Mikkelsen A., Langhelle O. (eds.) Arctic Oil and Gas. Sustanability at Risk?

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the conservation, sustainable utilization and protection of Arctic ecosystems

and natural resources for the benefit and enjoyment of present and future gener-

ations, including indigenous peoples’ (AEPS, 1991: 9–10). Apart from general

principles such as the above, however, the main focus in the AEPS Strategy was

directed towards environmental problems. Since global warming and ozone

depletion were being addressed in ‘other fora’ (within the UNCED process and

the Montreal Protocol), these issues were not addressed in AEPS. The strategy

identified and focused upon six issues: persistent organic contaminants, oil pollu-

tion, heavy metals, noise, radioactivity and acidification.

As part of the AEPS, the Arctic states also agreed to establish Working Groups

in four programme areas, where member states, observers and indigenous groups

could participate in the work.

– The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP) was established to

identify the levels and effects of selected anthropogenic pollutants in all

compartments of the Arctic, including humans.

– A Working Group on the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF)

was established to address species and habitat conservation.

– A Working Group on the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME)

was established to inventory the threats to the Arctic marine environment

irrespective of origin and to identify gaps in the coverage of existing interna-

tional Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) concerning the Arctic.

– A Working Group on Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPPR) was

established to provide a framework for cooperation in response to the threat

of environmental emergencies.

The Working Groups have moved from analysis and advice towards questions of

implementation, and the scientific output from these groups has been huge

(Archer and Scrivener, 2000; Haavisto, 2001; AHDR, 2004).

The broadening of the AEPS environmental agenda began at the Nuuk

Ministerial Meeting in 1993. Here, the Arctic states agreed to create a Task Force

on Sustainable Development and Utilization (TFSDU). The Task Force was

established as a response to the UNCED process and the World Summit in Rio

de Janeiro 1992, and prompting by the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), which

also played an important role at the Rio conference (Reimer, 1993; Nuttall, 2000).

In addition, The Nuuk Declaration affirmed Principle 22 of the Rio Declaration

concerning indigenous people and contained statements with clear linkages to the

UNCED process and sustainable development:

Determined, individually and jointly, to conserve and protect the Arctic

Environment for the benefit of present and future generations, as well as the

global environment, Noting that in order to achieve sustainable development,

environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development

process and cannot be considered in isolation from it ... We support the

achievements of the United Nations Conference on Environment and

26 Oluf Langhelle, Bjørn-Tore Blindheim and Olaug Øygarden

Development, and state our beliefs that the Principles of the Rio Declaration

on Environment and Development have particular relevance with respect to

sustainable development in the Arctic.

(The Nuuk Declaration, 1993)

According to Vanderzwaag, Huebert and Ferrara (2003), the participants at

the Nuuk meeting ‘reached a general recognition that the AEPS needed to consider

issues of sustainability and not only environmental protection’. In 1996, Foreign

Ministers of the Arctic states agreed in the Ottawa Declaration to form the Arctic

Council with a mandate to undertake a broad programme to include

all dimensions of sustainable development.

The Arctic Council replaced the AEPS

and took over the programmes already established under the AEPS. The Council

was established as a ‘means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interac-

tion among the Arctic States’, with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous

communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues. Indigenous

groups were accorded the status as Permanent Participants.

Decisions, however,

are based on the ‘consensus’ of the Members states (Arctic Council, 1996).

The creation of the Arctic Council led several Environmental Ministries and

environmental non-governmental organizations to worry that a shift from envi-

ronmental concerns to the broader issues of sustainable development could

weaken or downgrade environmental efforts in the Arctic (Archer and Scrivener,

2000: 615). According to Archer and Scrivener, the creation of the Arctic Council

‘slowed the momentum of environmental cooperation in the AEPS’:

It revived mutual fears of hidden agendas behind the impetus to regional

collaboration and also diplomatic caution about circumpolar institution-

building, while bringing into sharper focus tension involved in reconciling

pollution and conservation concerns with economic development under the

elusive rubric of sustainable development in the Arctic.

(Archer and Scrivener, 2000: 616).

The WWF Arctic Bulletin (1996: 6–8) contained comments on the creation of

the Arctic Council from several respected scientists on Arctic issues. Oran R.

Young commented that the creation of the Arctic Council was:

likely to affect the contents of the Arctic policy agenda, redirecting interests

from classic environmental protection issues ... to issues centred around the

interaction between people and the environment (e.g. the sustainable use of

living resources) and issues involving the impacts of airborne and winter-

bourne pollutants.

According to Young, this was not necessarily bad news from the view of environ-

mental protection. Monica Tennberg on the other hand, commented that ‘the

Arctic Council institutionalises the view that the Arctic is a rich region whose

resources will be used increasingly in the future’. This was, according to

Framing Arctic oil and gas 27

Tennberg, inconsistent with the goal of environmental protection, and the

perception of the Arctic as ‘a vulnerable and sensitive region in need of

protection’.

At the first Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council in Iqaluit, Canada, September

17–18, 1998, the Council transformed the Task Force on Sustainable Development

and Utilization to a Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG).

The group

was to work on the adopted Terms of Reference for a Sustainable Development

Program. The goal of the programme was formulated as follows:

The goal of the sustainable development program of the Arctic Council is

to propose and adopt steps to be taken by the Arctic States to advance

sustainable development in the Arctic, including opportunities to protect

and enhance the environment, and the economies, cultures and health of

indigenous communities and of other inhabitants of the Arctic, as well as to

improve the environmental, economic and social conditions of Arctic

communities as a whole.

(Arctic Council, 1998b)

The SDWG was to facilitate completion of work on sustainable development

proposals, propose possible priority areas in the further development of the

sustainable development programme, and review specific proposals and prepare

them for approval by the Ministers (Arctic Council, 1998a). At the second

Ministerial Meeting in Barrow, Alaska, October 12–13, 2000, the Arctic Council

adopted a Framework Document (Chapeau) for the Sustainable Development

Program, which was an attempt to specify the meaning of sustainable develop-

ment within the special circumstances of the Arctic. The Chapeau was to provide

the Council with a capacity to identify projects, activities and priorities. Among

the principles in the Chapeau was the definition of sustainable development from

Our Common Future, and the ambition that

The Sustainable Development Program should leave future generations in the

North with expanded opportunities, and promote economic activity that

creates wealth and human capital, while simultaneously safeguarding the

natural capital of the Arctic.

(Arctic Council, 2000)

The Chapeau also included a list of the subjects that the Arctic Council

‘attaches special importance to’ under the heading of sustainable development.

These were described as ‘critical to human health and sustainable development’,

and included health issues and the well-being of people living in the Arctic,

prevention and control of disease and injuries, the long-term monitoring of the

impact of pollution and climate change. In addition, the Chapeau focused on

sustainable economic activities and the prosperity of Arctic communities, educa-

tion and cultural heritage, children and youth, the management of natural, includ-

ing living resources, and lastly, infrastructure development.

28 Oluf Langhelle, Bjørn-Tore Blindheim and Olaug Øygarden

The third Ministerial Meeting in Inari, Finland, 2002, decided to develop the

Chapeau further and to prepare a Sustainable Development Action Plan (SDAP).

The plan was adopted at the Arctic Council fourth Ministerial Meeting, Iceland,

2004, ‘as a tool for the practical realization of the Arctic Council’s Sustainable

Development Program and assessing the progress made by the Arctic Council in

advancing sustainable development in the circumpolar region’ (Arctic Council,

2004a). To a large extent, the Action Plan built on the previous documents

addressing sustainable development. The Action Plan established three ‘broad

categories’ as ‘priorities for the activities of the Arctic Council on sustainable

development’ under the headings of economic, social and environmental dimen-

sions of sustainable development. Among them were:

– Sustainable economic activity and increasing prosperity of Arctic communities.

– Sustainable use of natural, including living, resources.

– Health of the people living and working in the Arctic.

– Education and cultural heritage, including language.

– Prosperity and capacity building for the people of the Arctic, in particular for

children and youth.

– Gender equality.

– Enhancing well-being, eradication of poverty among Arctic people.

– Prevention and elimination of environmental pollution in the Arctic.

– Arctic marine environment protection.

– Biodiversity conservation in the Arctic.

– Climate change impact assessment in the Arctic.

– Prevention and elimination of ecological emergencies in the Arctic, including

those relating to climate change. (Arctic Council, 2004b)

While the SDAP contained an overview of the different ongoing projects under

each of the above headings, the SDAP has not been especially operational within

the Arctic Council. It is still only available in its draft form and the Action Plan

seems to have had limited impact. This is partly due to the general nature of the

document, and is also linked to the two contradicting views identified in AHDR

(2004) on how sustainable development should be dealt with within the Arctic

Council. One view is a project-based approach, where it is the projects that form

the activities of sustainable development in the Arctic context. The other view

stresses the importance of a wider programme of sustainable development to

direct the selection and support of projects. As with the Chapeau on sustain-

able development, the Action Plan can be used to prioritize projects supported

by SWDG, and as the Chapeau, the Action Plan can be seen as an attempt to

overcome these differences (Haavisto, 2001). It is still unclear, however, how

these strategies are to be balanced.

The SDWG Work Plan adopted at the Salekhard Ministerial in 2006 first and

foremost represents the project-based approach. It is an operating document

intended ‘to provide a framework for the work and priorities of the SDWG during

the period 2006–2008’ that complements the existing Ministerial Declarations

Framing Arctic oil and gas 29

and other SDWG documents. The projects are placed under the headings of the

following priority areas:

– Economic dimension of sustainable development: sustainable economic

activity and increasing prosperity of Arctic communities; sustainable use of

natural, including living, resources; development of transport infrastructure

(including aviation, marine and surface transport), information technologies

and modern telecommunications.

– Social dimension of sustainable development: health of the people living and

working in the Arctic; education and cultural heritage, including language;

prosperity and capacity building for the people of the Arctic, in particular for

children and the youth; gender equality; enhancing well-being, poverty erad-

ication in the Arctic.

Thus, the SDWG Working Group’s agenda is broad, and the work within

SDWG must be seen in relation to the other Working Groups (AMAP, CAFF,

PAME, EPPR) of the Arctic Council. Even though they have a special focus on

the environment, all Working Groups under the Arctic Council deal with sustain-

able development (Haavisto, 2001). While there have been some tensions

between the different groups, and some questions over the ownership of ‘sustain-

able development’ (Haavisto, 2001), the social, economic and environmental

dimensions are crucial parts of the sustainable development concept.

It seems, however, that there is still tension between the project-based approach

and the wider programme approach to direct the selection and support of projects.

To some extent, it is also difficult to detect clear priorities from a sustainable

development perspective within the SDWG Working Group. It could also be

argued that both the Arctic Council and the SDWG group are still struggling with

ways to find a good and operational form to cope with sustainable development.

There are also several people who voice the need for institutional reforms of the

Arctic Council (Haavisto, 2001; Koivurova and Vanderzwaag, 2007). In a discus-

sion paper distributed at the SDWG meeting in Tromsø, April 2007, the Arctic

Athabaskan Council presented a number of suggestions for reforming the Arctic

Council, including the establishment of a task force to look at the future direction,

structure, priorities and communication of the Arctic Council, in order to improve

its efficiency and effectiveness (Arctic Athabaskan Council, 2007).

Arctic oil and gas and sustainable development

Arctic oil and gas has been addressed in several of the Working Groups in the

Arctic Council, both directly and indirectly. In the following, we present some of

the major contributions and findings from the work conducted within the

auspices of the Arctic Council, including the Arctic Human Development Report,

and other projects and other Working Groups in relation to oil and gas. We start

with the AHDR, which is perhaps the most important study done under the

auspices of the Arctic Council in terms of trying to come to grips with the human

dimensions of sustainable development. As the lead authors of the introductory

30 Oluf Langhelle, Bjørn-Tore Blindheim and Olaug Øygarden

chapter argued, the report was an explicit attempt to ‘help to establish priorities

for the activities of the Sustainable Development Working Group’ within the

Arctic Council, with the explicit aim of shedding light ‘on the concept of human

development itself’, and to highlight ‘dimensions of human well-being that are

not prominent in mainstream discussions of this topic’ (Young and Einarsson,

2004a: 15). In doing so, the report focused on a number of sustainable develop-

ment challenges, although without using sustainable development as an explicit

frame of reference.

Conclusions from the Arctic Human Development Report

The Arctic Human Development Report focused on a number of issues, such as

demography, societies and cultures, indigenous people, economic systems, polit-

ical and legal systems, resource governance, community viability, human health

and well-being, education, gender issues, circumpolar international relations and

geopolitics. In a way, these headings also reflect what is seen as essential parts of

the sustainable development agenda for the Arctic.

The concluding chapter of the AHDR report, with Oran R. Young and Nils

Einarsson as lead authors, singled out major conclusions from the report, which

‘merit attention on the part of the Arctic Council and its Sustainable Development

Working Group’, and with a special focus upon ‘policy-relevant conclusions’ and

‘gaps in knowledge’ (Young and Einarsson, 2004b). Some of these conclusions are

directly or indirectly linked to oil and gas activities in the Arctic. The first relates to

the economic systems of the Arctic. Arctic economies are, according to Young and

Einarsson, ‘narrowly based and highly sensitive to outside forces, including market

fluctuations and political interventions’. The narrow base typically consists of the

extraction of non-renewable resources or industrial harvesting of living resources.

The gap in knowledge relates to the ‘understanding of the roles that modern indus-

trial activities play in the pursuit of sustainable development at the regional level’.

The challenge, or nature of the problem, is described in the following way:

The Arctic today is the site of world-class industrial activities. Typically,

these activities involve the extraction of non-renewable resources or indus-

trial harvesting of living resources. The Prudhoe Bay oil field is the largest

ever discovered in North America. The super giant gas fields of northwestern

Siberia are critical to Russia’s efforts to reconstruct the country’s economy.

Nickel and lead/zinc mines located in the Arctic are among the largest in

the world. The industrial fisheries of the Bering, Norwegian, and Barents

Seas figure prominently in the world harvest of marine living resources.

Diamonds from Siberia and Canada’s Northwest Territories now account for

a sizable share of the world market. Taken together, these enterprises have

become prominent symbols of the new North. They provide employment

opportunities for Arctic residents, tax revenues for local governments like the

North Slope Borough, and sources of income for regional governments like the

State of Alaska and the Sakha Republic. At the same time, these industrial

activities introduce more or less severe instabilities in many parts of the region.

Framing Arctic oil and gas 31

Non-renewable resources like oil and gas are not only exhaustible, but the

income they produce is also subject to the volatility of world markets.

Extractive industries are generally controlled by multinational corporations

that are more responsive to global forces than to local concerns. The activities

of industrial fishers can conflict with the needs of subsistence harvesters.

We need to learn more about feasible responses to these sources of instability.

(Young and Einarsson, 2004b: 239)

Moreover, Young and Einarsson argue that it is a misinterpretation to regard

Arctic economic systems as ‘backward’ or ‘marginal’. Although transfer payments

are important in many parts of the Arctic:

large quantities of profits and rents, arising mostly from the extraction of

natural resources on a large scale, flow out of the Arctic, depriving public

authorities in the region of potential sources of revenue. A comparison of

outflows in the form of profits and rents and inflows in the form of transfer

payments shows that the Arctic as a whole is a net exporter of wealth.

(Young and Einarsson, 2004b: 231)

This issue is closely linked to another policy implication drawn by Young and

Einarsson concerning the political systems. They argue that the ‘devolution of

political authority to regional and local governments in the Arctic has not been

accompanied by significant reallocations of material resources’ (Young and

Einarsson, 2004b: 232). They point to some exceptions but, in general, they argue

that the only alternative to continued dependence on transfer payments is to

‘change the rules of the game to ensure that more of the profits remain in the

Arctic’. Therefore, ‘finding ways to address the imbalance of authority and

resources is a matter of the utmost importance throughout the Arctic today’.

An associated challenge is to maintain the ‘viability of Arctic communities’.

This requires an ‘enhanced ability to take advantage of the interactions among

governmental, corporate, organizational and personal networks from the local

to the global level’, and ‘a better understanding of the effects of cumulative

changes on cultural and social well-being in the Arctic’ (Young and Einarsson,

2004b: 234, 238). Although one of the main arguments put forward by Young and

Einarsson is the high resilience of human societies in the Arctic, they argue that

‘it would be a mistake to assume that Arctic societies and cultures can remain

resilient in the face of all biophysical and social changes. Today, Arctic societies

face an unusual combination of biophysical and socio-economic stresses’ (Young

and Einarsson, 2004b: 230), many of which were addressed in the AHDR report,

and many of which can be linked to oil and gas.

Climate change and Arctic oil and gas

Climate change has been an important issue in the Arctic Council. In 2000, the

Arctic Council endorsed, adopted and established the Arctic Climate Impact

32 Oluf Langhelle, Bjørn-Tore Blindheim and Olaug Øygarden

Assessment (ACIA) at the Barrow Ministerial Meeting. In 2004, this Assessment

was released at the ACIA International Scientific Symposium held in Reykjavik,

Iceland, November 2004.

The main findings were presented in two different

publications, a syntheses report (Impacts of a Warmer Arctic; ACIA, 2004) and a

scientific report (ACIA, 2005). In addition, the Arctic Council endorsed a policy

document based on the ACIA report at the Ministerial Meeting in Reykjavik,

November 2004 (Arctic Council, 2004d).

The ACIA project represents a seminal effort on climate change impacts. In the

Arctic Council Policy Document (Arctic Council, 2004d), ACIA is described as

‘the world’s most comprehensive and detailed regional climatic ... assessment to

date’. No doubt, the ACIA report has played an important role in identifying

impacts that affect human health, culture and well-being as well as risks to Arctic

species and ecosystems. The effect of ACIA has been to increase attention

towards and awareness of the problem of climate change in the Arctic.

In the ACIA project, climate change is conceived as a global problem with

regional impacts, although in the case of the Arctic, it will in turn also have seri-

ous consequences for the global climate. The disappearance of Arctic ice and

snow increases the absorption of heat from the sun, and thus further warms the

planet. Glacial melt and river runoff add fresh water, which can slow down ocean

circulation, affecting both the regional and global climate. It may alter the release

and uptake of greenhouse gases in soils, vegetation and coastal oceans, and also

have implications for biodiversity around the world affecting migratory species

depending on the Arctic (ACIA, 2004: 10).

The focus of the ACIA project, however, was as the title indicates, explicitly on

impacts. Mitigation efforts and the reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases

were beyond the scope of the report.

For oil and gas activities in the Arctic, there-

fore, it is a striking feature of the ACIA framing of oil and gas that the focus is

on the impacts of climate change on oil and gas activities, not the other way

around. The main human-induced drivers of climate change in ACIA were iden-

tified to be the burning (consumption) of fossil fuels and clearing of land (ACIA,

2004: 2), activities that are mostly taking place outside the Arctic region.

Regarding the impacts of climate change on oil and gas activities, some of the

ACIA conclusions were quite positive, especially regarding offshore extraction.

Reduced and thinner sea ice would most likely increase marine access to oil and gas.

It would also make marine transport easier, and thus also the transport of oil and

gas to world markets (ACIA, 2004: 11; ACIA, 2005: 1001). In addition, reduced

extent and thinner sea ice would also ‘allow construction and operation of more

economical offshore platforms’ (ACIA, 2005: 1001).

On the negative side, it was argued increasing movement of ice in some areas

initially could hamper oil and gas operations offshore, and that thawing ground

could disrupt oil and gas extraction on land, affecting travel, buildings, pipelines

and industrial facilities (ACIA 2004: 11; ACIA, 2005: 1001). Damage to oil and

gas transmissions lines in the permafrost zone was said to present ‘a particularly

serious situation’ (ACIA, 2004: 117). The cost of maintaining these structures would

also increase (ACIA, 2004: 119; ACIA, 2005: 1001). Some offshore activities

Framing Arctic oil and gas 33

could also be hindered by increased wave action in sub-region II (Siberia and

adjacent seas) (ACIA; 2004: 19), and reduced sea ice could ‘hamper winter seis-

mic work on shore-fast ice’ (ACIA, 2005: 1001). The environmental challenges

discussed were first and foremost linked to increased risk of oil spills. Referring

to a study from the Exxon Valdez accident in the Alaskan Prince William Sound,

the report worried that oil spills in high-latitude, cold ocean environments may

last much longer and be far worse than first expected (ACIA, 2004: 85).

The Arctic Council Policy Document (Arctic Council, 2004d) addressed both

mitigation and adaptation policies. In relation to mitigation, it was argued that even

though ‘overall emissions of greenhouse gases within the Arctic region are limited,

there are important mitigation opportunities in the region that would contribute to

sustainable development and global emission reduction efforts’. The document

further requested action and ‘climate change mitigation strategies across relevant

sectors’ and the promotion of ‘appropriate energy sources, uses, technologies and

efficiencies’. Relevant initiatives mentioned were the International Partnership for

Hydrogen Economy (IPHE) and The Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum

(CSLF), and also initiatives to promote renewable energy production and more

efficient energy use (Arctic Council, 2004d: 5). Apart from this, it did not address

the issue of oil and gas production in the Arctic any further.

Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines (PAME)

Greenhouse gas emissions from oil and gas production have, however, been

addressed within the Working Group Protection of the Arctic Marine

Environment. The first Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines were developed by

PAME in 1997 in cooperation with the other Working Groups. The guidelines

undergo periodic review, and the Arctic Council endorsed a new version in 2002

(PAME, 2002). The guidelines are intended to be of use by the Arctic Nations

central and regional authorities at:

all stages during planning, exploration and development of offshore oil and

gas activities. They should be used to secure common policy and practices.

The target group for the Guidelines is thus primarily the national authorities,

but the Guidelines may also be of help to the industry when planning for oil

and gas activities and to the public in understanding environmental concerns

and practices of Arctic offshore oil and gas activities. While recognizing the

non-binding nature of these Guidelines, they are intended to encourage the

highest standards currently available. They are not intended to prevent States

from setting stricter standards, where appropriate.

(PAME, 2002)

The stated goals for environmental protection during oil and gas activities are

quite ambitious. Amongst other things, these operations should be planned and

conducted so as to avoid: ‘adverse effects on climate and weather patterns’;

‘significant adverse effects on air and water quality’; ‘significant changes in the

34 Oluf Langhelle, Bjørn-Tore Blindheim and Olaug Øygarden

atmospheric, terrestrial (including aquatic), glacial or marine environments in the

Arctic; degradation of, or substantial risk to, areas of biological, cultural,

scientific, historic, aesthetic or wilderness significance; and ‘adverse effects on

livelihoods, societies, cultures and traditional lifestyles for northern and indige-

nous peoples’. Moreover, the guidelines are directly linked to sustainable

development:

In permitting offshore oil and gas activities, Arctic governments should be

mindful of their commitment to sustainable development, including, inter alia:

– protection of biological diversity;

– the duty not to transfer, directly or indirectly, damage or hazards from

one area of the marine environment to another or transform one type of

pollution into another;

– promotion of the use of best available technology/techniques and best

environmental practices ...;

– the duty to cooperate on a regional basis for protection and preservation

of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional

features; and

– the need to maintain hydrocarbon production rates in keeping with

sound conservation practices as a means of minimizing environmental

impacts. (PAME, 2002)

Furthermore, the guidelines suggest ‘programs that emphasize energy effi-

ciency and conservation in all activities, exploration (survey and exploratory

drilling), development (construction and drilling), production, and transporta-

tion’, and contain thorough descriptions and guidelines for the conduct of

Environmental Impact Assessments. In 2004, PAME also published guidelines for

transfer of refined oil and oil products in Arctic waters (PAME, 2004).

Oil and gas in the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme

The first assessment report published by AMAP in 1997, included the collaborate

efforts of over 400 scientists and administrators in monitoring the levels and

effects of anthropogenic pollutants. The report looked at two sources of pollution:

sources remote to the Arctic, and sources found within the Arctic. In short, many

sources of persistent organic pollutants were located outside the Arctic. For other

contaminants, like heavy metals, two-thirds were originating from industrial

activities in the Kola Peninsula.

The assessment also included a chapter on petroleum hydrocarbons, which

discussed several kinds of pollution associated with oil and gas activities. The

chapter concluded that oil spills and chronic releases from poorly maintained

pipelines and from ships pose the greatest threat to hydrocarbon contamination.

The Arctic environment was also said to be more vulnerable to oil spills, since oil

breaks down more slowly under cold, dark conditions and plants and animals in

the Arctic need a longer time to recover. Remedial measures are equally difficult

Framing Arctic oil and gas 35