Hess Earl J. Field Armies and Fortifications in the Civil War: The Eastern Campaigns, 1861-1864

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38 On to Richmond

Fort Totten, defenses of Washington. Ofﬁcers of Companies A and B, 3rd Massachu-

setts Heavy Artillery, with the crew of a 100-pounder Parrott gun. Note the neatly

whitewashed revetment, the sodded parapet, and the well-polished tube. (Library of

Congress)

surprised that so little had been done to fortify Washington. Any reluctance

to invest the time and money to dig in evaporated with the defeat at Bull

Run. McClellan assigned Barnard to oversee the construction of works north

of the river. He would devote his considerable expertise to this project for

much of the war, and he justly deserves the title ‘‘Father of the Washington

Defenses.’’ Construction would continue for the rest of the war, involve thou-

sands of troops and civilian workers as laborers, and cost $1.4 million. But all

this effort and money turned Washington into the most heavily fortiﬁed city

in the history of North America.

McClellan endorsed a plan developed at the instigation of the House of

Representatives (since Washington was a Federal city, the U.S. government

was responsible for its defense). The plan called for a system of forty-eight

forts mounting 300 guns. Barnard likened the project to Wellington’s Lines

of Torres Vedras, which protected the approaches to Lisbon, Portugal, during

On to Richmond 39

Magazine of Fort Totten, defenses of Washington. Gun crews demonstrate their readi-

ness at pieces mounted en barbette. Note the heavy timber facing of the magazine on

the right. Also note, in the foreground, the entrance to a tunnel (known as a postern)

that goes under the parapet and gives access to the ditch. This is on the gorge, or rear,

face of the fort. (Library of Congress)

the Peninsula War of the Napoleonic era. In both cases a system of ﬁeld

fortiﬁcations stretched for miles across the countryside. The idea was to

place enclosed works on key ground and sweep the surrounding area with

artillery ﬁre. Curtains consisting of ‘‘light parapets’’ could later be built to

connect these works and hinder enemy movement between them. Barnard

cited Napoleon himself, who had asserted that all national capitals are natu-

ral targets and should be heavily fortiﬁed.

Barnard went to work in August 1861 enlarging the line of works south

of the river as well. Names for the new forts were assigned the following

month, and most honored famous ofﬁcers, especially those recently killed.

Barnard spent an average of more than $7,000 on each fort in his plan,

employing a dozen engineers who were aided by civilian crew foremen. It

took about eight months to complete this initial phase of the fortiﬁcation

plan. The line of works, thirty-three miles long, required a garrison of 20,000

men, while the guns typically were 24-pounders and 32-pounders. There was

40 On to Richmond

Fort Slemmer, defenses of Washington. Like Fort Totten, Fort Slemmer guarded the

northeastern approaches to Washington. Note the line of abatis outside the fort, the

neatly packed but unsodded parapet, and the revetment made of sharpened, upright

logs to support the entrance. (National Archives)

yet no complete system of connecting infantry lines—that was a development

of the future—but the basic system of forts had been established. Twenty-

three were on the south side of the Potomac, from where everyone expected

the major threat, while fourteen forts and three batteries screened the west

and north sides of the city between the Potomac and the Anacostia River.

Eleven additional forts were constructed south of the Anacostia and east of

the Potomac.

When he compared his handiwork with the Lines of Torres Vedras, Bar-

nard noted that the Washington defenses had fewer but larger forts and far

less auxiliary construction, such as abatis, palisades, and military roads.

Fewer guns were mounted at Washington, but of course they were heavier

and more powerful than those available to Wellington. In weight, the Fed-

eral artillery around the capital was double the tonnage at Torres Vedras.

∞∞

By the time McClellan was ready to launch his Peninsula campaign, Wash-

On to Richmond 41

ington was secure. The line of forts would be greatly enhanced over the next

three years so that it became an iron vise around the city, absolutely impene-

trable if manned by sufﬁcient numbers of troops. But the defenses also

created a dilemma for Union commanders. To man them adequately re-

quired a lot of troops who could be better employed in the ﬁeld armies that

were taking the offensive into the heart of the Confederacy. The massive

earthworks became a burden, creating the necessity for hard choices in troop

deployment. But the political nerve center of the Union had the shield it

needed in case of emergency. Washington required fortiﬁcations; it was wide

open and potentially in the path of invading Confederate armies.

Defenses of Richmond

The defense of Richmond was not undertaken with such decisiveness or

lavish expenditure of time, money, or manpower. Consequently, even though

it needed protection, the Confederate capital was fortiﬁed in a haphazard

fashion. Responsibility for the defenses was divided among three govern-

mental levels—the city, the state, and the Confederate—as Richmond was

the capital of both Virginia and the Confederacy. The city asked the state to

begin fortifying, but initial efforts were later deemed inadequate by central

authorities. Believing the works were too close, a more forward line was

planned. When McClellan approached in the spring of 1862, another, more

forward line was built. As a result, not one but three lines of works were

constructed to defend the Confederate capital.

Richmond also was vulnerable to a drive up the James River by Federal

gunboats. When Robert E. Lee commanded the Virginia Forces, he pushed

for the construction of batteries below the mouth of the Appomattox River.

The site of old Fort Powhatan, twelve miles south of the Appomattox, was

the ﬁrst location chosen. It was followed by works built on Jamestown Is-

land, Hardin’s Bluff, Mulberry Island, and Day’s Point.

Lee also initiated the construction of forts just outside the city. When a

committee of the Richmond City Council asked him on May 9, 1861, to

consider fortifying Richmond, Lee ordered Andrew Talcott, the chief engi-

neer of the state of Virginia, to look into the matter. Talcott initially recom-

mended that four or ﬁve redoubts built along key roads outside Richmond

would ‘‘afford all the protection required at this time, and be fully within

[my] means to construct and of the State to defend.’’ He envisioned the

works as big enough to hold 600 men. Talcott proceeded in an unhurried

fashion. First, he and his subordinates conducted a thorough topographical

survey to decide where to place the redoubts. Then they traced the outline

on the ground. Next, he placed an order for the ordnance to arm them. Lee

42 On to Richmond

reported that the work was slowed by a shortage of labor, and he wanted the

city council to take action on the matter.

∞≤

The Committee on Defenses in the Richmond city government recom-

mended that the mayor ‘‘impress the services of such free negroes he may

think proper to work on the fortiﬁcations around the city.’’ The committee

also strongly suggested that ‘‘it is not alone the duty of our citizens to build

them, but as this city is an important point to the Confederate Government,’’

the Davis administration should take charge of the project and pay at least

part of the expense. Secretary of War Leroy P. Walker agreed to share costs.

Hundreds of free black and slave laborers were sent to the line, fed, and

housed by state authorities.

∞≥

Meanwhile, Confederate authorities examined Talcott’s line and found

many faults. First, it was too close to prevent the Yankees from bombarding

the city. Second, all the guns were to be mounted en barbette, so that they

could ﬁre over the parapet instead of through embrasures cut into it. This

would expose the gun crews to enemy ﬁre as they worked their pieces. Third,

the line was too short, essentially covering only the eastern approaches to

the city. The engineers recommended that a longer and more forward line be

constructed, and that the ﬁrst line be completed so it could serve as a support

to the new line. They wanted to cover at least some of the northern and

southern approaches to Richmond. Thus, the initial position came to be

called the Inner Line, and the new position would be known as the Inter-

mediate Line.

∞∂

Work on the Richmond fortiﬁcations proceeded at a slow pace, perhaps

because of the victory at First Manassas, which promised to keep the Yankees

some seventy miles north of the city. Little progress had been accomplished

by the time Maj. Danville Leadbetter, acting chief of the Confederate Engi-

neer Bureau, inspected them in October 1861. He found that serious prob-

lems impeded the arming of these works. Only six guns had thus far been

mounted. Thirty more were available but lacked carriages due to a shortage

of mechanics and skilled laborers to construct them. Talcott assured Lead-

better that the state authorities wanted the Confederate government to take

charge of the defenses, and the acting bureau chief agreed. Even though he

had no engineer ofﬁcers to supervise the defenses full time, he hoped the

civil engineers already working on them could handle the job for a while.

∞∑

Thus responsibility for the city defenses was shifted to the governmental

authority with the best prospects for shouldering it. This did not speed up

work. The slaves and free blacks earlier pressed into service were released

after a reasonable amount of time, and black convicts were put to work on

the fortiﬁcations. Even by late February 1862 the works were only ‘‘fairly well

On to Richmond 43

started,’’ in Leadbetter’s words. Eighteen forts or semi-enclosed works were

under construction along the Inner Line, with seven outworks. The line was

twelve miles long and between one and one and a half miles from the city. It

needed 218 heavy guns, but there was little prospect of that number becom-

ing available any time soon.

∞∏

Until an imminent threat appeared, there was no pressing need to com-

plete the armament of the existing forts or to initiate the construction of

new ones. Thus many months were wasted that winter that could have been

used to perfect a defensive system that rivaled the one already surrounding

Washington.

Ball’s Bluff

Months of Federal inactivity followed the disaster at Bull Run. Confeder-

ate forces assumed positions in a wide arc along the south side of the Poto-

mac River, with the far left at the village of Leesburg, thirty-ﬁve miles up-

stream from Washington. Leesburg was held by Col. Nathan G. Evans, whose

Mississippi and Virginia brigade watched the fords and ferry crossings of the

upper Potomac. He built Fort Evans, a sizable redoubt two miles east of town

near the road linking Leesburg with Edward’s Ferry. It enclosed one and a

half acres and was used by Evans as his headquarters. The fort was situated

on high ground, with a good view in all directions and gentle, irregular

slopes surrounding it.

Another work called by the Federals the Masked Battery was built where

the Edward’s Ferry Road crossed Cattail Run. The emplacement was on the

western bluff of the creek, about twenty feet above the bottomland. It strad-

dled the road with a single parapet and a good ditch in front. The parapet, of

which about seventy yards remain, had a protruding, angular bastion to

protect the left wing.

Evans completed these two works before the Federals advanced against

his position in October. While Fort Evans had big, well-made parapets, the

Masked Battery was a minor ﬁeldwork that nevertheless presented a good

front to an approaching enemy. Both works were vulnerable to turning

movements.

∞π

On the Maryland side of the river opposite Evans’s position, Brig. Gen.

Charles P. Stone commanded a Federal division of three brigades. McClellan

initiated a series of moves in late October designed to see if Evans could be

compelled to evacuate Leesburg. The Rebels had just pulled back from their

advanced positions along the rest of the Potomac River line, so McClellan

sent a division under Brig. Gen. George A. McCall to occupy Dranesville, ﬁf-

teen miles southeast of Leesburg. This move merely made Evans more watch-

44 On to Richmond

ful, so McClellan instructed Stone to move across the Potomac to threaten the

Rebels more directly. Stone was to feint a crossing at Edward’s Ferry while

making his real strike at Smart’s Mill Ford, near Harrison’s Island in the

middle of the river. Just downstream from Smart’s Mill Ford lay Ball’s Bluff, a

steep, eighty-foot-tall eminence virtually unguarded by the Confederates. A

series of events led the Federals to move a considerable number of troops

over Harrison’s Island and up the narrow path ascending Ball’s Bluff. It

became the main line of approach, despite its obvious difﬁculties.

The result of these moves was a Union ﬁasco. While Stone supervised the

crossing of Brig. Gen. Willis A. Gorman’s brigade at Edward’s Ferry, Col.

Edward D. Baker was to cross at Ball’s Bluff to reconnoiter Evans’s position on

October 21, 1861. He soon was pushing his entire brigade up the bluff, and a

sharp battle developed on top of the height. Evans realized that Gorman’s

crossing was a feint, so he sent all available troops to the bluff. They attacked

the Federal line, which stretched across a small open ﬁeld and was anchored

on both ends at the edge of the bluff. It was one of the most undesirable posi-

tions to be in, backed up against a precipitous cliff with a winding trail

leading to a narrow bottomland and a hazardous crossing of the river. Baker

was killed, and Union attempts to break through the trap and retreat to

Edward’s Ferry were unsuccessful. Subsequent Confederate attacks forced

the harried Unionists to retreat under ﬁre. There were not enough boats

for everyone to cross, so many Federals drowned, pelted by Confederate

riﬂe ﬁre. Of 1,720 men engaged, the Yankees lost 869 killed, wounded, and

captured. The Confederates had almost the exact number engaged but lost

only 155.

∞∫

The next day, October 22, the 13th Mississippi attacked Gorman’s 2,000

men, who had dug in on the south side of the Potomac at Edward’s Ferry. Gor-

man’s skirmishers were driven into the works, but the Confederates failed to

press home an attack due to the strength of the position. Nevertheless, Stone

ordered Gorman to withdraw to the Maryland side that evening.

∞Ω

Confederate reinforcements were rushed to Leesburg after the battle, but

the Federals had no more heart for offensive moves in this area. The battle

led to increased digging by the Rebels. Daniel Harvey Hill initiated the con-

struction of two more redoubts, Fort Johnston to the north of Fort Evans and

Fort Beauregard about a half-mile south of it. Some of the latter work re-

mains, a straight parapet about 300 yards long. It has a good trench but no

ditch in front of the parapet. Interestingly, the Confederates constructed a

series of short traverses, only one yard long, placed every thirty yards along

the extant line. It is the earliest surviving example of traverses dug for the

protection of infantry in a ﬁeld fortiﬁcation of the eastern theater.

≤≠

On to Richmond 45

Atlantic Coast

While the armies were ﬁghting between Richmond and Washington, op-

erations were taking place along the Atlantic coast that were designed to

nibble away at the edges of the Confederacy. Its long coastline was vulner-

able, and the Northern navy controlled the coastal waters. There was ample

opportunity to exploit this advantage to close down seaports and open the

way for incursions inland.

The ﬁrst target was the most vulnerable: two Rebel forts on the thin line

of barrier islands that protected much of North Carolina’s coastline. Fort

Hatteras and Fort Clark covered inlets through this line of islands that gave

access to the wide, calm sounds that lay between the barrier and the main-

land. The landscape here—narrow, ﬂat, treeless, and sandy—did not allow

for the deployment of large numbers of troops or much heavy ordnance.

With little in the way of naval power, the Confederates were not able to offer

much support to these forts.

The expedition against them, as well as subsequent operations along the

coast for the rest of the fall, winter, and spring to come, was essentially an

amphibious operation. Each of these expeditions had a greater or lesser

number of infantry cooperating, but their role was primarily to occupy points

blasted into submission by naval gunﬁre. The only exception to this rule was

the invasion launched by Brig. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside on the North

Carolina coast, which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

Burnside waged a sustained campaign that not only penetrated the seacoast

but drove some distance inland to occupy a number of points. All of the

others merely seized toeholds on the coast that could be enlarged if future

operations demanded it.

Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler led the ﬁrst of these expeditions against the

barrier islands. He commanded 860 infantrymen; the main power lay in the

guns aboard the seven warships, commanded by Flag Ofﬁcer Silas H. String-

ham. His ships bombarded Fort Hatteras and Fort Clark on August 28, 1861,

compelling their surrender the next morning. The infantry landed to take

control of the works.

≤∞

A much larger expedition was organized to take Port Royal and Beaufort,

South Carolina, which were protected by two strong fortiﬁcations on coastal

islands. Fort Beauregard, on St. Phillips Island, and Fort Walker, across the

sound on Hilton Head Island, were major obstacles to a Union thrust up the

Broad River. Brig. Gen. Thomas W. Sherman commanded 12,000 Federal

infantrymen who accompanied the ﬂeet of seventeen warships under Flag

Ofﬁcer Samuel F. Du Pont. The powerful ﬂeet bombarded both forts on

November 7, 1861, and compelled them to surrender. Sherman’s men landed

46 On to Richmond

to occupy the fortiﬁcations, the islands, and the two port cities, but no

incursion inland was planned.

≤≤

The Federal attack on Fort Pulaski, at the mouth of the Savannah River,

involved very few infantrymen. Engineer Capt. Quincy A. Gillmore directed

operations there. He planted batteries on Tybee Island under cover of dark-

ness and opened a bombardment on April 10, 1862, with thirty-six guns. Nine

of the cannon were riﬂed. The guns blasted the masonry walls of the fort for

thirty hours, breached them, and compelled the garrison to surrender. One

regiment of Federal infantry had helped Gillmore and the engineers to con-

struct their batteries, and of course, infantrymen occupied the surrendered

fort; but no movement inland was contemplated.

≤≥

The comparative ease with which the Federals reduced coastal defenses

led the Confederates to evacuate their remaining forts on exposed islands in

the winter and spring of 1862. The Yankees could bring their strengths—

heavy naval guns and control of the waters—to bear against overextended

Confederate resources. A better strategy lay in concentrating men and guns

at key locations such as Charleston and the Cape Fear River approach to

Wilmington and in strengthening individual earthworks so they could be a

defensive match for offensive ﬁrepower. This strategy proved to be quite

successful.

3:Western Virginia and Eastern North Carolina

hile military operations unfolded in the corridor be-

tween Washington, D.C., and Manassas, Union forces

also launched successful efforts deep in the western

counties of Virginia and along the coastline of North

Carolina. Field fortiﬁcations were used by both sides as

the Federals achieved limited but important victories in these two regions.

Western Virginia

The ﬁrst sustained, deep penetration of Confederate territory began in

northwestern Virginia in June 1861. Situated across the Ohio River from free

territory, this area was a vulnerable shoulder of the Confederacy. Union

troops entered it initially to protect the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and

then enlarged their presence on Virginia soil to the degree that they were en-

gaging in an invasion. Within the ﬁrst year of the war, they would secure the

ﬁrst large section of Confederate territory liberated from the secessionists.

George McClellan gained his ﬁrst public fame by commanding the troops

that initially crossed the Ohio. Acting on reports that the railroad bridges

were being destroyed by Confederate troops, he rushed several regiments

into Virginia on May 27 and easily chased the Rebels away from the railroad.

Col. Benjamin F. Kelley, who had recently organized a Union regiment at

Wheeling, planned and led a strike against those Confederates who had

fallen back to Philippi, thirty miles from the railroad at Grafton. The result-

ing engagement on June 3 sent the Confederates ﬂeeing southward.

McClellan believed that the best line of advance into western Virginia was

not here but farther south, along the Great Kanawha River Valley. Charleston

and Gauley Bridge were key locations along that route. Yet he felt it was

necessary to postpone an advance along that line in order to personally take

charge of the growing Union concentration already operating along the line

of the Staunton-Parkersburg Turnpike, which connected Grafton and Phi-

lippi. This pike was the major road through the northern portion of the

Virginia mountains. It started at Staunton in the middle range of the Shenan-

doah Valley and ran to McDowell, then crossed Alleghany Mountain and

Cheat Mountain and headed northward up the valley of Tygart’s River