Mackesy P. The War for America, 1775-1783
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enjoying a reputation as high as any in the army. Howe and Burgoyne had had their chance and failed, and he was
next in line of succession. For two years he had held a dormant commission as Commander-in-Chief in case of
accident to Howe. Nevertheless he seems to have succeeded Howe by default rather than the active preference of
the government. Amherst had once again refused the command; and as late as the middle of February the
government seems to have intended to send out a general from home.1 It would have been easier to prevent
Clinton's appointment than to supersede him when he was installed.2
2
The Evacuation of Philadelphia
Clinton had only been in Philadelphia for a day when the Porcupine sloop arrived from England with the Cabinet
orders of 21 March. They changed the whole character of his task. France was now an enemy in fact if not yet in
name. Clinton learnt that he was to expect no reinforcements and no recruits, and would loose 8,000 men to Florida
and the West Indies. His first act as Commander-in-Chief would be to abandon Philadelphia and remove the gutted
remnant of his field army to New York. There was no glory in this.
The army in the rebel colonies had a strength at that moment of nearly 27,000 rank and file fit for duty: 8,400 at
New York, 3,500 at Rhode Island, and 14,700 with the main force in Philadelphia. The detachments for the West
Indies and Florida would leave about 8,000 rank and file fit for duty to withdraw from Philadelphia.3 But Clinton
resolved to postpone the departure of the expeditions to the southwards till his own movement to New York was
complete. His reason was the impossibility of providing simultaneous naval protection for both movements. The
last news from Europe was that a squadron under la Motte-Picquet was at sea, while Lord Howe had only five
ships of the line and three fifties, of which he would have to detach all but two sixty-fours with the St Lucia
expedition. It seemed wiser to keep the squadron together till the evacuation of Philadelphia was complete.
This decision gave Clinton the extra troops which enabled him to take a second resolution. He lacked the shipping
to take off the whole army with its horses, if 3,000 loyalists who could not be left to the rebels' mercy were
1 So G 2194 seems to imply.
2 Willcox, JMH, 1947, p. 109; Wortley, 150; G 2194. In conjunction with Frederick B. Wyatt, Willcox has
made an experimental study of Clinton's psychology in the William and Mary Quarterly, 1959.
3 CO 5/95, ff. 222 et seq. (returns for March). Figures include Germans and Provincials. Total effective
strength was 33,756 (Philadelphia 19,530, New York 10,456, Rhode Island 3,770).
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to be embarked. The army could have cut the throats of its 5,000 horses, but the loss and humiliation were too
much to bear. Instead Clinton resolved to march his army overland to New York, freeing the shipping for stores
and refugees.1
On 18 June, when the embarkation was complete and the transports had left the quays, Clinton set out on his
march. It was not a simple movement. He had 90 miles of rebel country and obstructed roads to cover, and might
have to fight on the way; and since he was casting loose from his base he took with him what he confessed was an
'enormous' provision train stretching over nearly twelve miles of road. To protect it he marched in two divisions.
Knyphausen's escorted the train, and Cornwallis's acted as an offensive rearguard to pin the enemy if they
attempted to work their way up the flanks of the column towards the supply train.
The long, vulnerable column gave Washington an opportunity which he could not ignore. With a force rather
greater than Clinton's he marched from Valley Forge in pursuit, while the Jersey militia turned out to harass the
British flanks. Washington had many veterans, and his army had been drilled for three months by Steuben: it was
the most refined instrument he had yet commanded. The American force converged with the British at Monmouth
Court-house, and General Lee advanced to strike at Cornwallis's rearguard. Clinton was there in person. In
suffocating heat he took the offensive, drove the enemy back for two or three miles, and disengaged without
interruption in the cool of the night.2 The army made good its retreat, and crossed unmolested to Manhattan to
rejoin Lord Howe and his convoy. Thus the evacuation of Philadelphia was accomplished. By skill on land and
good fortune at sea the army returned without loss to New York, drawing in its horns in America to strike at the
French in the West Indies.
Yet it had been a narrow thing. If Clinton had adhered to his orders and sent off the St Lucia expedition from the
Delaware, he would have taken much longer to embark his forces and stores, and the greatest part of the army in
America would have been at sea in 400 sail of transports when d'Estaing swooped on the American coast. Off the
Delaware Howe learnt for the first time from Germain's packet-boat that an enemy fleet was approaching. There
was much indignation at the neglect to send early warning; indignation which was increased in July when a fleet of
victuallers from Cork entered the Delaware in ignorance of the evacuation.
The hazarding of the victuallers concerned the Treasury. They had sailed
1 CO 5/96, f. 20; Carlisle, 380; Willcox, JMH, 1947, p. 120.
2 CO 5/96, f. 27. Numerous Hessians are said to have deserted on the march. The actual number of Hessian
desertions in the six months to 24 June 1778 was only 219 NCOs and men.
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from Cork at the end of May, two months after the order to abandon Philadelphia was sent to Clinton; entered the
Delaware to find the enemy in possession; and by mere luck escaped to New York with their vital cargoes. The
blunder seems grotesque. But its cause was not ministerial negligence, but friction in the badly oiled eighteenth-
century machinery of war.
When the decision was taken to abandon Philadelphia, Lord North was under the impression that the arrears of the
1777 provisions were on the point of sailing, and would reach Clinton before the withdrawal. This was confirmed
by the Commissary at Cork; and it was not till the very end of May that a further letter from Cork informed the
Treasury that six more victuallers were on the point of sailing. This reached Robinson at midnight on 4 June, and
he wrote at once to divert them to New York, but the ships had already gone. The error was due to a
misunderstanding. The Commissary had spoken the strict truth when he said that the New York supplies were
about to sail: he referred to the supplies furnished by the 'New York' contractors. But the Treasury had instructed
him that the supplies from the 'Canada' contractors should also be sent to Clinton; and it was these, believed by the
Treasury to have sailed in March, which formed the later shipment.1
The incident is a salutary reminder that in this war both sides were operating in an eighteenth-century time-scale
and with eighteenth-century standards of efficiency. The worst consequences of misunderstandings were seldom
reaped, because the enemy worked at the same pace and were subject to the same chances. Neptune was no
partisan, and the hazards of the ocean afflicted French as well as British. If d'Estaing, sailing on the favourable
southern track from Gibraltar, had made his landfall on the American coast ten days earlier, he might have
destroyed Lord Howe and his convoy. But his passage took twelve weeks from Toulon; and when he sighted the
Delaware capes, Howe was safe in New York. In this war time was vital, but it could not be calculated.
3
The Crisis Weathered
With Clinton's return to New York the contraction in America was complete. But before the next phase of the
Cabinet's plan could be mounted, and the battle shift to the West Indies, Lord Howe had to face d'Estaing. His
appearance on the American coast might sever the strategic communications and throttle the southward shift of
forces.
Lord Howe had thrown out a chain of frigates to the southward to watch for the enemy. On 7 July they brought
news of a French squadron at anchor in the Delaware; and a few days later a sloop came in which had sighted
1 WO 34/113, f. 172; Thynne Papers, American Affairs, 17779, No. 23.
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twelve French ships of the line steering for New York on the previous evening.
The French line of battle mounted 850 guns against Howe's 534, and d'Estaing had six frigates against his three.
Perhaps the danger has been exaggerated; but it was serious. The loss of Howe's fleet and seamen would have been
a difficult blow to repair, and Clinton's army would have been in peril; caught, says one writer, like rats in a trap.
Cut off they would certainly have been; but they could look after themselves. In the New York area, Clinton had
perhaps 24,000 men fit for duty, divided between Manhattan, Staten Island, Long Island and Paulus Hook.
Manhattan itself had 14,000, and Washington, who had forborne to press the detachment marching from
Philadelphia, would certainly have found it impossible to assault the same troops in their redoubts and
entrenchments. The real danger lay in the shortage of provisions. The six Cork victuallers which escaped in the
Delaware did not arrive till the crisis was past; and even with their cargoes the army's reserves were low, for
reasons which will appear.1 Had Howe lost the command of the sea it is possible that Clinton would have been
starved into surrender during the autumn. Possible, but no more. For the French squadron based on Boston or
perhaps Rhode Island might have found it hard to maintain an efficient blockad of the approaches to New York
when the gales began to blow; and great efforts would have been made to succour the garrison.
Howe met the superior forces of the enemy by anchoring his squadron in a defensive line. It was a method later
discredited by Brueys' use of it at Aboukir; but properly employed it was used several times with success by
outnumbered British fleets in the course of the American War. As the British had reason to know, the shallow bar
at Sandy Hook was very hazardous for ships of the line, and several ships struck on it in the course of the war.
D'Estaing would not find it easy to feel his way into the harbour under fire. An advanced squadron would harry the
enemy as they sounded their way across the bar; and behind it Howe placed a line of ships to cover the main
channel with their broadsides, with springs on their cables so that they could swing as the enemy came up the
harbour. The seaward flank of the line was covered by a battery and a brigade of infantry on the Hook.
For eleven days the two fleets watched each other across the bar, while d'Estaing waited for wind and tide to carry
him into the harbour. On 22 July the French fleet weighed with a spring tide and a following wind. But d'Estaing's
pilots reported that there was not enough water at the bar for the ships of deep draught; and he allowed himself to
be deterred and made sail to the southward. For this he has received much blame, and probably with
1 Below, pp. 2224.
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little justice. The pilots' advice was checked by soundings, and was found correct. Even if the French fleet had
penetrated the harbour, Howe was confident that he could beat them: 'We should succeed at no time if we fail on
such as occasion.'1
New York was saved, but the danger shifted now to Rhode Island. General Pigot's garrison had been threatened for
several months by Sullivan; but while d'Estaing awaited the spring tide off Sandy Hook, Clinton had anticipated
events by slipping a reinforcement of five battalions through Long Island Sound to Newport. On 27 July Howe
became convinced that Rhode Island was d'Estaing's next target. 'Where is Byron?' Clinton exclaimed, surveying
the exiguous squadron. But help was beginning to arrive. The principle had come into operation by which the navy,
scattered to exercise the command of the sea, would concentrate on a point of crisis. A sixty-four and a fifty joined
from Halifax, another fifty from the West Indies; and on 30 July a seventy-four, the solitary forerunner of Byron's
fleet, came in with its tale of misfortune. No one could guess when the rest of Byron's ships would appear; but
already the balance of force was beginning to be redressed. There were now thirteen weak ships of the line, if the
five of fifty guns could be so classed; and Howe felt better able to face the sickly fleet of d'Estaing. Foul winds
detained him till 6 August, when he weighed for Rhode Island.
Sullivan, with the support of two French ships of the line, had pressed in on the British garrison, and Pigot, in
expectation of an enemy landing, had burnt the four frigates in the harbour and withdrawn into the lines outside
Newport. On 8 August the French fleet entered the passage to Newport, and French and American troops began to
land. At that moment the British fleet appeared. 'The surprise was complete', d'Estaing reported, 'and the day very
exactly calculated with reference to our projects.' He attributed the precision of Howe's timing to spies, as people
will when they are surprised; but he was wrong. Howe's action was the consequence of a sensible deduction from
his cruiser-reports; his timing dictated by the wind. He had 772 guns in his line of battle against d'Estaing's 8502;
but he was on the open sea, while the enemy was involved in the support of a military operation.
As Howe discovered when he communicated with General Pigot, there was very little he could do to help the
garrison. But d'Estaing allowed himself to be diverted. Disliking the prospect of being blocked up between
channels commanded by the enemy, he profited by a rare north wind and put to sea. Howe bore away to the south,
hoping for a change of wind to give him the weather gage. For two days he manoeuvred for an advantage
1 Quot. Willcox, JMH 1947, p. 111.
2 Ward gives Howe 914 guns by including his frigates and flotilla.
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to offset his weakness, but the cleaner French ships outsailed him; and on the night of the 11th a full gale scattered
both the fleets. The weather moderated on the 13th, and as the Admirals collected their squadrons several
indecisive single-ship actions were fought. On the 17th Howe reached Sandy Hook, to find that three of his ships
had severe damage.
Sullivan had been pressing his siege at Newport, confident that the French troops would return to help him. The
fleet returned indeed, but d'Estaing had learnt that the first of Byron's ships were arriving. He refused further help
and sailed for Boston to refit his damaged ships while he still had time, for his orders if a superior British fleet
appeared were to retire to Boston to revictual, and from there to sail for the West Indies. Howe followed him,
leaving Sullivan a clear retreat from the island; and when Clinton appeared from New York with 3,000 troops in
transports to cut him off, the last of the Americans had just crossed to the mainland. When Howe reached Boston
the French had had two days to fortify their anchorage, and were beyond his reach.
This was the end of operations in the northern theatre. Howe returned to New York to learn of his promotion to be
Vice-Admiral of the Red, an occasion which he used to complain of his omission from the last promotion, when
he had been left second on the list. 'I cannot cease to lament the public testimonies of their Lordships' disesteem.'
He had long since made gestures of resigning, and is said to have had motives of disappointed avarice; but his real
reason for quitting at this critical moment seems to have been his desire to support his brother. He knew that his
action would cause criticism; but with the enemy still on the coast, and Byron on the way to relieve him, he handed
over his command to the unpopular and incompetent Gambier, and sailed for England.1
4
Failure of a Mission
It was under the shadow of these critical operations that the Peace Commissioners shot their bolt. They had made
their approach to Congress, offering a union of Great Britain and America under a common sovereign, acting
together in peace and war 'on a basis of equal freedom and mutual
1 Adm. 1/488, f. 343; Walpole, Last Journals, II, 121. He explains his unwillingness to let his brother down
by remaining in a letter to an unidentified correspondent which was catalogued in Messrs Sotheby's sale of
6 Oct. 1958 (Item 44).
Gambier had probably been sent to America to make room for Samuel Hood as Commissioner at Portsmouth.
He bitterly regretted the move when he found himself relegated by Howe to be Port Admiral at New York; an
inadequate reward for quitting 'an honourable lucrative safe post, a loved and amiable wife big with child of a
fifth produce of our conjugal happiness'.
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safety'. Short of independence, there was nothing more to offer. But Congress's answer was an assertion of that
independence. They would negotiate for peace when England had recognised the United States or withdrawn her
forces.
In different circumstances the British offer would have been attractive and generous. Americans had been offered
the liberty 'to dispose of their property and to govern themselves without any reference to Great Britain, beyond
what is necessary to preserve that union of force in which our mutual safety and advantage consist'.1 Carlisle had
small hope of success. But he believed that his terms offered real advantages to the Americans: a continued
connection with Britain, which he thought essential to them; help in restoring their currency; free commerce;
political stability, so rarely the reward of revolution; and at a safe distance the cohesive force of the monarchy to
hold the states together. Like most Englishmen he believed that for England total separation would mean the loss
of the West Indies, and probably of Canada and Nova Scotia; and that in time of war a hostile America could
inflict deep injuries on England's major trade routes. Time proved his fears unnecessary; but they were not
groundless or irrational.2
In retrospect it is easy to say that in withholding independence at this moment Britain was blind and foolish; and
that by cementing the American alliance with France she ensured her own downfall in a ruinous double war. But
there is another side to the question. The Commissioners had indeed latitude to entertain a demand for
independence. But now that America had bound herself to the French alliance, and French forces were actually on
the coast, to concede independence as a preliminary would throw away one of the few negotiating cards that
England held. The Americans would be free to assert that they could not treat separately from the French, and to
fight on for Canada with French assistance. Four years later the British government did recognise American
independence without a treaty, but they obtained an equivalent: a separate negotiation with the United States.
Carlisle spent the rest of summer hanging about New York with his fellow-Etonians, abusing his patrons in
England and complaining of the heat and the monotonous scarlet uniforms. His disappointment at the loss of
Philadelphia had warped his judgment; and he and Eden worked themselves up to such a pitch that they implored
the government to cancel the St Lucia expedition so that Clinton could resume the offensive. If they had had their
way, d'Estaing's arrival would have caught the army scattered in weak detachments from Philadelphia to Newport,
with Howe's handful of ships attempting to cover every part. In the autumn, on the eve of their departure,
1 Ritcheson, 278.
2 Carlisle, 353ff.
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they were agitating for a systematic war of destructive raiding. But as Colonel Stuart observed, America was
almost invulnerable to a war of destruction. Boston and Philadelphia were the only important towns in the rebels'
hands (for Charleston had been almost destroyed by fire); and to destroy either of them the whole army would have
to be used, in the type of large-scale operation hitherto so unsuccessful. Our barbarities, said Stuart, had already
planted an 'irrecoverable' hatred, and it would be rash to incur the American's enmity for ever. 'I doubt whether
they have, on this point, either power or understanding to advise; I fancy private resentment has drove them to
adopt quite contrary opinions from those they came here with, not from a greater or more extensive knowledge of
the country, but from a deep sense of the insults they have received.'1
But in the malcontent Clinton, the Commissioners found a ready sympathiser. Since the moment when he assumed
the command he had been distressing the Ministry with his complaints of personal neglect and inadequate forces.
Instead of the usual calculation of total effectives he chose to reckon his force by the rank and file fit for duty.
Eden fed his chagrin at the order to detach to the West Indies, and urged him to ignore it. And in the middle of
September, when news of the relief of Rhode Island had eased the anxiety at home, a letter arrived from Clinton
which threw the Ministry into fresh consternation. Written when Rhode Island was still in danger, it forecast his
future prospects in tones of deepest gloom. When he detached to the West Indies and Florida, and complied with
the demands for help which he expected from Canada, he would probably be forced to abandon New York and
withdraw to Halifax.2
Clinton had made his calculation by assuming that Haldimand would call for a third of his remaining force. The
depth of his pessimism is plumbed in a letter written the same day to his cousin the Duke of Newcastle. 'By the
present arrangement I wish one half [of the army] may not be underground by Christmas, and the rest reduced to
an ignominious flight to avoid still further disgrace.' His prophesy was received at home with utter dismay. Though
the King was still prepared in the last resort to abandon New York in order to beat the French, even the timid
North could not see that the moment for the sacrifice had come. If Clinton withdrew to Halifax, every hope in
America would be blasted, and the army destroyed by a Nova Scotian winter under canvas. Germain tried to
strengthen the General's nerves by painting a more cheerful picture. The large force collected by Washington was
no more than might have been expected for a special
1 Wortley, 1323.
2 Royal Institution MSS., I, 435; Knox, 150; Sackville, II, 1167; Willcox, JMH, 1947, pp. 11213, 118.
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effort; and the disgraceful failure of his co-operation with d'Estaing might cause a revulsion of public opinion. 'In
no light do I see anything but good in prospect.' Canada seemed safe enough; but if Clinton was forced to send help
to Haldimand, Germain begged him to evacuate the dependent post of Rhode Island and keep New York.1
Mercifully Clinton recovered his balance. It dawned on him that Canada was in no danger and had probably
received its reinforcements from Europe. Halifax, too, had been strengthened from home. He resolved to send off
the expeditions to the West Indies and Florida as soon as convoy could be provided. He was now willing to hold
New York with the balance of his force, which he called 13,000. This figure was derived from the lowest basis of
assessment, and even then he underestimated, for when the expeditions had embarked he still had nearer 14,000
rank and file fit for duty in the New York area. On the usual basis of calculation he had 17,452 effectives.2
The departure of the expeditions left a melancholy body of officers at New York.3 Their depression was not in
itself very alarming: it was the natural result of a dull and circumscribed defensive, and spirits would rise again
with the prospect of action. Its sinister aspect was that the croakers were led by the Commander-in-Chief. Clinton
filled his despatches with laments, and hinted at his wish to quit a post which he had not sought. He did not wish
to remain there, 'a mournful witness of the debility of an army at whose head, had I been unshackled by
instructions, I might have indulged expectations of rendering serious service to my country'. 'Do not let anything be
expected of me, shackled as I am.'4 These 'shackling instructions' were part of a general redeployment of the
country's forces to meet the danger from the Bourbons. Not for a moment did Clinton admit that other theatres had
claims on the nation's resources, or that his own renown should not be the Ministry's chief concern.
5
A Provisioning Crisis
D'Estaing's threat to New York brought home the need for a proper reserve of provisions, not only to give the army
a degree of strategic flexibility but to enable it to survive if its lifelines were cut. The threat passed, but the
1 Willcox, JMH, 1947, p. 113; G 2405; Knox, 1501; CL, Clinton, 25 Sept. Germain to Clinton.
2 CO 5/96, ff. 110, 211. His complaint of the shortfall of numbers was an old one. Cf. Wolfe at Quebec: ' . . .
the army 9,000 men; in England it is called 12,000' (Reilly, 223).
3 Wortley, 139.
4 CO 5/96, f. 1612; CO 5/97, f. 28.
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autumn of 1778 saw a crisis developing in the army's provisioning system. In spite of the Cork victuallers' escape
from the Delaware, the stock of provisions dwindled as the year drew to its close. By the middle of December
Clinton had only a fortnight's flour in hand. Another victualling fleet sailed from Ireland in October, but the first
ships did not reach New York till January. By that time the troops were living on indifferent oaten bread to which
British soldiers had not been accustomed for a generation.1
The British Government had not expected, when it resolved to coerce America in 1775, that the initial supply
burden would continue. But as the years passed and no conquests in depth were consolidated, the commissariat
continued to draw the greater part of its needs from home. At such a distance the Treasury could not question the
commanders' estimates of their needs. 'We are in their hands', wrote Robinson, 'and must submit.' After the initial
difficulties, the department had maintained a transport fleet adequate to the needs, and at the beginning of 1778
there were enough ships at Cork to complete the 1777 supply.2
The difficulty was not primarily shipping, but indenting. From the beginning the Treasury had been starved of
accurate information of the army's needs. General Gage had kept the department in the dark, so that 'we are obliged
I may say to grope for it'.3 Commissary Weir was sent out to introduce an orderly system of indenting, but
confusion continued. The shortage of 1778 burst on the Treasury without warning. Weir's returns had not revealed
whether the refugees from Philadelphia had increased the army's consumption, as Whitehall had intelligently
expected; nor could the officials make out whether his returns included the Rhode Island garrison, and whether the
army was eating 46,000 rations a day, or 10,000 more. What did suddenly become clear was that without the
Treasury's knowledge the army had consumed in seven months an additional 3½ million pounds of bread and flour,
and nearly 2 million pounds of meat.4
The fault, as the King said, lay in America. Nor could it be quickly remedied. When the July returns first revealed
the coming shortage, arrangements were made at once to ship additional supplies. But so many transports had been
detained in New York that none were available to take out the
1 CO 5/95, f. 114; CO 5/97, ff. 28, 66, 76. Ligonier had persuaded the Treasury to sanction wheaten bread
in 1743.
2 Add. MSS. 38209, f. 163 (5 Sept., Robinson to Jenkinson); Add. MSS. 38343, f. 1 (memo. on transport
service). On 1 January 1778 the Treasury had 72 victuallers and storeships in service (23,080 tons), besides 43
small oat ships (6,972 tons) which were under orders to be discharged. The total cost of shipping engaged in
the two years to 30 Sept. 1777 was £438,460 (Add. MSS. 38375, f. 47; Add. MSS. 38343, f. 9).
3 Add. MSS. 38208, f. 180 (19 Sept. 1775, Robinson to Jenkinson).
4 Usher, 2978; Add. MSS. 37834, f. 1.
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