Rawls J. Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy

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system of rules. It is something that we are prompted to do because we rec-

ognize that an individual person needs our help. It doesn’t involve in the

same way that the rules of property do some conception of social good, or

depend on an idea of how general systems of rules are required to produce

the social good.

A further point is that in contrast to the natural virtues like benevo-

lence, the public good that results from rules regarding property, transfer

and contract, all regarded as systems of public rules, depends essentially, in

Hume’s view, on their being adhered to even when, in an individual case,

complying with the rules may seem to do more harm than good. This

would not be so in the case of a natural virtue like benevolence. The rules

of property are distinctive in that we are to adhere to them as public sys-

tems of rules even when, despite their being as well designed as they can

be, they are still going to require us, in certain particular cases, to do things

that may seem to us to be harmful. For example, rules of property may re-

quire that misers who are, perhaps, not able or willing to use their property

productively, nevertheless have the right to keep it. Or in the case of inheri-

tance, the rules specify who is going to inherit property, even though it may

seem to us that that person who does inherit it cannot or will not use it pro-

ductively; or perhaps we think that they’re bad or unworthy and ought not

to have it. Nevertheless, in Hume’s view, the beneﬁts of the system of prop-

erty can be attained only if these general rules are mutually recognized as

applying to everyone, and only if we adhere to them more or less inﬂexibly,

even when, in particular cases, our actions seem to do more harm than

good.

So, the general social background, in Hume’s view, for an artiﬁcial vir-

tue is roughly the following: First, that there exists a system of general insti-

tutional rules which deﬁne property transfer and contracts, which system

of rules he regards as an artiﬁce of reason. The second feature is that this sys-

tem of rules is publicly recognized by the members of society as promoting

the public good and the general interest and necessities of society, and that

this recognition by the members of society is itself a work of reason. By

“publicly recognize,” I mean that each person recognizes that the system of

rules is for the general beneﬁt of society, and each recognizes that the other

also recognizes that, and so on.

A third point is that the beneﬁts of this general system of institutional

rules depend, as I have just said, on its being inﬂexibly followed, even in

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particular cases where it may appear harmful to do so, or where there ap-

pear to be better alternatives than complying with the existing rules. I take

it to be Hume’s view that not to follow them, or to regard them in too ﬂexi-

ble a fashion would undermine legitimate expectations—it would under-

mine the reliability of being able to count on what other people are going

to do. For social behavior to be reliable and foreseeable, it is necessary to

have certain general systems of rules that can be counted on to be inﬂexibly

followed. One can allow for certain kinds of exceptions (e.g. to prevent im-

minent disaster) and allow for complicated rules to some degree. But, in

Hume’s view, there is a limit to the extent to which one can do that.

Finally, the fourth point is that the disposition to be just is a quality of

character to adhere to these rules with the appropriate degree of inﬂexibil-

ity, provided that others in society have a manifest intention likewise to com-

ply with them. And Hume believes that once we understand the back-

ground of these rules, then it is a normal fact about people, given the laws

of human psychology and the like, that they will have this disposition to be

just.

I call your attention to the fact that towards the end of the last section

of the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (Section IX, Part II) Hume

talks about a “sensible knave” who, for his own proﬁt, may allow himself

exceptions to these rules. Hume doesn’t actually address any argument to

him in terms of his own interests. He just regards such a person as one who

is not motivated as most of us are, who isn’t offended at the thought of

himself, say, acting unfairly, or unjustly, or free-riding, as we might say, on

this system of rules.

I would urge you to read Appendix III of the Enquiry, “Some Further

Considerations With Regard To Justice.” It is very instructive on what

Hume’s notion of artiﬁcial virtue is. Pay attention there to the sense in

which he says that justice is based upon “convention,” understood as “a

sense of common interest.”

He uses the example of two men rowing a

boat, each relying on the other to pull his oar, without the need of prom-

ises or contract, to illustrate what he has in mind when he says that justice is

based on convention. Now the four points I have just gone over touch all the

things that Hume has in mind there.

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6. See Hume, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and the Principles of Morals,

ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 1902), p. 306.

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There are two further points I want to make in regard to this account.

Hume talked as though the general interests of society alone account for

the institution of property and transfer and contract, and also account for

how these institutions provide a background for the artiﬁcial virtues of jus-

tice and ﬁdelity and integrity and the like. But he does not seem to allow

for the possibility that it may actually be the case that it’s not the general in-

terests of society that account for private property and this particular speci-

ﬁcation or arrangement of it. Rather, there may be some other interests in-

volved that account for property—perhaps the interests of the more

powerful, or maybe the interests of those who have the most property. He

just does not seem to allow for that. Now I don’t think that one should say

that Hume is not aware of that possibility. One would have to assume that

he is. I interpret him as giving a kind of idealized account of how the insti-

tution of property and the virtues of justice, integrity, and so forth could

come about, and as setting out the general features and general factors that

actually explain the natural roots, the psychological basis of our moral be-

havior.

In other words, I think it is important to understand about Hume that

he is trying to give an account of why it is that we have the virtues that we

have, and why it is that we are motivated to act in accordance with those

virtues. And this is intended to be, for the most part, an actual psychologi-

cal account. It is not like Locke’s view, a normative doctrine beginning from

the fundamental law of nature and other natural laws, and saying what our

rights and duties are, and then giving an account of the form of regime

that could legitimately come about. That is not what Hume is doing, or at

least it is not what I take Hume to be doing. I see him as explaining why we

have some virtues—why they exist, why they are praised, why we are moti-

vated to act in accordance with them—as one might do in psychology, or,

one might say more broadly, a science of human nature. So, for his pur-

poses I think it’s adequate for him to give this more or less idealized ac-

count, leaving aside certain other possible interests, and seeing how the in-

stitutions of property and the virtues that are associated with them might

come about, and how they would be different from other virtues, for exam-

ple, the natural virtues.

This would mean that on Locke’s account, a system of property would

appear to be derivative from the fundamental law of nature, and it would

include certain rights to property which would have to be respected in cer-

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tain ways. This is, as I have said, a normative account. One is working

within a kind of system of natural law, with all its overtones. Whereas on

Hume’s view, any system of rights is just going to be a system of institu-

tional rules that will be recognized in society and acted upon because of cer-

tain psychological forces that he has attempted to explain. It’s a very differ-

ent kind of view that Hume is presenting, in which any account of rights is

going to be derivative from some notion of utility and on how it actually

can be expected to operate in social institutions.

§3. The Judicious Spectator

Now I will end by saying something about Hume’s principle of humanity

and then his notion of the “judicious spectator,” which is one of the most

interesting and important ideas in the Enquiry, and which is also found in

the Treatise of Human Nature.

You should think of this as a psychological ac-

count of how we make moral judgments. Hume is explaining the “mecha-

nism” of moral judgments. How are they made and what accounts for their

content? Hume aims to explain our moral judgments and feelings as natural

phenomena. He wants to be the “Newton of the Passions.” In contrast to

Locke, he does not present a normative system of principles founded on

the Laws of Nature as the laws of God known to reason. Instead he is inves-

tigating how morality comes about as a natural phenomena, the role it plays

in social life and in establishing social unity and mutual understanding, and

what natural human capacities make morality possible. In short, how does

morality work, and what aspects of human psychology support it?

The “principle of humanity” is the psychological tendency we have to

identify with the interests and concerns of others when our own interests

do not come into competition with them. There are two main discussions

of the principle of humanity in the Enquiry, in Sections V and IX, and also

an important passage in Section VI.

These are Section V: especially ¶¶17,

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hume

7. [See Rawls, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, Hume Lecture V, pp. 84–104,

for an in-depth account of the role of Hume’s idea of the “judicious spectator.” —Ed.]

8. [In addition to “the principle of humanity” (p. 272), Hume refers in the Enquiry Con-

cerning the Principles of Morals to “the principles of humanity and sympathy” (p. 231), also

to “such principle in our nature as humanity or a concern for others” (p. 231), “the senti-

ment of humanity” (p. 272), and the “affection of humanity” (p. 273), and says “it alone

can be the foundation of morals” (p. 273). —Ed.]

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41–45, and then the footnotes to ¶¶3–4 (contra the argument that morals

are an invention of politicians), and ¶¶14–16 (contra psychological egoism).

In Section IX, see especially ¶¶4–8; and in Section VI, see ¶¶3–6. In Part II

of Section IX, Hume considers the problem of moral motivation versus the

epistemological problem, and perhaps most clearly in his answer to the

“sensible knave” (¶¶22–25) he takes his stand with the “confederacy of hu-

mankind” (¶19), which is no doubt implicit in the Enquiry (even though it

holds itself out as a psychological and social inquiry).

In its simplest form he is saying that, when we say qualities of character

are virtuous or vicious, or actions are right or wrong, we are considering

them from a suitably general or “common point of view,”

the point of

view of the “judicious spectator,”

without any reference to our own inter-

ests; and we are expressing, by making the moral judgment, our approval and

disapproval. The reason why we approve or disapprove of qualities of char-

acter or institutions is that, when we consider them from this general point

of view, our judgments are guided by the tendency of these actions or qual-

ities or institutions to affect the general interests of society, or the general

happiness of society. What Hume is trying to do is explain the fact that we

agree. How can there be a basis on which people can agree when they

judge institutions? When looked at from each person’s own standpoint, it is

not possible to have agreement as to whether institutions or actions are

good or bad. How then can there be a basis for people to agree about these

things? On Hume’s view there is only one possible basis, and that is one

that appeals to our principle of humanity, which again is the psychological

tendency we have to identify with the interests and concerns of others

when our own interests do not come into competition with them.

The point of view of the judicious spectator is one we take up towards

others’ qualities of character, or towards rules of institutions; it enables us

to appraise them solely according to their tendency to affect the general in-

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9. Hume, Enquiries, Sec. IX, Part I, p. 272.

10. [“Judicious spectator” is a term used only in the Treatise of Human Nature, Book III,

Part 3, Sec. i (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 1978), p. 581. In the next paragraph

Hume distinguishes “his peculiar point of view” from “some steady and general points of

view.” Hume uses “common point of view” and “spectator” in conjunction in the Treatise,

on p. 591. —Ed.]

11. [As Hume says: “If he mean, therefore, to express that this man possesses qualities,

whose tendency is pernicious to society, he has chosen this common point of view, and has

touched the principle of humanity, in which every man, in some degree, concurs.” En

quiries, p. 272. —Ed.]

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terests or general happiness of society. How is it that that brings us into

agreement? It does so because the only factor in our, you might say, “sensi-

ble nature” that is brought into play when we take up the point of view of

the judicious spectator is our principle of humanity, or fellow-feeling. When

our own interests and the interests of our family are not involved or af-

fected, the only motivational aspect of our character that is going to direct

our judgment, and that we are going to express, is how an action or an in-

stitution or quality of character is going to affect the interests and concerns

of those who are themselves involved. So, on Hume’s view, then, what

makes agreement on moral judgment possible is our being able to take up

and to imagine ourselves into the point of view of the judicious spectator.

We must be able to do that in such a way that we respond to and have, as it

were, a kind of afﬁnity with the effects of these institutions or qualities of

character in virtue of their beneﬁcial effects on the persons who are advan-

taged by them. We can then approve of virtuous persons, say, in other cul-

tures and other countries and other times, because we are able by taking

this point of view to identify with and sympathize with the people who are

beneﬁted by those institutions and characteristics.

That, then, will be what makes agreement in moral judgment possible,

and it is by working out that idea that one can see why the principle of util-

ity has the content it does. That is, the idea would be that the greater extent

to which any institution were to satisfy that principle would correspond

with the extent to which the person who takes the point of view of the ju-

dicious spectator would feel stronger approval of that institution. The more

it satisﬁes the principle of utility, the stronger the effects on or the afﬁnity

with the person’s moral sensibility.

I believe this is supposed to be, in Hume’s view, a psychological account

of how it is possible for us to make moral judgments and to come to agree-

ment about moral judgments. It is his view that the only possible basis for

agreement is via the principle of humanity. There is not any other aspect in

human nature that, on his view, would make agreement possible. If we

work that idea out, from the way in which he sets up the point of view of

the judicious spectator, we can see why, I think, it is natural for him to have

ended up with the criterion of right and wrong which he did, namely the

principle of utility.

Just to conclude our discussion of Hume, the idea of the judicious spec-

tator is one of the most important and interesting ideas in moral philoso-

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phy. It appears in Hume for the ﬁrst time. Hume’s whole view, including his

account of property and the judicious spectator, should be understood as

an attempt to give a psychological account of our moral thought. There is a

contrast between Hume and Locke in that regard. Hume is trying to ex-

plain how we are able to make moral distinctions with the idea of the judi-

cious spectator. Where does the distinction between right and wrong come

from? He is not talking about moral motivation—about why we are moved

to do what is right or what we believe to be right. Rather, he’s interested in

where the distinction between right and wrong comes from. He is asking,

“How do we learn to make that distinction? How do we come to agree on

what is right and wrong?” His answer is that we learn to take the point of

view of the judicious spectator. All that is moving our judgments from that

point of view is the principle of humanity. In this way, we all respond to

things in the same way.

Finally, to repeat a point made earlier: If we contrast Hume’s and

Locke’s accounts of property, we may think of Locke as a constitutional

lawyer, where Locke is arguing within a constitution whose laws are set

forth by God. He is arguing with Filmer. It is all a normative view, taking

for granted certain fundamental ideas. The constitution is one of the uni-

verse of all humans. The basic law is the fundamental law of nature and the

principle that God has supreme authority over all creation. His argument

within that constitution is with Filmer. Hume is not working within this

framework. Hume does not believe any of that. He hates religion. He is

just trying to explain why there is property. Why does it exist? How did it

come about? What sustains it? What social purpose does it serve? He is not

answering the same question at all as Locke is—the normative question

within the constitution of the universe—when he addresses the question of

property. So for Hume, anything about past history of property or govern-

ment does not count; it is not important for whether or not property or

government is justiﬁable now. For Hume, let bygones be bygones. On a util-

itarian view, what counts is how the institution operates now and into the

future, and whether it is the case that the institutions we have now are

more likely to serve the needs of society. Hume’s aim is to view these issues

from the standpoint of what we now call “social science.” He is trying to

give an empirical account of these matters.

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rousseau

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