Drinkwater J.F. The Alamanni and Rome 213-496 (Caracalla to Clovis)
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‘gain more child-producing subjects and be able to muster a strong
force of recruits’.5 Ammianus probably made much of this because it
resulted in disaster: the barbarians attacked Constantius just as he
was about to make a speech to them.6 However, the arguments
concerning the beneWts of immigration ring true. Likewise, from
the barbarian side, spontaneous Alamannic settlement, though
impudent, should not automatically be construed as hostile.
Alamannic leaders may have been promised land, and thus had no
reason not to call on this promise when the opportunity oVered.
Moreover, they will surely have been aware that Franks were settled
over the Rhine in Toxiandria,7 and had not been expelled despite
Frankish involvement in the recent troubles.8 And they may have
known that some early-arriving Elbe-Germani had been allowed
across by Maximian.9 There is every reason for believing that these
Alamanni did not see themselves, or expect to be seen, as enemies of
Rome. They can have entertained no hope, or even concept, of ‘con-
quering’ Gaul. They must also have appreciated that any rash action
would, sooner or later, be punished by the enormous resources avail-
able to the Empire.10 In exposing themselves and their dependants to
Roman power over the Rhine they cannot have believed that they were
committing a punishable oVence: they must have been convinced that
they had suYcient authority for their actions in the documents and
promises they had received from Constantius II. And in settling across
the Rhine under the aegis of Rome they showed themselves willing to
become Roman subjects.11 It comes as no surprise that they did not
occupy the cities of the Upper Rhine. Ammianus, famously, put this
down to their superstitious dread of such places, but this is vitiated by
the fact that he says the same of the Huns.12 I propose that the
Alamanni kept out of these places because they had no use for
5 AM 19.11.7.
6 AM 19.11.10.
7 Above 200.
8 Above 201.
9 Below 366–7.
10 Elton (1993); cf. Tacitus, Annales 14.33.6: British awareness of inevitable Roman
retaliation at the start of the Boudiccan rebellion.
11 Contra Heather (2001: 46–7): Chnodomarius as the leader of an anti-imperial
movement—in modern terms, a freedom Wghter.
12 AM 16.2.12. Above 84. Zotz (1998: 394).
218 ConXict 356–61
them13 and, more signiWcantly, because they recognized the cities as
continuing seats of imperial power and administration. In this respect,
they were more sophisticated than the Franks, who ‘took’ Cologne:
there are strong grounds for believing that the Alamanni did not do
the same with Cologne’s sister-city, Mainz.14
Thus, it is likely that by 356 peaceful Alamannic migration over the
Upper Rhine was an established and, as far as a number of leading
Wgures on both sides were concerned, an acceptable and positive
phenomenon. The Alamanni could believe in the permanency of the
arrangement since there had been no action against the settlers.
The problem was that Constantius II, used to the east, had misread
the situation. Westerners, military and civilian, historically inclined to
a forward policy based on the Rhine,15 would have detested extensive
Germanic settlement on its left bank. This explains the initial clashes
in 356 on the approach to the Rhine and at Brumath, as Roman troops
and settled Alamanni came into contact for the Wrst time.16 After this,
both sides were, presumably, restrained by their leaders; but Julian,
taking part in his Wrst expedition, had noted the situation, guessed
what could be made of it, and took the opportunity to act when it was
oVered in 357.
The year 356 saw two Alamannic expeditions. The better-known is
the one in which Julian saw action for the Wrst time. Ammianus has
him move from Vienne, where he had spent the winter, to Reims by
way of Autun, Auxerre and Troyes. On the way he was attacked by
bands of ‘barbarians’ and at Autun and Troyes he found city popu-
lations which too had suVered, or feared they would suVer, violence
at the hands of barbari.17 Having arrived in Reims, Julian then led the
Roman forces collected there against Alamanni in the Rhine valley by
way of the Decem Pagi.18 He was attacked by ‘the enemy’ en route,
but recovered himself, and then proceeded more slowly and cau-
tiously.19 On reaching the Rhine, Julian retook Brumath, Strasbourg,
13 Above 105, below 358.
14 Below 205.
15 Drinkwater (1987: 252).
16 AM 16.2.10–13. Cf. below 220.
17 AM 16.2.1, 6–7.
18 Cf. above 126.
19 AM 16.2.9–11.
ConXict 356–61 219
Seltz, Rheinzabern,20 Speyer, Worms, and Mainz, the territories of
which had been occupied by the barbarians.21 The only resistance he
encountered was on the approach to Brumath.22 After this, he moved
further downstream, recovering Cologne and intimidating the
Frankish kings there into making peace.23 He then withdrew, via
Trier, to winter apud Senonas—now no longer generally interpreted
as Sens, but Senon, near Verdun, though the case for Sens still
continues to attract support.24
The lesser-known Alamannic campaign of 356 is a third (after
those of 354 and 355) by Constantius. Tucked away in Ammianus’
account of the battle of Strasbourg in 357 is the information that
during the previous year Constantius had invaded Alamannic terri-
tory by way of Raetia. He met little resistance, with the Alamanni
eventually suing for peace. They were, in fact, in dire straits since ‘the
emperor was menacing them by way of Raetia, Caesar was near at
hand and would not allow them to slip out anywhere, and their
neighbours (whom civil strife had made their enemies) were all but
treading on their necks and they were hemmed in on all sides’. After
granting them the peace they sought, Constantius departed.25
The date of Julian’s campaign is fairly easy to establish, since
Ammianus provides a speciWc date (24 June) for Julian’s arrival
at Autun: it must have lasted from June into August.26 That of
Constantius is usually placed later. This is because Ammianus
has the Alamanni, after early lacklustre resistance, yielding to the
emperor as winter bit.27 However, it cannot have been a true winter
campaign because Constantius was in Milan on 10 November.
Modern commentators place it in autumn.28 Ammianus’ reference
to wintry conditions may therefore be seen as another of the literary
conceits by which he depicted the Alamanni as a savage people in a
20 See Lorenz, S. (1997: 36 n. 77): Rheinzabern not, as is usually stated, Saverne.
21 Cf. above 217.
22 AM 16.2.12–13.
23 AM 16.3.1–2.
24 Lorenz, S. (1997: 39 n.107, from Nicolle); cf. Matthews (1989: 492 n.16).
25 AM 16.12.15–16.
26 Barnes (1993: 227).
27 AM 16.12.15: sidere urente brumali.
28 Seeck (1921: 4.255, 7); Barcelo
´
(1981: 30); Barnes (1993: 221–2); Lorenz, S.
(1997: 37).
220 ConXict 356–61
savage land, and through which he disparaged Constantius’ success:
nature defeated the Alamanni, not the emperor. On the other hand,
with Constantius arriving in Alamannia just as Julian was leaving,
this chronology fails to explain how both can be seen as presenting a
joint threat—a ‘pincer movement’, as some have interpreted it.29
To understand them, we must place these events in their political
and military context. The west was now, at least nominally, in the
hands of Julian; and Constantius—for all his personal failings, some-
one who always sought to do what he regarded as proper—must have
felt the need to ensure that Julian and the re
´
gime he represented
enjoyed success. Constantius II was a worrier. The man who had
taken the trouble to give Julian a detailed code of conduct, ‘written in
his own hand’, ‘as if sending oV a stepson to university’,30 must have
been thinking of him as he faced his Wrst major undertaking in Gaul.
It is, indeed, Constantius who demands our attention.
Ammianus grossly exaggerates Julian’s role at this time. Julian was
only an imperial Wgurehead. The real directors of operations were
Ursicinus and Marcellus, Ursicinus’ successor, acting on orders from
Constantius. Both campaigns of 356 were Constantius’ campaigns.31
Even if not the closing jaws of a pincer movement, they must have
been closely related. I suggest, therefore, that Constantius’ principal
objective was to ensure that Julian ran into no diY culties. To bring-
this about, all he needed to do was to continue existing practice.
There is ever y reason to suppose that from around 351 to 361
Constantius had important dealings with leaders of Alamannic pagi
close to Italy and further down the Rhine.32 In 356, he could have
sent messengers alerting Alamannic communities on the Upper
Rhine that Roman forces would soon be moving west in strength
to reassert control over the Rhine valley and warning them not to
make trouble. The positive side of this was that there was no inten-
tion of expelling Alamannic settlers on the left bank of the river: as
they must not resist so they need not resist. He could also make it
clear that he would be on hand in the region shortly after his Caesar,
29 So, e.g. Bidez (1930: 142); Rosen (1970: 79–80); Barcelo
´
(1981: 31); Lorenz, S.
(1997: 37).
30 AM 16.5.3.
31 Rosen (1970: 77–9).
32 Above 155–6, 176.
ConXict 356–61 221
and so be in a position to support him if the need arose. Julian’s task
was, therefore, made easy: police work not warfare. Not much
trouble was expected, and little was encountered.
The trouble that Julian met while moving to Reims was patently
not very serious, and may or may not have concerned Alamanni. It
was certainly not the creation of major Alamannic chieftains. It could
have involved unruly young warriors;33 but it might have been the
work of other Germani (e.g. Franks, Saxons), or even domestic
miscreants whom it was convenient to label ‘bar barians’. Uncertain
times always tended to Wll the uplands and forests of Gaul with army
deserters, runaway slaves and even ordinary refugees driven by des-
peration to attack settlements and travellers.34 Once the campaign
had begun, there were just two skirmishes with Alamanni—one en
route, in mist, the other before Brumath—both ascribable to ner-
vousness on both sides. The Roman army was clearly under orders
not to engage with Alamanni en masse; and Alamannic leaders were
not disposed to tackle it. Operating north of the allied pagi of
Gundomadus and Vadomarius, it quickly re-established control
over cities lying in the area in which Alamanni were settling but, in
line with Constantius’ plans and Alamannic expectations, it did not
turn on the settlers. ‘Retaking’ the Rhenish towns in this region was
straightforward, since the Alamanni were not occupying them—not
even Mainz.35 (Further aWeld, as the example of the Frankish ‘con-
quest’ of Cologne showed, such cities could not be held by Germani
even when they attempted some sort of possession.)
Constantius’ route, from Bregenz to the Rhine crossing at Zurzach,
by way of Windisch36 would have taken him between the paciWed
Lentienses and the pagi of Gundomadus and Vadomarius. To sup-
port Julian, he need not have gone very far, which would have suited
his cautious nature. If he took the main road from Zurzach to
Rottweil or Sulz, both on the Neckar, he could threaten the rest of
the Neckar valley, while being able to move down the Kinzig to the
Rhine north of Strasbourg if the situation demanded (Fig. 18). Coin-
33 Above 122.
34 Libanius, Orat. 18.104 speciWcally mentions banditry in Gaul practised by
survivors of Magnentius’ army. Cf. Drinkwater (1984: 369).
35 Above 218–19, below 240–1.
36 Lorenz, S. (1997: 36–7).
222 ConXict 356–61
Wnds show that the Rottweil road was still frequented in the fourth
century.37 This would have been useful since, by the time Constantius
arrived, Julian would probably have moved north to the Lower
Rhine. Thus, Constantius secured Julian’s rear. Constantius’ concern
to prevent trouble flaring up behind the western army is indicated by
the length of time he spent in the Weld: probably long enough to see
Julian safely into winter quarters.
Rhine
Former
Upper German/Raetian
limes
Rhine
Rhine
Rhine
RhineRhine
MainMain
Neckar
Neckar
Neckar
Julian
Constantius II
Constantius II
Constantius II
Fig. 18 Proposed routes of the 356 campaigns.
37 Above 130; cf. Lorenz, S. (1997: 37).
ConXict 356–61 223
A secondary objective would have been conWrmation of Roman
authority over the Neckar valley. The middle and upper Neckar valley
was to become important in later Alamannic development.38 This is
not surprising, since it contains good land. However, we know very
little about it in earlier periods. Lorenz suggests that it was the
location of the pagi of Urius, Ursicinus and Vestralpus, allies of
Chnodomarius in 357.39 This is because Ammianus says that in the
skirmishing that led up to the battle of Strasbourg in 357 the combined
Alamanni recognized the shield devices of Barbatio’s defeated army as
those of earlier, victorious enemies.40 Against this, Constantius would
not have helped Julian’s army as it moved northwards in 356 by
attacking pagus chiefs close to powerful leaders on the Rhine. I would
place the pagi of Urius, Ursicinus and Vestralpus closer to the Rhine,
near those of Suomarius and Hortarius, and possibly along the Main,
in the Groß-Gerau/Seligenstadt/Stockstadt area, another region of
strong coin circulation41 (Fig. 18). In the Neckar valley Constantius
intimidated otherwise unknown communities, the inhabitants of
which found themselves caught between fellow Elbe-Ger mani who,
thanks to the work of 354 and 355, were now Roman federates, and an
incoming Roman army. In 357, it was as allies of Chnodomarius that
their warriors drew attention to Roman shield blazons.42
Constantius’ secondary activity would have been welcome in Italy
as the third and Wnal stage in the stabilization of southern Alamannia.
Again contrary to the impression given by Ammianus and adopted by
modern commentators,43 his 356 campaign may be regarded as a
success. However, continued Roman toleration of the trans-Rhine
settlement must have been interpreted by the Alamanni as full licence,
which explains their dismay at what happened in 357.
The 357 campaigns were the most famous of Julian’s career. Ammia-
nus tells us that, during the winter of 356/7, Julian was blockaded in
Senon by hostile barbarians. When the magister equitum, Marcellus,
refused to come to his aid, Julian complained to Constantius II, who
38 Below 342–3.
39 Lorenz, S. (1997: 37–8); cf. below 247–8.
40 AM 16.12.6. Below 225, 229.
41 Above 130, below 250, Fig. 21.
42 Below 238–9.
43 Cf. Lorenz, S. (1997: 38).
224 ConXict 356–61
cashiered Marcellus. Marcellus appealed, but Constantius stood by his
decision.44 Julian then moved to Reims, where the older and more
tractable Severus was now in charge of the assembled Gallic army,
which numbered some 13,000. Meanwhile, Constantius’ magister ped-
itum, Barbatio, brought a force of 25,000 (Libanius: 30,000) from Italy
to Kaiseraugst. The plan was to drive the rampaging Alamanni ‘into
straits’ as with a ‘pair of pliers’.45 However, laeti slipped between both
armies and attacked Lyon. They were driven oV, and Julian broke them
on their return, but they were not destroyed by Barbatio.46 At the same
time, Alamanni living west of the Rhine, alarmed by the approach of
the Roman armies, blockaded the roads and fled to islands in the
Rhine.47 Julian asked for seven ships from Barbatio (of those which
Barbatio had collected for building pontoon bridges over the Rhine),
but he was refused, and Barbatio burned all his vessels. Julian, however,
found his own way of taking the islands and butchered all he could. The
survivors fled east.48 Julian re-garrisoned the fort at Saverne/Tres
Tabernae, important for controlling access to central Gaul, and then,
from headquarters in Strasbourg, prepared a major campaign.49 Bar-
batio was hit by a surprise attack of the Alamanni and thrown back to
Kaiseraugst and even beyond. He lost his baggage train and camp-
followers. He abandoned the campaign and returned to Constantius
highly critical of Julian.50 Encouraged by Barbatio’s failure, seven kings
of the Alamanni united under Chnodomarius and commanded Julian
‘to depart from the lands which they had won by valour and the
sword’.51 Julian derided their presumption and detained their envoys.
He advanced against the Alamannic forces and precipitated, ‘against
his will’ (his soldiers were keen, as was Florentius, the praetorian
prefect), the battle of Strasbourg.52 This was a hard-fought but glori-
ous victory.53 Julian was hailed as Augustus, but refused the honour.54
Chnodomarius was captured, but Julian spared him and sent him to
Constantius, who exiled him to Rome.55
44 AM 16.4.1–3, 7.1–3, 8.1.
45 AM 16.11.1–3, 12.2; Libanius, Orat. 18.49–50. 46 AM 16.11.4–7.
47 AM 16.11.8. 48 AM 16.11.8–10.
49 AM 16.11–12; 16.12.1. Geuenich (1997a: 46). 50 AM 16.11.14–15.
51 AM 16.12.1–4. 52 AM 16.12.7–19.
53 AM 16.12.20–63. 54 AM 16.12.64–6. 55 AM 16.12.65.
ConXict 356–61 225
Julian pressed on. Having freed the Alamannic envoys,56 he moved
to Mainz, where he bridged the Rhine and invaded Alamannic terri-
tory in the western Wetterau.57 The Alamanni, thunderstruck (‘since
they little expected that they could be molested, settled as they were in
undisturbed peace’), Wrst attempted to treat (‘they sent envoys with
set speeches to declare the harmonious validity of the treaties with
them’), but then changed their minds and demanded withdrawal.58
Julian trapped them in an obscure but eVective pincer movement of
his own devising. 59 As his forces pillaged and destroyed at will, some
Alamanni liv ing north of the Main fled to join those to the south.60
Other Alamannic forces were, however, still hiding in the forest north
of the Main, and Julian proceeded against them.61 After marching for
about 10 miles, he found the road blocked with felled timber.62 He
withdrew and re-garrisoned a munimentum (usually translated as
‘fort’) built by Trajan, ‘which of late had been very forcibly
assaulted’.63 This caused the Alamanni Wnally to sue for peace. A 10-
month agreement was made w ith ‘three kings’—‘very savage’—who
had sent aid to those who had been vanquished at Strasbourg. These
also agreed to respect and even provision the fort.64 Julian then
withdrew.65 The autumnal equinox had passed around the time that
he had been dealing with the munimentum Traiani,66 so it was now
late in the year, but this was not the end of his campaigning. En route
to winter quarters in Paris, Julian laid siege to 600 Frankish raiders.
These had seized the opportunity to attack while Julian was busy
among the Alamanni and now fled to two abandoned forts on the
56 AM 17.1.1.
57 AM 17.1.2.
58 AM 17.1.3.
59 AM 17.1.4–5. This account is diYcult, and possibly corrupted: de Jonge
(1977: 11); Lorenz, S. (1997: 51).
60 AM 17.1.6–7.
61 AM 17.1.8.
62 AM 17.1.8–9.
63 AM 17.1.11: dudum violentius oppugnatum. See, e.g. Barcelo
´
(1981: 37): ‘eine
alte, la
¨
ngst verlassene traianische Festung’; but contrast Zotz (1998: 404): ‘das
Siegesdenkmal Traians’. (At AM 28.2.2, munimentum clearly means ‘fort’.)
64 AM 17.1.12–13: immanissimi.
65 AM 17.2.1.
66 AM 17.1.10.
226 ConXict 356–61
Meuse. Julian besieged them for 54 days, from December into Janu-
ary. Having worn them down, he captured them, and sent them to
Constantius.67
The chronology of these campaigns is not too diYcult to establish.
From Ammianus’ references to the Rhine’s running low and Roman
conWscation of Alamannic harvests68 it is clear that events leading up to
the battle of Strasbourg occurred in high summer or early autumn. We
can assume that Julian, and probably Barbatio, set out in early July.69
Julian was campaigning on the Main well into autumn, which suggests
that he crossed the Rhine at Mainz at the end of September.70 He
engaged the Franks for most of December 357 and January 358.
Less easy to answer is why major campaigning was scheduled for 357
at all. In 356, Julian, Marcellus and Ursicinus had successfully reoccu-
pied the Rhineland. There will have remained much to be done,
including diYcult police work against deserters, bandits, petty outlaws
and renegade barbarians, but this surely did not require a second
campaign. Likewise, in 357 Constantius began to move eastwards.
After a short visit to Rome, from 28 April to 29 May, he left for the
Danube. From the start he headed north-eastwards, via Ravenna, well
away from the route to Alamannia which he never saw again.71 Why
therefore, while Constantius was still in Italy, were two full72 armies
ordered into the Rhine valley, one under the imperial heir and the other
under the Empire’s most senior general, in a move which must have
been long in the planning and directly authorized by the emperor?
Despite Ammianus’ reference to ‘Alamanni raging beyond their
customary manner and ranging more aWeld’,73 there was no major
Alamannic warlike activity at this time. The identity of the ‘hostiles’
who attacked Julian at Senon is just as obscure as that of those who
harassed him on his way from Vienne to Reims, and the threat they
posed probably just as exaggerated. Julian and his circle probably
67 AM 17.2.1–3.
68 Below 236.
69 Lorenz, S. (1997: 40).
70 Lorenz, S. (1997: 51).
71 AM 16.10.20. Barnes (1993: 222). Ammianus’ account of ‘Suebic’ raiding into
Raetia presumably relates to Juthungi, dealt with by Barbatio in 358: AM 17.6.
Cf. above 48 and below 242.
72 For their sizes, see below 238; for their relatively great strength see Elton (1996a: 211).
73 AM 16.11.3: saevientes ultra solitum Alamanni vagantesque fusius .
ConXict 356–61 227