Perrie M. (ed.) The Cambridge History of Russia, Volume 1: From Early Rus’ to 1689
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that the right concessions might give him reason to break with the Turks and
reconcile.
Ordin-Nashchokin, by this time in declining health, had limited options in
dealing with the Doroshenko problem. The missions he sent to Istanbul and
Edirne to get the sultan to accept Andrusovo were rebuffed, and his efforts
to negotiate with the sultan through Crimean Tatar mediation were blocked
by the Zaporozhian host, which went so far as to assassinate the Crimean
and Muscovite envoys. This left him no real alternative but to concentrate on
diplomacy with Warsaw, communicating his willingness to negotiate some
kind of shared Polish–Muscovite suzerainty over the right bank in order to
transform the Andrusovo Armistice into a permanent peace and a mutual
defence pact against the Ottomans. He also sent missions to Vienna, to enlist
at the least the emperor’s mediation and optimally his agreement to join in
coalition against the sultan.
But besides risking giving Doroshenko, the khan, and the sultan provo-
cation to declare war, these negotiations caused alarm among the left-bank
cossacks, who feared Ordin-Nashchokin might give back Kiev or even part
of the left bank to the Poles in order to achieve his alliance project. Many of
those left-bank cossacks losing faith in Muscovy’s readiness to stand firm for a
unified Ukraine freed from Polish rule began defecting to Doroshenko, who
appeared at the time a more resolute defender of these principles even with his
troublingties to the Turks and Tatars.Support for Doroshenko on the left bank
reached such proportions that eventually even Briukhovet’skyi recognised the
extent of his delegitimation, turned renegade, and began expelling the Mus-
covite garrisons. Briukhovets’kyi apparently expected that Doroshenko and
the sultan would reward him by confirming him as vassal hetman over the left
bank and Zaporozhia. But Briukhovets’kyi was deceived: Doroshenko crossed
the Dnieper and overthrew him, replacing him with commissioned hetman
Demian Mnogogreshnyi.
Ordin-Nashchokin retired in 1671. Within a year the new director of the
Ambassadors’ Chancellery, Artamon Matveev, confronted a simpler if starker
and more dangerous situation in Ukraine. Muscovite control over the left
bank had been partly restored: Mnogogreshnyi had shifted his allegiance to
Moscow and had ratified the Hlukhiv Articles (February 1669). The Hlukhiv
Articles had the effect of quelling anti-Muscovite feeling while putting the left-
bank hetman on a tighter leash: they conceded some greater autonomy to the
hetman’s administration (revenues to maintain the Muscovite garrisons and
voevody were once again to be collected into the hetman’s treasury, not into the
tsar’s) yet reaffirmed the tsar’s right to maintain garrisons for the time being in
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other towns besides Kiev and to control the Hetmanate’s foreign relations.
22
When Mnogogreshnyi began chafing under these restraints Moscow easily
deposed him (June 1672) and replaced him with the more compliant Ivan
Samoilovich.
Furthermore, support for Doroshenko was now ebbing on the right bank
as well as on the left. He was perceived as having gone too far in servilising
himself to the sultan, his Korsun’ Articles (April 1669) having pledged his
full alliance with the Porte and khanate and even his formal vassalage to the
sultan. The terms of these Korsun’ Articles were meant to commit Ottoman
and Crimean Tatar forces to joint operations with Doroshenko’s regiments
without compromising the autonomy of Ukraine, but the sultan and the khan
did not send quick and unequivocal assurance they accepted these terms. The
right-bank colonels therefore began falling away from Doroshenko, leaving
him all the more dependent upon his Ottoman and Tatar auxiliaries and all
the more isolated from the Ukrainian population.
The most important development of all, however, was the escalation of
Ottoman military support forDoroshenko into a full-blown Ottoman invasion
ofthePolish-LithuanianCommonwealthin the summer of 1672.On17 October
King Michal
signed a peace treaty at Buczacz ceding all of Podol’ia to the
sultan and recognising the independence of right-bank Ukraine under Hetman
Doroshenko.
Podol’ia thereby came under an Ottoman occupation that would last until
1699. And Doroshenko was emboldened to step up agitation on the left bank
to unite all Ukraine under his leadership. Muscovite commitment to a protec-
torate over a left-bank hetmanate now carried much greater risk of provoking
war with the Ottoman Empire, the most imposing military power in Eastern
Europe.
Yet Artamon Matveev accepted this risk and reaffirmed Moscow’s com-
mitment to Samoilovich’s left-bank hetmanate. Ironically, Doroshenko’s own
intransigence had made this possible. Doroshenko was still talking to Mus-
covite envoys and presenting himself as amenable to reconciliation with
Moscow, but he had raised the price for this reconciliation: not only the cession
of Kiev, the left bank and Zaporozhia, but also now Moscow’s pledge it would
assist him militarily to protect Ukraine from the Turks.
23
Thus Muscovy now
22 V. Gorobets, ‘Ukrainsko-rossiiskie otnosheniia v politiko-pravovoi status getman-
shchiny’, in A. I. Miller et al. (eds.), Rossiia-Ukraina: istoriia vzaimootnoshenii (Moscow:
Iazykimirovoikul’tury, 1997),p. 9;N.I. Kostomarov,Ruina.Mazepa. Mazepintsy (Moscow:
Charli, 1995), pp. 158–65.
23 Ibid., p. 267.
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ran the risk of war with the sultan regardless of whether it accepted or rejected
Doroshenko’s sovereignty over all Ukraine. War against the Ottomans was a
frightening prospect, but Muscovy was at least better prepared for it now. The
Muscovite army had had time to recover from the revenue and manpower
shortfalls that had produced stalemate in the Thirteen Years War (by 1669 the
total strength of the Belgorod and Sevsk army groups had expanded to over
112,000);
24
G. G. Romodanovskii had emerged as a competent commander
capable of carrying the war over to the right bank; Moscow knew it could
count on the loyalty of the Zaporozhian host; great numbers of refugees were
crossing the Dnieper to resettle on the left bank; and Samoilovich was as intent
on conquering the right bank as Doroshenko was on subjugating the left. The
Turks were at the time too preoccupied in Podol’ia to offer Doroshenko much
help in holding the eastern reaches of the right bank. Furthermore, Matveev
could still hope for alliance with the Commonwealth: the Sejm had refused to
ratify the shameful Buczacz Treaty and a number of Polish commanders had
joined Crown Hetman Sobieski in a confederatio to resume military operations
against the Turks. The wretched King Michal
died on 10 November 1673; that
same day Sobieski dealt the main Ottoman army a crushing blow at Chocim
and forced it to withdraw across the Danube.
In early 1674 Moscow therefore abandoned negotiations with Doroshenko.
Romodanovskii and Samoilovich invaded the right bank, captured Cherkassk
and a number of other towns, and put Doroshenko’s capital of Chyhyryn
under siege. An assembly (rada) at Pereiaslav proclaimed Samoilovich het-
man of all Ukraine – prematurely, it turned out, for Chyhyryn was well
fortified and able to withstand long siege and a large Ottoman army under
Kaplan Pasha finally began marching to Doroshenko’s relief in the summer.
Romodanovskii and Samoilovich were forced to lift the siege and withdraw
across the Dnieper. The real damage to Doroshenko’s cause was done by his
own ally, Kaplan Pasha, whose massacres of civilians at Lodyzhin and Uman’
drove thousands of refugees eastward across the Dnieper, and by Hetman
Sobieski, recently elected king of Poland, who re-entered right-bank Ukraine
and captureda number of importanttowns as soon as Kaplan Pasha’s army had
withdrawn.
By December 1676 Doroshenko’s forces numbered no more than 2,000
and Doroshenko was compelled to surrender. But Samoilovich was unable to
exploit this to establish his control over the right bank, for the Ottomans still
claimed sovereignty over Ukraine, now as a principality of Lesser Sarmatia
24 Hellie, Enserfment,p.271.
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Muscovy at war and peace
under their new puppet, Iurii Khmel’nyts’kyi, and they appeared to be ready
to campaign on Iurii’s behalf to seize not only Chyhyryn but Kiev and thereby
eliminate any Muscovite military presence on the eastern side of the Dnieper.
Sufficient provocations for an Ottoman attack had already been given –
Zaporozhian cossack raids on the Crimean coast and small-scale operations
by Don cossacks and Muscovite forces against the Ottoman fortresses on
the lower Don. And the Poles could no longer be counted on to divert the
Ottomans on the right bank: now that he was king, Sobieski found it harder
to raise armies of the size he had commanded while in confederatio revolt, so
in October 1676 he had signed an armistice with the Turks at Zorawno and
ceded the right bank to them. The Turks seem to have led him to expect that
Smolensk would be restored to the Commonwealth once Samoilovich and
the Muscovites were defeated. Moscow was unable to present Sobieski with a
compelling counter-offer, especially as Tsar Alexis had just died and Matveev’s
influence over foreign policy was fading.
In June 1677 an Ottoman army of 45,000 under Ibraim Pasha crossed the
Danube and marched towards Chyhyryn, the symbolic capital of the Het-
manate. Muscovy now risked being dragged into full-scale war with the
Ottoman Empire. But Romodanovskii and Samoilovich were able to con-
vince Moscow to reinforce the Muscovite–Ukrainian garrison at Chyhyryn
and to let them lead a large relief expedition of over 50,000 men. Samoilovich
was especially adamant about holding Chyhyryn, without which he could not
maintain the loyalty of the Zaporozhian host much less extend his sovereignty
over the towns and villages of the right bank. Moscow was probably more con-
vinced by Romodanovskii’s argument – that the capture of Chyhyryn would
give the Turks and Tatars a staging area for attacks upon Kiev and the towns
of the left bank – and by the realisation that failure to endorse Samoilovich’s
projects could weaken Samoilovich’s support for Muscovite occupation over
the left bank.
In late August Romodanovskii and Samoilovich succeeded in routing the
Ottoman and Crimean forces besieging Chyhyryn. Their victory appears to
have been one of the more striking Muscovite military successes to date:
total Muscovite and Ukrainian casualties were reported at just 3,000 dead and
5,000 wounded, while the Turks and Tatars allegedly lost about 20,000 men.
25
The sultan subsequently expressed his displeasure by imprisoning both Ibraim
Pasha and Khan Selim.
25 A. N. Popov, ‘Turetskaia voina v tsarstvovanie Fedora Alekseevicha’, Russkii vestnik 6
(March 1857): 167–70;V.N.Zaruba,Ukrainskoe kazatskoe voisko v bor’be s turetskoi-tatarskoi
agressiei (Kharkov: Osnova, 1993), pp. 46–50.
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In June 1678 the Ottomans made a second bid to seize Chyhyryn. This
time the invading Ottoman army numbered 70,000 (not counting Crimean
Tatar auxiliaries), had a much larger artillery train and was commanded by
Kara Mustafa Pasha, the grand vizier. Romodanovskii and Samoilovich again
marched to the relief of Chyhyryn, with the same forces and nearly the same
plan of operations as the year before. The crucial difference this time was
that they halted their armies on the far side of the Tias’min River, nearly four
kilometres from Chyhyryn, on 4 August, ostensibly to await reinforcements,
and meanwhile made no serious effort to harass the Ottoman camp. This
gave the Turks time to continue their bombardment of Chyhyryn and move
their trenches up to its walls. On 11 August Romodanovskii ordered Chyhyryn
evacuated and burned to prevent it from falling into enemy hands. He and
Samoilovich then withdrew across the Dnieper.
Given Romodanovskii’s insistence the year before on the strategic necessity
of holding Chyhyryn, this had the appearance of a major defeat, and it led
many Ukrainians to blame Romodanovskii for incompetence or even treason.
Actually Moscow had issued Romodanovskii secret orders to do everything to
avoid battle with the Turks, to seek peace talks with them and to be prepared
to sacrifice Chyhyryn rather than his army so as not to leave Kiev and the left
bank under-defended. Chyhyryn was of greater importance to Samoilovich
than to Moscow, which placed higher priority on defending Kiev and the left
bank.
26
The Russo-Turkish war of 1676–81 is usually seen as a stalemate or even as a
Russian defeat because Chyhyryn had to be destroyed and the right bank was
thereby lost to the Turks and Iurii Khmel’nyts’kyi. In fact the right bank did
not fall to them. The higher Ottoman priority at the time was consolidating
control over Podol’ia, to hold the Moldavian and Wallachian hospodars in
line and block Sobieski from invading Moldavia. A massive Muscovite force
build-up on the left bank, in Sloboda Ukraine, and along the Belgorod Line
provided sufficient deterrent against an Ottoman attack across the Dnieper or
a Crimean Tatar invasion from the south: in 1679 70,000 Muscovite troops and
30,000 of Samoilovich’s cossacks defended Kiev and the left bank, while 50,000
Muscovite troops held the Belgorod Line; roughly equal numbers were fielded
in1680.
27
TheOttomans thereforemade no effort to rebuildChyhyryn as abase
for operations against Kiev and the left bank, and most of the Ottoman and
26 Brian Davies, ‘The Second Chigirin Campaign (1678): Late Muscovite Military Power
in Transition’, in Eric Lohr and Marshall Poe (eds.), The Military and Society in Russia,
1450–1917 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2002), pp. 101–2, 104–5.
27 Ibid., pp. 115–19.
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Muscovy at war and peace
Crimean troops supporting Khmel’nyts’kyi were soon withdrawn. By January
1681 the pasha of Azov was signalling the Sultan’s interest in armistice talks.
Chyhyryn proved far less decisive in shaping the destiny of the right bank
than the spring 1679 raids on right bank towns and villages undertaken by
Samoilovich’s son Semen and Muscovite troops out of the Kiev garrison and
the regiment of Grigorii Kosagov. This operation came to be called the Great
Expulsion. Several of the larger right-bank towns were burned and about
20,000 of their inhabitants were driven across the Dnieper into the left-bank
hetmanate. This depopulated most of the right bank as far as the Bug River,
turning it into a no man’s land buffering the Dnieper frontier of the left-bank
hetmanate. Iurii Khmel’nyts’kyi was left only with the western part of Bratslav
palatinate as a resource base. The Turks deposed him in 1681 and tried to set
Moldavian hospodar Gheorghe Duca over Podol’ia and the right bank, but
this was frustrated by a cossack revolt supported by the Poles. Sulimenko, the
next pro-Ottoman hetman on the right bank, was overthrown in 1685.
The 20,000 refugees pushed across the Dnieper could not all be resettled
on the territories of Samoilovich’s cossack regiments, where competition for
ploughland was already intense, so two-thirds of them were transferred to
Sloboda Ukraine, to perform cossack service from virgin steppe land along the
Northern Donets and Oskol’ rivers. This strengthened the Sloboda Ukraine
cossack regiments serving in the Muscovite army and encouraged further
Muscovite and Ukrainian colonisation of the region, to safeguard which the
Military Chancellery began erecting a new defence line, the Iziuma Line,
running 530 kilometres in all, linking up twenty garrison towns, enclosing an
area of 30,000 square kilometres, and thereby extending the Muscovitefrontier
another 160 kilometres southward. With the construction of the towns of
Maiatsk and Tor Muscovy now had garrisons within 150 kilometres of the
Black Sea coast.
28
The build-up in Sloboda Ukraine and link-up of the Iziuma Line with the
Belgorod Line provided much greater protection against Crimean Tatar raids.
Khan Murad Girey was compelled to negotiate at Bakhchisarai a twenty-year
armistice with Muscovy (1681), formally recognising Kiev and the left bank as
Muscovite possessions and a 10-kilometre-wide strip of the rightbank along the
Dnieper as a neutral zone closed to territorial aggrandisement by any power.
The khan subsequentlyinduced Sultan Mehmed IV to ratify these same terms.
It could therefore be argued that Muscovy won its first great war with the
Ottoman Empire. It had secured its position on the left bank, eliminated for
28 Onthe construction and colonisation ofthe Iziuma Line,see V. P. Zagorovskii, Iziumskaia
cherta (Voronezh: Voronezhskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 1980).
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some time the danger of a rival right-bank hetmanate, and further reduced
the Crimean Tatar threat. A further indication that the war had strengthened
Muscovy’s military and political standing was the new foreign policy pursued
by the Commonwealth after the collapse of the Gninski mission to Istanbul
in 1678. The Sejm finally ratified a fifteen-year extension of the Andrusovo
Armistice (on terms less advantageous to the Commonwealth than previously
demanded) and King Jan Sobieski abandoned attempts to ally with the Porte
and returned to his project of driving the Turks from Podol’ia and Moldavia.
He therefore began negotiations to induce Tsar Fedor to join him, Emperor
Leopold I and Venetian Doge Alvise Contarini in coalition to drive the Turks
from Europe.
By 1684 Moscow was ready to join this Holy League. Sobieski’s surprising
victory over the army of Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa at the gates of Vienna (12
September 1683) undoubtedly helped to convince the Muscovite government,
buttherewere other reasons.The most importantconsideration was the Com-
monwealth’s clear eagerness for Muscovite alliance, which showed Golitsyn
the time had come to demand that the Poles renounce all claim to Kiev, the
left bank, the Zaporozhian Sech’ and the regions of Smolensk, Chernigov and
Seversk. Golitsyn demanded the Commonwealth sign a treaty of permanent
peace on these terms, and to the Sejm’s dismay King Jan Sobieski’s envoys
signed it (26 April 1686).
29
Hetman Samoilovich was also angered by this, for
the treaty had the effect of recognising Polish claims over the right bank and
frustrating his campaign to unite all Ukraine under his own mace.
The Treaty of Eternal Peace can be said to mark the point at which Mus-
covy achieved lasting geopolitical preponderance over the Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth (Map 21.2 shows territory ceded by Poland-Lithuania after
1667). Sobieski had hoped to compensate the Commonwealth for these lost
territories by driving the Turks out of Podol’ia and Moldavia, but neither of
these objectives was accomplished in his lifetime and the lives and revenue
he squandered on them ultimately provoked a backlash by the magnates,
who further reduced the military power available to the crown. Nor was he
able to re-establish control over the right bank; efforts by Polish magnates to
recolonise the region drove the majority of right-bank cossacks into a new
revolt led by Colonel Semen Palii.
Ratification of the Eternal Peace now obligated Muscovy to make good its
pledge to the Holy League and wage war upon the Crimean khanate. Golitsyn
29 Andrzej Sulima Kaminski, Republic vs. Autocracy. Poland-Lithuania and Russia, 1686–1 697
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1993), p. 12.
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Muscovy at war and peace
0 400 km
Moscow
Novgorod
Kiev
D
n
i
e
p
e
r
Don
Black Sea
Lake
Ladoga
Polotsk
Gulf of
Finland
LIVONIA
FINLAND
POLAND-
LITHUANIA
Pskov
Narva
OTTOM A N
EMPIRE
Smolensk
Starodub
Chernigov
Chyhyryn
Pereiaslav
Novgorod
Severskii
Belgorod
Sea of
Azov
Perekop
ZAPOROZHIA
Territory ceded by
Poland–Lithuania
from 1667
Kaffa
Azov
Cherkassk
C
R
I
M
E
A
N
K
HAN
A
T
E
Map 21.2. Russia’s western borders, 1689
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brian davies
undertook two expeditions against Perekop (1687, 1689) to pin the Tatars down
in Crimea while the Poles invaded Moldavia, the Austrians engaged the Turks
in Transylvania and the Venetians campaigned in Dalmatia. On both of these
expeditions Golitsyn led an enormous army of over 110,000 Muscovite troops
and 30,000–50,000 Ukrainian troops across hundreds of kilometres of empty
and arid steppe; both expeditions failed to besiege Perekop and withdrew with
heavy casualties, mostly from drought and lack of fodder; and Golitsyn con-
tributed to his own downfall and the downfall of regent Sophia by trying to
pass off both campaigns as successes, to the disgust of his officers and the court.
In fairness to Golitsyn, a successful expedition across the steppe to capture
Perekop was probably beyond the capabilities of any other power of the age
and may not even have been Golitsyn’s real objective. The Crimean expedi-
tions did divert the Crimean Tatars from reinforcing Ottoman operations on
other fronts and did show the Holy League the tremendous powers of resource
mobilisation Muscovy now possessed (if also of its ability to waste resources);
theydid establish two important garrisons and supply depots (Novobogorodit-
skoe and Novosergeevsk) for future expeditions against the khanate and the
Ottoman fortresses on the Dnieper; and they had the effect of tightening
Moscow’s control over the Zaporozhian host and the left bank, by planting
Muscovite garrisons just across the Dnieper from the host and by creating the
opportunity to scapegoat and depose Samoilovich and replace him with Ivan
Mazepa.
Besides profiting politically from the discrediting of Golitsyn’s Crimean
expeditions, Tsar Peter and his circle initially saw no advantage to campaign-
ing on behalf of the Holy League; they were convinced the Poles and Austrians
were already bogged down in Moldavia and Hungary and inclining to a sep-
arate peace with the Ottomans, so it would be better for Muscovy to seek
its own reconciliation with the Porte and khanate lest it be left struggling on
alone. For the time being, then, the new government would distance itself
from Warsaw and Vienna and soften its demands upon the sultan and khan in
hope of negotiating an armistice. It was not until 1694 that Peter would renew
commitment to the Holy League by preparing a major expedition against
Azov.
Muscovy’s emergence as a great power
In Tsar Alexis’s reign Muscovite foreign policy had played for very high stakes
but had run high losses in the process. Tsar Alexis had entered the Ukrainian
quagmire in 1654 in order to obtain Bogdan Khmel’nyts’kyi’s aid in Belarus’
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Muscovy at war and peace
and Lithuania; he had prolonged the war with the Commonwealth by set-
ting unrealistic terms for peace, including his election to the Polish throne;
and he had left the conflict with the Commonwealth unresolved in order to
suddenly open an unsuccessful war upon the Swedes for control of the Baltic
coast.
Muscovite foreign policy after 1676 was generally more cautious but sure-
footed. The 1677 Chyhyryn campaign (which ended very fortunately) or
Golitsyn’s Crimean expeditions (whichwastedlives butdid not leave the south-
ern frontier more vulnerable) cannot be compared with Tsar Alexis’s gambles.
Yet several major strategic objectives were achieved by 1689. Muscovy had
won Polish and Ottoman recognition of the Tsar’s sovereignty over left-bank
Ukraine and had begun to exercise greater control over the Zaporozhian and
Don cossack hosts. It no longer faced any significant threat from a right-bank
hetmanate (the right bank’s pro-Polish hetmans could seldom mobilise more
than 5,000 men, its pro-Ottoman hetmans no more than a few hundred). The
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was no longer Muscovy’s mortal enemy;
it had finally signed a treaty of permanent peace and abandoned its claims to
the long-contested territories of Smolensk and Chernigov in return for Mus-
covite entry into the Holy League. The Crimean khanate remained a threat
to the towns of Sloboda Ukraine and the Belgorod Line, but no longer to
the Muscovite heartland; more of the steppe had come under Muscovite mili-
tary colonisation, advancing the front to just a few hundred kilometres of the
khanate and encouraging Muscovite and cossack forces to go on the offensive
with a series of operations on the lower Don and Dnieper. Muscovy still did
not have mastery over the Livonian coast of the Baltic but had been able to
enjoy a long respite from conflict with Sweden.
These successes were owed in part to blunders by Muscovy’s rivals. A
contributingfactorwasthegreaterexperienceandenlargedscopeofMuscovite
diplomacy. Now that Muscovy had demonstrated its military usefulness to
the Ottoman Empire’s enemies it became practical to send frequent missions
to most of the European powers. Muscovy finally had its first permanent
mission, at Warsaw, which served as a clearing house for reports from its
envoys in other European capitals as well as a source of improved intelligence
on foreign efforts to manipulate Polish political factions. The Little Russian
Chancellery (Malorossiiskii prikaz) had also taken on great importance for
managing political relations with the hetmans, colonels and towns of the left
bank. Its work made it possible to reduce the ability of the later hetmans
(Samoilovich, Mazepa) to pursue their own foreign policies while maintaining
their loyalty for longer than had been possible before; by further servilising
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