Mackesy P. The War for America, 1775-1783

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The new system depended on a large and active body of loyalists. The refugee officials from the southern colonies

had unanimously assured Germain that it existed; and for the Middle Colonies Galloway had made himself the

spokesman. He had long been in touch with Lord Dartmouth, to whom he had written on the capture of

Philadelphia to report that the rebellion in the Middle colonies had collapsed. When Philadelphia was evacuated, he

made his way to England, where he arrived about the beginning of December 1778, asserting that the Middle

Colonies were tired of the war, and that if the army had not abandoned Philadelphia all Pennsylvania and New

Jersey would have returned to their allegiance. In the memoranda which were passing through the hands of the

King he declared that if the British army would drive Washington away, the loyalists could disarm the rebel

minority by their own efforts.1

Galloway was persuasive. Lord North, who had never been an optimist, was satisfied by him that a vigorous

campaign at that moment had every hope of success. Yet the opinions of exiles are notoriously unreliable, and in

matters of this kind, where opinions must predominate over facts, the Ministry could only act on what seemed to

be the most trustworthy or the most agreeable advice. Colonel Stuart was later to assert that the plan had been

foisted on the Ministry by a set of sycophantic refugees; and it is true that General Howe had denied that the

liberated loyalists could even protect themselves, let alone disarm the rebels in the first instance.2 Yet Howe in his

own fashion was perhaps no more dispassionate than Galloway and the southern officials; and to all appearances

Germain and the Ministry were not building solely on the quicksands of refugee opinion: they had, or thought they

had, better authority. General Robertson was home from New York for the winter, and the Peace Commissioners

were at hand. They unanimously endorsed the optimistic view of American opinion.

Yet was this enough? Reading another loyalist, we slide back into the nightmare world of the refugees: a world of

insubstantial fears, jealousies and plots. Thomas Jones was to write in his history of the rebellion that the evidence

on which Germain relied was a tangled scheme for self-advancement concocted between Eden, General Robertson,

and the loyalist William Smith: that Smith, a renegade rebel like Galloway, remained a fellow-traveller of the

rebellion, and was the moving spirit of the conspiracy. Where is there firm ground among these quicksands?

Perhaps a voice may be allowed to speak from the other side of the fence which divided the combatants, to show at

the least that if the British government was deceived by appearances it was not alone. Two months after these

discussions the

1 Dartmouth, II, 449; Hutchinson Diaries, II, 226; G 2467, 24923.

2 Wortley, 152; above p. 157.

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French Minister with the rebels, writing in the heart of Galloway's Pennsylvania, opposed the idea of a long-term

truce between the Americans and the mother-country on the ground that the people were naturally favourable to

England, and could never be roused a second time to resume the struggle.1

General Robertson, at any rate, firmly endorsed Galloway's assertion that most Americans opposed the rebellion;

'and it is on this foundation we should build our hopes'. Carlisle and Eden came home convinced that the lower

country round New York was ready to be reclaimed. In conference with Germain they recommended the seizure of

the Highlands between the Hudson and Connecticut Rivers, to cover the fertile lower country of Connecticut. The

people would then be free to send representatives to an assembly in New York, and civil government could be

restored.2

Translating this plan into military terms, Galloway had urged a main effort in the Middle Colonies from New

Jersey to northern Virginia. At the other extreme Amherst, while he thought opportunities might occur to attack

Georgia from East Florida and New Hampshire from Nova Scotia, still favoured the systematic coastal raiding

which he had advocated after Saratoga.3 But Germain's instructions to Clinton followed Robertson and the Peace

Commissioners. Carlisle and Eden had recommended the New York area as the starting point of political re-

absorption; and their suggested occupation of the Connecticut Highlands would have the further military advantage

of cutting New England off from supplies and succour. General Robertson took a similar line. The army should not

wander from place to place, nor call people to arms who could not be sustained, nor scatter troops in battalion

packets to defend them. The people who might arm and protect themselves, and could be reached faster with the

help of water carriage by the British army than by the enemy's, should be put under civil government and their

trade encouraged. He thought the government of New York might soon be able to support itself; and that this

example, combined with negotiations and military pressure, would bring in the other colonies. Like Carlisle and

Eden, he saw the Highlands as the vital country. Their occupation would cut off New England, almost starve the

rebel army, open communications with the Indians, and enable the loyalists to defend themselves. He advocated

raiding on the New England coast to call home the local forces and weaken once more the defences of the

Highlands.4

Robertson added the rider that a plan for the campaign could be formed

1 Thomas Jones, History of New York, I, 1601; Harvard, Sparks MSS., 78, Gérard's of 8 and 10 March

1779.

2 G 2494; CL, Germain, 11 Jan. 1779 to North; CO 5/97, 23 Jan. to Clinton.

3 G 2492, 2494.

4 CL, Germain, 11 Jan. to North; G 2494.

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only by the Commander-in-Chief in America, from circumstances which could not be known in England; and that

he should therefore be vested with every power to form and execute his own plans. Yet Clinton was not of a

stature to frame a large design and adhere to it. Ministerial guidance was needed. Remembering his susceptibilities,

and the charges of ministerial dictation which had been levelled after Saratoga, Germain presented the instructions

as suggestions, whose execution was left to Clinton's absolute discretion. Yet perhaps the orders which were signed

on 23 January contained too much military detail, and insufficient broad direction on the political concept which

underlay it.1

Germain's orders assumed an army of 29,000 men at New York and Rhode Island. The last return showed Clinton

to be 7,000 short of this target; and the numbers would be made up by transferring 1,000 men from Halifax, no

longer threatened by d'Estaing, and adding three regiments to the reinforcements from England, making the total

from Europe 6,600. Clinton would then have enough troops to provide garrisons 9,000 strong for New York and

Rhode Island, a main field force of 12,000, and coastal raiding forces of 8,000. Germain hoped, too, that Clinton

could increase his Provincial forces. In the past year their strength had more than doubled, to over 7,000, as a result

of the enlarged recruiting area while the army was at Philadelphia. Germain believed that by restoring to Provincial

officers the status granted by Amherst during the Seven Years War, and offering permanent rank and a right to half

pay to efficient units, their numbers could rapidly be increased.

For the main army the most effective course would be to bring Washington to decisive action at the start of the

campaign. But if this proved impossible, the Continental army should be driven into the Highlands, leaving the

lower country at liberty to return to their allegiance as the Commissioners said that they desired. The majority of

counties could then send members to the Assembly, and the Constitution could be restored to New York. To

prevent the reinforcement of Washington by the militia, two amphibious forces each of 4,000 men should raid the

coasts of New England and the Chesapeake, while parties of Indians and troops harassed the back areas from

Canada. If Washington was forced to concentrate for the defence of the Highlands, the raiding force in the

Chesapeake might be strengthened with new levies of Provincial troops so that they could liberate and organise the

loyalists of New Jersey or the Delaware peninsula. And thus the reoccupation might be extended into the Middle

Colonies.2

1 G 2671; CO 5/97, ff. 1216 (23 Jan. Germain to Clinton, which should be read in conjunction with

Germain's of 11 Jan. to North in CL, Germain).

2 Anderson, 314; CL, Germain, 11 Jan. to North; Royal Institution, I, 427; CL, Clinton, 25 June, 1779, from

Germain.

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One apparent disharmony between the military and political aims lurks in these plans. A civilian commentator had

pointed out in the previous autumn that destructive coastal raiding was likely to implant an irremovable hatred in

the victims.1 Yet there were arguments in the other direction. One was the menace of the rebel militias. Experience

had shown that only a small nucleus of Continentals was needed to turn them into a formidable menace to their

loyalist neighbours and at times to the army. The Danbury raid in the previous spring and General Grey's autumn

raid on New Bedford had shown what might be achieved by raiding; and Germain accepted the proposition that in

addition to the damage it could do to privateering and the rebel economy, the raiding policy offered the best means

of pinning down the militias and securing the peace of areas which returned to their allegiance.2

Taken as a whole, the arrangements for 1779 were moderate and sensible. Clinton was to argue that the dispersion

of force they entailed robbed him of the hope of beating Washington. Yet he had orders to attempt this if he

thought it could be done; and how often had military victory eluded the commanders in America? If Washington

could not be assaulted in his mountain strongholds, there was little point in pitting the maximum force against him.

What the army in the field had always lacked was not mass but speed and flexibility. The raiding forces might

prove a powerful asset on the rebel coasts. And if the attempt to recover America was reasonable at all, Germain's

proposals, a nice balance of military and political considerations, had a better chance of success than a military

policy of concentrated blows against the small and elusive Continental army.

The Erosion of the Plan

Such were the plans: it remains to consider the machinery for their execution. Germain was aware that the

constructive political part of his proposals required something more than the machinery at the disposal of the

Commanders-in-Chief. The most urgent problem was in Georgia, which Colonel Campbell was expected to attack.

To profit by its occupation civil government would have to be established; for as William Smith was to write, 'if all

America becomes a garrison, she is not worth your attention'. A number of southern officials were despatched at

once from their refuge in England to assist the soldiers in restoring civil government; among them James Simpson

the Attorney-General of South Carolina, whom Germain had already con-

1 A commentary in WO 34/110, ff. 14152.

2 CL, Germain, 4 Nov. to Clinton; Knox, 153.

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'RODNEY INVESTEDOR ADMIRAL PIG ON A CRUIZE'

Caricature by Gillray of Rodney's supersession. Pigot sets

forth in a ship of cards, his sail the Knave of Hearts. Pigot

was said to owe £17,000 to Fox's faro bank, and Fox in the

distance explains that he has given Pigot the appointment

to enable him to pay off the debt.

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GENERAL ELIOTT ON THE KING'S BASTION AT GIBRALTAR

From a drawing by his Aide de Camp

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sulted about the recovery of the south, and whom we shall meet again in this connection. On the news of

Campbell's complete success, Sir James Wright returned to enjoy three more years as Governor, and the Peace

Commissioners signed a proclamation to be published on his arrival, restoring the colony to the King's peace.

Georgia was to be the only province where the Carlisle Mission's procedure for restoring civil rule was used.1

In the summer of 1779 a more general measure of political control was framed. A critic of the policy of coastal

destruction had recently advocated a Council of State for America, to be composed of the two Commanders-in-

Chief and a number of civilians.2 It should administer all civil matters lying within the royal prerogative, with

power to restore the provincial governments and prepare for a general Congress or Parliament for all America.

Whether or not Germain saw the proposal, he adopted a measure on similar lines. A new Commission was drawn

up in the summer on news of good progress in South Carolina. Carlisle and his friends were superseded, and

Clinton was now to be sole Commissioner, with a council of civil and military members to advise him. The new

Council had power to offer pardons; to restore districts to the King's peace; and to investigate American opinion on

taxation and all proper subjects of negotiation.3 Alas for this admirable and overdue arrangement: the chief

obstacle to its usefulness was the Commissioner himself. Clinton became a consistent opponent of civil

government.

At the remote outset of the rebellion in 1775, Sir William Howe and Burgoyne had suggested the appointment of a

Viceroy to co-ordinate policy and strategy in America.4 After Saratoga there was renewed interest in the idea.

'That a Lord Lieutenant be sent over to America', runs one proposal, 'vested with the powers . . . to superintend and

direct the military operations, and to establish civil Government as soon as the Colonies shall be reduced.' Opposed

to the idea was the characteristic English obsession with tyranny and usurpation, the cry which had been raised

against Marlborough and prevented an adequate military establishment in time of peace. The objections were

answered; but nothing was

1 Carlisle, 414, 418; CL, Germain, 19 Jan. to Lt-Col. Campbell; CO 5/97, ff. 144, 183; CL, Clinton, April

1779, No. 34.

2 WO 34/110, ff. 14152. The author was probably William Pulteney: see CO 5/174, No. 15

3 CL, Germain, Clinton's Commission of 22 July 1779. The military members of Clinton's Council were to be

Cornwallis and Robertson; the civilians Governors Franklin of New Jersey and Martin of North Carolina,

Chief Justice Fred. Smith and Attorney-General John Tabor Kempe of New York, Andrew Elliot

(Superintendent of the Port of New York), and William Smith.

4 Above, p. 74.

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done, and both military and political control remained in the hands of the commanders.1

For a different reason the naval and military commands themselves required a degree of higher supervision which

could not be supplied from home. The effect on the Hudson valley plan of separating the American and Canadian

commands was already apparent. And the intervention of France brought a third theatre of operations into the

struggle in the Western Atlantic. For the North American and West Indian theatre were indissolubly linked by

geography and climate. This central truth was grasped by Germain. He did not intend the transfer of troops from

America to the Leeward Islands to be a fixed and permanent arrangement; for he dreamed of the Western Atlantic

as a single vast theatre of war. Between Quebec and the Antilles 50,000 soldiers were deployed. When ice gripped

the harbours of North America, and frozen ground and rivers kept the troops in their cantonments, the Caribbean

stirred from its long siesta; and when the summer spread green forage across the northern colonies, operations in

the West Indies were stopped by heat, disease and hurricanes. Germain visualised a succession of offensives by

troops and squadrons switching their blows between north and south as the seasons changed, using the command

of the sea to achieve a superiority on each front in turn.

In practice this alternation produced its difficulties. The campaigning seasons overlapped, ships were transferred

late and without refits, troops expected in America were detained to protect the islands against enemy fleets. Yet it

had been done in the last war, when the Cuba expedition of 1762 had been concentrated in part from England and

in part from North America, to which part of the force returned at the end of the campaign. And it was to be done

again with resounding success in 1781: but not by the British.

Both Clinton and the Peace Commissioners had grasped how the theatres interlocked. Clinton's aide-de-camp was

in England that winter, with instructions to press for the return of General Grant's force in the West Indies for a

summer campaign against Charleston; and the Commissioners recommended that the North American squadron

should no longer be confined to its station, but should act in intimate connection with the Leeward Islands fleet.2

Much would depend on the reciprocal goodwill of the commanders. Clinton suggested a single generalissimo to

control both

1 One such proposal is an undated plan, later than 1777, in the British Museum, Eg. 2135, f. 14. There is a

long refutation of the danger of usurpation among Lord Stormont's papers at Scone. Germain raised the

question again after Yorktown (see below, p. 462).

2 Willcox, American Rebellion, 11920; CL, Germain, 11 Jan. to North.

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theatres; 'indeed an admiralissimo would be equally necessary'.1 Rodney was to suggest the same arrangement to

overcome the selfishness of rival admirals. Whether the structure would have worked is another matter. Unified

command in the west was tried by the navy for a year in the War of 1812, with three station commanders at

Halifax, Jamaica and the Leeward Islands under the general direction of Admiral Warren, but the experiment was

dropped in 1813. Both an American Viceroyalty and a Supreme Command in the Western Atlantic would have

been easier to decree than to fill. Either would have required a public servant of great stature. Rodney may have

felt that this was his mission: but it was Rodney himself who sent an incomplete squadron to America in 1781 as

the crisis mounted at Yorktown.

When the plans for 1779 were drawn up in January, there was no immediate prospect of returning Grant's troops to

Clinton, for the news that Byron had allowed d'Estaing to sail from Boston to the West Indies without pursuing him

roused much anxiety for the fate of Grant's expedition.2 But in March it was learnt that Byron had joined Hotham

in the Leeward Islands and restored the British ascendancy. The islands were safe, and it became possible to think

of restoring the borrowed battalions to Clinton. This was the more fortunate in that the hope of 6,600

reinforcements for Clinton from Europe was doomed to disappointment. Of the 3,000 promised British recruits,

only 1,300 were to materialise.

With the fall of St Lucia Germain regarded the winter operations as complete. The defence of the islands till the

next campaigning season was the responsibility of the fleet assisted by garrisons; and the balance of Grant's force

could be returned to America for the summer, giving Clinton two or three thousand seasoned troops of the highest

quality to compensate for the deficiency from England. But Sandwich was reluctant. Characteristically he wanted

the troops to stay in a defensive posture where they were: perhaps he already felt some foreboding about the naval

balance in the islands. Germain insisted on putting the question to the Cabinet without loss of time, and on 1 April

orders for the transfer were sent to Grant. If there was no prospect of taking the offensive again before the

hurricane season, he was to distribute garrisons where they were needed, remembering that the British fleet was

always intended to be superior to the French, and to embark the remainder for America. On the same day Clinton

was informed of the coming accession from Grant, and the news was broken that the recruits from home were short

of the promised strength. He was asked to return

1 Willcox, American Rebellion, 120 n.

2 Sackville, I, 139.

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Grant's men at the end of the summer for a renewed offensive in the islands; and the admirals on both stations

were ordered to consider their two squadrons as one. For the moment Byron's fleet was not to be replaced at full

strength in America; a small task force of four ships of the line was ordered out under Arbuthnot, but the security

of American waters would depend on mutual support with the West Indian fleet. The government declared that it

intended any future offensive in the West Indies to be mounted from America, and the troops to be brought back

there when the campaigning season was over.1

Thus by one means or another Clinton's reinforcements seemed secure. And once again Germain had every reason

to hope that those from England would make an early passage. He had warned the Admiralty of his shipping

requirements as early as 11 December, long before the operational plan was drawn up: transports for 3,000 recruits

and 1,500 tons of camp equipment and stores were to complete their loading by 20 February. When three regiments

were added in January, the Admiralty was at once ordered to send transports to the Forth to collect them.2 But, as

usual, hopes of an early sailing date were cruelly disappointed. In spite of fine weather and favourable winds

Germain discovered at the end of February that the transports he had ordered to the Forth five weeks earlier were

still in the Thames. It was not till early April that they returned with the troops. Germain watched the wind with

relief as it set fair for them to enter the Downs. But already he knew that they would arrive late in America.3

Admiral Arbuthnot, who was to succeed Byron in the American command, was ordered to take his convoy to sea at

once, without waiting for the German recruits. Germain's spirits rose. 'We have charming weather', he wrote

cheerfully from Stoneland, 'but we farmers are never contented; the wheat wants rain, and we shall all be undone.'

But not only the farmers were at the mercy of the weather. The wind turned up Channel, and Arbuthnot was still

detained in Portsmouth at the end of April.

At last the convoy put to sea. But as it turned down Channel, a privateer swept in from Jersey with news of a

French attack. The Channel fleet was not ready for sea; and Arbuthnot, dropping his merchantmen in Torbay,

rushed to the rescue with his warships and troops. Before he arrived, a frigate force had driven off the enemy, and

he turned back to his proper mission.4

This chapter of accidents had brought round the campaigning season in

1 G 2589; CL, Knox, 27 March from Germain; CO 318/5, 1 April, Germain to Grant; Sackville, II, 152;

Adm. 2/1336, f. 21.

2 CO 5/254, ff. 123, 125.

3 CO 5/254, ff. 1278; Sandwich, III, 121; CL, Knox, 4 April from Germain.

4 Sackville, II, 1278.

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