Kristiansen Svein. Maritime Transportation: Safety Management and Risk Analysis
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It is also alarming to see that racism is quite widespread at sea and even on high
standard vessels (see Table 12.19).
12.7 THE GL OBAL LABO UR MARKET
There are some concerns about the general situation in the maritime labour market, not
least in view of the fact that the almost two-thirds of the world fleet is flagged under
offshore registries (not national flags). As ICONS (2000) states, it is critical to maintain ‘a
competent, rested and well-motivated crew’. The employment of seafarers takes place in
an international labour market which offers considerable flexibility in the hiring and firing
Ta b l e 1 2 . 1 5 . W ork load and fl ag standard: percentage reported
Flag standard Too large work load Too long working time
High 19 14
Medium high 22 11
Medium 18 14
Medium low 20 21
Low 29 31
Source: Alderton and Winchester (2001).
Ta b l e 1 2 . 1 6 . Rest and leave versus flag standard: percentage reported
Flag standard Too little rest and sleep Too short shore leave Too short holiday
High 15 25 14
Medium high 13 24 17
Medium 15 23 19
Medium low 16 29 30
Low 25 43 35
Source: Alderton and Winchester (2001).
Ta b l e 1 2 . 1 7. Stress and flag standard: percentage reported
Flag standard Too high stress level
High 22
Medium high 24
Medium 25
Medium low 29
Low 37
Source: Alderton and Winchester (2001).
356 CHAPTER 1 2 OC CUPATIONAL SA FETY
of crew. It is fair to emphasize that not everything is substandard, but there are many
examples of abuse, exploitation and denial of legal rights. This negative development was
started as a result of the oil crisis in the 1970s and the slump in world trade that forced
shipowners to reduce their operating costs. The present labour market is characterized to
a greater or lesser degree by the following (ICONS, 2000):
. Relative unattractiveness in developed economies
. Outsourcing of labour
. Questionable training standards
. Trainees failed to complete training
. Too many officers leave too early in their careers
. Reduced autonomy and standing for masters and senior officers
. Paying of unreasonable hiring fees to manning agents
. Practices of some manning agencies are criticized
. ‘Passport holders’: recruitment outside the authorized agencies or channels
. Fraudulent certificates
. A surplus of 224,000 ratings on a world-wide basis (BIMCO, 2000)
. Voyage-by-voyage employment
. Blacklisting for ‘offences’ like contacting union officials (10,000 in the Philipines
alone)
. ‘Quit claims’: P & I agents pressur e seafarers to accept compensation below what they
are entitled to
. Abuse and ill-treatment
. Non-payment of wages
. Abandoning of seafa rers in a foreign port
Ta b l e 1 2 .1 8 . General employment conditions and flag standard: percentage dissatisfaction reported
Flag standard Salary Job safety Moral, culture Social support
High 25 18 16 14
Medium high 28 25 18 22
Medium 35 27 17 24
Medium low 52 49 26 34
Low 52 39 29 43
Source: Alderton and Winchester (2001).
Ta b l e 1 2 . 1 9 . Racism versus flag standard: percentage reported
Flag standard Unfair treatment Physical abuse by officer Psychological/harassment
High 22 9 17
Low 33 19 34
Source: Alderton and Winchester (2001).
12.7 THE GLOBAL LABOUR MARKET 357
REFEREN CES
Alderton, T. and Winchester, N., 2001, The Flag State Audit. Proceedings of SIRC’s Second
Symposium, Cardiff University, 29 June. Seafarers International Research Centre, Cardiff, UK.
http://www.sirc.cf.ac.uk/pubs.html
Arner, O., 1970, Fatal Accidents among Seafarers [In Norwegian: Dødsulykker blant sjømenn].
Universitetsforlaget, Oslo.
BIMCO, 2000, BIMCO/ISF Manpower Update Summary Report, April.
Eriksen, S. I., 2000, Do We Take the Work Conditions in the Merchant and Fishing Fleet Seriously?
[In Norwegian: Tar vi arbeidsmiljøet i handels – og fiskefla
˚
ten pa
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alvor?]. Haugesundskonferansen,
15 Febuary, Haugesund.
Fletcher, N. et al., 1988, Work at sea: a study of sleep, and of circadian rhythms in physiological and
psychological functions, in watchkeepers on merchant vessels. VI. A sea trial of an alternative
watchkeeping system for the merchant marine. International Archives of Occupational and
Environmental Health, Vol. 61, 51–57.
Hansen, H. L. and Vinter, M., 2004, Occupational Accidents and Ship Design: Implications for
Prevention. Danish Society of Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering (Skibsteknisk
Selskab), http://www.skibstekniskselskab.dk/download/WMTC/A18(R99).pdf
ICONS, 2000, Inquiry into Ship Safety: Ships, Slaves and Competition. International Commission on
Shipping, Report ISBN 0-646-41192-6, Charlestown, NSW, Australia. http://www.icons.org.au/
images/icons_reportmedia.pdf
Iverga
˚
rd, T. (ed.) et al., 1978, Work Conditions in Shipping – A Survey. [In Swedish: Arbetsmiljo
¨
innom Sjo
¨
farten – En kartla
¨
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¨
fartens Arbetarskyddsna
¨
mnd, Stockholm.
Keltner, A. A., 1995, Stress management on board. In Wittig, W. (ed.), The Influence of the
Man-Machine Interface on Safety of Navigation. ISHFOB ’95: Proceeding of the
International Symposium on Human Factors on Board, Bremen, November, Verlag TU
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Rheinland.
Li, K. X. and Shiping, Z., 2002, Maritime professional safety: prevention and legislation on personal
injuries on board ships. IAME Panama 2002 Conference Proceedings, 13–15 November,
International Association of Maritime Economists.
Nielsen, D., 1999, Occupational accidents among seafarers. RINA Conference: Learning from
Marine Incidents, 20–21 October, Royal Institution of Naval Architects, London.
Nielsen, D., 2002, Safety and working conditions in international merchant shipping. IAME Panama
2002 Conference Proceedings, 13–15 November, International Association of Maritime
Economists.
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Personulykker). Norwegian Maritime Directorate, Oslo.
358
Parker, A. W. et al., 1998, A Survey of the Health, Stress and Fatigue of Australian Seafarers.
Australian Maritime Safety Authority, ISBN 0-642-32007-1, http://www.amsa.gov.au/SP/
Fastoh/
Sanquist, T. F. et al., 1995, United States Coast Guard alertness and fatigue research program
In Wittig, W. (ed.), The Influence of the Man-Machine Interface on Safety of Navigation.
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November, Verlag TU
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V Rheinland.
REFERENCES 359
13
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS
Life can only be understood backwards, but has to be lived forwards.
(Søren Kierkegaard, Danish author and philosopher)
13.1 INTRODUCTION
It should be more or less obvious that the basis for any kind of safety work should be firm
knowledge about why accidents happen – or, stated in the opposite way, what is safe
operation? A key source of such knowledge is lessons learned from accidents, incidents
or near-accidents.
Both maritime authorities and operators should base their activities on such
knowledge. Authorities are supposed to enforce and develop safety regulation, whereas
operators should strive to improve their safety performance.
The basis for sound accident analysis is that the fieldwork is done in a reliable and
thorough way:
. Who were involved: persons, vessels, agencies
. Under what conditions: weather conditions and sea state
. What happened: events in terms of errors and failures
. What triggered the events: immediate causes
. Why did it happen: basic causal factors related to humans and organizations
In this chapter we will give some background for accident analysis, mainly related to the
characteristics of a maritime operation. In addition, a few different approaches to accident
analysis will be outlined.
13.2 SAFETYAND LEARNING
Systematic and efficient safety work has to be based on a firm understanding of how the
maritime system functions and what kind of generic behaviour will minimize the risk of the
operation.
361
Safety work rests on three fundamental factors, namely motivation, knowledge and
methods, as elaborated upon in Table 13.1.
Safety work has to be based on a broad set of information sources. They are of both a
specific character and of more a general character, as indicated in Figure 13.1.
Incident-based information is also called retrospective information and is a vital source
for organizational learning within the company or regulatory institution. We may make a
distinction between the following events:
. Accid ents: events that lead to damage and environmental consequences, injury/
fatalities and economic loss.
. Incidents: events that are controlled before they lead to accidents.
. Non-conformities: deviations from accepted technical or operational tolerances.
The proactive approach will be discussed in Chapter 15 in relation to formal safety
management.
Ta b l e 13 . 1 . Key f ac tor s in s afety work
Factor Examples
Motivation Top management concern about safety matters
View of safety as a competitive business factor
Priority between safety, time and economics
Individual attitudes at all levels of the organization
Knowledge Risk level of operation
Frequency of incidents of various degrees of seriousness
Why do accidents happen?
Human attitudes and behaviour
Methods Risk analysis methods (FSA – Formal Safety Assessment)
Accident investigation techniques
Auditing and inspection methods
Reliability modelling
Figure 13.1. Sources of information about safe operation.
362 CHAPTER 13 ACCI DENT ANALYS IS
13.3 WHY ANAL YSE ACCIDENTS ?
13.3.1 Regulatory Requirement
All Flag States have regulations that specify the situations in which maritime accidents
will be investigated. The objectives are threefold:
. Identify causes and potential measures that will reduce the risk of similar accidents in
the future
. Identify weaknesses in the current regulations
. Establish liability and criminal conduct
Caridis et al. (1999) have discussed the organization of official investigations in European
countries and the USA. We will look further into this later in this chapter.
Official investigation of accidents should also be seen as an element in the continuous
development and enforcement of safety regulation. It should be evident that lessons
learned from accidents are an important input in this context. The key functions of
Maritime Administrations are:
. Flag State inspection of sailing vessels
. Port State control
. Survey and acceptance of new buildi ngs
. Approval of manning
. Audit of safety management system under ISM
. Monitor maritime traffic and dangerous cargoes
. Investigat e and analyse maritime accidents
As discussed earlier in this book, Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) will see wider use
in the future revision and development of international regulation. FSA is based on the
principles and methods of risk analysis and requires data on accident patterns and
frequencies. Table 13.2 illustrates the data needs for typical FSA methods.
Ta b l e 13 . 2 . Data needs in Formal Safety Assessment
Technique Relevant accident database information
Preliminary hazard
identification (PHA)
Accident type and consequence frequency
Event distribution
Correlation of accident type, events and consequences
Failure mode and effects
analysis (FMECA)
Failure modes for systems and components
Criticality based on correlation with consequence data
Fault tree analysis (FTA) For given accident type, distributions for events and causes
Correlation of events and causes
Frequency for basic events
Cost-benefit analysis Distributions for various consequence parameters:
economic and human loss
13.3 WHYANALYSE AC CIDENTS? 363
13.3.2 Management Needs
Safety management will be outlined and discussed in Chapter 15. It is sufficient here to
stress that a systematic approach must be based on information and data from all kinds
of non-conformities.
Typical question s that may be addressed in company accident investigations are:
. Accident frequency and severity rates by ship type
. Accident frequency trends (change over time)
. Accidents frequency by experience level or crew categor y
. Incidents by time of day or time into work shift
. Injuries for different jobs or tasks
. Severity of different accident types
Table 13.3 gives an idea of the various types of information that are needed for the
different management functions.
13.4 THE MARITIME SYSTEM
1 3.4. 1 Hierarchical Structure of Maritime Systems
Analysis and understanding of why casualties take place must be founded on an
understanding of how the maritime system functions. Description of the maritime system
may involve a number of dimensions. A crude conceptual model is outlined in Figure 13.2
(see page 366).
The system itself has two important dimensions, namely:
. Horizontal: Different systems elements operate in parallel and interaction. The
resultant perfor mance is a joint function of these elements. Examples: human–machine
interaction; system acquisition and personnel training.
. Vertical: The system as a number of decision levels. Seen from the top down it goes
from broad strategic aspect s to operative oriented actions with a limited scope.
Examples: top-level decisions on maintenance policy to low-level actions to control
safe speed in harsh weather.
It should also be pointed out that there are important relations between the decision
levels (Kjelle
´
n and Tinmannsvik, 1989). In general, a higher decision level puts restrictions
on the functionality of the lower level. As illustrated in Figure 13.2, the way the
departments are set up will influence or govern the quality of the key operative resources:
systems, crew and procedures.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the performance, or rather lack of performan ce,
will be reflected in different types of deviations or non-conform ities. A high-level devia-
tion might be management oversights, as seen in the upper right part of Figure 13.2.
A more critical kind is the fully developed casualty which in the first instance is related
to the operative level. It should, however, be pointed out that different forms of deviation
364 CHAPTER 13 AC CIDENT ANALY SIS
may reflect the same inherent problem in the maritime system in question. This is also
reflected in the fact that modern thinking in safety management works along a different axis:
. Experience feedback from accidents and incidents
. Inspection of systems and operation to detect hazardous states and behaviour
. Auditing of management system to detect oversights
Ta b l e 13 . 3 . Data needs in safety management
Function Relevant accident database information
Safety policy and culture Accident/incident frequency, accident-related costs
Social conditions, LTA supervision onboard
Resource allocation and priority
to safety activities
Accident/incident frequency,
accident-related costs
LTA maintenance policy and operations
Inadequate tools and equipment
Internal audits Reported incidents and non-conformities
Safety coordination Accident/incident frequency,
accident-related costs
Reported injuries and fatalities
Reported incidents and non-conformities
Organization, management,
business re-engineering
Less than adequate (LTA)
management
LTA personnel management, watch system
Social relations onboard
Non-conformances and incidents Reported incidents and non-conformities
Design, system acquisition,
system modification
Reported accidents and incidents related
to technical failure, dangerous material
and environmental impact
Inadequate tools and equipment
Maintenance-related problems
Personnel management,
hiring and training
Reported injuries and fatalities
Human error related accidents and incidents
Social relations onboard
LTA personnel management, watch system
LTA emergency preparedness
Physical stress, inadequate workplace conditions
LTA occupational health management
Maintenance management Accident/incident frequency, accident-related costs
LTA maintenance policy and operations
Inadequate tools and equipment
Maintenance-related problems
Emergency preparedness Human error related accidents and incidents
LTA emergency preparedness
13. 4 THE MARITI ME SYSTEM 365