Mackesy P. The War for America, 1775-1783
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third over the enemy was considered necessary, and in the American War the British fleet was never strong enough
to impose a sustained blockade.
In the absence of effective close blockade, readiness to detach was vital. France was a great military power which
did not fear attack, and her navy was free to take the offensive where it pleased. Only a swift riposte could check it.
But the British home fleet's flexibility was constricted by fear of invasion. It was an old bugbear, which the First
Lord of the Admiralty always feared more than his colleagues in the Cabinet: Anson more than Pitt, Sandwich
more than Germain, Spencer more than Dundas and Grenville. There was a constant temptation to forget the
Channel fleet's role in global strategy: to over-insure in home waters and detach late and reluctantly. The
Admiralty was too apt to treat the home fleet as a static shield rather than a strategic reserve. By the end of the war
Sir Charles Middleton was convinced that too many ships had been kept in the Channel: that other objects had been
sacrificed to the maintenance of a Channel squadron which was too weak to block the enemy's ports and command
the Channel, yet stronger than was necessary to hamper an invasion.1
In March 1778 the local squadrons scarcely existed. Only the American station had a respectable squadron of five
sail of the line backed by five fifties. As Sandwich had pointed out, it was necessary to reinforce all the overseas
theatres at once. At home were forty sail of the line more or less ready, with another thirteen in commission which
would soon be ready if men came in fast. Sandwich intended Keppel to have a Channel squadron of twenty
powerful ships, to be augmented from time to time as other ships became ready and the enemy's strength required.
This left twenty ships for other services; and from these the Admiralty intended to form its overseas squadrons
including one for the Mediterranean.2 Of these the Mediterranean squadron was incomparably the most important.
It was much more than a local squadron charged with the safety of Gibraltar, Minorca and the Levant trade; for it
confronted one of the enemy's main European bases, and was in fact an extension of the home fleet which
jealously watched Brest. In 1757 the Mediterranean had been watched so successfully that the French had been
unable even to prepare a squadron in Toulon which they had intended for the relief of Louisburg in the following
spring. On the French declaration Sandwich persuaded the Cabinet to order the immediate formation of a
Mediterranean squadron to follow this precedent.3 But within a short time he began to lose his nerve.
1 Barham, II, 3740, 54.
2 The sources of these figures are at first sight confusing. Compare: G 2218; Sandwich, I, 3501; II, 5 n., 1921,
183, 269, 274, 369; CL, Shelburne, Vol. 142, No. 39.
3 Sandwich, I, 35961.
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The force in immediate readiness at home was less than appeared on paper. Fourteen ships had been cruising since
early February in the Bay of Biscay, doing the work of the frigates which were absent in America, and did not
come in till 2 April, when they required extensive refitting and provisioning. Four others needed docking, and all
were still short of men. But the question whether England could afford to detach to the Mediterranean was not
debated on grounds of readiness. Sandwich began to doubt the sufficiency of twenty ships in the Channel, although
thirteen more would soon be ready. In this he was almost certainly influenced by Keppel, the Commander-in-Chief
in the Channel. Keppel approved in principle of a Mediterranean squadron to stop d'Estaing, but he was becoming
insistent that twenty were not enough for the Channel, and that we should make no detachments till we were
certain that the enemy had committed their forces.1 On 4 April Sandwich gave his written opinion to the Cabinet
that it would be unsafe to leave England and Ireland without a very much larger force than Keppel's twenty sail of
the line. Two days later he reiterated to the Cabinet, and later the same day to the King, that it would be impossible
at that moment to form a separate squadron to meet the Toulon fleet without sacrificing every other service. The
only possibility was to send the Channel fleet itself, which was too great a risk in the face of the Brest fleet and the
possible intervention of the Spaniards.2
Sandwich's theme was that we must be secure at home before we detached. His argument of numbers was a weak
one: the Brest fleet was no more ready than the British, and it was not conceivable that they could mount a serious
invasion before Keppel was strengthened by the ships which were nearly ready. If there was weakness at home it
lay rather in the shortage of frigates to defend the trade and intercept landing craft or raiders like Paul Jones. Lord
North suspected that the French were not so ready as Sandwich supposed, and intelligence in the middle of April
supported him. But he was in no state to dispute the issue with effect. He was standing up badly to the pressure of
political tension, and was so harried and confused that he fled from London to collect his scattered wits in the
country. He did no more than lament feebly to the King that no squadron had been sent out to intercept the Toulon
fleet. Germain pressed for a reinforcement, and the King persuaded Sandwich to see if Keppel could be induced by
the promise of additional ships to detach a force to Gibraltar.3
But the First Lord had allowed Keppel to dominate him; and Keppel was dominated by the fear of invasion.
Though ships were coming forward
1 Sandwich, II, 1921; G 2263, 2312.
2 Sandwich, II, 223; G 2275.
3 G 2301, 2304, 2309.
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rapidly in March and April, he remained adamant. The fleet must be kept together, he replied to Sandwich on 16
April, with a squadron ready to follow the enemy if they detached abroad.1 It is true that the army at home was
very weak. Many points were vulnerable to a raid; and the French would not need to pass a very large force across
the Channel to mount a full invasion. Yet even Lord North doubted the reality of the danger. There were reports of
troop concentrations in Normandy, but none whatever of landing craft. Keppel, however, swallowed the French
demonstration. He was certain that an invasion was coming, and haunted by fear that Spain would join the enemy
as soon as her galleons were home. He lamented the lack of frigates to intercept the enemy transports. 'I am not
brave enough to go to my bed with the confidence of the country's being in security', he wrote.2
Keppel and Sandwich might have recalled that at the opening of the previous war the priority given to the fitting
out of the Channel fleet had delayed Byng's departure for the Mediterranean and lost Minorca. Exactly twenty
years later another First Lord was to face a similar problem and give the same answer as Sandwich. In 1798 Lord
Spencer was asked to find a force to intercept the expedition being prepared by Napoleon in Toulon. With the
advice of his naval colleagues on the Board he answered that the ships could not be spared with safety from the
Channel. But the Younger Pitt and his Secretaries of State were a tougher team than North's; and in view of the
political and strategic issues at stake they induced the First Lord to accept the risk in the Channel, which his
advisers had greatly magnified. The consequence was the annihilation of the Toulon fleet by Nelson at the Nile.
Perhaps the parallel is not entirely fair: for in 1778 Sandwich faced an efficient, undefeated and well prepared
enemy, while in 1798 the French navy had suffered from revolution, defeat and lack of sea training. Yet in both
cases the army at home was depleted, the fleet was short of men, and Ireland was restless. In April 1778 a dozen
ships of the line might have been spared for Gibraltar.
2
The British Riposte
Keppel's reply to Sandwich on 16 April killed the last opportunity to send a fleet to the Straits. No squadron was
sent; and on the 20th the Proserpine frigate sailed with orders for the Admiral at Gibraltar to station her with one
of his own frigates on either side of the Straits to watch for d'Estaing and determine his course. Another cruiser was
sent to reconnoitre Brest.
1 Sandwich, II, 31.
2 Sandwich, II, 534, 645, 823.
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At this moment a preliminary warning should have been sent to Lord Howe. He was still under orders to detach
most of his force to the West Indies; and though he had been warned in March that a squadron was out from Brest,
the Admiralty had informed him on 2 April that it had put back to port. He was thus allowed to presume that there
was no further danger. Nor should there have been; for at the time when his orders for the West Indies were
drafted, the Cabinet had resolved with the First Lord's advice to send a force to the Mediterranean. It was not till
far into April that the hope of a Mediterranean squadron was finally lost; and it was at this point that Howe should
have been warned that the Toulon fleet would not be intercepted. This was admitted by the American Department
within its own office walls. Under the existing orders the army in America would be at sea and Lord Howe's little
squadron divided when d'Estaing reached the Delaware. Only a lucky decision by Clinton was to avert the danger.1
On 27 April, six weeks after the French declaration of alliance with the United States, came the first positive
intelligence of the Toulon fleet. The sources were an agent in Paris, and the bankers of Amsterdam, whose news
was relayed by the British Minister at The Hague. D'Estaing had sailed on the 11th with eleven sail of the line, a
fifty-gun ship, and several frigates. His nine months' provisions made a destination outside Europe virtually
certain; and the personnel embarked confirmed the Paris rumours that it was the Delaware or Boston.2 To Germain
the news portended the ruin of all his work: the loss of command in American waters, and the fall of Philadelphia,
Halifax or Quebec. He had done all he could to have a fleet sent to Gibraltar. Now it was too late, and to avoid a
small risk we had exposed ourselves to a great disaster. He entreated North to act on the intelligence and send part
of the home fleet to America. That this was the enemy's destination no one doubted. Yet still Sandwich hesitated,
unwilling to stake everything on a probability and maintaining that we could not detach from home with safety. He
had fixed a Cabinet for the 29th to discuss the news. By that day Germain was desperate at the inaction, and he
made a formal protest in writing to the King and Cabinet. At least twelve sail of the line should be sent to America
immediately. He presumed that the ships which would remain in the Channel would be enough for home defence;
but in any case he insisted that in war risks must be run, and it was better to fail in a vigorous effort than tamely
submit to the loss of our distant fleets, armies and possessions.3
1 CL, Germain, précis at end of 1778.
2 SP 78/306, copy of Yorke's of 24 April.
3 G 2316; Sandwich, II, 356, 38; CL, Germain, 29 April, Germain to King and Cabinet.
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Germain's protest was decisive. The Cabinet resolved the same day to send thirteen ships of the line to America,
and he had the satisfaction of sending the order to the Admiralty. On his suggestion, the squadron was to make for
Halifax, and proceed to the West Indies if there was no sign of the enemy in American waters. Should there be no
intelligence of the enemy in either theatre, the commander was to bring his squadron home to the Channel.1
It remained to send a belated warning to Howe. Germain's paper had demanded a frigate to warn the commanders
in America. But Sandwich sent word that the relieving squadron would have only a single frigate to meet the
numerous cruisers believed to be with d'Estaing, and none could be spared for despatches. He asked the American
Secretary to arrange a special packet boat, and the despatches were sent down to Falmouth by express on 4 May.
But only one packet on the American run was available, for none of the last five sent out had returned. The West
India packet was taken off its run and ordered to Philadelphia, and the American packet was sent off with
duplicates to New York. The American packet was taken on passage by the enemy; but the West India packet
joined Howe off the Delaware on 29 June with the news that she had been chased by a French battle squadron.2
The relieving squadron called for a senior Admiral. Lord Howe was probably coming home; and no one wanted
Gambier, who had sailed with a convoy in March, to command so large a force. Vice-Admiral Byron, who was
under orders to take the command in India, was summoned to the Admiralty. He dashed up from Pirbright as soon
as he could get horses, to learn that he was to be switched to America. Much of his baggage had been sent ahead to
India, and the rest was in London. He hired a waggon which trundled his things towards his ship at Plymouth, but
if his squadron sailed as soon as the Cabinet expected, there was a good chance that he would put to sea with a
purser's kit. Byron was the second son of Lord Byron and nephew of the Lord President, Gower. Now in his
middle fifties, his experience was of exploration rather than fleets; and the nickname of 'Foul-weather Jack'
ominously suggested the shape of his luck.3
Whatever the merits of Sandwich's reluctance to despatch the squadron, the ships should have been ready to sail at
a moment's notice when the decision
1 G 2320; CL, Germain, 29 April to Admiralty.
2 Sackville, II, 110; CL, Clinton, Secretary of State Out, 4 May, Germain to Clinton; CL, Germain, 29 April to
King and Cabinet, and précis at end of 1778; Royal Institution, I, 260. Germain attributed the shortage of
packet boats to their unnecessary detention at New York. The precariousness of the communications were
underlined later in the summer, when the August packet from New York was taken by a privateer and the
bearer of the despatches was killed.
3 Sandwich, II, 43.
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was taken. And Sandwich evidently imagined that they were. He went down to Portsmouth on 1 May to accelerate
their departure, followed the next day by the King. But Byron would sail with his baggage. For the ships, with one
exception, were still stored and provisioned for Channel service, and according to Keppel two of the ships which
were to remain in the Channel were stripped of their running rigging to fit out those for America. While the
Channel ships had to embark a further four months' provisions, the gun-decks of Byron's flagship at Plymouth
were crammed with provisions for a voyage to India, and these had to be returned to the Victualling Office.1
Everything possible was now done to hasten the squadron to sea. Eight hours should have been enough to complete
the provisions. But rough weather prevented the victuallers from lying alongside the ships at Spithead. Finding that
some of the ships could not fix their sailing date, the King resolved to stay and chivvy the Port Admiral. He
remained for a week, taking notes on the state of the shipping, inspecting the fleet, and walking about in the rain
among the dockyard puddles. In his absence the House of Commons stormed at the squadron's unreadiness, and the
loss of an east wind to carry it out of the Channel. One member demanded the heads of North and Sandwich; a call
for retribution curiously seasoned with a letter assuring North that no personal attack had been intended.2
Even now, however, the battle to despatch the squadron was to be resumed. The Lords of the Admiralty at
Portsmouth Sandwich, who was visiting, and Palliser and Mulgrave who were serving in the Channel fleet were
anxious that Byron's squadron should not winter abroad, as its absence would be very dangerous and prevent any
further detachment from home. Germain laid the First Lord's letter before the Cabinet, and once more persuaded
them to turn it down: an intervention which was to save the West Indies in the coming winter. But when the
preparation of the squadron had been hastening forward for a week, advices from Paris and a letter from the
Admiral at Gibraltar brought reports that the Toulon fleet had gone to Cadiz, and a list of the Spanish fleet. Keppel
once more fell a prey to doubt, and drew Sandwich in his wake. Though every day strengthened the evidence that
d'Estaing was bound for America, they felt that in view of the combined strength of the Brest fleet and the
Spaniards it would be wrong to detach Byron without absolute certainty that when d'Estaing left Cadiz he would
cross the Atlantic. The French design to hold the British navy in the Channel was bearing fruit. The latest reports
from France were that the Brest fleet of twenty-five of the line was nearly ready, and that a French victory over
Keppel would be followed by an invasion. Of all this North
1 G 2318, 23278
2 G 2328, 2330, 23245.
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remained sceptical; and on receiving a letter of 7 May from Sandwich at Portsmouth urging further delay, he took
the lead for once.
North replied to Sandwich that the Proserpine would probably return from Gibraltar with positive news before
Byron could sail, and warned him not to retard the squadron for a moment without an order from a Secretary of
State. He then collected the opinions of all the members of the Cabinet who were in London. From Weymouth,
Germain, Gower and Dartmouth he obtained the same answer: unless Sandwich received positive information
before the squadron's departure that the Toulon fleet had not gone to America, Byron should sail as soon as
possible. Though North did not regard invasion as impracticable, and thought it possible that the French and
Spaniards would try it, he did not believe they could do so for some time. The danger in America was more
probable and immediate. The episode reveals North in a moment of unusual decisiveness and activity. It is
interesting that the King was far away at Portsmouth. Perhaps the royal presence sapped rather than vitalised the
Prime Minister.1
3
Byron Sails for America
On the evening of 17 May the wind dropped at Spithead, and under a clear moon the ships began to complete their
stores. The King went out from Portsmouth to hurry the work, and returned to London on the following evening
satisfied that the fleet would weigh with the first fair wind. For now the fatal south-west wind which blew across
the Channel ports in the spring had interposed. The fleet, ready at last, was held up by the weather. The Admirals
of the Channel fleet were happy to see the Cabinet's intentions thus frustrated; for Palliser agreed with Keppel in
his reluctance to see Byron away till d'Estaing's destination was known beyond human doubt. The natural instinct
of a fleet commander was to over-insure, and to see the danger in his own command writ larger than that in a
distant theatre. And Sandwich had been excessively influenced by these partial views.2
The squadron was still waiting for the wind on the 13th when news of d'Estaing burst like a thunderclap on the
Ministers. He had been sighted off Algiers on 28 April. The Proserpine's long absence was explained. Far from
having entered Cadiz or set its course for America, the Toulon squadron had not even left the Mediterranean a
fortnight after it had sailed. The chances were now very good that the frigate would pick up the enemy and
discover their course. With the King's approval Sandwich anticipated the Cabinet's decision
1 Sackville, II, 110; Sandwich, II, 412, 48, 4954; G 2326, 2329.
2 G 2330, 2333; Sandwich, II, 558.
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which was given the next day, and sent an express dashing off to Portsmouth to stop the fleet from sailing.1
There followed three torturing weeks of uncertainty. Contradictory reports flowed in, rumours flew about, and
plans were canvassed for every contingency. The Toulon fleet was to destroy Howe and enter the St Lawrence had
put back to Toulon would join the Brest fleet off Finisterre was steering for Brest. In the meantime the ships at
Spithead dropped down the Channel to join their Admiral at Plymouth; and the squadron's destination was changed
from Halifax to New York. This alteration had been suggested to the King and Sandwich by Commodore Hood on
the ground that it was easier to get north from New York than south from Halifax. It was adopted by North with a
timid reference to 'the opinion of the best seamen', as he thought it increasingly probable that d'Estaing would go
direct to New York. This was accepted by the Cabinet on the 16th. The loss of Halifax would have been a crippling
blow; but the Cabinet took into consideration the three regiments believed to be on their passage to reinforce the
garrison. In this they were misled. The transports for the Halifax force had been ordered in February for 2 April,
but had not reached the Clyde till May. The troops were on board on 12 May; but without consulting or informing
Germain the Admiralty had postponed the sailing to wait for Byron's departure.2
At last on 2 June the Proserpine sped into Falmouth after nearly seven weeks' absence. In company with the
Enterprise, which reached Plymouth on the 3rd, she had sighted the Toulon fleet in the Straits on 16 May, and
followed it for a short distance south-west into the Atlantic. From its regular course and great press of sail her
captain supposed it was bound for the West Indies; but when his report reached the Queen's House on the following
morning, the King reasoned that the enemy's course was more probably intended to catch a good wind for America.
'The Cabinet cannot meet too soon, nor Byron be ordered to sail', said his note to Sandwich at half-past nine.3
The Cabinet faced a harassing decision when it met later in the morning: a wrong one would bring great losses. But
they had before them a mass of digested intelligence which had not been available to the Proserpine's captain. The
King's guess was supported by the accounts of persons and material on board the enemy, which all suggested that
d'Estaing was bound for America and was steering an indirect course to catch the trade wind for the Delaware.
1 Sandwich, II, 578, 375; Wortley, 1245.
2 Sandwich, II, 56, 62, 745, 370, 3745; G 2332, 2346; CL, Germain, 17 May to Admiralty; ibid, précis at end
of 1778 correspondence.
3 James, 923; Sandwich, II, 8, 89.
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The Ministers resolved that Byron should sail at once for America. At three o'clock on the morning of 7 June he
was roused by sailing orders from the Admiralty. The wind was blowing into Plymouth Sound at the time; but two
days later he was at sea, and his squadron was dropping down the Channel for New York.1
4
Keppel and the Channel Fleet
The Ministry had staked its forces, and could do no more. Byron's despatch was the last action by which it could
influence the summer's campaign beyond the Atlantic. The Government's attention was now claimed by the
Channel fleet, which was ordered to sea at the same time as Byron.
Admiral Augustus Keppel had been chosen as war-commander of the Channel fleet when the guardships were
manned in the autumn of 1776. By birth and connection he was a Rockingham Whig, and his brother the Bishop of
Exeter had recently died thanking God that he had never given a vote for shedding American blood. The Keppels
were a close-knit clan. The eldest brother, Lord Albemarle, after sitting on Germain's court martial, had
commanded at the capture of Havana in 1761, with his brother General William Keppel serving in his force and
Augustus as second in command of the fleet.2 Both Albemarle and his brother Augustus had been in office in
Rockingham's administration, Augustus at the Board of Admiralty for fifteen months in the period of the navy's
rapid decay. He was a close friend not only of Rockingham, but of Richmond and Fox, to both of whom he was
related.
Keppel's conduct since the beginning of the American rebellion had matched his connections. He refused to serve
against the Americans, actively opposed the war, and at the end of 1775 quarrelled violently with Sandwich over
the disposal of a sinecure. This was the Lieutenant-Generalcy of the Marines, which went to Palliser though both
Howe and Keppel had wanted it. Palliser was Keppel's junior; but Generals of Marines were not appointed by
seniority. Palliser was a member of the Board of Admiralty, and as Comptroller had been Sandwich's closest
colleague in the reconstruction of the fleet. Sandwich followed precedent, and would have been a fool to hand over
the plum to his political enemy. But this dispute must be remembered when Palliser appears as Keppel's second in
command in the Channel fleet.
'When men do not draw with men in power, they should not be entrusted with the command of the King's ships.'3
Keppel's political friends assiduously
1 Sandwich, II, 91, 371, 375.
2 There is some reason to suspect that the Keppels did not emerge with completely clean hands from the
administrative duties of the expedition.
3 Barham, I, 89 (Captain W. Young in Dec. 1780).
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planted in his mind the idea that he had been chosen as the future scapegoat for the navy's weakness. By nature he
was open to this kind of suggestion. He was a small man with a broken nose; popular with his seamen, and
physically courageous. But more than physical courage was needed for his coming task. What of his moral powers?
He had been a member of Byng's court-martial, and though he had made some effort to obtain Parliament's
intervention after the sentence, he had been 'too frightened to lift up his voice' when he was questioned by
Mansfield and Hardwicke at the bar of the House of Lords.1 The memoirist Wraxall took a view of him which his
letters do not contradict: 'in self possession, judgment, superior maritime skill, and presence of mind; in all those
endowments of a great commander which ensure victory, I have always regarded him as deficient.'2 His health was
bad. He suffered constant pain from an old injury to his back, and at times it prevented him from walking.
This was the man who had been chosen to command the main fleet of England: a comparatively junior vice-
admiral, of good reputation but questionable firmness of character, and a personal and political enemy of the First
Lord. Only a few weeks before the breach with France he had complained to Sandwich of delay in promoting him,
which he attributed to his political opinions.3 Since Saratoga he had taken a most dispirited view of the country's
prospects. 'Full of alarm and uneasiness', he had predicted the loss of India and the West Indies if France entered
the war. When the time for action came, he saw the King; and in accepting the command of the Channel fleet he
asked that he should take under his orders only ships which he had inspected and agreed to be properly manned.
His motive was fear that he might have to 'answer for operations proportionate to my apparent, not my real
strength'. Since Sandwich's treatment of Keppel has been indicated, it is as well to be clear about Keppel's attitude
to Sandwich from the outset of his command.4
The weeks which followed were loud with Keppel's lamentations. On taking command he was promised twenty
sail of the line alleged to be ready in home ports, but only six of them were really ready for sea when he came to
inspect the list. The remainder, of course, were either refitting after their winter cruise or fitting out for the first
time as a result of the delayed mobilisation, and the work was slowed by the shortage of hands. To Rockingham,
whom he invited to visit him at Portsmouth, Keppel expressed
1 Nothing in the American War equals the baseness of these lawyers in procuring Byng's execution.
2 Wraxall Memoirs, I, 386.
3 Williams Transcripts, 27 Jan. 1778.
4 Keppel, II, 1315; Sandwich, II, 17.
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