Perrie M. (ed.) The Cambridge History of Russia, Volume 1: From Early Rus’ to 1689
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michael khodarkovsky
ineffective resistance, the local elites could be easily co-opted, divided and
manipulated and the furs would be collected either in form of a tribute or
trade. The native peoples were to become ‘the iasak-paying subjects eternally’
and the only choice they had was to ‘enter the sublime protection of the Grand
Sovereign, the Tsar’ voluntarily or to be reduced into submission by Russian
arms.
6
The second route of Russia’s expansion into Siberia took the Russians into
the lands of the Buriats and Evenk around Lake Baikal and the Daurs of the
Amur River. Then Russia’s advance had quickly come to a halt. Here, the
Russians encountered another sovereign state and empire, whose ruler too
claimed suzerainty over numerous native residents of the area. The Russians
approached the imperial boundaries of Ch’ing China.
It was not uncommon for both sides to claim suzerainty and the right
to collect iasak from the same native people and for the natives to pay trib-
ute to both Russians and Chinese. Russia’s encroachment into the Chinese
sphere of influence and the numerous arguments and disputes over the loy-
alty and tributary payments of the native peoples were annoying enough
for the Manchu rulers of China. But when the rebellious Russian cossacks
arrived to found Fort Albazin on the Amur River in 1665 and Russian set-
tlers, attracted by the stories of the Amur region’s fabulous riches, began
to arrive in larger numbers, Beijing realised that negotiations alone would
not resolve the contentious issues. Chinese armies marched towards the
Russian forts of Albazin and Nerchinsk, eventually forcing the Russians to
raze most of their forts and settlements and to abandon any further expansion
in the region. The Treaty of Nerchinsk signed in 1689 established a boundary
between the Russian and Chinese empires along the Argun and Shilka rivers
and the Stanovoi mountain range, effectively denying Russia any access to the
Amur region. The Russians had to wait for over 150 years before annexing
the Amur region and turning it into the far-eastern corner of the Russian
Empire.
7
6 AI, 5 vols. (St Petersburg: various publishers, 1841–2), vol. iv (Tipografiia II Otdeleniia
Sobstvennoi E. I. V. Kantseliarii, 1842), no. 219,pp.473–4.
7 George Lantzeff and Richard Pierce, Eastward to Empire: Exploration and Conquest on the
Russian Open Frontier, to 1750 (Montreal: McGill–Queen’s University Press, 1973), pp. 127–
83; James Forsyth, A History of the Peoples of Siberia (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992), pp. 48–109; Mark Bassin, Imperial Visions, Nationalist Imagination and Geo-
graphical Expansion in the Russian Far East, 1840–1865 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999), pp. 19–24.
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The North Caucasus
Throughoutthe seventeenth century Russiacould boast of no visibleterritorial
expansion in the North Caucasus. Russia’s advance here had been stalled for
the same reasons as its march eastwardinto south-eastern Siberia was halted in
the 1650s. In the Caucasus, Moscow approached the sphere of influence of two
sovereign states, the Ottoman and Persian empires. At the time when Russia’s
unquestionable military and economic superiority enabled it to expand with
relative ease into the lands inhabited by various tribal societies, Moscow had
to take a long pause before it was able to confront the similarly organised and
dynamic empires of the Chinese, Persians and Ottomans.
Since its first penetration of the Caucasus in the 1560s Moscow struggled to
maintain a foothold there. Forced to raze Fort Tersk several times, Moscow
had decided to build a fort at a new location further north in the estuary of
the Terek River. In 1588, Moscow dispatched a contingent of musketeers and
cossacks to defend the newly built fort at the site of the old Turkic town of
Tiumen’. Initially named Fort Tiumen’, it was quickly renamed Fort Tersk.
The survival of Tersk remained precarious for a few more years under the
renewed Ottoman demands to raze the fort and the rumours of the impending
Crimean campaign. But the Ottomans were busy prosecuting their successful
war against Safavid Persia and their priorities were to maintain the newly
won possessions along the Caspian coast: Derbent, Shemakha and Baku. The
issue seemed to have been raised by the Ottomans for the last time in 1593.
When Moscow assured the Ottomans of its peaceful intentions and promised
not to interfere with the Ottoman interests in the region, the Porte stopped
demanding the demolition of Tersk.
8
If anything, Russia’s presence in the North Caucasus in the seventeenth
century was a testimony to its tenacity and determination. Moscow’s attempts
to move south of Tersk proved to be unsuccessful. Several large-scale military
campaigns into Daghestan were a failure. Twice Moscow built and rebuilt
Fort Sunzhenskii on the Sunzha River where it flows into the Terek River, and
twice Moscow was forced to abandon it. The small cossack settlements which
emerged in the foothills of the Caucasus along the Terek River (the Greben’
Mountains) had to be razed in the 1650s. Only Tersk stayed and remained
Russia’s principal base in the North Caucasus throughout the seventeenth
century.
8 Kabardino-russkie otnosheniia v XVI–XVIII vv. Dokumenty i materialy, 2 vols. (Moscow: AN
SSSR, 1957), vol. i, nos. 21 (pp. 34–5), 41 (pp. 67–8), 43 (p. 69).
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The absence of a visible territorial expansion notwithstanding, Russia suc-
ceeded in establishing itself as a major power in the north-eastern corner of
the Caucasus. Throughout the seventeenth century, Moscow cultivated ties
with the numerous chiefs and nobles among the local peoples: the Kumyks,
Nogais, Chechens and particularly the Kabardinians. Occasionally, the
Russian troops marched from Tersk to assist a loyal native chief against his
rivals. But most of the time, Moscow extended its influence through a system
of payments, rewards and other benefits to those who represented Russian
interests in the region.
Throughout the seventeenth century, a growing number of native nobles
chose to seek refuge in Tersk from their rivalsand foes.They often arrived with
their retinue and were given land, grain and cash in exchange for their military
service. Nativecommonerstoo fledtoTersk in ever-increasingnumbers fleeing
justice, or heavy taxation or simply lured by promises of better life.Many of the
commoners became converts to Christianity. By the 1620s, four large quarters
populated solely by the indigenous people grew outside the walls of Tersk:
Circassian (Kabardinian), Okochane (members of the Ingush clan of Ako who
came to Tersk in the 1590s), New convert and Tatar. The Kabardinian quarter
was the largest with about 175 households by the end of the century. All in all,
the population of these four quarters was almost three times larger than the
Russian population of Tersk.
9
Perhaps the most celebrated example of the natives’ co-operation with
Russia was the Kabardinian dynasty of the Cherkasskiis, whose members for
several generations faithfully served Russian interests in the region. With the
construction of Fort Tersk in 1588, several Kabardinian chiefs offered their
service to Moscow and arrived at Tersk to reside there with their retinues.
Among these chiefs, one, Sunchalei Ianglychev, earned the complete trust of
the Russian government. He travelled to Moscow several times, was granted
an annuity, and in 1615 was appointed a ruling prince over the non-Christian
population of Tersk. His son Mutsal and grandson Kaspulat continued to serve
Russia faithfully.
In the last half of the seventeenth century, Kaspulat Mutsalovich Cherkasskii
proved to be Russia’s indispensable liaison in the entire southern region. He
ensured that important chiefs in Daghestan and various Kabardinian nobles
were at peace with Russia. His sister’s marriage to a Kalmyk chief tayishi
accounted for his special relations with the Kalmyks. On numerous occasions,
9 Ibid., p. 402,n.165; Istoriia narodov Severnogo Kavkaza s drevneishikh vremen do kontsa XVIII
v., ed. B. B. Piotrovskii (Moscow: Nauka, 1988), pp. 330–1.
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his motley contingent of the Kabardinians, Kumyks, Nogais and others in
Russian service joined the Kalmyks in their campaigns against the Crimea
and in Ukraine against the Ottomans. Handsomely rewarded for his service,
Kaspulat Cherkasskii was put in charge of all the non-Christians of Tersk, had
fortified houses near Astrakhan’ and Tersk and was granted for life the right
to collect customs duties in Tersk.
10
By the end of the century Tersk grew into an important frontier town. The
Russian government was making sure that Tersk was adequately protected. In
1650 alone, 1,379 musketeers and cossacks were transferred to Tersk from other
frontier towns and settled there with their families.
11
Tersk remained Russia’s
principal frontier garrison in the Caucasus until the second quarter of the
eighteenth century when the advancing Russian forts and cossack settlements
turned this once strategic frontier town into a provincial backwater.
The Baltics and Ukraine
Likeits double-headed eagle,the symbol ofthe Russianmonarchy, Russiafaced
simultaneouslytwovery different worlds: one in the east with its animist, Mus-
lim and Buddhist populations and the other in the west with a predominantly
Christian population. Unlike its rapid advance in the east, Russia’s numerous
attempts to expand in the west were frustrated by the superior militaries of its
neighbours: the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Sweden. Two wars in
the Baltic region (1558–83, 1656–61) brought Moscow in control of some parts
of Livonia and Estonia, only to be given up shortly thereafter. Only in the early
eighteenth century was Russia able to establish itself in the Baltic region. The
significance attributed to the Baltics was inescapable when Peter the Great
imposed his vision on the region and founded a new imperial capital on the
Baltic shores.
In the second half of the seventeenth century, Moscow’s newly claimed
subjects in the west came from eastern Ukraine. They were also Orthodox
and, in Moscow’s view, shared the same historical traditions of Kievan Rus’.
Yet for centuries, the residents of Ukraine had remained cut off from Moscow
and instead subjected to influences from Poland and Lithuania. Linguistically
and culturally, they clearly possessed an identity different from their Orthodox
co-religionists in Moscow. Given their common confessional identity, Moscow
10 Kabardino-russkie otnosheniia v XVI–XVIII vv., vol. i, nos. 28 (pp. 50–1), 52 (pp. 84–5), 208
(pp. 325–6), 232 (pp. 360–1), 236 (pp. 364–5); Khodarkovsky, Where Two Worlds Met,pp.95,
113–18.
11 AI, vol. iv,no.141,p.285.
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consideredtheUkrainiansto beRussian,butwith asmallnodtotheirdifference
it referred to them as ‘little Russians’.
Russia’s acquisition of eastern Ukraine was very similar to its annexation of
Siberia in the sense that Russia’s involvement and expansion here was equally
hesitant and cautious. The annexation of Ukraine might also have had to
await the early 1700s, when the modernised Russian military proved superior
to its western neighbours, had not the opportunity presented itself in 1654.
For decades the Dnieper cossacks who resided in the well-fortified territory
called the Zaporozhian Sech’ enjoyed their freedom and privileges like their
counterparts on the Don, Volga and Iaik rivers. But when the Polish govern-
ment attempted to increase its control over the Zaporozhian cossacks, they
revolted. The largest such uprising took place in 1648–9 under the leadership of
Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi, who was able to unite the cossacks and the Ukrainian
peasants under the anti-Polish, anti-Jewish and anti-Catholic banner.
First and foremost the cossacks were opportunists. Their sense of shared
Orthodox Christian identity with the Russians mattered less than their inde-
pendence and privileges. It was only after failing to form an alliance with
the Ottomans and the Crimean Tatars that the cossacks approached Moscow.
Realising that the support of the Zaporozhian host would mean a war with
Poland-Lithuania,Moscow rebuffed Khmel’nyts’kyi and his cossacks. Yet a few
years later in a momentous decision, the tsar, the Church and the boyars felt
that they could no longer pass the opportunity to liberate their co-religionists
from Catholic oppression and finally to acquire the lands of ancient Kievan
Rus’.
In January of 1654, in the town of Pereiaslav the Zaporozhian hetman
Khmel’nyts’kyi and other cossack leaders affixed their signatures to a doc-
ument which the cossacks regarded as the terms of their military alliance
with Russia and which Moscow considered an affirmation of the cossacks’
new status as the subjects of the tsar. Such divergent understanding of their
relationship inevitably led to a speedy fall-out. Two years later, in 1656, the
cossacks entered an alliance with Sweden, and in 1658 chose to revert to
the protection of the Polish king. But Moscow was no longer shy about its
ambitions in Ukraine. The fate of Ukraine was decided in a war between
Russia and Poland and the truce which the two concluded at Andrusovo
in 1667. Ukraine would become divided: the left bank of the Dnieper River
would come under Russian control and the right bank would remain in Polish
hands.
Several other cossack revolts in the seventeenth century failed to change
the status quo and to unify the cossacks again. For some time, the cossack
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hetmanate on the left bank of the Dnieper retained most of its privileges and
sufficient autonomy. Typical incongruities of Russia’s policies which were in
evidence elsewhere were also present in Russia’s relationship with the cossack
hetmanate. While considering the occupants of the left bank to be Russian
subjects, Moscow dealt with the hetmanate via the Little Russian Chancellery
which was part of Russia’s Foreign Office.
In many ways Moscow’s relationship with the cossacks fell into a pattern
of Russia’s relations with the peoples elsewhere on its expanding frontiers.
Like various non-Christian peoples along the Russian frontier, the cossacks
too interpreted their treaty with Moscow as a military alliance with mutual
obligations. They too initially were allowed autonomy which then was slowly
eroded as Moscow engaged in co-opting the elites, manipulating the local
rivalries and resettling those who chose to serve Russia and enrolling them in
the Russian military (thus, the eastern part of the hetmanate became known
as the Sloboda Ukraine and was settled with the Ukrainian cossacks who
were organised into the regular regiments under the military command of the
Russian governor in Belgorod). It seems that the nature of Russian autocracy
allowed no exceptions, and the Russian imperial policies applied to both the
non-Christians and Christians alike.
The fate of the hetmanate was likewise similar to many of its steppe neigh-
bours. The Ukrainian hetmanate too was slowly stripped of its autonomy. By
the 1720s the hetmanate was increasingly drawn into the Russian administra-
tive and social structures, a process which was completed by the end of the
eighteenth century.
The mid-Volga region
While rapidly expanding into the new areas, Russia also continued to consol-
idate its control in the regions conquered in the previous century. By far the
most diverse and important was the middle Volga region. Here, in addition to
the conquered peoples – Tatar, Bashkir, Mari, Mordva, Chuvash and Udmurt –
others arrived to settle and colonise the region. By the end of the seventeenth
century, not only did many towns have a sizeable Slavic population, but the
countryside too was transformed by the arrival of Russian landlords and peas-
ants and exiled Polish prisoners of war. If in the frontier regions Moscow’s
objectives did not go beyond the initial demands of political loyalty, in the mid-
Volga region the previously vanquished population was already thoroughly
integrated into the Russian administrative system. Some non-Christians were
enlisted into the Russian military and occupied a special position known as
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the service Tatars. Other non-Christians were levied specific iasak or other
payments and performed sundry state services.
Thenatives had severalchoices:tosuccumb to the Russiandominance,resist
it or to flee further away; and they exercised all of these options. The majority
of the non-Christians stayed on their ancestral lands, but their acceptance
of Russian domination was hardly peaceful. Throughout the centuries the
non-Christians of the Volga region together with the cossacks of Russia’s
southern borderlands were the main source of resistance to Moscow and
its policies. The mid-Volga region was systematically rocked by both small-
scalepopular disturbancesandlarge-scaleuprisings.Amongnumerouspeoples
of the regions, the Bashkirs unquestionably took the prize and suffered the
consequences of being the most rebellious subjects of the tsar.
12
The Russian conquest and colonisation policies of the mid-Volga region
also triggered a large-scale migration of the non-Christians. Some reported
fleeing to avoid onerous taxation, others were fearful of forceful conversion
to Christianity, whether real or rumoured. Thousands of those who fled and
settled on the Bashkir lands eventually formed two social categories of regis-
tered peasants (tepter) and unregistered migrant peasants, who later became
state peasants (bobyl’). In 1631–2, there were 8,355 tepter and bobyl’ households
residing on the Bashkir lands.
13
While some among the native elites with the status of tarkhan had their
traditional privilege of tax exemption confirmed and others were bestowed
with it anew, a great number of the native population found itself labouring
under the increased burden of taxation, corv
´
ee, state services and various legal
restrictions.The impoverishment of the native peoples was evident in the flight
of the population, numerous rebellions and a ceaseless paper trail of formal
complaints to the governing Russian authorities. One desperate measure to
whichthenatives resorted at the hardeconomic timeswasselling theirchildren
and kin into slavery to their wealthy co-religionists or the Russians.
14
Russian policies of incremental integration of the conquered native popu-
lation in the Russian Empire and their consequences were best described by
the fugitive Bashkirs. In 1755, in the wake of yet another Bashkir uprising, a
group of more than 1,500 Bashkir households came to seek refuge among the
Kazakhs and warned them about the dangers of submitting to Russia. The
12 Materialy po istorii Bashkirskoi ASSR, vol. i: Bashkirskie vosstaniia v XVII i pervoi polovine
XVIII vekov (Moscow and Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1936), pp. 26–40, 150–212.
13 Ocherki po istorii Bashkirskoi ASSR, vol. i, pt.1 (Ufa: Bashkirskoe izdatel’stvo, 1956), p. 97.
14 Ibid., pp. 132–4; Materialy po istorii Bashkirskoi ASSR, vol. iii: Ekonomicheskie i sotsialnye
otnosheniia v Bashkirii v pervoi polovine XVIII veka (Moscow and Leningrad: AN SSSR,
1949), pp. 9–25.
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fugitive Bashkirs explained that they had become Russian subjects of their
own volition, had agreed to pay iasak and had provided numerous services
and labour. In the beginning they too, like the Kazakhs, had been granted
privileges, but then the government had begun to demand from them more
than from their ancestors. Every year they were getting worse off, and now
they were brought into such misery that they could not even feed themselves.
Their petitions did not reach the empress, and their petitions to the governor
remained unheeded. The governor forbade them to petition the empress, and
seized, tortured and killed many of their people; they were no longer free in
their ownlands and waters. Howcould they live without the land? Military reg-
iments came and ruined them; they cut their trees with the beehives, built forts
and forced Bashkirs to fell trees, dig soil, cut stones, provide transportation,
join the military patrols and buy salt at a higher price. Finally, the desperate
Bashkirs resolved to flee, even though the Russian authorities tried to prevent
them from fleeing by ordering executions of one remaining Bashkir resident
for each fugitive. The Bashkirs warned that the same fate would soon befall
the Kazakhs.
15
Methods of conquest and colonisation
Russia’s methods of conquest and colonisation appear to have formed a clear
pattern. The newly encountered peoples were expected to submit an oath of
allegiance seeking the tsar’s protection and favour and pledging their eternal
loyalty. These oaths of allegiance were prepared in Moscow and were often
available only in Russian. After the native rulers, either coerced or beguiled by
Russian promises, had agreed to affix their signatures to the shert’, Moscow
held them responsible and insisted that they became Russia’s subjects. A disin-
genuity on the part of both Moscow and the native chiefs was obvious. The
chiefs were mostly interested in economic largesse and political advantages,
but never considered such documents binding. Moscow too understood very
well the precarious nature of its relationship with the various peoples on its
frontiers. It might have claimed them as subjects, but it treated them as for-
eigners and considered all related matters through Russia’s Foreign Office. In
a further sign of Moscow’s conscious and deliberate obfuscation, the royal
titles which claimed suzerainty over various peoples in the frontier regions
were mentioned only in correspondence with the Western Christian rulers
15 Kazakhsko-russkie otnosheniia v XVI–XVIII vekakh. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov (Alma-
Ata: AN Kazakhskoi SSR, 1961), no. 210,p.539.
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and were carefully omitted in letters to the Ottoman sultans and Persian
shahs.
16
In the initial stages, Moscow relied heavily on the local elites, winning them
over through a system of payments and rewards and retaining their privileges.
In time, however, the growing military and economic dependence of these
elites on Russia and increasing proximity of the Russian settlements, towns,
monasteries and forts allowed Moscow to move into a more intrusive stage of
bringing the native population under a tighter Russian rule. In other words,
Moscow proceeded cautiously from indirect rule in the borderlands to direct
rule once the borderlands were more firmly integrated.
Of course, such an evolution of Russia’s rule over the non-Russian peoples
was not a straight line, and Moscow had to overcome numerous pitfalls along
the way. One of the typical dilemmas confronted by the Russian authorities
along the frontiers was whether to unite a native people by supporting a
single authority of a strong local ruler or to divide them by encouraging the
rivalry among their elites. Both approaches were deployed at different times:
the former when Moscow was in a weak position and chose to rely on the
non-Russians’ military aid, the latter when such aid was no longer needed
and Moscow’s goals then were to weaken and subdue its new non-Russian
subjects.
Other issues seemed to have worked at cross-purposes. It was well under-
stood in Moscow that winning over the native elites was critical to Russia’s
interests and Moscow pursued the policies of co-optation. At the same time,
other Russian policies served to undermine the collaboration of the native
elites. One of the major issues which emerged throughout the seventeenth
century was the flight of native slaves and commoners to seek freedom and
a better life in Russia. While the arrival of the native elites to seek military
service and protection in Russia was an old and established practice, the exo-
dus of commoners was a new and disturbing phenomenon in the view of the
non-Russian elites.
The native nobles bitterly complained that they were losing their people to
their great detriment and demanded the fugitives’ return or a monetary com-
pensation. Such complaints were most of the time dismissed by the authorities
in neighbouring Russian towns under the pretext that the fugitives had been
converted to Christianity and therefore could not be returned. Even in Siberia,
where the increased number of fugitives meant diminished quantities of fur
iasak, the Russian authorities accepted such fugitives and converted them to
16 Kotoshikhin, O Rossii v tsarstvovanie Alekseia Mikhailovicha,pp.39, 40, 87.
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Christianityaslongastheirconversion was‘voluntary’. The drainofthenatives
into Russia remained an issue of great importance throughout the centuries
and continued to undermine Russia’s relations with various native chiefs along
the frontiers.
17
Even when, compelled by political circumstances, Moscow instructed its
governors to return such fugitives unconverted, few of them found their way
back home. The unaware native fugitives, who could be profitably exploited
or sold, represented an attractive source of profit to the corrupt local Russian
authorities. Half a century later, in 1755, responding to the undeniable reality of
massive exodus, purchase and conversion of the natives, the government gave
a green light to those who wished to purchase and convert the natives in the
frontier regions of Astrakhan’, Orenburg and Siberia. In a remarkable violation
of the exclusive privilege of the Russian nobility to purchase and own serfs, the
government permitted priests, merchants, cossacks and others to buy, convert
and teach non-Christians, who were to remain their serfs until the owners’
death. The Senate sanctioned the purchase of Kalmyks, Kumyks, Chechens,
Kazakhs, Karakalpaks, Turkmens, Tomuts, Tatars, Bashkirs, Baraba Tatars
and other Muslims and idol-worshippers. Thus, the non-Christians would be
acquired without force, ‘so that they could be converted to Christianity’. Such
transactions were to take place only with written permission from the native
chiefs or parents of those offered for sale, and with the reasonable assurances
that those to be sold had not been kidnapped.
18
Of course, given the desperate
situation of many natives and the corruption of both the Russian officials and
the native chiefs, these conditions were unlikely to prevent any illegal sales.
What was in the seventeenth century still a cautious government policy by
the mid-eighteenth century had developed into a direct encouragement of
a wide-ranging enserfment and Christianisation of the non-Christians in the
frontier regions.
Whether through deliberate policies or the circumstances of its overwhelm-
ing dominance, Russia’s impact on the indigenous societies was destabilising
and destructive. In time, the native elites found themselves drawn into the orbit
of Russia’s influence, becoming dependent on Moscow in political, military
and economic matters. The attraction of the Russian market and access to a
17 AI, vol. i (Tipografiia Ekspeditsii zagotovleniia Gosudarstvennykh bumag, 1841), no. 209,
p. 449; vol. iii (Tipografiia II Otdeleniia Sobstvennoi E. I. V. Kantseliarii, 1841), no. 1542,
pp. 236, 244–5;no.1594,pp.355–6; Michael Khodarkovsky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier: The
Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500–1800 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002),
pp. 201–10.
18 Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi imperii (Moscow), f. 119,op.5, Kalmytskie dela, 1755 g.,
d. 17, ll. 17–20.
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