Mackesy P. The War for America, 1775-1783
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Palliser insisted on a trial to clear his name. With no specific charges, it took the form of an enquiry without a
prosecutor. He stood under the prejudice of Keppel's acquittal and of the votes of both Houses of Parliament, and
his judges under threats and the fear of unpopularity. Nevertheless his conduct in the battle was found to have been
exemplary and meritorious, the Court merely observing that he should have informed Keppel by the frigate which
brought the order to rejoin the Flag that he was disabled; a fact which Palliser had regarded as too apparent to be
worth reporting. After this acquittal he asked for reinstatement. From this Sandwich shrank for the moment; and
for a time Palliser lived in reduced circumstances near Knaresborough. But in 1780 Sandwich manoeuvred him into
the Governorship of Greenwich Hospital, and gave him one of his seats in the House of Commons 'to curb
Keppel'. In spite of attacks in Parliament Palliser survived in his post to an honourable old age.
2
Generals and Admirals
Keppel was not slow in opening his counter-offensive. In a long letter to the King he set forth his ill-treatment and
implored the King not to send him to sea again under the present Ministers. His motive was thought to be to force
the King to dismiss him. The Admiralty asked him whether he intended to serve, received an offensive answer, and
replied in the same manner by ordering him to strike his flag. Several of his captains thereupon resigned; and
Admiral Harland, who had commanded a division in the battle, struck his flag, 'convinced that it cannot be for the
public service nor my own safety to serve with or to command men high in rank who differ so much in opinion
with me on the great points of naval discipline'. Palliser could take comfort from the fact that the Keppelite
captains had all been in Keppel's own division on the day of the battle.1 Nevertheless the Channel fleet was now
deprived of all its commanders of divisions, and the navy was split from top to bottom. Even the 'common sailors'
were involved. The Victory and Formidable, flagships of Keppel and Palliser, were docked separately for fear that
their crews would fight it out with fatal results.
Nor was the mischief confined to the navy. Three days before Keppel was charged, his brother had resigned his
military command. The camps had just broken up for the winter, and the General's ostensible reason was that he
had been unsupported and uninformed during the summer. But the tone and volume of Amherst's correspondence
suggests that this was no more
1 Captain Ross was suspected of being a Keppelite though he had been in Harland's division. But Leveson-
Gower and Lindsay, who resigned, and Walsingham, Jervis and Macbride, who took Keppel's side, had all
served in his division.
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than a malicious pretext. General Keppel was soon taking his part in the debates on his brother's trial.
The Ministry had now had its fill of enquiries; but scarcely had the naval trials reached their noisy conclusion
when a new devil was raised by the hasty temper of Germain. When the Howe brothers returned from America in
1778, efforts had been made to conciliate them. After the Keppel trial, the King hoped to bring Lord Howe to the
Admiralty in place of Sandwich, and looked round for a suitable governorship for Sir William. The General had
promised the King that he would not follow Burgoyne into opposition, but reserved the right to defend himself
against Germain and the pamphlets which the American Secretary was, with small reason, suspected of having
inspired. In the autumn of 1778 the Howes moved for papers in the House, but the Ministry had no intention of
making scapegoats of them, and even Germain showed no great desire to defend himself at their expense. One
opponent of the enquiry used an argument which had been used against Palliser, that they should take no notice of
scribblers. But under an attack by Burgoyne, Germain allowed himself to be pushed into specific disapproval of the
landing in the Chesapeake. After this it was impossible to refuse the Howes an opportunity to defend themselves.
A muddy enquiry dragged through May and June of 1779 till the adjournment of Parliament brought it to an
inconclusive halt.1
Graves, Carleton, Burgoyne, the Howes, Keppel: the list was already long. Would Clinton's name be added? His
complaints had reached a climax in the autumn of 1778, and just when the Keppel affair was brewing an officer
arrived from New York with his application to resign. His request was supported at home by his cousin the Duke
of Newcastle. The real cause of his discontent was still the beggaring of his striking force to reinforce Florida and
the West Indies. Following on his endless complaints of neglect, his letter must have tested the not inexhaustible
patience of Germain; and a commander who showed so grudging a spirit and so little willingness to see his task in
perspective ought to have been removed at once. But the Ministry had lost the services of too many commanders;
and its political weakness made it clumsy in handling the recalcitrants and frightened of alienating those who
remained. Germain could not afford to lose another general; and he refused Clinton's application to resign with
assurances of his confidence and a promise to do all in his power to reinforce him. He explained that the
disposition and employment of the troops had always
1 Anderson, 3224; Valentine, 3512; G 2387, 2470, 2485, 2506, 2540; Sandwich, II, 325; Add. MSS. 38210,
ff. 628. The chief pamphlet attack on Howe was written by Mauduit, a man of good reputation whose
nervous fear of the consequences does not suggest powerful backing (see Hutchinson Diaries, II, 2034).
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been left to Clinton's own judgment: the sole exception had been the order to evacuate Philadelphia and detach to
Florida and St Lucia. This, said Germain, had been done with regret, not least because of the chagrin it would
cause Clinton; 'but the intelligence we had received of the intentions of France . . . would not allow of an
alternative, and I am persuaded you will now join in opinion that those measures were unavoidable'.1
This apology for the government's major strategy was a remarkable concession to the sulks of a theatre
commander. The King had already had to apply an emollient K.B. to 'heal his mind' after the Charleston failure,
and a couple of Colonelcies were now thrown in to sweeten his temper.2 If anything short of unlimited
acquiescence in his demand for troops could have satisfied the egoism of Clinton, German's reply should have
done so. Hence-forth the American Secretary was obliged to handle the Commander-in-Chief in America with
velvet gloves. Not least of the misfortunes which sprang from the alienation of the Howes and Keppels was that
the North government was saddled with Clinton for the rest of its existence.
3
The Disintegration of North
Throughout these troubles North had remained his amusing and baffling self in the House of Commons; but behind
the scenes his political leadership had disintegrated. The successful strategic defensive in 1778 had lent him no
confidence, for it was already clear in the autumn that the breathing space which had been gained was the prelude
to greater dangers. Once again he implored the King to release him. 'In critical times', he reiterated, 'it is necessary
that there should be one directing Minister, who should plan the whole operations of government, and controul all
the other departments of administration so far as to make them co-operate zealously and actively with his designs
even tho' the contrary of their own.' The attributes of a great war leader have seldom been better drawn. But the
letter continued: 'Lord North . . . is certainly not capable of being such a minister as he has described.'3
In the Ministry as it existed, even his patient Under-Secretary Robinson acknowledged that North was the
insurmountable barrier to energy. As 1779 went by, paralysis continued to creep over his will, and his incapacity
for taking or adhering to decisions was becoming worse. The exasperated King lamented the frequent changes of
mind which stopped all business.
1 CL, Clinton, 3 Dec. 1778.
2 Walpole, Last Journals, II, 108; Add. MSS. 37833, f. 155; CO 5/96, f. 194; CO 5/97, f. 191.
3 G 2446.
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In Cabinet his weak chairmanship held up decision, and more and more he did his work in holes and corners with a
few junior confidants 'the flimsy way of doing business' of which Hillsborough complained.1
The effect on strategy of North's weakness can be exaggerated. Particular items of war business seldom depended
on his initiative, for departmental Ministers followed the established practice of taking the lead in Cabinet on their
own affairs. Though urgent general questions like Ireland and India might be delayed or evaded, specific decisions
on strategy were rarely if ever held up by North's remissness. Yet a stronger man might have reconciled the
conflicting views of Sandwich and Germain, and forced the executive departments out of their leisurely pace.
What drove North's friends to despair was his political leadership. His majority in the Commons was becoming less
stable, and a motion of censure on the weakness of Keppel's fleet was defeated in March 1779 by only thirty-four
votes, a slender margin in the unreformed House of Commons where weakness bred desertion. To hold the
Ministry together through such trials it was vital to wield patronage firmly and fill the vacant offices promptly and
well. This was what North was failing above all to do.
At this critical period of the war, one of the Secretaryships of State fell out of play. Lord Suffolk had had a fit in
June 1778, but was forced to linger on in the Northern Department, 'dead to the state long before he was dead to
nature'. He died in March 1779, but still no successor was appointed. After being tenanted for nine months by a
moribund man, this key office lay vacant through the fateful summer of 1779, and its duties were discharged by
the inattentive Secretary for the Southern Department. 'The whole of the laborious and arduous correspondence of
this Empire, rested solely upon the activity and energy of Lord Weymouth', said the ironical Burke. Weymouth's
neglect of business was thought by Robinson to be due to a settled intention to desert the Ministry.2
Suffolk's place was vacant because North was incapable of contending with his colleagues' rivalries. Before the
death of Suffolk he had toyed with the idea of pushing Sandwich upstairs into the Secretaryship, as his presence at
the Admiralty was embarrassing after the Keppel affair; but Lord Howe, who was designed as his successor, posed
terms which were repugnant to the King, and at the Admiralty Sandwich remained.3 When Suffolk was truly dead
and North could no longer pretend that the Secretaryship was filled, he hoped to bring in his friend Lord
Hillsborough. But here as elsewhere the hatreds generated in the 'sixties were at work. Hillsborough was disliked
1 G 2741, 2775; Add. MSS. 37834, f. 133; Sandwich, III, 164; Abergavenny, 28.
2 Butterfield, George III, Lord North and the People, 345.
3 On Germain's position in this negotiation, see Valentine, 3902.
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by the Bedford group, who had driven him from the Ministry in 1772 and now made known their objection to his
appointment.1
The Bedfords had an axe of their own to grind. Lord Gower's son-in-law Carlisle had returned from America and
needed a new job. It was not clear that provision for Carlisle would keep the Bedfords in the Ministry; but it was
quite certain that if he were not given a salary and if Hillsborough were brought in, they would go. The King would
not hear of Carlisle as Secretary of State; but there was always the Board of Trade. It had been annexed to the
American Department for the past ten years; but by separating it and doubling the salary North could give Carlisle
£2,000 a year for very little work. A happy conception; but the difficulty lay in Germain, who said that the
separation of the Board from his own department would degrade him. This deadlock continued throughout the
summer.
More demoralising to North than the open designs of the Bedfords were the intrigues of his own lesser confidants.
William Eden returned like Carlisle from America in need of a place; but lacking Carlisle's connections he had to
work more deviously. He opened his campaign in January 1779 by stirring up that ambitious Scots lawyer, his
cousin Wedderburn. What they wanted was a matter for speculation. Knox thought Eden was after the Legation at
The Hague. Robinson believed that they were ultimately seeking the highest offices of state. At the least they
hoped to prevent the appointment of Hillsborough, and to obtain a Secretary of State who would give them the
influence which Suffolk had done. Eden managed to extort a pension of £600 settled on his wife; but Wedderburn's
demand was more difficult to satisfy. He wanted the Chief Justiceship of the Common Pleas with a peerage, so that
he would be irremovable if the Ministry foundered. But the Chief Justiceship was not vacant; and to force the
incumbent to retire and give Wedderburn a peerage would create more jealousies and enmities than it would buy
off.
Eden's tactics were devious but simple: they were to harry and frighten North. It was easily done. He opened the
campaign by holding conversations with Shelburne's party, which he followed up with talk of the Ministry's failures
and possible resignations, 'knowing well how that operates to carry and Job he wants'.2 Intrigues were more than
North's nervous system could bear, and before long he had become quite incapacitated for decisions. Incapable of
saying no, he had already ensnared himself in careless promises to other junior Ministers.
Behind North in his own department stood two sturdy inelegant figures, the Secretary John 'Ratcatcher' Robinson,
and Charles Jenkinson, a junior
1 Thomson, Secretaries of State, 58; Knox, 264.
2 Knox, 261; Add. MSS. 38210, ff. 225, 2937.
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Lord of the Treasury who had succeeded Lord Barrington as Secretary at War in the autumn of 1778. These two
men figured as eminences grises and unseen agents of the Crown in the lurid imagination of Burke: in reality they
were useful hard-working props of the faltering system. Robinson was North's expert in the management of the
House of Commons, and ranked in the Treasury as 'one of the most active and essential functionaries of the
executive government'.1 Over the past two years he had, through the agency of Jenkinson, developed a confidential
relationship with the King, who was becoming increasingly distressed by his Prime Minister's irresolution. In
North's equable and conciliating assistant he recognised an ideal go-between to fathom the Prime Minister's
intentions and keep him on course. No one who exercised the patronage of the Treasury could be universally
popular; and 'low Secretary' and 'low Attorney' were frequent sneers among the place-hunters of Lord Carlisle's
set.2 But he had a moralising vein which appealed to the King: 'by severe sumptuary laws', he replied to a royal
letter in the war crisis of 1778, 'a reformation of manners should be endeavoured to be brought about, and
oeconomy, temperance and industry introduced'.3 Through him the King tried to fight the forces of confusion in
the government; but North could not be brought to make a firm stand. Robinson found it impossible to make his
chief discuss political appointments calmly, and was forced to put his ideas on paper in the hope that North might
read them at leisure.4
1 Wraxall Memoirs, II, 2256.
2 Carlisle, 540, 542.
3 Add. MSS. 37833, f. 239.
4 Add. MSS. 37834, f. 76.
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Chapter XIV
The Strategy of 1779
1
The Autumn Deployment
The return of the Channel fleet from its summer operations always marked the start of a new period of naval
planning, and was followed by a winter deployment. Reinforcements were found for the campaigning seasons in
the Indian Ocean and the Caribbean, and the remainder of the fleet was brought in for its winter refit. When Keppel
returned, the situation had improved so much since the spring that a small squadron could now be spared for the
Mediterranean, to check the French squadron which remained in Toulon and keep the trade routes open. Enemy
squadrons were preparing in Brest for overseas service; and five British ships of the line were therefore intended to
reinforce the Leeward Islands, and three to strengthen the Indian squadron whose reinforcement had been
postponed in the spring for the sake of America. The ships for India could even create an opportunity for a small
operation in West Africa, a battalion attack on the French slave settlement of Goree.
But towards the middle of October the prospect was darkened by an intervention from Madrid. The Spaniards
came forward with an offer of mediation whose hostile tone suggested that they would soon align themselves with
the enemy. Spain was the third naval power in the world, and her intervention would utterly change the prospect
for which Britain was laying her plans. The King stood firm against a compromise; for with Spain and France
armed to the teeth he argued that only from the test of war could stability emerge. And if the Spaniards could be
kept quiet through the winter, he thought the navy might be strong enough to face both the Bourbon Powers.1 But
Sandwich, though equally convinced that Spain would enter the war unless she were bought off at a high price,
could not treat the danger so boldly. Better than anyone he knew the facts about the country's naval strength; and
he feared that if Spain entered the war that autumn England would pay for her late start in the armaments race.
Jamaica and Minorca might be lost at once; and though Gibraltar could stand a long siege it would also fall in the
end if the fleet could not relieve it. So near were the Spaniards to achieving their objects.
We must temporise, said Sandwich. Two months could be gained by asking for explanations: time to reinforce
Minorca, to send a squadron to
1 G 2434, 2464.
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Jamaica, and to strengthen the Channel fleet. The proposed Mediterranean squadron must be dropped. France and
Spain together had about eighty ships of the line in commission at home; and Sandwich calculated that by the end
of the year England could have only fifty-four in the Channel, including five old receiving ships which could be
used in home waters. But the deployment of this force depended absolutely on getting the seamen; and troops
should be called from their winter quarters to bolt them from their lurking holes. The army at home must be
strengthened by every possible means; and Sandwich suggested asking Russia for a squadron for the Channel: 'for
everything is now at stake'.1
Though Sandwich talked of a fleet for Jamaica, he knew that it was easier to propose than to provide.2 For he still
held that the proper strategy was to concentrate in the Channel. But at the end of October he was shaken by news
of the loss of Dominica. By then the ships and troops from America should have been in the islands, but by the
latest report no sailing date had been fixed for the expedition. It was rightly suspected that d'Estaing's French
squadron would winter in the West Indies instead of coming home, and further losses in the Leeward Islands
seemed inevitable.3
The West India merchants were baying for blood. The loss of Dominica had disclosed to a shocked public the
weakness of the West Indian garrisons; and the Committee's representatives visited Sandwich and Germain to
remonstrate. They were sent away with a promise of reinforcements but a refusal to specify the force; and they
were back again in the evening with a renewed demand for a strong and adequate reinforcement. The weak
Ministry would have found it hard to withstand this pressure if they had wanted to. On the same day three ships of
the line were added to the force for the Leeward Islands; and a strongly worded order was sent to New York for the
immediate despatch of Grant's convoy to Barbados. Byron's arrival in America was not yet known, and Gambier
received the blame for the delay which, said Sandwich, 'subjects you . . . to the blame and clamour that will be the
consequence of the loss of our islands'. He censured the commanders' preoccupation with their own problems and
indifference to the general situation. 'For believe me', he warned Gambier, 'this is an object which all sorts of
people here have set their hearts on, and upon which they are much in earnest.' His relief was immense when news
arrived that Grant's force had sailed. 'You cannot conceive the sudden alteration that was occasioned among us.'4
1 Sandwich, II, 17982.
2 Sandwich, I, 419.
3 Knox, 151, 153; CL, Germain, 4 and 13 Nov. to Clinton.
4 CO 5/254, ff. 1213; Sandwich, II, 328, 341; CL, Germain letterbook, 4 and 13 Nov. to Clinton.
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If there had been any serious question of reinforcing Jamaica, the danger in the Leeward Islands ruled it out. A
regiment was embarked to strengthen the garrison; but rather than add to Sir Peter Parker's squadron, Sandwich
relied on the reinforcement of the Leeward Islands to protect Jamaica.1 Eight ships of the line sailed in December
to join Barrington.
The West India merchants were not the only pressure group whose anxiety pressed on strategy that autumn. In
December there was intelligence of a squadron under de Ternay preparing to leave Brest for India. Its real strength
was five ships of the line, but six or eight were reported. The East India Company appealed for reinforcements; and
three ships of the line were added to the force preparing to go out under Admiral Hughes, making six in all. A
regiment of foot would sail with them.2
2
A Fresh Start in America
Thus the French initiative was dispersing Sandwich's strategic reserve in home waters. But his preference for a
concentration in home waters and a holding strategy abroad had never been shared by Germain. If Sandwich had
had his way, Byron's squadron in America would have been ordered home for the winter instead of pursuing
d'Estaing to the West Indies, and disaster in the Leeward Islands might have followed. Germain had himself had
doubts about the future of the American theatre when the Spanish threat began to take shape in October, and
recognised that with the army and navy at full stretch against the Bourbons England might have come to the end of
her offensive capacity against the rebellious colonies. At the end of 1778 only 3,000 recruits were allotted to
Clinton as reinforcements for the next campaign; and Germain expected little more than coastal raiding in the
theatre.3 But in the New Year the danger from Spain seemed to have receded; and in spite of Sandwich's doubts
about the naval situation, Germain believed that more troops could be found for Clinton and that the reduction of
the colonies could be resumed.
While the Opposition was crowding the court-room at Portsmouth in January for the Keppel trial, a series of
consultations was held in London from which a new plan for America emerged. There was fresh evidence to
consider. The renegade Congressman Joseph Galloway had recently arrived in England, and through Robinson had
conveyed some lengthy reports to the King, who referred them to Amherst. The Peace Commissioners had also
returned, and at North's suggestion Germain summoned Eden and Johnstone to meet such Ministers as were in
London. Germain was
1 Sandwich, I, 406.
2 Richmond, Navy in India, 8793.
3 CL, Germain, 4 Nov. to Clinton; CO 5/96, f. 193; Knox, 153.
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determined to enlist North's support. Convinced that the Cabinet at that time would automatically reject any
suggestions of his own, he prepared the ground for a full Cabinet discussion by priming North with a long paper
explaining the views he had formed as a result of his talks with the Commissioners. 'If he adopts them', he told
Knox, 'they may be of use; if they come only from me, I know their fate.'1
In the first two campaigns of the war, the aim had been to break the rebellion by crushing its army and overrunning
its political centres. The result had been that while the American army had survived, the British had failed to
consolidate their territorial gains. The army's motion, as Admiral Samuel Graves observed, was like 'the passage of
a ship through the sea whose track is soon lost'.2 The military master-plan having failed, it was necessary to
attempt a more systematic consolidation: to break away from the search for an enemy centre of gravity, to
recognise the atomised political and social structure of the colonies, and to subordinate the military to the political
aspect of the problem. The germ of the idea is contained in a memorandum on the southern colonies in the
Germain papers of 1778.3 'The great point to be wished for, is that the inhabitants of some considerable colony
were so far reclaimed to their duty, that the revival of the British constitution, and the free operation of the laws,
might without prejudice be permitted amongst them.' The advantages of British sovereignty would then become
apparent; 'and a little political management, would with ease bring about what will never be effected by mere
force'.
If this reasoning was sound, the piecemeal reduction of separate colonies might achieve what the search for a
single point of effort had failed to do. If the regular army could not destroy Washington, its role must be to drive
him out and fend him off, while internal order in the recovered colonies was established by a loyalist militia.
Secure from within and without, the colony could then send representatives to an assembly, and political re-
integration with the Empire could proceed. The role of the militias had been sketched by Germain a year earlier in
his instructions of 8 March 1778 for an attack on the southern colonies. Though farmers and men of means could
not be expected to serve as soldiers for an indefinite period and far from their homes, the British might use them as
the rebels did, by embodying them under their own officers to co-operate with the regular troops in their own
district, or defend a post in their absence. 'Such appear to be the methods taken by the rebels for strengthening their
own army.'4
1 Knox, 155: the paper referred to is CL, Germain, 11 Jan. 1779, cited below. There appear to have been
Cabinet meetings on the 12th and 16th.
2 Williams Transcripts, 6 Aug. 1778 to Sandwich.
3 CL, Germain, II, Suppl.
4 Sackville, II, 98.
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