Kristiansen Svein. Maritime Transportation: Safety Management and Risk Analysis

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In addition, there are always several concerned parties in the case of maritime

pollution accidents, such as the shipowner, cargo owner, local community (e.g. local

fishermen) and government. Because of the interests involved, maritime pollution

accidents often raise both political and legal issues with respect to overall management.

Figure 1 4.1 4. Decision-making process for the reporting of a polluting discharge. (Source: ICS, 2002.)

456 CH APTER14 EME RG ENCY PREPARE DNESS

Ta b l e 1 4 .1 6 . Pollution emergency plan for the event of tank overflow during loading or bunkering:

measures to be taken

3.1.2 Tank Overflow During Loading or Bunkering

Measures to be implemented immediately:

 Stop all cargo and bunkering operations, and close manifold valves

 Sound the emergency alarm, and initiate emergency response procedures

 Inform terminal/loading master/bunkering personnel about the incident

Further measures:

 Consider whether to stop air intake into accommodation and non-essential air intake to

engine room

 In the case of a noxious liquid substance, consider what protection from vapour

or liquid contact is necessary for the response team and for other crew members

 Consider mitigating activities such as decontamination of personnel who have been exposed

 Reduce the tank level by dropping cargo or bunkers into an empty or slack tank

 Prepare pumps for transfer of cargo/bunkers to shore if necessary

 Begin clean-up procedures

 Prepare portable pumps if it is possible to transfer the spilled liquid into a slack or empty tank.

If the spilled liquid is contained on board and can be handled by the pollution prevention team, then:

 Use absorbents and permissible solvents to clean up the liquid spilled on board.

 Ensure that any residues collected, and any contaminated absorbent materials used

in the clean-up operation, are stored carefully prior to disposal.

Source: ICS (2002).

Ta b l e 1 4 .1 7. Checklist for response to operational spill of oil or a noxious liquid substance

This checklist is intended for response guidance when dealing with a spill of oil or a noxious liquid

substance during cargo or bunkering operations. Responsibility for action to deal with other

emergencies which result from the liquid spill will be as laid down in existing plans, such as the

Emergency Muster List.

Actions to be considered (Person responsible) Action taken?

YES NO

Immediate Action

 Sound emergency alarm (Person discovering

incident)

 Initiate ship’s emergency response procedure

(Officer on duty)

Initial Response

 Stop all cargo and bunkering operations (Officer on duty) hh

 Close manifold valves (Officer on duty) hh

 Stop air intake to accommodation (Officer on duty) hh

 Stop non-essential air intake to machinery

spaces (Engineer on duty)

(continued)

14.8 POL LUTIO N EM ERGEN CY PLAN N I NG 457

Ta b l e 1 4 .1 7. Contin ued

This checklist is intended for response guidance when dealing with a spill of oil or a noxious liquid

substance during cargo or bunkering operations. Responsibility for action to deal with other

emergencies which result from the liquid spill will be as laid down in existing plans, such as the

Emergency Muster List.

Actions to be considered (Person responsible) Action taken?

YES NO

 Locate source of leakage (Officer on duty) hh

 Close all tank valves and pipeline master valves

(Officer on duty)

 Commence clean-up procedures using absorbents

and permitted solvents (Chief Officer)

 Comply with reporting procedures

(Responsible: Master)

Secondary Response

 Assess fire risk from release of flammable

liquids or vapour (Chief Officer)

 Reduce liquid level in relevant tank by dropping

into an empty or slack tank (Chief Officer)

 Reduce liquid levels in tanks in suspect area (Chief Officer) hh

 Drain affected pipeline to empty or slack tank

(Chief Officer)

 Reduce inert gas pressure to zero (Chief Engineer) hh

 If leakage is at pump room sea-valve, relieve

pipeline pressure (Chief Officer)

 Prepare pumps for transfer of liquid to other

tanks or to shore or to lighter (Chief Engineer)

 Prepare portable pumps for transfer of spilt

liquid to empty tank (Chief Engineer)

Further response

 Consider mitigating activities to reduce effect

of spilt liquid (Master)

 Pump water into leaking tank to create water

cushion under oil or light chemical to prevent

further loss (Chief Officer)

 If leakage is below waterline, arrange divers to

investigate (Master)

 Calculate stresses and stability, requesting shore

assistance if necessary (Chief Officer)

 Transfer cargo or bunkers to alleviate high stresses

(Chief Officer)

 Designate stowage for residues from clean-up

prior to disposal (Officer on duty)

Source: ICS (2002).

458 CH APTER14 EME RG ENCY PREPARE DNESS

Figure 14.15 indicates how an oil spill accident may be organized in order to be both

effective and well co-ordinated. The on-scene co-ordinator should have the necessary

authority to direct the vessel and manage the available resources relating to salvage, oil

spill containment and clean-up. In order to co-ordinate the mobilization of various

resources, an oil sp ill emergency team should support the on-scene co-ordinator with

representatives from the involved parties.

Figure 1 4. 15. Oil spill resp onse organization.

14.8 POL LUTIO N EM ERGEN CY PLAN N I NG 459

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and Police, Oslo.

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Cowley, J., 1994, Fire casualties and their regulatory repercussions. Conference IMAS 94, Fire Safety

on Ships, London, 26–27 May. Institute of Marine Engineers, London.

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Det Norske Veritas Strategic Research, Høvik, Norway.

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behaviour data. International Conference on Human Factors in Ship Design and Operation,

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International Chamber of Shipping and the International Shipping Federation, London.

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London.

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for the Safe Operation of Ships and Pollution Prevention, 1994 Edition. International Maritime

Organization, London.

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Administrations, Resolution A.788(19) adopted 23 November 1995.

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Consolidated Edition . International Maritime Organization, London.

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for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, and its Protocol of 1988: articles, annexes and certiﬁcates.

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REFERENCES 461

SAFETY MANAGEMENT

Any action for which there is no logical explanation will be deemed

‘‘company policy’’.

(‘‘Second Law of the Corporation’’)

15.1 INTRODUCTIO N

Broadly speaking, the objective of safety management is to ensure that activities such as

ship operations, for example, are carried out safely and efficiently. Safety management

should therefore be seen as an essential and integral element of the overall management

system of an organization. This chapter will examine some important aspects of safety

management and safet y management systems. This should only be considered as an

introduction to the topic, as safety management is a large and complex field of study that

could itself be the subject of a whole book.

Four aspects of safety management are given special attention in this chapter.

These are safety management in the context of Total Quality Management (TQM), the

International Safety Management (ISM) Code utilized within shipping, the topic of

auditing which is of great relevance for both TQM and the ISM Code, and finally the issue

of safety cultures, which is briefly introduced. This introduction will try to establish a

context for the discussion of these four important aspects of safety management. First, a

brief discussion of the vulnera bility of modern organizations is given. Secondly, different

strategies on how accidents can be avoided or prevented are presented. Thirdly, the

historic developm ent of the maritime safety management regime is reviewed.

15.1.1 TheVulnerability of Modern Organizations

Large-scale accidents such as those at Flixborough (1974), Bhopal (1984) and Chernobyl

(1986), the capsize of the Ro-Ro passenger and freight ship Herald of Free Enterprise

(1987), and the loss of the space shuttle Columbia (1986), have been attributed to the

increasing complexity of technology and organizations. According to Mitroff and

Pauchant (1990), ‘the potential for large-scale disasters seems literally to be built into the

very fibre an d fabric of modern civilization’. Mitroff and Pauchant illustrated this

situation with the Exxon Valdez grounding accident, which resulted in massive oil spills

and catastrophic environmental damage on the coast of Alaska. The company Exxon

463

Shipping was in for their judgement in deep trouble:

. Exxon Shipping (ES) was unable to make the necessary decisions to deal sati sfactorily

with the alcohol problem of the Master on Exxon Valdez.

. ES had just some weeks before the Exxon Valdez accident decided not to reassess their

environmental preparedness plan, primarily because they had never had any major

spills.

. It took almost one and a half days before ES started to respond to the Exxon Valdez

oil spill.

. Experts said that the company was in what is called a ‘restructuring blu es’ as the result

of a 28% reduction of the workforce. Even company executives admitted that certain

operations were 10% undermanned.

. An Exxon employee said: ‘The more things change at Exxon ...the more they have

stayed the same.’

. During the initiation of an internal inquiry into whether there was anything fundamen-

tally wrong with the huge company, ES’s president said: ‘We don’t believe there is ...’

. At a conference the president of ES denied that the management structure or culture

was at fault. Instead he put the blame on individuals onboard the ship and the ship

culture.

The analysis of Mitroff and Pauchant (1990) shows that crisis-prone companies are

unable to admit in a frank and honest manner that the companies are far from perfect and

professional. Instead they exhibit various defensive behaviours that are similar to those

experienced by individuals in crisis situations, such as narrow-mindedness and focus on

short-term survival.

1 5. 1.2 Acci dent Prevention Strategies

Before discussing different ways of managing safety, it is useful to take a pragmatic look

at how accidents can be avoided or prevented. Morone and Woodhouse (1986) have

proposed the following five accident prevention strategies:

1. Protect against the potential hazard: If we accept that accidents are inevitable, a

good strategy is to protect against the consequences of these accidents. For example,

in order to prevent oil pollution from grounding and collision accidents with tankers,

double hulls were introduced to withstand penetration of cargo oil tanks. Recently

it has been discussed whether high-speed marine vessels should have better strength

against impact from groundings and collisions to avoid rapid sinking resul ting from

such accidents. Such consequence-reducing measures are often very expensive to

implement.

2. Proceed cautiously: One way to interpret this strategy is to prepare and plan for

the worst possible accidents. This requires the use of, for example, formal safety

assessment (FSA) in order to identi fy all hazards and accident scenarios. Another

464 CH APTER 15 SA FETY MANAG EMENT

interpretation is that new technical solutions and methods of operation should be

considered dangerous until proven otherwise.

3. Test the risks: This strategy implies that simulations and testing should be

undertaken under realistic conditions in order to assess how the system responds

to certain conditio ns and situations. Important questions are whether realistic

conditions can be prepared and whether such testing is acceptable. Evacuation and

life-saving equipment/systems may be used as an exampl e. The function and

reliability of lifeboats and liferafts has been a topic of continuous discussion: Have

the equipment/systems been tested unde r realistic conditions? Is it acceptable to test

these systems with people under realistic conditions such as heavy seas, etc.?

4. Learn from experience: This principle has been generally accepted, but there is

still some way to go before it is satisfactorily implemented. The strategy is a question

about developing procedures for reporting, analysis and corrective response to non-

conformities, incidents and accidents. The main challenge today is to take the least

serious incidents into consideration. These incidents have the largest learning

potential by being the most frequent. It is a paradox that most resources today are

used on learning from infrequent accidents/catastrophes.

5. Set priorities: The safety manager is confronted with a large number of hazards

and accident scenarios. It is a key management function to continuously assess the

alternative risks the operation is confronted with and to give priority to the critical

ones or those with the highest beneﬁt-to-cost ratio. In other words, apply scarce

resources where the safety improvement is highest.

On the basis of this, we may try to identify which management functions are related

to these strategies. A simple categorization is shown in Table 15.1. This overview gives a

simple presentation of what we mean by safety management functions.

Some will perhaps say that these strategies and safety management functions reflect

too narrow an approach towards achieving safety and that we thus need a broader safety

orientation in order to reach a sustainable safety level. Table 15.2 proposes some elements

that constitute such a broader orientati on. The key idea is that safety must be reflected

in both company and human values and be visible in the so-called company culture.

The culture concept may be seen as a fairly vague term, and this will be addressed in

Ta b l e 1 5 . 1 . Strategies applied to prevent accidents with corresponding safety management functions

Strategies Safety management functions

Protect against potential hazards Engineering, Formal Safety Assessment (FSA)

Proceed cautiously Policy formulation

Test the risks Formal Safety Assessment (FSA), design verification

and testing

Learn from experience Accident reporting and analysis, inspections, auditing

Set priorities Policy formulation, Formal Safety Assessment (FSA)

15.1 INTRODUC T ION 465