Kristiansen Svein. Maritime Transportation: Safety Management and Risk Analysis

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There are about 40 class institutions in all and an owner is, in principle, free to select

a class among those institutions. As the owner has to pay for the class and associated

services, it may become a matter of trade-off between safety and cost:

. Class institutions offer different standards, control regim es and tariffs.

. They compete on price.

. Some are not serious in enforcing control and follow-up maintenance.

. Owners may ‘jump between institutions’ to avoid costly maintenance.

. Change of class means that an outstanding survey is delayed for 3 months.

Port State control clearly documents that the performance of the classification societies

differs quite substantially (Figure 3.7). The best classes have a detention rate in the order

of 1% whereas the worst are as high as 35%. The most notorious ones are: Register

of Albania (RS), International Register of Shipping – USA (IS), International Naval

Surveys Bureau – Greece (INSB) and Bulgarski Koraben Regista r (BKR). Against this

background, certain Flag States are contemplating banning vessels classed in specific

classification societies.

The serious class institutions are organized in IACS (International Association of

Classification Societies). The members cooperate in order to attain a harmonized standard

for the serious institutions. Finally, it should be pointed out that the serious institutions

maintain a high professional standard and contribute in many ways to the advancement of

the safety standard.

As already pointed out, the Classification Society may also unde rtake control tasks

on behalf of a Flag State administration. Presently they also undertake auditing tasks and

assignment of ISM Certificates.

3.6.1 The Ma ri ti me Code (SjÖlov e n)

The Maritime Code (MC) covers the legal aspects of shipping and ship operation as a

commercial activity. The law can be summarized by the following keywords:

. Registration of vessel

. Partnerships

. The Master of the vessel

SCANDIN A VIAN STAR FIR E

As already discussed in relation to Flag State control and SOLAS, there were some

shortcomings of the control that also were relevant for the class survey:

. A number of technical faults and missing components.

. No survey was undertaken immediately before the start-up of the operation

in Scandinavia.

76 CHAPTER 3 R U LES AN D REG ULATIONS

. Liability, and limitation of liability

. Contracts of affreightment, bill of lading

. Carriage of passengers

. Oil pollution and environmental liability

. Liability for collisions

. Salvage

. Marine insurance

. Maritim e inquiries

One of the controversial aspects of the Scandinavian Star accident was the unclear

ownership and the lack of involvement from Scandinavian maritime administrations.

S CAN DINA VIAN S TAR FI RE

The ship was owned and operated by a number of companies within the VR DaNo

group which in itself was not a legal entity. The ownership was related to K/S

Scandinavian Star, which chartered the vessel to Project Shipping Ltd on a bare-boat

basis. The mann ed vessel was further transferred on a time-charter to VR DaNo ApS.

As far as the investigation could establish, all these companies were related to a group

of persons representing a sphere of interests. The identity of the real owner was unclear

at the time of the accident and has yet not been fully established. It has been indicated

that the Danish owner only fronted for other parties, among which some well-known

Scandinavian companies have been mentioned. A more detailed description of the

company and owner structure is given in Figure 3.8.

The vessel had registration on the Bahamas under their Merchant Shipping Act of

1976. That means that neither the Norwegian nor the Danish Flag State administra-

tions were involved in the registration, and therefore had no direct jurisdiction over the

company or the vessel.

Figur e 3.7. Detention rate of classification societies (MOU, 2004).

3.6 CLASSI FICA TION SOCIETIES 77

The Master of a vessel has a special position in comparison to the other crew members.

The MC Chapter states that the Master:

. Has the highest authority on board

. Is responsible for seaworthiness

. Is responsible for seaworthiness in relation to the cargo

. Has the power to enter a contract with a salvage tug

Figure 3.8. Compan ies in the VR DaNo g r oup.

78 CHAPTER 3 R ULES AN D REGU LATIO NS

This philosophy has a historic background based on the fact that in the age of the

sailing ships, the shipowner had no daily control over his vessel and had to rely on the

trust and competence of his repres entative on board, namely the Master.

In today’s world of modern communication, the Master has the opportunity to report

and confer daily with the manager. Likewise the manager has the complete freedom

to instruct and control his vessel in detail. This means that the role of the Master has

changed significantly. This fact makes his unique authority and responsibility somewhat

outdated.

3.6.2 Liability

Liability in case of sea trans port is a large and complex topic. Here we shall only comment

on liability in relation to passengers and environment.

The Norwegian Maritime Code x418 covers the matter of liability in case of personal

injury and death to passengers. Liability will be imposed under circumstances where the

injury is caused by fault or neglect of the carrier. An important requirement, however, is

that the claimant must prove that:

. The harmful event took place during the voyage, and

. Was the result of fault or neglect by the carrier.

In other words, liability stemming from personal injury is objective. Presently x422 limits

the compensation to NOK 1,622,500 per passenger.

During the last 20–30 years the world has witnessed a number of serious ship accidents

with mass ive spil ls like Torrey Canyon, Amoco Cadiz and Exxon Valdez. This soon raised

the matter of liability related to environmental harm. The so-called CLC Convention

S CAN DINA VIAN S TAR FI RE

The Master entered the ship on 23 March, roughly two weeks before the

tragedy. During this short period the vessel was subject to continued modi-

fication work, manning and preparation of the operation. The clear message

from the owner was to get the vessel ready. The Master spent considerable time

on checking safety systems on board, and it must have become clear to him

that the vessel was not operationally ready with respect to vessel, manning or

routines.

There was no indication that the Master took this problem up with the

owner or tried to delay the start of the operation. This would have required

considerable personal and moral strength. Given the determination of the ship-

owner and the fact that the Master had got this commission after a consider-

able period of unemployment, the legal status of the Master becomes less

meaningful.

3.6 CLASSI FICA TION SOCIETIES 79

(the intervention and liability convention) was approved in 1969. It represented a radical

change in stating that:

. Owners of ships transporting oil as bulk cargo are made strictly liable for oil

pollution, with virtually no exceptions, and

. The amounts could only be lim ited to sums much larger than the general rules.

This means that, contrary to personal injury, in the case of an environmental accident a

claim can be put forward without proving negligence.

The United States has introduced its own rules through the Oil Pollution Act (EPA,

2004), which gives the plaintiff almost unlimited right to make the shipowner liable.

Activities on board a vessel may also be subject to prosecution under the Norwegian

Criminal Code of 1902. x12 contains rules with respect to personal acts and x48 covers the

provisions for companies. The main principle is that the same laws that apply ashore also

apply on Norwegian vessels.

SCANDIN A VIAN STAR FIR E

The owner of Scandinavian Star was made liable and sentenced for fault and neglect

mainly for securing adequate operational readiness. However, the fine was symbolic.

The passengers and relatives of the deceased were compensated as a result of a joint

agreement between the group and SKULD which covered the P & I insurance

(protection and indemnity or third-party liability).

It has also been speculated that the shipowner accepted the fine immediately, rather

than entering into legal battles over the ownership. If fraudulent circumstances had

surfaced as a result of a legal process, substa ntially larger fines might have been the

consequence.

80 CHAPTER 3 R U LES AN D REG U LATIONS

REFERENCES

Alderton, T. and Winchester, N., 2001, The Flag State Audit. Proceedings of SIRC’s Second

Symposium, Cardiﬀ University, 29 June. Seafarers International Research Centre, Cardiﬀ, UK.

http://www.sirc.cf.ac.uk/pubs.html

AMLG, 2004, Admirality and Maritime Law Guide – International Conventions. http://www.

admiraltylawguide.com/conven/unclospart2.html

EPA, 2004, Oil Pollution Act, US Environmental Protection Agency. http://www.epa.gov/region5/

defs/html/opa.htm

EQUASIS, 2004, EQUASIS – Public web-site promoting quality shipping. http://www.equasis.org/

Falkanger, T., Bull, H. J. and Brautaset, L., 1998, Introduction to Maritime Law: The Scandinavian

Perspective. Tano Aschehoug, Oslo.

ILLC, 2002, International Conference on Load Lines 1966, 2002 Edition. International Maritime

Organization, London.

ISM, 2002, International Safety Management Code (ISM Code) and Guidelines on Implementation of

the ISM Code, 2002 Edition. International Maritime Organization, London.

Kristiansen, S. and Olofsson, M., 1997, SAFECO – Safety of Shipping in Coastal Waters.

Operational Safety and Ship Management – WPII.5.1: Criteria for Management Assessment.

Report No. MT23 F97-0175, Marintek As, Trondheim, Norway.

MARPOL, 2002, MARPOL 73/78 Consolidated Edition 2002. International Maritime Organization,

London.

MOU, 2004, The Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control, Yearbook 2002.

http://www.parismou.org/

NAS, 1991, Tanker Spills: Prevention by Design. Committee on Tank Vessel Design, Marine Board,

National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences. The National Academies Press,

Washington, DC.

NOU, 1991, The Scandinavian Star Disaster of 7 April 1990. Norwegian Oﬃcial Reports NOR 1991:

1 E, Government Administration Services, Government Printing Service, Oslo.

Sjøfartsdirektoratet, 1998, Rules of the Norwegian Ship Control [In Norwegian: Den Norske

Skipskontrolls Regler]. Erlanders Forlag, Oslo.

SOLAS, 2001, SOLAS Consolidated Edition 2001. International Maritime Organization, London.

STCW, 1996, Convention on Standards of Training, Certiﬁcation and Watchkeeping for Seafarers,

1996 Edition. International Maritime Organization, London.

PART II

STAT IST IC AL METHOD S

STAT IST ICAL RIS K MONI TORING

A paradox of life: The risk taker may be undeservedly lucky, whereas the

prudent person may be struck by a catastrop he.

(Attributed to J. Reason)

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In order to manage risk it is of key importance to be able to monitor the safety level of the

operation. Key risk parameters are accident frequency and expected consequences in terms

of human suffering, environmental damage or economic loss. It is clear that accidents are

the result of complex interactions within the system, in relation to the operators and to the

environment. This means that both the occurrence and outcome of accidents are to some

degree stochastic in nature. It is therefore important that the risk manager has a good

understanding of how statistics can be used in the monitoring of accident phenomena. The

following presentation will highlight some key topics from statistical theory with strong

emphasis on the practical application in risk management.

4.2 STATISTICAL MEASURES

Let us consider a random variable with a known probability density function. The variable

may be characterized with certain statistical measures.

4.2.1 Mean,Weighted Mean

The mean of a random variable is also termed the average or expected value. It may be

viewed as the centre of gravity of the associated distribution. The most straightforward

way to compute the mean accident frequency rate (AFR) is to apply the sample mean for

N observations with value X

X ¼

i¼1