
712 Appendix B Solutions to selected questions
(d) Until 1990, Galahad pursued a policy of distributing 40–50 per cent of profit after tax as dividend. Each
year, it has offered a steady dividend increase, even in 1989, when its earnings actually fell. This was pre-
sumably out of reluctance to lower the dividend, fearing an adverse market reaction, and reflecting a
belief that the earnings shortfall was a temporary phenomenon. In 1990 it offered a 12 per cent dividend
increase, the highest percentage increase in the time series, possibly to compensate shareholders for the
relatively small increase (only 8 per cent) in 1989. It would appear that Galahad has either already built
up a clientèle of investors whose interests it is trying to safeguard, or that it is trying to do so.
The proposed dividend cut to 5.0p per share would represent a sharply increased dividend cover of 3.5,
on the assumption that EPS also grows at 10 per cent p.a. Such a sharp rise in the dividend safety margin
is likely to be construed by the market as implying that Galahad’s managers expect earnings to be
depressed in the future, especially as it follows a year of record dividend increase. Such an abrupt change
in dividend policy is thus likely to offend its clientèle of shareholders at best, and at worst, to alarm the
market as to the reliability of future earnings.
In an efficient capital market, with homogeneous investor expectations, the share price would increase
by the amount calculated in (b), at least, if the market agreed with the managers’ views about the attrac-
tions of the projected expenditure. However, in view of the information content of dividends, Galahad’s
board will have to be very confident of its ability to persuade the market of the inherent desirability of
the proposed investment programme. This may well be a difficult task, especially given the stated doubts
of some of its managers. The board will have to explain why they feel internal financing is preferable to
raising capital externally, either by a rights issue, or by raising further debt finance. While the level of
indebtedness of Galahad is not given, the implication is that it is unacceptably high, so as to obviate the
issue of additional borrowing instruments. If this is the case, then it seems doubly risky to propose a div-
idend cut, as it may signal fears regarding Galahad’s ability to service a high level of debt.
If the dividend cut is greeted adversely, then the ability of the shareholder clientèle to home-make div-
idends will be impaired, since, apart from the transactions costs involved, there will perhaps be no capi-
tal gain to realise. Any significant selling to convert capital into income will further depress share price.
If the investment programme is truly worthwhile, Galahad’s managers perhaps should not shrink from
offering a rights issue, since, despite the costs of such issues, shareholders will eventually reap the bene-
fits in the form of higher future earnings and dividends. However, this might suggest a short-term reduc-
tion in share price, which may penalise short-term investors, but who still have the option of protecting
their interests by selling their rights.
CHAPTER 18
1
2
Market value of
(i)
(ii)
(iii) cost of debt is the solution R to:
Solution value for R 10.3%
£90
£8
11 R2
£8
11 R2
2
p
£8 £100
11 R2
6
cost of debt £811 30%2>£90 1£5.6>£902 6.2%
cost of debt 38% £1004>£90 1£8>£902 8.9%
debt £100 1£45 m>£50 m2 £90
Total Liabilities>Total Assets 1£300 m>£800 m2 37.5%
Income Gearing 11>4.82 100 21%
Interest Cover 1£120 m>£25 m2 4.8 times.
Net Debt>Equity 1£190 m>£500 m2 38%
Net Debt 1£200 m £50 m2
1£20 m £40 m2 £190 m.
Total Debt>Equity 1£200 m £50 m2>£500 m 50%
LTD>1LTD Equity2 £200 m>1£200 m £500 m2 28%
LTD>Equity 1£200 m>£500 m2 40%
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