Hess Earl J. Field Armies and Fortifications in the Civil War: The Eastern Campaigns, 1861-1864
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2:On to Richmond
A
lthough fighting with improvised armies, the field com-
manders of the Civil War often recognized the value of
fortifications. At Big Bethel, First Manassas, and Ball’s
Bluff, field fortifications were used in peripheral ways
that often had little impact on the outcome of the bat-
tles, yet field armies dug in deeper and more widely after each engagement.
The capital cities of the opposing sides were ringed with the beginnings of
massive earthworks designed to protect the political and administrative cen-
ters of the Union and Confederate war efforts. Even along the Atlantic sea-
coast, fortifications came to play a role in combined operations designed to
close blockade-running ports and open the door to future Union incursions
on the edges of Confederate soil.
Big Bethel
One of the first battles of the war occurred near Big Bethel, a rural church
on the Yorktown Peninsula. The Federals had retained control of Fortress
Monroe on the tip of the Peninsula after Virginia seceded from the Union on
April 17. Monroe was one of three forts in the seceded states still under Union
control. It was strategically located to serve as a jumping-off place for an
advance up the Peninsula to Richmond. Such an attempt would be made by
McClellan the following spring. In May 1861, Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler
occupied the post with a small garrison and easily controlled Hampton and
Newport News as well.
The Confederates shifted troops to Yorktown, halfway up the Peninsula
and the site of the American victory that had brought the Revolution to
a close in 1781. Col. Daniel Harvey Hill’s 1st North Carolina (six months)
reached Yorktown on May 25 and began to dig in. ‘‘We worked all night
throwing up fortifications,’’ Hill wrote his wife, and ‘‘are now in a very strong
position and I have not the slightest uneasiness.’’ His men dug along the most
advantageous ground outside town, which happened to be the same spot
where Lord Cornwallis had planted his own works eighty years earlier. The
British earthworks that protected the town were reworked and incorporated
into Hill’s new line. The diggers uncovered ‘‘human bones, powder, car-
On to Richmond 29
tridges, bombshells,’’ and other relics of the Revolution, according to Lewis
Warlick of Hill’s regiment. The Tar Heels dug day and night, a novel occupa-
tion for many of them. ‘‘We do all this work ourselves,’’ bragged Francis
Marion Parker, ‘‘have no negroes to help us; our boys say they intend going to
ditching when they get back home; that they are getting to be experts at
handling the shovel and spade. It goes right tough with some, who have
never been used to any thing of the kind before.’’ Soon the Rebels had
a strong position that Hill was certain could withstand attacks by 10,000
Yankees.
∞
Hill led the 1st North Carolina to a forward post at Big Bethel, some
thirteen miles from Yorktown and eight miles from Hampton, on June 6.
Here the road between the two towns crossed the northwest branch of Back
River. Hill built a mile-long infantry trench and placed a redoubt just south
of the line to cover the bridge that crossed the branch. This redoubt was an
enclosed artillery emplacement that also accommodated firing positions for
infantry. It was designed by both Hill and Lt. Col. Charles C. Lee of the 1st
North Carolina and was constructed on the night of June 7 and all day on
June 8. The regiment had only twenty-five spades, six axes, and three picks.
Two spots forward of the main position were fortified for artillery, one for a
single gun to cover the right flank. The land around Big Bethel is flat, but the
northwest branch of Back River forms a valley 150 yards wide just south of
the redoubt. The Tar Heels, positioned mostly in the work, could easily cover
the bridge with their fire. Col. John B. Magruder arrived on June 8 to take
command of the Rebel forces, bringing with him several companies of Vir-
ginia infantry, cavalry, and some guns.
≤
Butler decided to eliminate this outpost, even though he knew it was well
fortified. Among other reasons, he wanted to prevent the Confederates from
rounding up slaves to work on the defenses of Yorktown. Butler sent 3,500
men and two guns under Brig. Gen. Ebenezer W. Pierce toward Big Bethel on
the night of June 9. Magruder had 1,800 men and five guns to defend the
position. The Yankee approach led to some hasty entrenchment by the 3rd
Virginia, which was placed to cover Magruder’s right. The men ‘‘worked with
great rapidity,’’ according to Hill, ‘‘and in an hour had constructed tempo-
rary shelters against the enemy’s fire.’’ The Federals pressed forward along
Hampton Road to keep the Rebels occupied in front while troops tried to
outflank the position. On the right, the 3rd Virginia evacuated its meager
works, but a countercharge by a portion of the 1st North Carolina recovered
the one-gun emplacement and forced the Federals to retire. Other com-
panies of the 1st North Carolina stopped the Yankee threat to the left. There
was a lot of noisy firing all around, but the Federals did not push home their
30 On to Richmond
advance on Magruder’s front. After about an hour, the Yankees retreated to
Hampton, and the battle was over.
≥
It was a meaningless defeat for the Federals but a stimulating victory for
the Rebels. The 1st North Carolina, which made up the bulk of the Confeder-
ate troops under fire, had held the redoubt well. Balls flew over their heads
and buried themselves in the nearby parapet. ‘‘We were greatly protected by
our breastworks,’’ crowed Lewis Warlick; ‘‘if it had not have been for them we
would have been slaughtered by numbers.’’ Only one man in John Thomas
Jones’s company was injured, and that was merely a scratch on his face.
∂
The battle taught members of the 1st North Carolina the value of earth-
works. Hill’s command returned to Yorktown and immediately strengthened
the fortifications. ‘‘The men don’t dislike it near so much as they did before
the fight at Bethel, where they saw the necessity of building them,’’ reported
Egbert A. Ross to his sister. Francis Marion Parker, who still was proud that
no slaves had been used to build the works, admitted the same to a friend.
‘‘Before the action our men seemed unwilling to use the spade and shovel so
constantly; but seeing how effectually the trenches screened them from
Yankee bullets, they are perfectly willing to do any amount of that kind of
work.’’ Hill reported that if all Confederate regiments dug as well as his Tar
Heels, ‘‘there would not be an assailable point in Virginia. After the battle
they shook hands affectionately with the spades, calling them ‘clever fellows
and good friends.’ ’’ What had seemed like formidable fortifications before
Big Bethel now appeared inadequate, but the additional work transformed
them into the kind of protection the Tar Heels required. The North Carolin-
ians were convinced that at least 25,000 Yankees were needed to take them
by storm.
∑
The story of Big Bethel illustrates a common tendency among Northern
and Southern soldiers in the first half of the war. Their campaigns often
involved some degree of earthwork construction even if the average soldier
doubted the usefulness of the labor he expended. The first battle usually
taught the men differently, and it was often followed by a spate of increased
digging. The Tar Heels were unusually frank in their expressions following
the battle of June 10, and their extra work demonstrated how seriously they
took the lesson; but this attitude did not necessarily translate into consistent
progress toward a full realization of trench warfare. The members of Hill’s
1st North Carolina went home in November, after their six-month term of
enlistment was over. Many eventually joined other, long-term units, espe-
cially the 11th North Carolina. None of these men indicated in their subse-
quent letters that they continued to feel so warmly about the value of for-
tifications. It was necessary for soldiers to be repeatedly taught that lesson in
On to Richmond 31
several campaigns before they were willing to dig in as they would do auto-
matically by the spring of 1864. Long months of fighting, often in the open,
were to follow before commanders and soldiers alike embraced fortifications
fully and consistently.
First Manassas, Manassas Junction, and Centreville
First Bull Run was the first major battle of the conflict. The climax of the
initial Union drive toward Richmond, it came to grief only thirty miles south
of Washington near Manassas Junction. The Confederates were acting on
the defensive, guarding the approaches to Richmond, and at first relied only
halfheartedly on fortifications to block Union progress. The battle was an
open field fight with no earthworks involved, but the Confederates hastened
to dig in much more thoroughly after the engagement.
As commander of Virginia Forces, Maj. Gen. Robert E. Lee recognized the
value of Manassas Junction as a forward line of defense for Richmond. He
told local commanders in late May 1861 that it had to be held at all costs.
Suggesting they dig in along Bull Run Creek, Lee promised to send entrench-
ing tools. Brig. Gen. G. T. Beauregard took command of Confederate forces
at the junction on June 1, 1861. He had graduated second in his West Point
class in 1838 and had served as an engineer officer on Winfield Scott’s staff
during the Mexican War. Beauregard thoroughly examined the lay of the
land around the junction. It was mostly a flat plain surrounded by rolling
countryside, an ideal place for a railroad junction but less suitable for de-
fense than the topography along Bull Run, a short distance to the northeast.
Beauregard ordered Brig. Gen. James Longstreet’s brigade to dig modest
earthworks at the junction, but he intended to place most of his strength at
the creek. Longstreet’s men grumbled at doing hard labor, so Beauregard
called on local planters. Claiming that his soldiers could not be spared from
drill, he asked the civilians to send ‘‘such of their negro men, as they can
spare,’’ well supplied with spades and picks.
Beauregard placed most of his troops along the creek and at various points
along the roads that approached Manassas. Six detachments of twenty-five
men each, with axes, spades, and picks, were sent to cut trees and dig ditches
across the roadbeds near Fairfax Court House, Centreville, and other spots
well forward of Bull Run. Beauregard wanted to delay a Union advance long
enough to give him time to concentrate his strength. Other than some slight
defenses planned by Capt. Walter H. Stevens at Fairfax Court House, there
were no works at these advanced places because Beauregard had no inten-
tion of defending them. Yet he did not build works along the west side of Bull
Run either. He could well have done so, for there were numerous fords easily
32 On to Richmond
accessible to the Federals, and even a small, resolute force behind a well-built
earthwork could have delayed a crossing for some time.
Beauregard changed his mind after the Federals approached his position.
Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell’s 30,000 men were slowed by the road obstruc-
tions, but the Yankees launched a reconnaissance in force on July 18. Press-
ing forward against Blackburn’s Ford and Mitchell’s Ford, they fired a lot of
artillery and skirmished with the Rebels, but they did not take advantage of
a ridge on the north side of the stream that Beauregard called ‘‘an admirable
natural parapet.’’ It was nearly fifty feet higher than the ground occupied by
the Confederates. Even this tentative Union advance was enough to propel
the Confederates into a spate of entrenchment. All day of July 19 the troops
dug in at the fords, constructing works designed by Lt. Col. Thomas H.
Williamson and Capt. David B. Harris.
Erroneous reports that the Confederates were well fortified on July 18 con-
tributed to an exaggerated fear of earthworks among the Federals. Northern
newspapers had been filled with ‘‘columns of balderdash’’ about masked bat-
teries, which supposedly were concealed artillery emplacements that could
ambush the Yankees as soon as they appeared on a quiet road. ‘‘I doubt there
was a soldier in our regiment,’’ recalled Abner Small of the 3rd Maine, ‘‘who
hadn’t already written home tall tales of concealed rifle-pits, mined roads
and bridges, and masked batteries, which had no existence except in the ink
pots of the penny-a-line journalists.’’
The battle that took place on July 21, 1861, involved some 60,000 troops
on both sides. The Federals held the Confederates in place along the creek
while a strong flanking column used a ford upstream to cross and attack
Beauregard’s left. This assault was stalled by hard-fighting Confederates,
especially Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson’s Virginia brigade on Henry House
Hill, allowing more Rebel troops to gather for the climax of the engagement.
Reinforced by troops newly arrived from the Shenandoah Valley under Gen.
Joseph E. Johnston, the Confederates counterattacked and drove the Yankee
army from the field, creating a panic that turned the retreat into a rout.
∏
Beauregard greatly increased the troop concentration at Manassas Junc-
tion and began to dig extensive earthworks after the victory. Nearly a dozen
forts of all sizes were constructed around the junction with some connecting
infantry trenches. The works covered all approaches to Manassas and strad-
dled the two rail lines that ran to it, the Orange and Alexandria Railroad and
the Manassas Gap Railroad. At least two works were constructed on high,
commanding hills a half-mile and a mile to the east of the line, known today
as Mayfield Fort and Signal Hill. In addition to the works at the junction,
Beauregard maintained the older fortifications at the fords across Bull Run.
On to Richmond 33
Confederate line, Manassas Junction. Note how the artillery emplacement and em-
brasure have been constructed. The connecting line on the other side of the railroad
grade has a parados, and the Confederates have made extensive use of barrels for
traverses in the works farther away. (The Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleve-
land, Ohio)
When members of the 21st North Carolina crossed the stream at Blackburn’s
Ford on their way to the junction in early November, they came across the
Creole general inspecting the damage done to his works by rising waters.
‘‘It will require much labor to restore them,’’ commented a soldier in the
Tar Heel regiment, ‘‘since the water completely hid them from view at
many places.’’
π
The works at Manassas Junction were well designed. Some of the de-
tached ones had a simple, circular configuration. The largest work was on
top of Signal Hill. It had several bastions and was configured to cover the
entire hilltop. At least nine photographs taken in the spring and summer of
1862, after the junction had been occupied by Federal troops, show the true
nature and extent of the works. They had a post-and-plank revetment. Small
saplings, many still with dried leaves, were interwoven along the tops of the
posts. In some works, this hurdle extended only a few inches down the posts,
but in at least one work it extended fully halfway down their vertical length.
The hurdle provided rigidity for the top of the posts to help prevent them
34 On to Richmond
Hurdle revetment in a Confederate fort, Manassas Junction. This is a superb example
of hurdling that extends halfway down the revetment, to the bottom of the embrasures.
Note the raised artillery platform in the center of the image and the two emplacements
at ground level on either side. (Massachusetts Commandery, Military Order of the
Loyal Legion and the U.S. Army Military History Institute)
from bending inward with the pressure of the parapet. This type of reinforc-
ing with intertwined saplings was a clever way to strengthen the revetment
and make it last.
The photographs show that the Confederates often used barrels to build
traverses. One of the forts had a wooden palisades constructed to its rear to
cover the road that led to the sally port. A photograph also shows a connect-
ing infantry trench that has a well-formed parapet facing the front but a
smaller parapet (called a parados because it was designed to protect the rear
of the work) immediately behind the trench. This parados is also rare in Civil
War fortifications, useful only if the designer expected the possibility of
crossfire from the rear of the work.
∫
A stronger line was constructed at Centreville. The town sits on a high
ridge that runs roughly north to south, about six miles north of Manassas
Junction. The line of works lay to the east, northeast, and north of Cen-
treville, slicing across six roads. The eastern line ran along the top of the
ridge, a high and dominating position, for 1
≥
⁄
∂
miles. The northern line ran at
a right angle to the eastern line and descended onto the flatter land north-
west of Centreville. The best-preserved section of the eastern line still has a
On to Richmond 35
Artillery emplacement in Confederate fort, Manassas Junction. Note the saplings and
branches interwoven along the posts that support the revetment of the parapet. Note
also the wooden gun platform consisting of stringers sunk below the surface and a solid
floor of planks laid on top. The short posts at the embrasure have holes in them; the
Confederates had secured metal hooks to use as leverage while pulling the guns for-
ward with ropes after they were fired. Note also the remnants of a campfire and
cooking pole immediately behind the platform. (Massachusetts Commandery, Mili-
tary Order of the Loyal Legion and the U.S. Army Military History Institute)
large parapet, a well-dug ditch in front, and the remnants of a fire step in the
trench, a rarely preserved feature of Civil War fortifications. There is also a
parados behind the trench here, as at Manassas Junction. The eastern line
had a total of seven works of all sizes, including two redoubts, two lunettes,
two batteries, and ‘‘one bastion fort,’’ with a total of forty embrasured gun
positions. The northern line was two miles long and included thirty-one em-
brasured gun positions. Today most of this line is gone, but a well-preserved
section crosses Stone Road. It has two artillery emplacements, one with four
and the other with five embrasures. There is a ditch in front of the artillery
emplacements but none in front of the connecting infantry trench. The land
here forms gentle waves or ripples, and the line is placed on the highest wave.
36 On to Richmond
Confederate works, Centreville. In this wonderful view of a connecting line, the works
face toward the left; note the fire step and the hurdle revetment in the foreground.
Note, too, the parados, which also has a hurdle revetment. There is a ditch in front of
each parapet. The same construction can be seen in the continuation of the line in the
midground on the other side of the road. Note that the photographer also is standing in
a road. A massive work pierced with embrasures stands on high ground in the distance.
Despite these details, it is difficult to pinpoint the location of these works on the map of
the Centreville defenses. (Massachusetts Commandery, Military Order of the Loyal
Legion and the U.S. Army Military History Institute)
These works at Centreville formed a more continuous line than those at
Manassas Junction. One fort had embrasures for eight guns and parapets 10
to 20 feet thick and 6 feet tall. A wooden door and a loopholed palisades
guarded the sally port in its rear. Ditches 6 to 10 feet deep and 12 feet wide
circled the forts. The size of the fort and its configuration—circular, octago-
nal, or three-sided—varied. The Centreville line would have been a difficult
target for any force approaching from the front.
Ω
The availability and quality of entrenching tools was a problem for Beau-
regard’s troops. David B. Harris reported on their scarcity and poor condi-
tion. By mid-January 1862 Harris had only 105 picks available, and ‘‘Several
require[d] pointing.’’ He had 23 spades in the depot, but 10 were borrowed
from the 8th South Carolina and 5 more were damaged, leaving only 8 of
On to Richmond 37
these essential tools available for departmental use. Of 14 axes, 4 had not
been returned by work details, and 1 of Harris’s 7 saws apparently had been
acquired from the enemy. Only 4 files and 1 grinding stone were in store for
use in sharpening the tools. These problems were eased by more careful
attention to the tool supply by infantry officers. Robert Rodes ordered each
regimental commander in his Alabama brigade to have on hand one ax, one
shovel, and one pick. All excess tools were to be turned over to the quarter-
master. The Engineer Bureau in Richmond also sent sandbags for use on the
Centreville works.
∞≠
The formidable works at Manassas Junction and Centreville were never
tested in battle. The Confederates evacuated both places in March 1862 and
moved to new positions along the Rappahannock River.
Defenses of Washington
The summer of 1861 also saw major efforts to fortify the two capitals of
the opposing sides. Given their proximity and the natural tendency for ar-
mies to strike for their enemy’s political center, the two cities became locked
in a deadly contest of attack and defense.
Before the start of the war, the only formal defense of the Northern
capital was Fort Washington, built after the War of 1812 some twelve miles
down the Potomac River. This masonry work on a high bluff was designed to
defend against a naval force armed with smoothbore guns sailing up the
stream. The land approaches to the city were open and not easy to defend. It
was located in southern Maryland, a slave state with divided loyalties and
just across the Potomac from Confederate territory. Situated in a basin on
the north side of the river, the city was surrounded by higher ground that
ranged from 200 to more than 400 feet above the lowest river level. It is
possible to see this if one stands at Fort Washington and looks toward down-
town Washington on a clear day. The trees on the high ground just to the
north of the city center are visible above the buildings and monuments.
The first Union effort to secure the city’s defense involved gaining control
of the transportation routes across Maryland that linked it to the free states,
and in the process the Federals prevented Maryland from seceding as well.
Federal troops then crossed the Potomac River to occupy Arlington and
Alexandria on May 23, 1861. They began to fortify the next day under the
supervision of Maj. John G. Barnard. Six major forts were constructed over
the next seven weeks; they were nearly finished when McDowell left for
Manassas on July 16. Military engineers began to survey the land and map
out the roads north of the city in preparation for building similar works there.
McClellan took command of the Army of the Potomac on July 27 and was