The Collapse of the Grand Alliance
Q
Focus Question: Why were the United States and the
Soviet Union suspicious of each other after World
War II, and what events between 1945 and 1949
heightened the tensions between the two nations?
The problems started in Europe. At the end of the war,
Soviet military forces occupied all of Eastern Europe and
the Balkans (except Greece, Albania, and Yugoslavia),
while U.S. and other Allied forces secured the western part
of the Continent. Roosevelt had assumed that free elec-
tions, administered promptly by ‘‘democratic and peace-
loving forces,’’ would lead to democratic governments
responsive to the local population. But it soon became
clear that the Soviet Union interpreted the Yalta agreement
differently. When Soviet occupation authorities began
forming a new Polish government, Stalin refused to accept
the Polish government-in-exile---headquartered in London
during the war and composed primarily of landed aris-
tocrats who harbored a deep distrust of the Soviet
Union---and instead set up a government composed of
Communists who had spent the war in Moscow. Roosevelt
complained to Stalin but eventually agreed to a compro-
mise whereby two members of the London government
were included in the new Communist regime. A week
later, Roosevelt was dead of a cerebral hemorrhage,
emboldening Stalin to do pretty much as he pleased.
Soviet Domination of Eastern Europe
Similar developments took place in all of the states oc-
cupied by Soviet troops. Coalitions of all political parties
(except fascist or right-wing parties) were formed to run
the government, but within a year or two, the Communist
Party in each coalition had assumed the lion’s share of
power. It was then a short step to the establishment of
one-party Communist governments. Between 1945 and
1947, Communist governments became firmly en-
trenched in East Germany, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland,
and Hungary. In Czechoslovakia, with its strong tradition
of democratic institutions, the Communists did not
achieve their goals until 1948. After the Czech elections of
1946, the Communist Party shared control of the gov-
ernment with the non-Communist parties. When it ap-
peared that the latter might win new elections early in
1948, the Communists seized control of the government
on February 25. All other parties were dissolved, and the
Communist leader Klement Gottwald became the new
president of Czechoslovakia.
Yugoslavia was a notable exception to the pattern of
Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe. The Communist
Party there had led resistance to the Nazis during the war
and easily assumed power when the war ended. Josip Broz,
known as Tito (1892--1980), the leader of the Communist
resistance movement, appeared to be a loyal Stalinist. After
the war, however, he moved to establish an independent
Communist state. Stalin hoped to take contr ol of Yugo-
slavia, but Tito refused to capitulate to Stalin’s demands
and gained the support of the people (and some sympathy
in the West) by portraying the struggle as one of Yugoslav
national freedom. In 1958, the Yugoslav party congress
asserted that Yugoslav Communists did not see themselves
as deviating from communism, only from Stalinism.
They considered their more decentralized system, in which
workers managed themselves and local communes
exercised some political power, closer to the Marxist-
Leninist ideal.
To Stalin (who had once boasted, ‘‘I w ill shake my
little finger, and there will be no more Tito’’), the cre-
ation of pliant pro-Soviet regimes throughout Eastern
Europe may simply have repres ented his interpretation
of the Yalta peace agreement and a reward for sacrifices
suffered durin g the war, satisfyin g Moscow’s aspirations
for a buffer zone against the capitalist West. If the Soviet
leader had any i ntention of promoting future Com-
munist revolutions in Western Europe---and there is
some indication that he did---such developments would
have to await the appearance of a new capitalist crisis a
decade or more into the future. As Stalin undoubtedly
recalled, Lenin had always maintained that revolutions
come in waves.
Descent of the Iron Curtain
To the United States, however, the Soviet takeover of
Eastern Europe represented an ominous development
that threatened Roosevelt’s vision of a durable peace.
Public suspicion of Soviet intentions grew rapidly,
THE COLLAPSE OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 645
Europe. To foster mutual trust and an end to the suspicions that
had marked relations between the capitalist world and the Soviet
Union prior to the war, Roosevelt tried to reassure Stalin that Mos-
cow’s legitimate territorial aspirations and genuine security needs
would be adequately met in a durable peace settlement.
It was not to be. Within months after the German surrender,
the mutual trust among the Allies---if it had ever truly existed---rap-
idly disintegrated, and the dream of a stable peace was replaced by
the specter of a potential nuclear holocaust. The United Nations,
envisioned by its founders as a mechanism for adjudicating interna-
tional disputes, became mired in partisan bickering. As the Cold
War between Moscow and Washington intensified, Europe was di-
vided into two armed camps, while the two superpowers, glaring at
each other across a deep ideological divide, held the survival of the
entire world in their hands.