Moyar Mark. A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq
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BRIGADIER GENERAL J. FRANKLIN BELL
Rapidly promoted during the Philippine Insurrection for his exceptional
leadership talents, Bell defeated insurgents by using harsh counterinsur-
gency measures while minimizing excesses against the civilian population.
(Library of Congress)
RAMON MAGSAYSAY
Magsaysay (center), who became secretary of national defense and then president of the
Philippines with American help, turned around the war against the Huk insurgents by ring
weak commanders and inspiring his subordinates. (U.S. National Archives)
SIR HENRY GURNEY
As British high commissioner in Malaya from 1948 until his assassination in
1951, Gurney did not venture into the countryside to observe or to supervise,
which resulted in poor decisions at the top and incompetence at the lower levels
of leadership. (AP /World Wide Photos)
SIR GERALD TEMPLER
Templer suppressed the Malayan insurgents by ruthlessly replacing
ineective commanders with talented ocers gathered from elsewhere
in the British empire and by inspiring local commanders during
countless tours of the combat zones. (AP/ World Wide Photos)
NGO DINH DIEM
During his rst years in power, South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh
Diem built a new corps of South Vietnamese leaders, and when they
came of age in 1962, they turned the tide of the war against the Viet
Cong. But the successes were undone the next year when American-
sponsored conspirators assassinated Diem and conducted massive
purges. (U.S. National Archives)
GENERAL CREIGHTON ABRAMS
e commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam from 1968 to 1972,
Abrams helped the South Vietnamese government compensate for
the American drawdown by persuading South Vietnamese president
Nguyen Van ieu to oust weak South Vietnamese military
commanders. (U.S. National Archives)
GENERAL CARLOS EUGENIO VIDES CASANOVA AND JOSÉ NAPOLEÓN DUARTE
As El Salvador’s minister of defense, General Vides (le) revamped the Salvadoran military
leadership in the mid-1980s, with little help from Duarte (right), El Salvador’s president
from 1984 to 1989. (Getty Images)
HAMID KARZAI
President Karzai (right) let family ties, friendships, and political connections inuence leader-
ship appointments in Afghanistan’s police and civil service, empowering individuals whose
misconduct in oce alienated many of the traditional elites. (U.S. Department of Defense)
LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAVID BARNO WITH DONALD RUMSFELD AND
DICK CHENEY
Barno (center), anked here by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld (le) and Vice President
Cheney (right), found that some American commanders in Afghanistan adapted to
counterinsurgency warfare without receiving any doctrine while others had to be steered
in the right direction. (U.S. Department of Defense)
GENERAL ABDUL RAHIM WARDAK
e leadership of General Wardak (with sunglasses), Afghanistan’s defense minister,
enabled the ocer corps of the Afghan National Army to improve over time while the rest
of the government languished. (U.S. Department of Defense)
COLONEL H. R. MCMASTER
As commander of the U.S. 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, McMaster (right) permanently
removed a large concentration of insurgents from the Iraqi city of Tal Afar through a com-
bination of combat operations and appeals to local tribal leaders to bring their relatives into
the police. (3rd Cavalry Museum)
LIEUTENANT COLONEL DALE ALFORD AND GENERAL GEORGE CASEY
Casey (right), commander of Multi-National Force—Iraq from 2004 to 2007, paid numer-
ous visits to local commanders like Alford (le). As the commander of a Marine infantry
battalion, Alford was the driving force behind the rst major counterinsurgency victory in
Anbar province. (Courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Dale Alford)