature oblige in foro interno; that is to say, they bind to a desire they

should take place: but in foro externo; that is, to the putting them in act, not always.” Levia-

than, p. 79.

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tics and others are not binding, and who think that the dictates of reason,

that is the laws of nature, may be overridden for religious ends (Leviathan,

pp. 73–74). For Hobbes, then, such a breach of covenant would not be justi-

ﬁed. Thus the quest for our salvation does not in any way, in his view,

change the content of the Laws of Nature regarded as the dictates of rea-

son. Theological assumptions may enforce this secular system by adding God’s

sanctions to the dictates of reason, and they may enable us to describe it

in a somewhat different fashion so that the dictates of reason are called

“laws,” but they do not alter the fundamental structure of concepts and the

content of its principles, or what they require of us. In sum, it is on those

grounds that I propose that we can put aside the theological assumptions.

Another aspect of Hobbes’s view that I am going to put aside is his so-

called materialism. I don’t believe that this had any signiﬁcant inﬂuence on

the content of what I am calling his secular system. Hobbes’s psychology

derived mainly from common sense observation, and from his reading of

the classics, Thucydides, Aristotle, and Plato. His political thought, that is,

his conception of human nature, was probably formed there. It doesn’t

show any signs of actually having been thought out and derived on the ba-

sis of mechanical principles of materialism, the so-called method of sci-

ence. Although occasionally it is mentioned, it did not actually affect his ac-

count of human nature and the passions, and the like, that motivate it.

We may allow that Hobbes’s materialism, and the idea of there being a

mechanical principle that explains causation, gave him greater conﬁdence

in the social contract idea as an analytic method. He may have felt that the

two went together. For example: in the De Cive, which is an earlier, less full,

less elaborate work than the Leviathan, presenting much the same view, he

starts with a discussion of “the very matter of civil government,” and then

proceeds to discuss its generation and form and the ﬁrst beginnings of jus-

tice, and then he adds the phrase that “everything is best understood from

its constitutive causes.”

In order then to understand civil society, that is, the

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4. Thus, what Robertson said long ago seems largely right: “The whole of his political

doctrine . . . has little appearance of having been thought out from the fundamental princi-

ples of his philosophy...itdoubtless had its main lines ﬁxed when he was still a mere ob-

server of men and manners, and not yet a mechanical philosopher.” George Croom Rob-

ertson, Hobbes (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1886), p. 57.

5. Thomas Hobbes, De Cive, ed. Sterling P. Lamprecht (New York: Appleton-Century-

Crofts, 1949), pp. 10–11. Hobbes says that he starts from the “very matter of civil govern-

ment” and proceeds to “its generation and form, and the ﬁrst beginning of justice; for ev

erything is best understood by its constitutive causes.”

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great Leviathan, we must take it apart, break it down into its separate ele-

ments, or its matter—that is human beings—and view these elements as if

dissolved. Doing this enables us to understand what the qualities of human

nature are, and in what way they make us ﬁt or unﬁt to live in civil society,

and to see how men must be agreed among themselves if they are to form

a well grounded state (id.). His idea is that viewing civil society as if dis-

solved, or broken into its elements, leads to the idea of the State of Nature.

Then having the notion of a State of Nature, he then suggests the social

contract as a way of conceiving of the unity of a well-grounded state. Me-

chanical notions and principles of causal materialism may have reinforced

this train of thought in Hobbes, and it may even in some sense have

prompted him to have these thoughts. But clearly such a mechanical basis is

not essential, and they do not affect the content of these ideas. The ideas of

the State of Nature and of the Social Contract can stand on their own feet.

And numerous writers have espoused these notions who have rejected

mechanism and materialism.

In conclusion, I am going to discuss Hobbes’s secular moral system as

essentially self-contained, and independent of theological assumptions and

principles of mechanics (materialism).

§3. Interpretations of the State of Nature and the Social Contract

Before taking up the problem of how one might interpret the social con-

tract, let me begin ﬁrst with Hobbes’s account of the State of Nature. We

should not interpret the state of nature as an actual state, nor should we in-

terpret the social contract as an agreement that actually took place. No

doubt Hobbes supposes that something like the state of nature did obtain

at one point, and he says that it now exists in some parts of the world, and

it also exists between nation-states, princes, and kings at the present time

(Leviathan, p. 63). So in that sense the State of Nature exists. But I do not

think Hobbes is concerned with giving an historical account or explanation

of how civil society and its government came about. His social contract

doctrine is best viewed, not as explaining the origin of the Leviathan and

how it came to be, but rather as an attempt to give “philosophical knowledge”

of the Leviathan so that we can better understand our political obligations

and the reasons for supporting an effective Sovereign when such a Sover-

eign exists.

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