were designed and fabricated practically flawlessly and tested successfully. Cryo-
genic and structural facilities including digging of 15 miles of tunnels were
underway by 1992. In parallel, aided by new capabilities in particle simulations,
innovative designs of the Interaction Region were developed, which would help
future colliders. Two massive detector programs, the SDC and GEM, very similar
to the present LHC detectors, also got underway. Overall, the sweat and intellect of
2,000 physicists and engineers, over 300 of whom were from foreign countries,
were successfully creating the largest ever enterprise in physics. It was clear that
there were no serious physics or technical obstacles to achieving the 20-TeV energy
and the 10
33
cm
2
/s luminosity, except for some adjustments in parameters such as
an increase in FODO quadrupole aperture. The cost and schedule of the project with
contingencies were approved by two government-led panels. But by this time, the
cost estimate for the project had doubled to over 9 billion dollars, some of it related
to simply inflation due to delays in the approval of the project and the project-
funding profile. Part of the cost increase was also toward preservation of the
environment and the green field concept promoted for the Fermilab under Robert
Wilson in the 1950s. There was also some nervousness about the aperture of
quadrupoles and hardware to absorb the synchrotron radiation from orbiting
protons. There would be additional cost increases for this.
The state of Texas itself contributed $1 billion and the profile of federal funding
was established with a goal of full operation around the turn of the century.
Additional contributions from Japan and other countries were sought to cover at
least part of the cost increas e. While Japan was mulling over this contribution, the
mood in US congress was not conducive for projects that could be cut with no
political cost. Under the ferocious deficit reduction zeal, created and fueled by the
conservative US speaker Newt Gingrich, a cost increase was just the weapon the
opponents of the project in Texas and opponents of big science needed. The media
publicity on the project management also did not help. After an expenditure of
$2 billion, after the full and complete development of each of the major components
of the machine and after fully 1/3rd of the tunnel had been built well under cost and
ahead of schedule, the US congress, in a demonstration of their preference for
politics over priorities, voted in 1993 to terminate the project. The change of US
presidency also did much to let the project die.
The turbulent days of SSC were well captured by the New York Times (March
23, 1993) correspondent Malcolm Browne who wrote about the SSC director:
The project’s 48-year-old director, Dr. Roy F. Schwitters, is racing along an obstacle-
strewn course – beset by technical difficulties, the insistent demands of fellow scientists,
and the opposition of powerful critics in Congress, the public and some scientists. ...Dr.
Schwitters, whose impeccable manners and gentle demeanor contrast with his harrowing
life, spends much of his time traveling. The Oldsmobile he drives around Ellis County to
various sites is equipped with a radio-operated trunk to speed access to his hard hat, safety
glasses and technical instruments. Every week or so he visits Washington to testify, lobby
politicians and officials, and seek political support for the supercollider. Meanwhile, he
makes hundreds of technical decisions each week, for which he has to read reports, listen to
subordinates, inspect complex gadgets and study.
The Superconducting Supercollider Laboratory 201