Rawls J. Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy

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moral judgments may be, whether we think moral distinctions have a tran-

scendental or an objective foundation, or whether our view is naturalistic

or even subjective, it is still true that as moral agents we do not act from

moral principles unless we are moved by our conscience, or by moral con-

viction, or some other form of moral motivation. Right conduct must have

some basis in our nature and character. Thus, a transcendentalist or an

intuitionist doctrine, as much as the utilitarian or any other doctrine, must

include a moral psychology.

Another of Mill’s main points is that historical experience shows that

we can be educated to act from the principle of utility as well as from other

moral principles. He contends that the principle of utility has a foothold in

our moral psychology at least as secure and natural as that of any other

principle.

2. I focus now on ¶¶8–11, which conclude Chapter III. ¶¶8–9 form a

unit, as do ¶¶10–11. Let’s begin with 8–9. Here Mill states several general

theses of his moral psychology, as follows.

(a) Our moral feelings and attitudes are not, to be sure, innate in the

sense that they are spontaneously present in everyone without training and

education; but like the educated capacities to speak and to reason, to build

cities and to engage in agriculture, they are a natural outgrowth of our na-

ture. Moral feelings and attitudes are capable of springing up, to some

small degree, spontaneously, and they are also susceptible of being brought

to a high level of cultivation and development.

(b) Mill grants that by an extensive enough use of external sanctions

and of early moral training guided by the laws of association, our moral

faculty can be cultivated in almost any direction. But there is this difference:

early associations which are entirely artiﬁcial creations, and which have no

support in our nature, yield by degrees to the dissolving force of intellec-

tual analysis. Unless the feeling of duty is associated with a principle conge-

nial to our nature and harmonious with its natural sentiments, it will upon

intellectual analysis gradually lose its power to move us. This is part of

Mill’s criterion of the natural as opposed to the artiﬁcial.

utility, the feelings of duty and moral obligation associated with it meet this

essential condition. For if they did not, they would be artiﬁcial and there-

fore would dissolve in the face of reﬂection and analysis.

3. Mill tries to show this in ¶¶10–11. He begins by saying that there is a

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powerful natural sentiment in human nature that supports the principle of

utility, namely, the desire to be in unity with others. This desire is such that,

even apart from learning based on the laws of association, it tends to be-

come stronger from the inﬂuences of advancing civilization. Let’s consider

ﬁrst, the content of this desire to be in unity with others, and second, the

inﬂuences which make it stronger as civilization advances:

(a) The content of this desire Mill describes in ¶11 as the desire that we

should not be rivals with others for the means of happiness. It is also the

desire that there should be a harmony between our feelings and aims and

the feelings and aims of others, so that the objectives of our conduct and

theirs are not in conﬂict but complementary. What Mill has in mind is that

the desire to be in unity with others is the desire to act from a principle of

reciprocity. For he says in ¶10 that the feeling of unity with others, when

perfect, would never make us desire any beneﬁcial condition for ourselves,

in the beneﬁts of which others are not also included.

(b) Why is this desire a natural outgrowth of our nature? Mill thinks

that the social state itself is not only natural to us, but necessary and habit-

ual. Any features of society that are essential to it we tend to regard as

equally essential to us. Society is our natural habitat, as it were, and so what

is essential to it must be harmonious with our nature. But how have the

features essential to modern society been affected by the advances of civili-

zation? The desire to be in unity with others is increasingly characteristic of

the present age; so Mill must think there are special features of an advanc-

ing society that more and more sustain that desire.

of Chapter III. They are not sharply enumerated, but his main idea seems

to be that numerous changes are making modern society increasingly a so-

ciety in which people recognize that they must, of course, pay due regard

to the feelings and interests of others. The increasing equality of modern

civilization, and the large scale of cooperation with other people and of

proposing to them collective purposes, have made us aware that we must

work together for shared and not for individual ends.

(d) The increasing equality of modern society comes about in this way:

Mill thinks that all society among human beings, except for that between

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14. The fact that Mill says this leads us to ask whether the difference principle (see Re-

statement, pp. 42f) is a better expression of Mill’s view about equality and distributive jus-

tice than the principle of utility. However, I shan’t pursue this here.

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master and slave, is impossible unless the interests of all are to be con-

sulted; and a society between persons who regard one another as equals

can only exist on the understanding that the interests of all are to be re-

garded equally. In every stage of society, everyone “except an absolute mon-

arch lives on equal terms with somebody; and in every age some advance is

made towards a state in which it will be impossible to live permanently on

other terms [than equality] with anybody.” So the advance of civilization

towards greater equality strengthens the desire to be in unity with others.

Moreover, this desire is congenial to and harmonious with our nature

and is not artiﬁcial. Why? Because the condition of equality is natural to so-

ciety. It is the result of removing historical barriers and inequalities of

power and property originating from force and conquest, and long main-

tained by dominion, ignorance, and the generally impoverished state of

earlier society.

4. Aside, then, from the principle of dignity, what is the ultimate sanc-

tion of the principle of utility with its concern for equal justice? In Mill’s de-

scription it would appear to have two components. The ﬁrst component is

the desire to be in unity with others, as supported and strengthened by the

conditions of modern equality; while the second component is certain con-

victions about, and attitudes related to, that desire.

This second component needs to be clariﬁed. I take Mill to mean that

to those who have this desire, it seems as natural a desire as are the feel-

ings that accompany it. That is, it does not strike them on reﬂection and

analysis as a desire imposed by education guided by the laws of association,

or by laws relying on the intimidating power of society, and such that, once

they understand this, the desire tends to disappear. To the contrary, this de-

sire they think to be an attribute that it would not be good for them to be

without.

Thus, by Mill’s criterion of the artiﬁcial vs. the natural, the desire to live

in unity with others is natural and not undermined by analysis. And it is

this conviction (indeed all these convictions and attitudes together) about

the desire to be in unity with others that Mill says is the ultimate sanction

of the principle of utility, and so the ultimate basis of our willingness to

give justice.

The question now arises: how solid is the answer or explanation Mill

gives here? Can we really make it out? Do we need to do better? How

might we try?

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mill iii

The Principle of Liberty

§1. The Problem of On Liberty (1859)

1. I begin with stating the problem of On Liberty as Mill formulates it in

Chapter I. This problem is not the philosophical problem of freedom of the

will, but that of civil or social liberty. It is the problem concerning “the na-

ture and limits of the power that can be legitimately exercised by society

over the individual.” This is an ancient problem but one which, Mill be-

lieves, in the state of society of the England of his day, assumes a different

form under new conditions. It requires, therefore, a different and, in Mill’s

view, more fundamental treatment (I: ¶1). What Mill has in mind is that the

problem of liberty, as he anticipates it, will arise in the new organic age in

which society will be democratic, secular, and industrial.

The problem is not that of protecting society from the tyranny of mon-

archs, or rulers generally, for this problem has been settled by the establish-

ment of various constitutional checks on government power and by politi-

cal immunities and rights. The problem concerns the abuses of democratic

government itself, in particular the abuse by majorities of their power over

minorities. Mill says: “The will of the people...practically means the will

of the most numerous or the most active part of the people—the majority,

or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority; the

people, consequently, may desire to oppress a part of their number; and

precautions are as much needed against this as against any other abuse of

power” (I: ¶4). Thus Mill’s concern is the so-called “tyranny of the major-

ity,” to which Tocqueville had previously drawn attention.

2. Note, however, that Mill is equally concerned with “the tyranny of

the prevailing opinion and feeling,...thetendency of society to impose,

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1. See Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1st ed., 1835).

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by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of

conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development . . . of

any individuality not in harmony with its ways...Thereisalimit to the le-

gitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence;

and to ﬁnd that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispens-

able to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against political

despotism” (I: ¶5). Moreover, Mill foresees that this problem will occur

under the new conditions of the imminent democratic society in which

the newly enfranchised laboring class—the most numerous class—will have

the vote.

The problem, then, is to determine what, under these new circum-

stances, is the “ﬁtting adjustment between individual independence and so-

cial control” (I: ¶6). Some rules of conduct, legal and moral, are plainly nec-

essary. No two ages resolve this question in the same way, and yet each age

thinks its own way is “self-evident and self-justifying” (I: ¶6).

3. At this point Mill stresses a number of characteristic faults of prevail-

ing moral opinion. Thus, this opinion is usually unreﬂective, the effect of

custom and tradition. People are likely to think that no reasons at all are re-

quired to support their moral convictions. And indeed some philosophers

(perhaps Mill refers to the conservative intuitionists here) encourage us to

think that our feelings are “better than reasons and render reasons unneces-

sary” (I: ¶6). Then Mill states one of the main principles he wants to attack:

“The practical principle which guides them to their opinions on the regula-

tion of human conduct is the feeling in each person’s mind that everybody

should be required to act as he, and those with whom he sympathizes,

would like them to act” (I: ¶6). Of course, no one “acknowledges to him-

self that his standard of judgment is his own liking”; but Mill maintains that

it is true nonetheless, because: “an opinion on a point of conduct, not sup-

ported by reasons, can only count as one person’s preference; and if the rea-

sons, when given, are a mere appeal to a similar preference felt by other

people, it is still only many people’s liking instead of one” (I: ¶6). But to

most people, their own preferences supported by the preferences of others

are perfectly satisfactory reasons, and in fact, the only reasons they usually

have for their moral convictions. [See also IV: ¶12.]

4. The prevailing moral opinion in society tends, Mill believes, to be a

grouping of unreasoned and unreﬂective, mutually supporting shared pref-

erences; yet these opinions are inﬂuenced by many kinds of causes:

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(a) For instance, where there is an ascendant social class, a large portion

of the morality of a country reﬂects the interests of that class and its feel-

ings of class superiority.

(b) But also, the general and obvious interests of society have a share,

and a large one, in inﬂuencing moral opinion; so the role of utility (in

Hume’s loose sense of an appeal to these interests) is not unimportant.

These general interests, however, have their effect less from being recog-

nized by reason than as a consequence of the sympathies and dislikes that

grow out of them.

Thus, to sum up Mill’s argument, the unreasoned likings and dislikings

of society, or of some dominant portion of society, are the main elements

which have, up to now, determined the rules for general observance, which

have been enforced by the sanctions of law and prevailing opinion. And

“wherever the sentiment of the majority is still genuine and intense, it is

found to have abated little of its claim to be obeyed” (I: ¶7).

5. I have gone into these details since they help us recognize how Mill

views the problem of liberty and what he sees the Principle of Liberty—

ﬁrst stated in I: ¶9—as doing. Mill wants to change not only the adjustment

between social rules and individual independence, as actually determined

up to now, but also how the public—the educated opinion he wants to ad-

dress—reasons about those adjustments. He is presenting his Principle of

Liberty as a principle of public reason in the coming democratic age: he

views it as a principle to guide the public’s political decisions on those ques-

tions. For he fears that the sway of prevailing and unreasoned opinion

could be far worse in the new democratic society to come than it has been

in the past.

Note that Mill thinks that the time for making changes is “now” but the

situation is not hopeless. [Cf. III: ¶19 esp.] “The majority have not yet learnt

to feel the power of government [as] their power, or its opinions their opin-

ions” (I: ¶8). When those in the majority, including the new laboring class,

come to feel this way, individual liberty will be as exposed to invasion from

government as it has long been from public opinion.

On the other hand, Mill thinks there is much latent resistance to such

invasions. But the situation, as he sees it, is in a state of ﬂux and can go per-

haps one way or the other. “There is...norecognized principle by which

the propriety or impropriety of government interference is customarily

tested. People decide according to their personal preferences” (I: ¶8).

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They rarely decide in accordance with any principle, “to which they

consistently adhere, as to what things are ﬁt to be done by government.” It

is because of this lack of principle (in this state of ﬂux) that when govern-

ment does intervene, it is as likely to be wrong as right (I: ¶8).

6. Putting this together with I: ¶15, where Mill speaks of the present

tendency to increase the power of society while reducing the power of the

individual, we can say that he hoped to do the following:

(a) He aimed to state a principle of liberty appropriate for the new

democratic age to come. This principle would govern the public political

discussion of the adjustment of social rules and individual independence.

And:

(b) By convincing arguments, Mill wanted to build up support of this

principle “...astrong barrier of moral conviction” (I: ¶15). The disposition

of people to impose their own opinions can only be restrained by an oppos-

ing power; in this case Mill thinks it must be at least in part the power of

moral conviction. And:

do they appeal to genuinely moral convictions as opposed to widely shared

and mutually supporting preferences. Here it becomes plain that by rea-

soned arguments Mill means arguments founded on the Principle of Lib-

erty (as he explains it in Chapter I, ¶¶9–13), and as it is connected with his

conception of Utility (I: ¶11). This principle meets, he thinks, all the re-

quirements of a reasoned principle, whereas no other principle does so.

The Principle of Liberty is presented, then, as a public political principle

framed to regulate free public discussion concerning the appropriate adjust-

ment between individual independence and social control (I: ¶6). As such, it

will be instrumental in shaping national character to have the aims, aspira-

tions, and ideals required in the age to come.

I comment here that Mill’s chosen vocation is evident: he sees himself

as an educator of inﬂuential opinion. That is his aim. He thinks the situa-

tion is not hopeless: the future is still open. It is not unreasonable, or

merely visionary, to try to forestall the possible tyranny of democratic ma-

jorities in the coming age. Plainly Mill attributes signiﬁcant efﬁcacy to

moral convictions and to intellectual discussion about political and social

matters. (Here he would seem to differ from Marx. But there is a question

how to put this more exactly: for Marx too asserts that his Das Kapital has a

social role.) Attempts to convince by reason and argument can have an im-

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portant bearing, at least in those circumstances where things are in ﬂux and

can still go one way or the other. I wouldn’t say that Mill’s tone is particu-

larly optimistic. He is doing what he thinks he can best do in the present

circumstances.

The parts of Mill’s On Liberty to read particularly carefully:

I: entire

II: ¶¶1–11; and the last 5 paragraphs, 37–41

III: ¶¶1–9; 14; 19; and an important passage in ¶13

IV: ¶¶1–12

V: ¶¶1–4; and the last 8 paragraphs, 16–23 (re government and state

socialism and bureaucracy).

§2. Some Preliminary Points about Mill’s Principle

1. Before taking up the meaning and force of Mill’s Principle of Liberty,

I consider a few preliminary points relating to it. Note ﬁrst that he thinks of

it as covering certain enumerated liberties. They are given by a list and not

by a deﬁnition of liberty in general, or as such. (This procedure was used in

justice as fairness, where Mill is followed in this respect.) It is these listed

liberties which receive special protection and which are deﬁned by certain

legal and moral rights of justice.

(a) First (covering the inward domain of consciousness), liberty of con-

science, liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and

sentiment on all subjects, practical and speculative, scientiﬁc, moral or

theological. Freedom of speech and press is practically inseparable from the

preceding.

(b) Second, liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the “plan of our

life to suit our own character,” without restraint so long as we do not injure

the legitimate interests (or moral rights) of others, and even though they

think our conduct foolish, degrading, or wrong.

injure the (legitimate) interests of others; freedom of association. (For a, b,

c, see: I: ¶12.) Mill adds that “No society in which these liberties are not, on

the whole, respected, is free, whatever may be its form of government; and

none is completely free in which they do not exist absolute and unquali-

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ﬁed” (I: ¶13). Thus, for the most part, Mill presents his argument by defend-

ing these speciﬁc liberties. He focuses primarily on the ﬁrst two in Chapters

II and III, respectively.

2. Next, observe the scope and the conditions under which Mill says the

Principle of Liberty applies:

(a) It does not apply to children and immature adults; or to the mentally

disturbed (I: ¶10).

(b) It does not apply to backward societies: he says: “Liberty, as a princi-

ple, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when

mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discus-

sion” (I: ¶10). Mill notes that the nations with which he is concerned in the

essay are nations that have long since reached this stage.

rounded by external enemies, and always liable to hostile attack. Nor does

it apply to a people beset by internal commotion and strife, in either of

which a relaxation of self-command might be fatal (I: ¶14).

3. From these remarks it is clear that the Principle of Liberty is not a

ﬁrst or supreme principle: it is subordinate to the Principle of Utility and to

be justiﬁed in terms of it. Rather, the Principle of Liberty is a kind of medi-

ate axiom (Utilitarianism, II: ¶¶24–25). But nevertheless one of great impor-

tance: it is a principle of public reason—a political principle to guide the

public’s discussion in a democratic society.

That the Principle of Liberty is viewed by Mill as a mediate axiom, a

subordinate principle (II: ¶24), is conﬁrmed by what he says in I: ¶11: he

writes: “...Iforegoanyadvantage which could be derived to my argument

from the idea of abstract right, as a thing independent of utility. I regard

utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions.” He adds the very cru-

cial rider: “...butitmustbeutility in the largest sense, grounded on the

permanent interests of man as a progressive being.”

In the next lecture, I shall discuss these permanent interests and try to

connect them with the psychological principles that underlie Mill’s view.

For now I note that among them are interests in the ﬁrm guarantee of the

moral rights of justice, which establish the “very groundwork of our exis-

tence” (Utilitarianism, V: ¶25). Another permanent interest is an interest in

the conditions of free individuality, which conditions are an essential part

of the engine of progressive change.

Mill’s idea is that only if a democratic society follows the Principle of

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Liberty in regulating its public discussion of the rules bearing on the rela-

tion of individuals and society, and only if it adjusts its attitudes and laws

accordingly, can its political and social institutions fulﬁll their role of shap-

ing national character so that its citizens can realize the permanent interests

of man as a progressive being.

§3. Mill’s Principle of Liberty Stated

1. Mill states the Principle of Liberty in I: ¶¶9–13; IV: ¶¶3, 6; V: ¶2, with

further explanation in ¶¶3 and 4. In the ﬁrst statement it reads as follows (I:

¶9): “. . . the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or col-

lectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is

self-protection.” He adds that: “. . . the only purpose for which power can

be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against

his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or

moral, is not a sufﬁcient warrant.” Someone’s own good is a good reason

for: “remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or

entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in

case he do otherwise.” To justify such coercion requires that the conduct in

question is likely to produce evil to some one else. Regarding the part of a

person’s conduct which concerns himself alone, Mill says: “his indepen-

dence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the

individual is sovereign” (I: ¶9).

2. This principle is, of course, intended by Mill to apply to restraints on

liberty that are the result of what Mill calls the “moral coercion of public

opinion,” as well as to the restraints of law and other institutions enforced

by sanctions of the state. We can formulate the principle of liberty in the

form of three clauses as follows:

(a) First Clause: Society through its laws and the moral pressure of

common opinion should never interfere with individuals’ beliefs and con-

duct unless those beliefs and conduct injure the legitimate interests, or the

(moral) rights, of others. In particular, only reasons of right and wrong

should be appealed to in public discussions. This excludes three kinds of

reasons: Liberty, III: ¶9; IV: ¶3.

(i) Paternalistic reasons, which invoke reasons founded on other per-

sons’ good—deﬁned in terms of what is wise and prudent from their indi-

vidual point of view.

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