Hess Earl J. Field Armies and Fortifications in the Civil War: The Eastern Campaigns, 1861-1864
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148 Second Manassas, Antietam, and Maryland
Sunken road, Antietam. Taken shortly after the battle, this view demonstrates how the
roadbed could serve as a makeshift field fortification. It also movingly illustrates the
aftermath of combat in the Civil War. (Library of Congress)
In the Confederate center, D. H. Hill’s men found a farm road that started
from Hagerstown Pike and went southeast, zigging and zagging, until it
reached Boonsboro Pike between Sharpsburg and Antietam Creek. Wagon
traffic to a gristmill on the creek had worn down sections of it, and erosion
had hastened the sinking of those sections several feet. A recent historian has
called it a ‘‘natural trench,’’ although that is an overstatement. The sunken
section that would play a role in the battle is about 500 yards long, and its
depth ranges from one to four feet, barely deep enough for a fortification.
Like all such features, the sunken road lacked a parapet, and the view from it
was restricted. On the left, one can see a couple of hundred yards ahead, but
in the center the rising ground to the front restricts the view to no more than
thirty yards. On the right one can see a long distance, except that anyone in
the bottom of the rolls in the landscape is hidden from view. The Sunken
Road, or Bloody Lane as it would become known, offered two brigades of
Hill’s division a line of demarcation to form along, and it did cover them to a
Second Manassas, Antietam, and Maryland 149
limited extent from enemy fire; but it was far less effective than a well-made
earthwork or even a good breastwork would have been.
≥∑
These limitations did not prevent the fighting in the Rebel center from
reaching a level of intensity hardly equaled on other battlefields. The Union
Second Corps sent 5,700 men rolling across the open landscape to slam
into this position. Rodes’s Alabama brigade was on the left, and Brig. Gen.
George B. Anderson’s North Carolina brigade was on the right, totaling 2,500
men. Hill sent three more brigades to support these two, but the Confederate
position in the Sunken Road fell when Anderson’s right flank was turned.
About the same time, the left flank of Rodes’s brigade collapsed. Here the
road angled sharply and was so shallow as to be almost on the natural level.
The 6th Alabama was exposed to a deadly enfilade by the Federals who had
lodged themselves on the rising ground just in front of the center of the
Sunken Road, so the 6th was ordered to move to a deeper part of the road.
The commander misunderstood his instructions and retreated from the road
altogether, and the Federals exploited this mistake to hasten all Rebel troops
out of the lane. The Confederate defenders held the Sunken Road for three
hours but lost nearly a third of their number.
≥∏
On the Confederate right, the Union Ninth Corps was stymied for a long
while by Antietam Creek. Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside tried to force a
passage across one of several stone bridges in the area, the Rohrback Bridge,
soon to be known as Burnside’s Bridge. It was 125 feet long and 12 feet wide.
The creek valley was narrow with a steep western bluff that rose about 100
feet above the bridge. Col. Henry L. Benning and 400 men of the 2nd Georgia
and 20th Georgia took position overlooking the crossing. They took shelter in
shallow quarry pits and behind a stone fence and piles of cordwood, and
supplemented the civilian features with a small breastwork made of fence
rails and logs. A Union veteran recalled after the war that these were ‘‘rude
but substantial breastworks.’’
≥π
For three hours Burnside’s men tried simultaneously to push their way
across the stone bridge and to find a usable ford nearby. Benning’s badly
outnumbered soldiers on the creek bluff demonstrated their advantage of
position, supplemented by a few minor fortifications. Five hundred Yankees
were lost in effecting the crossing, while only 120 Confederates fell. Finally
the Ninth Corps crossed and began to move against Lee’s right wing. The
Army of Northern Virginia faced a terrible crisis. It was exhausted, and there
were no reinforcements except A. P. Hill’s division, which arrived just in
time from Harpers Ferry to block Burnside. The Ninth Corps barely made it
out of the creek valley before Hill’s men took position on the high ground
150 Second Manassas, Antietam, and Maryland
behind a stone fence half a mile from the bridge. Here the Union advance
ground to a halt.
≥∫
Despite the loss of more than 12,000 men in each army, the fighting was a
tactical draw. Lee evacuated Maryland, so in that sense Antietam was a
major Union victory. Like Second Manassas, the battle was notable for the
absence of prepared fortifications and the use of existing terrain features.
But unlike Second Manassas, Antietam nearly wrecked the Army of North-
ern Virginia. Lee would be much more cautious in the next encounter at
Fredericksburg.
Defenses of Harpers Ferry
McClellan responded slowly to Lee’s retreat from Maryland as subordinate
commanders saw to the safety of Harpers Ferry. The post had demonstrated
its strategic usefulness by hindering Lee’s communications, but its defenses
had been neglected by previous Federal commanders. Now a major effort
was made to erect the kind of works that would secure the post against a
large attack such as the one Jackson had unleashed. It was a scenario typical
of the Civil War; field commanders responded to a battle by digging in.
Lt. Cyrus B. Comstock surveyed the area in early October and recom-
mended that a lot of work be done, but his recommendations fell short of
what was needed to thoroughly secure the post. Comstock correctly noted
that holding the peninsula west of the junction of the Shenandoah and
Potomac rivers was the key to the position, and he recommended extensive
earthwork construction to guard against an attack from the west. Bolivar
Heights should be fortified with a line nearly two miles long, consisting of an
infantry trench and three battery emplacements. The heights should be held
by 6,000 men and twenty-seven guns. Comstock wanted the line placed a bit
down the forward slope of the height and continued all the way to the
Shenandoah, where a redoubt would be constructed on the bottomland.
This was to prevent the enemy from flanking the line, as A. P. Hill had done
the preceding month. Comstock also recommended the construction of a
redoubt on a hill north of the Potomac big enough for 500 men and with
artillery that could command the northern end of Bolivar Heights.
Comstock noted that all the high ground within one and a half miles of
the peninsula had to be securely held if Harpers Ferry was to be safe. Log
blockhouses could be erected on the crests of Loudoun Heights and Mary-
land Heights as a first step while artillery emplacements were hewn out of
the rocky soil, and the extensive tree cover could be cleared to open expan-
sive fields of fire. The next step should be to erect a line of redoubts or stone
blockhouses to protect a permanent camp big enough to house up to 3,000
Second Manassas, Antietam, and Maryland 151
Harpers Ferry
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Bolivar
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Harpers Ferry Defenses, 1863
men and eight guns on top of each crest. The camps could be supported by
artillery fire from Camp Hill, firing up the slopes of both mountains, a diffi-
cult task for gunners that the engineer never fully appreciated.
≥Ω
The proposal was partly implemented. Bolivar Heights was not fortified
according to Comstock’s plan until two years later, in the middle of Sheri-
dan’s Shenandoah Valley campaign, but Maryland Heights became the focus
of immediate construction efforts. Seared by McLaws’s occupation of that
eminence and how it had doomed the garrison in September, the Federals
started work on October 15, 1862, according to Comstock’s plan. The founda-
tion of a stone blockhouse was started that day on the crest of Maryland
Heights. It was 40 feet by 100 feet with a bastion on each end. The work
152 Second Manassas, Antietam, and Maryland
straddled the crest at an elevation of 1,448 feet. Before it was completed,
engineers had second thoughts about the feasibility of a stone fort. This
material was initially chosen because of the rocky nature of the soil, but it
would not stand more than a few rounds from even a small field piece. In
September 1863 the structure was converted into a supply warehouse.
More effective fortifications were built around the stone structure. The
Interior Fort, consisting of an earth and rock parapet for infantry, was built
in June 1863 when Lee’s Pennsylvania campaign threatened Harpers Ferry. It
had a rectangular configuration, with the stone blockhouse at one corner of
the rectangle. Five embrasures for 30-pounder Parrotts were included in the
parapet, which also had a ditch in front. The Exterior Fort was constructed at
the same time. It extended the Interior Fort westward, 550 feet down the
slope of Maryland Heights. The parapet consisted of stone and was 5 feet
wide and 3 feet tall.
Two major gun emplacements were built on Maryland Heights. The 30-
Pounder Battery, also known as the 6-Gun Battery, was dug in October 1862.
Its fire covered the tops of Loudoun Heights and Bolivar Heights. The work
had four sides but was open to the rear. The 100-Pounder Battery, built in
June 1863, had a 9-inch Dahlgren whose fire could cover nearly everything—
Loudoun Heights, the valleys east and west of Maryland Heights, and Boli-
var Heights. It was located on the crest of Maryland Heights between the
Stone Fort and the 30-Pounder Battery. The Dahlgren piece was replaced
with a 100-pounder Parrott in August 1863, and the gun platform was raised
to provide a wide traverse of fire.
∂≠
The Stone Fort complex was the left anchor of a line extending westward
from Maryland Heights to the Potomac River. Fort Duncan, built on the hill
that Comstock identified as needing a redoubt to cover the north end of
Bolivar Heights, lay in advance of this continuous line of infantry trench. It
was a rectangular work with parapets fifteen feet thick, a ditch, and sixteen
guns. The old naval battery was reinforced as well in June 1863. The sandbag
parapet was replaced by earthworks, the emplacement was enlarged and
embrasured, and four magazines were added. Loudoun Heights received its
share of attention, but that paled in comparison with the work on Maryland
Heights. Units of the Twelfth Corps occupied Loudoun on September 22,
1862. They cut trees and built stone works and a signal station on its crest.
∂∞
The work at Harpers Ferry in late 1862 and early 1863 was far more
extensive than anything that had been done before Jackson captured the
place, and it essentially mastered the difficult engineering problem of de-
fending this mountain post. The modest garrison would use the works on
Maryland Heights as a citadel. When Lee invaded Pennsylvania in June 1863,
Second Manassas, Antietam, and Maryland 153
10,000 Federals evacuated the town and fled to the works. They readied for
an attack, but Lee bypassed the post rather than reduce it. The same thing
happened in July 1864 when Jubal Early raced down the Valley and raided
into Maryland. This was not an unusual plan, for dozens of small towns
throughout the occupied South were guarded by small garrisons with a
modest earthwork on the outskirts of the village. The garrison was expected
to take refuge in the fort, leaving the town occupied temporarily until the
enemy—usually cavalry raiders or guerrillas—grew tired of their failure to
take the earthwork and left. Thus the fortification plan implemented by the
Federals for Harpers Ferry allowed them to maintain the post even though it
exposed the town to periodic occupation by the enemy.
The final part of Comstock’s plan, to fortify Bolivar Heights and close the
most accessible door to Harpers Ferry, was not implemented until August
1864. Officers apparently had believed that with a modest garrison, Mary-
land Heights was the only essential real estate to hold in the area. But after
two episodes of giving up the town and taking refuge on the heights, Sher-
idan completed the ring of fortifications around Harpers Ferry. Planning for
his drive up the Shenandoah Valley to deal with Jubal Early, Sheridan or-
dered the digging of nearly two miles of trench on the ridge, connecting not
three but six redoubts. As Comstock had recommended, the line was placed
some thirty yards down the forward slope, which is very steep and utterly
commands the valley below. A well-preserved stretch of this Sheridan earth-
work contains a lot of gravel, and a ditch lies in front of what little remains of
one redoubt on the left. Sheridan’s defeat of Early in the coming campaign
eventually cleared the Valley of Rebel troops.
∂≤
7:Fredericksburg
L
ee went on the defensive after Antietam, and Lin-
coln replaced McClellan with Ambrose Burnside. The
new commander devised a plan that might well have
worked. The army was concentrated at Warrenton and
would dash for Fredericksburg thirty miles southeast,
cross the Rappahannock River, and head for Richmond, another fifty-five
miles away. Burnside arranged for supplies and pontoons to be shifted to
Fredericksburg in preparation for his move. Maj. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner’s
Right Grand Division reached Fredericksburg on November 19, the same day
that the leading elements of Lee’s army arrived, but the logistical support
was not there. The wharf facilities at Aquia Creek and the railroad from that
place to Fredericksburg would not be operational for another week, and the
pontoons also were missing due to a staff mix-up. These delays and mistakes
forced Burnside to halt at Fredericksburg without crossing the river. Soon he
was confronted by Lee and most of the Rebel army.
∞
The two armies would face each other in this spot for the next five months.
Fredericksburg, nestled in the valley of the Rappahannock, was one of the
oldest towns in Virginia. On the east side of the river rose Chatham Heights
to an elevation of 100 feet. The small town of Falmouth also was here. The
river lies at 60 feet elevation, and Fredericksburg is laid out on the bottom-
land of the west side, only 20 feet above the river. While the valley is com-
paratively narrow, it quickly widens on the west side as one travels south of
town. The line of bluffs that ranges along the western edge of the bottom-
land made a superb defensive position, and the Confederates occupied it.
Taylor’s Hill, on the north, anchored the Rebel left and is as high as Chatham
Heights. Marye’s Hill is three-quarters of a mile from the river and directly
west of Fredericksburg. Telegraph Road runs along the base of Marye’s Hill
and is sunken in places, with a stone wall holding up the eastern bank. A
drainage canal ran north to south outside the town some 200 yards east of
Telegraph Road. Farther south, Telegraph Hill offers a high and command-
ing view of the town and the bottomland below. The line of heights con-
tinues south to Howison’s Hill and beyond, until a wide and deep ravine
cuts into the bluff line. Here the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac
Fredericksburg 155
Railroad curved west. Hamilton’s Crossing was the name of the spot where a
wagon road crossed the rail line as it curved.
≤
Both sides were given plenty of time to fortify their positions, but neither
did a thorough job. The Confederates concentrated on digging battery em-
placements on the high ground but neglected to provide protection for the
infantry. Lee sent his artillery chief, Brig. Gen. William N. Pendleton, to
select battery sites soon after he arrived at Fredericksburg on November 23.
Pendleton noted that the Federals were already fortifying their gun emplace-
ments. ‘‘On our own line a few hurried works were in progress’’ as well.
Pendleton recommended places for two 30-pounder Parrots on December 1,
and Lee approved his recommendations the next day. One was emplaced on
Howison’s Hill and the other on Telegraph Hill. Pendleton ordered the dense
tree cover on Telegraph Hill cut down, staked out the gun emplacement, and
directed the digging. Lee realized what a grand view the hill now afforded
and made it his headquarters site; afterward it became known as Lee’s Hill.
≥
Confederate activity quickened after this start. Lee not only used Pendle-
ton but sent two other artillerymen and engineer Capt. Samuel R. Johnston
to site and fortify most of his remaining guns. Col. Edward Porter Alexander
was put to work soon after his battalion reached Fredericksburg. One of
Lee’s most skillful artillerists, Alexander took pains to place the guns far
enough down the forward slope of the bluffs so they could hit targets on the
bottomland below—in short, so they could fire on advancing infantry and
field batteries. Lee complained about it, for he wanted the guns sited farther
up the slope so they could achieve sufficient elevation to fire on Union guns
across the river, but he relented when Alexander told him the digging had
already begun. Lee would realize the value of this adjustment when the
Federals attacked nearly two weeks later. Orders also went out to measure
the distance from each gun position to probable targets, and traverses were
constructed where necessary to protect the cannon against enfilade fire.
∂
There are remnants of three artillery emplacements on Lee’s Hill. None
have a regular ditch in front, just a line of holes where the soldiers dug dirt to
make the parapet. One emplacement has an L-shaped parapet with the gun
platforms on the natural level of the earth. The others are different in design.
One has a dug platform with a long traverse on the left but no parapet in
front, and the other has a traverse on both sides.
∑
Lee committed himself to a limited policy of fortifying in order to keep his
options open. Digging in all along the line, infantry as well as artillery, would
have represented a decision to stay put. It might have averted a Federal
offensive, but with the huge terrain advantage he possessed, perhaps Lee
wanted to induce rather than deter a Union attack. There were alternative
156 Fredericksburg
Ravine
Ravine
RAPPAHANNOCK CANAL
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Wilcox’s Line on Taylor’s
Hill (modern Fall Hill),
built before December 13
Returns are three
yards long
Segments of line are
ten to fifteen yards long
Gun Emplacements on Lee’s Hill (Telegraph Hill), probably built before December 13
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Gun rests on
natural surface
Incomplete parapet
Sunken
emplacement
for one gun
Traverses on
each side of
gun restrict
lateral aim
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Fredericksburg, December 13, 1862 (based on field visit, 1995)
crossing points downriver that Burnside wanted to utilize, and Lee had to
retain his mobility in case it became necessary to shift his army to those
points. He knew there would be time, if needed, to construct hasty works on
the heights if a crossing took place at Fredericksburg. All in all, Lee handled
the situation quite well.
Burnside was stymied in his efforts to find a less dangerous crossing
downstream, for Lee effectively used Jackson’s corps, which reached the vi-
cinity of Fredericksburg by December 1, to block all possibilities. He assumed
Fredericksburg 157
a defensive line thirty-five miles long, with Longstreet covering the area
upstream from the town and Jackson stretched out downstream to Port
Royal. Fully aware of the difficulty of crossing at the town and of Lee’s terrain
advantage, Burnside also knew the Rebels were not heavily dug in, so he
decided to cross at Fredericksburg. He announced this decision to his subor-
dinates on December 9. Three spots were selected on a two-mile sector of the
river where five bridges some 440 feet long would be set up. There would be
147 guns, divided into four groups on Chatham Heights, to cover the cross-
ing. Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin’s Left Grand Division would strike at
Hamilton’s Crossing, where the Rebels were weakest, and Sumner’s Right
Grand Division would hit Marye’s Hill. When the plan was relayed to the
engineers, Capt. Wesley Brainerd ‘‘came to the conclusion that we might now
return to our quarters and with great propriety execute our last Wills &
Testaments.’’ The proposed movement ‘‘seemed like madness.’’
∏
The way was clear for the most dangerous forced crossing of a river to
take place during the war. Brig. Gen. William Barksdale’s Mississippi brigade
and the 8th Florida were detailed to hold the town of Fredericksburg. These
1,500 men took shelter in houses and behind makeshift barricades. In one
place they dug a rifle pit behind a board fence, piercing portholes through
the boards. Three streets parallel to the river—Sophia, Caroline, and Princess
Anne—were similarly fortified. The U.S. Engineer Battalion took charge of
one bridge while Woodbury’s Volunteer Engineer Brigade handled the other
four. Fog helped to screen the movement when it began at 1:00 a.m. on
December 11. Captain Brainerd noted that the upper bridge was at mid-
stream by 3:00 a.m. An hour later, at dawn, his men received the first fire
from Barksdale’s troops. Brainerd acted on Woodbury’s order to pull back his
men and let the Federal artillery silence any opposition. Unfortunately nei-
ther the engineers nor their infantry support had any cover on the eastern
bank, and the Union artillery failed to drive the Mississippians out of Freder-
icksburg. Brainerd sent his engineers out again, but they refused to expose
themselves on the half-finished bridge. Two hours later Brainerd led ten men
onto the span; five were shot before they reached the end of it, and the
rest were hit soon after. Brainerd also was wounded but managed to make
it back to shore. At 10:00 a.m. Woodbury led eighty volunteers from the
8th Connecticut to the bridge, but they refused to work as soon as the first
man fell.
The fog cleared off by noon, and the bridge was still only two-thirds of the
way across the Rappahannock. The engineers had earlier suggested that
infantrymen cross the river in boats to clear a bridgehead on the west bank,
but no one took that recommendation seriously until now. Preceded by