Mikkelsen A., Langhelle O. (eds.) Arctic Oil and Gas. Sustanability at Risk?

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among Arctic states, and as we saw in Chapter 2, this continued in the work of

the Arctic Council and its Working Groups. At the national level, however,

there are major differences in the framing of environmental issues and the way

environmental issues are linked to oil and gas activities.

Looking at the different countries in general, environmental issues lost

significance in Russia during the 1990s, and development concerns have to a

large degree overshadowed environmental concerns (Hønneland and Jørgensen,

2006). In Canada and Alaska, conservation issues together with subsistence rights

(and sustainable use) for indigenous peoples, have dominated the environmental

concerns in relation to oil and gas activities. In Norway, where oil and gas

activities primarily are offshore, the environmental issues in relation to oil and gas

in the Arctic have had a strong focus on the vulnerability of the Barents Sea and

biodiversity issues linked to fish (and fisheries), mammals and birds. The envi-

ronmental issues have at times been the dominant issues in Norway in relation to

oil and gas, and also figured prominently in Canada. Norway and Canada are the

only countries where discourses of oil and gas production in the Arctic has been

directly linked to climate change.

In the following we will elaborate and discuss some of the most striking

differences, but also similarities among the regions/countries under the headings

of climate change and biodiversity and sustainable use.

Global and national responses to climate change

In the Arctic Council, climate change is primarily seen as a global problem

with regional effects, although the impacts in the Arctic may have serious

consequences for the global climate. For the most part, the linkage between Arctic

oil and gas development and global CO

emissions and greenhouse warming

has been lifted out of the Arctic and placed at the global and national level.

When the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

(UNFCCC) was established in 1992, US, Canada, Norway and Russia were

parties to the Convention. In 1997, all four countries signed the Kyoto Protocol.

The Protocol strengthened the Convention by committing Annex I Parties to

individual, legally binding targets to limit or reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG)

emissions. The US, Canada, Norway and Russia are all Annex I Parties. The total

of Annex I Parties commitments originally added up to a total cut in GHG emis-

sions of at least 5 per cent from 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008–2012

with the US included.

Only Parties to the Convention that have also become

Parties to the Protocol by ratification or approval are bound by the Protocol’s

commitments. Thirty-five countries and the EEC are required to reduce GHG

emissions below levels specified for each of them in the treaty. The Kyoto

Protocol’s Annex B lists the targets for individual countries. Table 12.1 shows

the Kyoto targets for US, Canada, Norway and Russia:

The Kyoto Protocol permits the use of flexible mechanisms in the implementation

of national targets. The flexible mechanisms, also referred to as the Kyoto

mechanisms, comprise emissions trading (ET), joint implementation (JI) and

326 O. Langhelle and K. F. Hansen

the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). These were designed to help

Annex I Parties cut the cost of meeting their emissions targets by taking advan-

tage of opportunities to reduce emissions, or increase GHG removals, that cost

less in other countries than at home.

Any Annex I Party that has ratified the Protocol may use the mechanisms,

but the Parties must provide evidence that their use of the mechanisms is ‘supple-

mental to domestic action’, which must constitute ‘a significant element’ of their

efforts in meeting their commitments. Whether ‘supplement’ refers to 25 per cent

or 50 per cent is still unclear. Also businesses, environmental NGOs and other

‘legal entities’ can participate in the mechanisms, however, under the responsibility

of their governments.

While 171 Parties have ratified the Protocol to date, including Canada (2002),

Norway (2002) and Russia (2004), the US has never ratified it. This decision

was made, according to President Bush, because of the perceived damage to the

economy of the US, the lack of commitments by the developing countries, and a

lack of scientific basis for targets (UNFCCC, 2004: 4). Others have explained the

decision by pressure and lobbying by industry adversely affected by mitigation

policies, in particular large energy corporations in the oil and gas sector.

The seemingly high mitigation costs in the US are due to a rapidly growing popu-

lation and high rates of economic growth. Thus, it has been argued that the US

‘would bear the lion’s share of global costs in a Kyoto-like regime’ (Bang,

Heggelund and Vevatne, 2005: 8).

In Canada, there was strong opposition to ratification of the Protocol similar to

the controversies in the US. While the reality of climate change was not equally

challenged as such, the government of Alberta and the coal, oil and gas industries

strongly opposed any regulation of economic activities to reduce greenhouse gases

(Toner, 2000). Climate change policies are still highly controversial in Canada, and

emissions have been steadily increasing. In April 2007, the Environment Minister,

John Baird, delivered a drastic vision of economic breakdown if Canada were

forced to comply with the Kyoto Protocol, arguing that the only way to meet

Kyoto’s carbon limits is to ‘manufacture a recession’.

Perceptions of Arctic challenges 327

Table 12.1 Kyoto Protocol targets for US, Canada, Norway and Russia

Country Target (1990–2008/2012)*

US – 7 per cent

Canada – 6 per cent

Norway + 1 per cent

Russian Federation 0

Source: UNFCCC (1997), Kyoto Protocol.

†

*The targets cover emissions of the six main greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide (CO

); methane (CH

);

nitrous oxide (N

O); hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs); perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride

(SF

) (see http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/background/items/3145.php (accessed 5 June 2007).

†

See http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/background/items/3145.php (accessed 22 May 2007).

In Norway, the issue of climate change was high on the political agenda in the

follow-up of the Brundtland report (Langhelle, 2000). In 1989, Norway became

the first country in the world to set a stabilization target for CO

emissions

(Hovden and Lindseth, 2004). Also in Norway, however, climate change policies

have been highly controversial. As pointed out in Chapter 9, Norway is probably

the only country in the world where a government has resigned over the issue of

climate change. This was linked to one of the main national controversies, the

domestic use of natural gas and the building of gas-fired power plants (Chapter

9; Langhelle, 2000; Hovden and Lindseth, 2004). In spring 2007, the Labour

Party, the largest party in the Government coalition, announced that the national

target for Norway was to be climate neutral by the year 2050, reduce emissions

by 30 per cent by 2020 and to over-comply the Kyoto commitments by 10 per

cent. The major issue in the domestic debate, however, is how much of these

reductions should be taken at home and how much should be achieved through

the Kyoto mechanisms.

The case of Russia is very different. Russia’s positive attitude to the Kyoto

Protocol was closely related to the assumed participation of the US and the

anticipation of economic gains from emissions trading between Annex I countries

made possible under the Kyoto Protocol. Owing to the breakdown of the

communist regime and transformation of the Russian economy, emissions of CO

peaked in 1989, and from 1990 to 1998, Russian CO

emissions decreased by

35.6 per cent, leaving Russia with substantial surplus quotas or ‘hot air’ for sale

(Kundzewicz, Schnellnuber and Svirejeva-Hopkins, 2004; Bang, Heggelund and

VeVatne, 2005).

The US is not bound by the Kyoto Protocol. This fact had several effects

on Russia. It sharply reduced the outlook for big revenues since the expected value

of surplus quotas was reduced. It turned many against ratification of the Protocol,

and fuelled the widespread concern that emission targets could harm Russian

economic growth. Since 1998, both GDP and GHG emissions have been on the

rise. The non-signing of US, however, left Russia in a key role in determining

whether the Protocol would be implemented or not. The Protocol would not enter

into force unless Russia ratified in the absence of US participation (Sabonis-Helf,

2003; Bang, Heggelund and Vevatne, 2005).

National framing of climate change in the Arctic

As we have seen, the national responses to climate change vary considerably in the

four countries. Except for the US, the Kyoto commitments have been and still are

important for the national follow-up and also for the framing of oil and gas discourses

in the Arctic. For the US, of course, the Kyoto Protocol has no real authority at the

federal level, although several of the states in the US have adopted the Kyoto target

for the US. Despite the reduction targets, there has been a large increase in CO

emis-

sions in all the countries, and in the later years, also in Russia (Table 12.2).

Although the above table refers to the CO

emissions only, and excludes land

use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) and other GHGs,

the Kyoto targets

328 O. Langhelle and K. F. Hansen

remain elusive for Canada and Norway. The energy industries, which include oil

and gas production, comprise a large share of total GHG emissions in all the

countries, especially in Russia. As seen in Table 12.3, the energy industry’s share

of GHG emissions has also increased in Canada, Norway and the US, but was

reduced in Russia. The energy industries include emissions from fuels combusted

by fuel extraction and energy production.

Within these national contexts, Arctic oil and gas has for the most part not been

specifically related to climate change. The dominant story line in all the countries

is linked to the Arctic as a ‘storehouse of resources’ and a future guarantee of

‘security of supply’. In the US, this is unproblematic. There are no constraints

from the Kyoto Protocol. Climate change is still disputed, although Bush

acknowledged climate change in his speech to the nation January 23, 2007.

Although there are currently few signs of a new policy at the federal level, many

analysts believe, however, that this may change in the US with a new president.

In Russia, the Kyoto commitments are still far from representing a constraint on

oil and gas production in the Arctic.

The situation is different in Canada and Norway. In both countries, the Kyoto

targets are more challenging, and politically challenging as well in terms of being

Perceptions of Arctic challenges 329

Table 12.2 Increase in CO

emissions from 1990 (baseline year in the Kyoto Protocol)

to 2005 in percentage (without land use, land-use change and forestry), and from

2000 to 2005

Country 1990–2005 2000–2005

Canada + 27.1 per cent + 3.5 per cent

Norway + 24 per cent + 3.8 per cent

Russian Federation – 28.6 per cent + 7.5 per cent

US + 20.3 per cent + 2.5 per cent

Source: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Secretariat. Data

compiled from http://unfccc.int/ghg_emissions_data/ghg_data_from_unfccc/ghg_profiles/items/

3954.php (Accessed 11 November 2007).

Table 12.3 Energy industries’ sector share of total greenhouse gas emissions

(without LULUCF) in 1990 and 2005 in Canada, Norway, Russia and US

Country 1990 2005 Change

Canada 31 per cent 33.2 per cent + 2.2 per cent

Norway 22.7 per cent 33.2 per cent + 10.5 per cent

Russian Federation 51.3 per cent 45.1 per cent – 6.2 per cent

US 35 per cent 38.6 per cent + 3.6 per cent

Source: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Secretariat. Data

compiled from http://unfccc.int/ghg_emissions_data/ghg_data_from_unfccc/ghg_profiles/items/

3954.php (Accessed 11 November 2007).

highly disputed (more in Canada than in Norway) and part of a wider public

debate. In both countries, there is a competing story line, which links the produc-

tion of oil and gas in the Arctic to climate change, which has been visible in the

public debate. In Canada, Shell’s investments in the exploitation of tar sands in

Athabasca have received attention from environmentalists from a climate change

perspective. The following quote is from a press release, dated June 8, 2006, from

the Canadian environmental NGO, Ecology North, placing the Mackenzie

pipeline in the global context of climate change:

The impacts of climate change are already being felt in the NWT and around

the world. These impacts are predicted to accelerate in the coming years.

Natural gas that stays in the ground does not add to climate change.

Extracting Mackenzie gas through the pipeline and burning it will add to

climate change . . . According to a report done by the Pembina Institute on

behalf of Ecology North, emissions just from building and operating the

pipeline will increase the NWT’s greenhouse gas emissions by 44 per cent.

Burning Mackenzie gas will release at least 25 million tonnes of carbon dioxide

into the atmosphere each year. This is the same increase in emissions that

adding 5.5 million cars to Canada’s roads would have.

(Ecology North, 2006)

Ecology North’s proposal is not a ‘no’ to the pipeline as such, however, but an

attempt to ‘Make the Pipeline Green!’, by ensuring that the emissions caused by

burning Mackenzie Gas are offset and thus ‘carbon neutral’. ‘To be carbon

neutral, every tonne of carbon dioxide released from building and operating the

pipeline and from burning the gas extracted by the pipeline would have to be

offset by a reduction of carbon dioxide elsewhere’.

Also the Natural Resources

Defense Council and the Sierra Club have linked Arctic oil and gas to climate

change (Price and Bennett, 2002).

In Norway, there is a similar competing framing of oil and gas in the Arctic.

Two of the most important environmental NGOs (Nature and Youth, and Friends

of the Earth, Norway), and also indigenous peoples, have argued against oil and

gas exploration in the Arctic from the point of view that this will contribute

further to climate change. Moreover, this view is shared also by the environmen-

tal NGOs that have focused more on biodiversity issues.

Those who link oil and gas production directly to climate change argue the

following way: Oil and gas production will increase domestic emissions in

Norway, which is problematic given the Norwegian Kyoto targets, and the

consumption of this oil and gas will further increase both domestic and foreign

emissions. The target which is primarily used as the point of reference, however,

is not the Kyoto targets, but the recommendations by the Intergovernmental Panel

on Climate Change (IPPC) for long-term reduction and stabilization of CO

concentrations in the atmosphere. In the latest Summary for Policymakers,

IPCC argues that a 50-85 per cent reduction in emissions will have to be achieved

by the middle of this century in order to reach a stabilization scenario that avoids

330 O. Langhelle and K. F. Hansen

dangerous anthropogenic interference (IPCC, 2007). In this picture, the Kyoto

Protocol only constitutes the first small step towards a stabilization of GHGs. Oil

and gas development in the Arctic is seen as contradictory to a development path,

which aims at substantial reductions in global GHGs. The following resolution

adopted by the Sámi organization Norske Samers Riksforbund (NSR), in 2005, is

one example of this specific framing of Arctic oil and gas in Norway:

Environment before oil and gas in the Arctic

NSR wants to draw attention to the significance of the Barents Sea for the

Sámi people, for people, and for the Northern areas . . . NSR looks with great

worry on the oil- and gas developments in the area . . . The impact of climate

change will affect indigenous peoples especially hard, amongst other things

by worsening the access to species important for traditional activities.

NSR demands that Norway shows responsibility and takes the consequences

of that increased oil extraction and the use of fossil energy creates negative

climate change. In addition, petroleum production constitutes a direct threat

in an Arctic area. The Barents Sea must therefore not be opened up for petro-

leum extraction.

(Norske Samers Riksforbund, Resolution No. 9, 2005)

Apart from the above linkages, the direct relation between Arctic oil and gas

production and the global CO

emissions and greenhouse warming has not been

a central part of the general sustainable development agenda in the Arctic.

As argued by Glomsrød in The Economy of the North (2006: 10), however,

the Arctic is part of the global greenhouse gas balance:

The Arctic currently supplies about 16 per cent of all oil and gas to the global

economy and has reserves to keep on with this for quite some time. Hence,

parts of the Arctic are seriously involved in the global greenhouse gas

balance, which is subject to increasing concern related to global warming.

Further, also the substantial production and reserves of minerals are

indirectly involved in the large scale emission of the greenhouse gases as

they are processed in coal-based and polluting smelters around the world,

including some Arctic regions. Thus, the Arctic is not only affected by rapid

climate change, activities in the region are also contributing their share to the

global warming.

The linkages between oil and gas production in the Arctic and global climate

change presented above are minority views. Understandably, the impacts of climate

change have caused deep worries in the Arctic. Many of the conclusions from the

Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) project were alarming. Climate change

may have dramatic impacts on biological diversity. Arctic vegetation zones are

likely to shift, causing wide-ranging impacts. Animal species’ diversity, ranges and

distribution will be affected and many coastal communities face increasing

Perceptions of Arctic challenges 331

exposure to storms. For some indigenous communities, the conclusions were

dramatic:

Changes in species’ ranges and availability, access to these species, a

perceived reduction in weather predictability, and travel safety in changing

ice and weather conditions present serious challenges to human health

and food security, and possibly even the survival of some cultures.

(ACIA, 2004: 11).

The Arctic, therefore, may be more vulnerable to climate change than other areas

of the world. And the Arctic may be the first region to really experience the

impacts of climate change. These impacts will take place in the context of other

stresses, among them chemical pollution, land-use changes, habitat fragmentation

and cultural and economic changes, stresses which in many parts of the Arctic are

related to oil and gas production.

Arctic oil and gas, biological diversity and sustainable use

of natural resources

With the exception of the US, all countries are parties to the Convention on

Biological Diversity (CBD), which was adopted at the Rio Summit in 1992. At pres-

ent, there are 189 Parties to the Convention. Canada ratified the Convention in 1992,

Norway in 1993 and Russia in 1995. The objectives of the CBD is threefold: the

‘conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the

fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic

resources’ (CBD, 1993: 146). In 2002, all parties committed themselves

to a more effective and coherent implementation of the three objectives of the

Convention, to achieve by 2010 a significant reduction of the current rate of

biodiversity loss at the global, regional and national level as a contribution to

poverty alleviation and to the benefit of all life on earth.

(CBD, 2002, Decision VI/26)

The 2010 Biodiversity Target was subsequently endorsed by the World Summit

in Johannesburg 2002 and later by the United Nations General Assembly in 2005.

In 2002, the Parties to the Convention adopted a Strategic Plan, committing them

to more effective and coherent implementation of the Convention. In 2004, at its

seventh meeting, an overall objective was set:

the objective of the establishment and maintenance by 2010 for terrestrial

and by 2012 for marine areas of comprehensive, effectively managed, and

ecologically representative national and regional systems of protected areas

that collectively, inter alia through a global network . . . contribute to achieving

the three objectives of the Convention and the 2010 target to significantly

reduce the current rate of biodiversity loss.

(CBD, 2004a, Decision VII/28)

332 O. Langhelle and K. F. Hansen

In addition, a multi-year programme of work until 2010 was endorsed.

In Decision VII/30, a preliminary framework of goals, subsidiary targets and

indicators was adopted. Among them, the target that at least 10 per cent of each

of the world’s ecological regions should be effectively conserved, that area of

particular importance to biodiversity should be protected, sustainable use

promoted and that the threats to biodiversity should be addressed. The adopted

goals and targets provided a flexible framework within which national and

regional targets could be developed, according to national priorities and

capacities (CBD, 2004b, Decision VII/30).

As part of the Convention requirements, Canada developed a National

Biodiversity Strategy in 1995, Norway in 1997 and Russia in 2001. As opposed

to climate change policies, the conservation policies in the different countries

seem to have been more influenced by the work within the Arctic Council. It was

at the core of the AEPS strategy from the beginning, and a core activity of the

Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) Working Group.

At the AEPS Ministerial meeting in Nuuk 1993, CAFF was asked to develop a plan

for a network of Arctic protected areas to ensure the necessary protection of Arctic

Ecosystems. A strategy and action plan was released in 1996, and laid the foundation

for the creation of the Circumpolar Protected Areas Network (CPAN). The aim of

CPAN is to identify gaps in protected areas and link the different national systems ‘into

a comprehensive and sufficient circumpolar protected area network’ (CAFF, 1996: 7).

Based on a number of earlier reports by CAFF/CPAN, the first comprehensive

overview of the Arctic environment, Arctic Flora and Fauna: Conservation and

Status was released in 2001 (CAFF, 2001). The report identified 405 protected

areas (including RAMSAR-sites

) in the Arctic, giving formal protection to

approximately 2.5 million km

, or 17 per cent of the Arctic as defined by CAFF

(2001: 77). Table 12.4 gives an overview of protected areas in Canada, Norway,

Russia and Alaska as of 2000.

In 2000, in the case of Norway, most of the area was located in Svalbard. Only

about 7 per cent of the Arctic mainland was protected. In the case of Russia, large

marine components and several large areas designated on a regional level but not

endorsed by federal authorities were included (CAFF, 2001: 78).

The CPAN Country Updates Report (CAFF, 2004) reports an increase both

in number of areas and total area protected in the Arctic. Although the figures

are not fully compatible, there has been a substantial increase in protected areas

and proposed areas for protection since 2000. In 2004, the total percentage of

the Arctic region having some type of formal protection was approximately

18 per cent. From 1997 to 2004, 124 new protected areas were created

(CAFF, 2004: ii). Among them a number of areas in Canada and Russia and the

creation of five new protected areas on the Arctic Archipelago in Norway,

extending protected areas at Svalbard. The new protected land areas cover a

total area of 4,449 km

, or 8 per cent of Svalbard’s land area (WWF Arctic

Bulletin, No. 3, 2003).

The World Wildlife Fund’s Arctic Programme, however, is still critical towards

the overall implementation within the Arctic states. In the Editorial in the WWF

Arctic Bulletin (No. 2, 2003), Samantha Smith writes:

Perceptions of Arctic challenges 333

In 1997, Arctic countries agreed to create a circumpolar network of protected

areas. Six years later, the countries are still discussing what areas should be

included. Arctic governments agree that oil and gas development will be a

key challenge for the region. The Council’s deliverables so far include an

outdated map of areas at risk, and guidelines for offshore oil and gas devel-

opment that are weaker than most Arctic national regimes.

(Smith, 2003a)

According to Smith, the sizes and types of existing protected areas are

inadequate to safeguard biodiversity and traditional lifestyles in the majority of the

Arctic states (Smith, 2003b). A major ‘gap’ seems to be the lack of marine and

coastal protected areas. Less than 1 per cent of the marine costal areas are protected.

Only 7 per cent of the Arctic coastlines were affected by development in 2002,

while 0.8 per cent had severe impacts. Hence, ‘the Arctic now appears to hold the

world’s last remaining undeveloped costal ecosystems’ (Ahlenius, Johnsen and

Nellemann, 2005: 37). These ecosystems are, however, said to be critical to Arctic

food chains and coastal ecosystems, and also the systems that are most at risk from

petroleum exploration (Ahlenius, Johnsen and Nellemann, 2005).

Thus, oil and gas activities are still seen as a threat for the conservation of

ecosystems. The conflict between conservationists and oil and gas can be found

in all the countries, and is being played out in several of the cases. In Norway, the

issue of ‘petroleum-free zones’ in the Barents Sea has been the main conflict in

the development of the comprehensive management plan. In Russia, conflicts

over land use have been prominent. In Canada, the Mackenzie Pipeline Project

has been attacked from a conservation point of view, and in the US, the conflict

over oil and gas exploration in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR)

represents the most prominent case.

Conservation and sustainable use

The traditional conflict between conservationists and indigenous peoples, is still

visible in our country studies. Canada witnessed a ‘seal war’ that waged for two

334 O. Langhelle and K. F. Hansen

Table 12.4 Protected areas in Arctic Canada, Norway, Russia and Alaska, classified in

International Union for Conservation of Nature categories I-V, plus Ramsar international

wetland sites as of 2000. Areas smaller than 10 km

are not included

Country Number of areas Total area (km

) Percentage of Arctic land

area of the country

Canada 61 500,842 9.5

Norway 39 41,380 25.3

Russia 110 625,518 9.9

US (Alaska) 55 296,499 50.2

Source: CAFF (2001: 78).

decades between the sealers and fur industry on one side, and the environmental-

ists on the other, ending with a ban on the use of baby sealskins in Europe

(Helander-Renvall. 2005). Similar conflicts played out in the early days of the

Arctic Council, between US officials and Canadian and Permanent members

regarding the harvesting of marine mammals. The US has continuously opposed

any form of trade with Northern marine mammals, while Canada has supported

such trade (Vanderzwaag, Huebert and Ferrara, 2003).

While conflicts over sustainable use and conservation have been important,

‘conservation’ is more often understood to include subsistence activities and

traditional lifestyles. This is the case for CAFF’s approach, and it is increasingly

so among environmental organizations. Moreover, protecting traditional ways of

life is in itself part of the quest for conservation. As reported by Helander-Renvall

(2005: 46) legislation on Special Protected Natural Territories (SPNT) is espe-

cially important for maintaining indigenous peoples’ lifestyles and for protecting

biodiversity in Russia. The state ecological programme for 2002–2006 provides

preservation of traditional activities of indigenous peoples. Examples are the

Khatymi reserve and the Kolyma-Koren reserve.

Indigenous peoples are also increasingly part of the management of natural

resources, especially in Alaska and Canada. While there is a broad range of

interpretations of co-management, Helander-Renvall (2005: 46) uses Campbell’s

(1996) definition of co-management ‘as an inclusionary, consensus-based

approach to resource use and development’, including the ‘sharing of

decision-making power’ and also as ‘a process of combining western scientific

knowledge and traditional environmental knowledge for the purpose of

improving resource management’ (Campbell, 1996). The level of participation by

indigenous peoples in these management boards can vary, but in the Canadian

territories indigenous peoples have a legally defined role within these co-

management structures, which provides them a strong voice in the management

of their resources.

The role of indigenous peoples in the creation of the 20,500-km

Ukkusiksalik

National Park in the Kivallik region, just south of the Arctic Circle, was also

acknowledged by WWF-Canada. The protection of the area for subsistence

hunting and ecotourism opportunities was described as ‘a fundamental step in

helping to achieve a well-balanced future for Nunavut’, and WWF-Canada

strongly supported what they saw as an expression of ‘Conservation First’,

meaning that ‘prior to industrial development, an adequate network of key

cultural and ecological areas is withdrawn from industrial development, thereby

protecting these critical values for future generations’ (Ewins, 2003).

Given the fundamental importance of subsistence and traditional lifestyles, it

is seen as an absolute necessity by indigenous peoples that the oil and gas

activities do not disturb, or at least do not spoil, the possibilities of continuing

traditional activities like reindeer herding, hunting, fishing and gathering. Thus,

support for oil and gas is conditioned on the way oil and gas activities are

conducted, and also the degree to which indigenous rights and land claims are

granted and respected.

Perceptions of Arctic challenges 335