RELATIVISTIC MASS
sions of existing theories. In the 1960s this so-called “Received View”
was challenged by Thomas S. Kuhn, Paul K. Feyerabend, and others,
who claimed that the development of science is a sequence of dis-
connected different canons of scientific thought, influenced to a great
extent by external factors.
27
The various stages in this sequence are
characterized by what Kuhn calls “paradigms” (or later “disciplinary
matrices”), which are “universally recognized scientific achievements
that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a commu-
nity of practitioners.” To adopt a new theory or paradigm means to
accept a completely novel conceptual scheme that has so little in com-
mon with that of the older, now rejected, theory that the two theories
are “incommensurable,” for no objective yardstick exists that makes
it possible to compare them. Furthermore, as the meaning of every
scientific term in a given theory depends upon the theoretical context
in which it occurs, even the individual scientific terms of the new
theory are incommensurable with the terms of the old one, despite
the fact that the same terminology is often retained. Any meaning-
invariance even of homonymous terms of different theories is therefore
strictly denied.
Two of the most frequently quoted incommensurable terms are the
“classical (Newtonian) mass” and the “relativistic rest mass.” Thus,
e.g., according to Feyerabend “the attempt to identify classical mass
with relative [i.e., relativistic] rest mass” cannot be made because these
terms belong to incommensurable theories.
28
In another context he says,
“That the relativistic concept and the classical concept of mass are very
different indeed becomes clear if we consider that the former is a relation,
involving relative velocities, between an object and a coordinate system,
whereas the latter is a property of the object itself and independent of its
behavior in coordinate systems.”
29
The thesis of the incommensurability of the classical and the relativis-
tic notions of mass can be defended not only on philosophical grounds
but also by physical arguments. It can be argued, following Erik Eriksen
27
T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1962, 1970). P. K. Feyerabend, Problems of Empiricism—Philosophical Papers, vol. 2
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
28
According to Feyerabend, Problems of Empiricism, “two theories will be called in-
commensurable when the meanings of their main descriptive terms depend on mutually
inconsistent principles.”
29
P. K. Feyerabend, “Problems of Empiricism,” in R. G. Colodny, Beyond the Edge of
Certainty (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 169.
57