Drinkwater J.F. The Alamanni and Rome 213-496 (Caracalla to Clovis)
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major conXict. This Wghting is conventionally dated to the late 290s,
but there is a case for putting it between 301 and 305, when the
number of times Constantius was hailed as Germanicus Maximus
rose from two to Wve.66
These disturbances were clearly exaggerated: 60,000 Alamannic
dead is an impossible Wgure. Much was made of them probably in
order to sustain Constantius’ military reputation against that of
Galerius, who in 297 or 298 won a spectacular victory over the
Persians. Diocletian’s Persian success may earlier have prompted
Maximian to make much of a minor Frankish chief. Though
Constantius had defeated Allectus, this was an internal aVair; he
needed a ‘foreign’ victory and Alamanni could be pressed into ser-
vice.67 These events amounted to the closest that the Alamanni ever
came to aVecting the course of world history. If Constantius I had been
disabled or killed, it is unlikely that his son, the future Constantine
the Great, would ever have become emperor. They deserve attention.
In the Wrst place, they should not have happened. Such conXicts
had been a feature of the third-century Crisis, but this was now over.
Under the Tetrarchy, Alamanni should not have been allowed to
penetrate so deeply into the Empire; and a Roman emperor should
not have been able to Wnd himself in such danger on imperial soil. It
will, indeed, have been easy to relate events in a way which damaged
Constantius’ reputation. Being hauled to safety on a rope is hardly
heroic. The rope incident could, of course, have been a later embel-
lishment, which means that we cannot attach any importance to
its absence from the panegyric. But the panegyric admits that
Constantius had been wounded, which could have exposed him to
the charge of professional negligence. On the other hand, it is clear
that the story was, in fact, ‘spun’ very positively. The panegyrist,
reminding Constantine I of the exploits of his father, tackles it head
on, having mentioned Constantius’ great victory at Windisch only in
passing.68 There are more indications of Constantius’ general
conWdence. Above all, there is no sign that he embarked on a punitive
66 Lippold (1981: 362); Barnes (1982: 61); Nixon and Rodgers (1994: 225 n.25).
67 Above 182, with Pan. Lat. 5(9).21.2–3 (Britain and Persia). Cf. Lippold (1981:
363); Barnes (1982: 63); Nixon and Rodgers (1994: 176 n.85).
68 Pan. Lat. 7(6).4.2 (allowing for the correctness of an emendation: Nixon and
Rodgers (1994: 223 n.17)).
188 ConXict 285–355
campaign over the Rhine. And, having defeated those Germani (who,
from the context, must be Alamanni) who had attempted to cross the
Rhine, he showed remarkable clemency, not slaughtering or enslav-
ing them, but taking captives by lot and freeing the rest. He did
not even bother to strengthen the line of defence from Basel to
Strasbourg.69
How can we explain these events? The answer may lie in the
wider context of Romano-Alamannic relations and contemporary
imperial politics. Rome probably encouraged permanent friendly
Elbgermanic settlement on the border.70 We may assume that this
was under way from around 300,71 but it was uneven, aVecting the
upper Rhine and upper Danube later than other areas.72 Alamannia
was constantly subject to population movement eastwards and west-
wards.73 At the close of the third century, there must still have been
war-bands raiding deep into the region and beyond. The Alamannic
frontier therefore needed constant attention, with friends supported,
foes undermined, and stray raiders ejected: Heather’s ‘management’.74
This may explain Diocletian’s campaign of 288, to the east of settled,
friendly Alamannic leaders, directing its worst terror against those
who were not Rome’s direct neighbours.75 In the heady days following
the defeat of Allectus, attention may have slipped, allowing raiders to
gain entry over the Upper Rhine where Roman military installations
were less dense and where there were as yet no established rig ht-bank
allied communities.76 The result was Constantius’ brush with death at
Langres. This was a nasty surprise but, thanks to a little luck, no great
disaster. Numbers were, as usual, overestimated. We should think in
terms of a few thousand, not tens of thousands, Alamannic warriors.
Once Constantius had marshalled his resources he had no diYculty in
pushing back the raiders and decisively defeating them as they sought
to return over the Rhine. Settled Alamanni further north on the
69 Below 192.
70 Above 81.
71 Above 82.
72 Above 83.
73 Above 106, cf.115–16, below 338.
74 Heather (2001).
75 Above 183.
76 Cf. below 295. Lorenz, S. (1997: 160) suggests a crossing over the Swiss Rhine,
around Basel, where the river is narrower.
ConXict 285–355 189
frontier may have provided useful help: this could have been the time
when Crocus began his association with Constantius.77 There was no
call for a punitive campaign.
One spring of contemporary Alamannic unrest may be found in
references linking Alamanni and Burgundians.78 Although mention
of the Burgundians is found in the sources from the Wrst century,
they remain shadowy until their move into Gaul early in the Wfth
century.79 However, they may have played more of a part in fourth-
century politics than is usually allowed. What always needs to be
taken into account is the sensitivity of the Main valley, down which
the Burgundians might spill to discomWt Romans and Alamanni
alike.80 Rome may have sought to manage the situation by encour-
aging Alamannic-Burgundian hostility while, through alliances with
local leaders, taking care to ensure that neither side gained a sig-
niWcant advantage over the other.81 That such management developed
very early is hinted at by the panegyrics’ knowledge of ill-feeling
between Alamanni and Burgundians well before the end of the third
century. Maximian’s campaign of 287 may therefore have been more
than self-advertisement. His march across Alamannia could have
taken him up the Main and then southwards, down the longest
stretch of the abandoned Upper German/Raetian limes. This would
have asserted Rome’s claim to sovereignty over its old territories
while giving the local barbarians a practical demonstration of the
length of the Empire’s reach. As was said of the later recovery of
Britain: ‘The Roman state holds in a comprehensive embrace of
peace whatever at any stage in the vicissitudes of time was ever
Roman.’82 Intimidation would have been directed against those
Alamanni who were not Rome’s direct neighbours and also possibly
against hostile Burgundians. Ammianus’ terminales lapides,or,at
least, their oldest predecessors, may have been set up at this time.83
77 For Crocus see above 146.
78 Pan. Lat. 2(10).5.1; 3(11).17.3. Cf. above 186.
79 Above 108.
80 Cf. above 112.
81 Above 112, 115.
82 Pan. Lat. 4(8).20.2. For habitual Roman refusal to concede sovereignty over lost
land see Pohl (2002a: 63, 135). Cf. above 111, 132.
83 Above 112.
190 ConXict 285–355
The same campaign could also have provided the inspiration for the
later ‘Lyon medallion’.84
Neglect of the Alamannic-Burgundian situation in the later 290s
could have been dangerous. Uncontrolled hostilities on the Main
may have stimulated wider raiding. Some bands could have reached
the Rhine ‘knee’ and then moved into Gaul. It is possible that it is
Constantius’ success at Windisch which is commemorated on a
monument at Nicaea, bearing the inscription Alamannia. However,
heavy damage to the structure makes this uncertain.85
Constantius fought no more Alamannic campaigns as Caesar; and
when Diocletian and Maximian retired and he became the senior
emperor in the west in May 305, he conWrmed his position by Wghting
far from the Rhine, in northern Britain.86 Romano-Alamannic rela-
tions appear settled. One of Constantius’ allies and counsellors on this
expedition was king Crocus.87 Overall, western rulers from 285 to
306 appear to have been more concerned with Franks than with
Alamanni.
This situation remained unchanged after 306, when Constantius
died at York and Constantine I improperly replaced his father as ruler
of the north-western provinces. In doing so, he precipitated a long
period of political instability and civil war until his victory over
Licinius in 324 gave him sole control of the Empire. From 306
to 312, when his responsibilities were exclusively north-western,
Constantine gave great attention to the Franks, characterized by
‘perWdy’. In 306/7, Constantine supposedly avenged Frankish attacks
which began around the start of his reign. His conduct was vengeful.
Spectacular punishment was wreaked on two Frankish chieftains,
Ascaric and Merogaisus.88 The campaign of 308 was equally violent,
consisting of an all-out assault over the Rhine against the Bructeri.89
All this is explicable in terms of Roman politics rather than of any
84 Below 364–7.
85 Quellen 6, Inscriptions no. 59 (¼AE 1939, 292).
86 Cf. Pan. Lat. 7(6).7.2, on Constantius’ location at the edge of the world.
87 Above 146.
88 Pan. Lat. 6(7).4.2; 7(6).10.1–7, 11.5; 10(4).16.5–6, 17.1; Eutropius 10.3.2.
Barnes (1982: 69). I follow Nixon and Rodgers (1994: 213–14) for the chronology
of 306–10.
89 Pan. Lat. 7(6).12.1–4. Barnes (1982: 70); Nixon and Rodgers (1994: 235 n.54).
ConXict 285–355 191
Frankish threat. Constantine’s Wrst campaign provided him with a
welcome opportunity to move himself from Britain—marginal to
imperial politics and embarrassing as the location of what, after all,
was a usurpation—to the Rhine.90 The second further conWrmed his
abilities as the conqueror of foreign foes. In 309, although there
was no Wghting, Constantine continued to pressure the Franks by
initiating the building of the fortiWed bridge complex at Cologne/
Deutz: an early example of imperial ‘busy-ness’.91
Here we may review late-third/early-fourth-century imperial
defence works. Following Roman withdra wal fr om the U pper German/
Raetian limes, a major development under Diocletian and Maximian
had been the commencement of the creation of a new demarcation
and defence line, comprising waterways and fortiWcations, along the
High Rhine (centred on Kaiseraugst)—the Danube–Iller–Rhine
limes.92 However, the Upper Rhine, from Basel to Mainz, was not
heavily fortiWed. Constantine I’s development at Breisach helped to
remedy a weakness exposed by his father’s disaster at Langres, but
major development of this sector was not begun until Valentinian I.93
One reason for the di Verent treatment of these two stretches of
the Rhine was undoubtedly hydrology: the meandering and unreli-
able course of the old Rhine downstream from Basel impeded
large-scale riverine construction.94 However, a more important
element in imperial thinking was probably the protection of Italy.
Fear of the Alamannic bogeyman will have persisted, and Diocletian
and his colleagues would have been as careful as Aurelian to show
themselves attending to the defence of the peninsula and the imperial
capital.95 Yet, again, such action was hardly necessary: Alamanni
never again raided deep into Italy. The decision not to lavish
resources on the Upper Rhine was, as events turned out, justiWed.
With rare exceptions, Gaul remained undisturbed by Alamanni until
Roman intrigue precipitated the crisis of the mid-350s.
90 So Seeck (1921: 1.74); Barcelo
´
(1981: 13).
91 Pan. Lat. 7(6).11.4, 13.1, 5; Gru
¨
newald (1989: 175–8); Nixon and Rodgers
(1994: 213). Below 296, 361.
92 Garbsch (1970); Petrikovits (1971: 181–2); Mackensen (1999: 203–22), arguing
against the view that this began under Probus.
93 Fingerlin (1990: 107), (1997a: 103–6); Lorenz, S. (1997: 138). Below 295.
94 Cf. below 231.
95 Cf. Stroheker (1975: 29).
192 ConXict 285–355
Constantine Wrst allied himself with Maximian and his family—who
had used the situation cr eated by his usurpation to re-establish
their own claims to imperial power. Initially this worked well, but in
308 a quarrel between Maximian and his son, Maxentius, brought
the former from Italy to Gaul into impossibly close proximity to
Constantine. Their relationship deteriorated and in 310 Maximian
revolted against Constantine in Arles. Constantine moved quickly,
and captured Maximian after besieging him in Marseille. In the same
year, Constantine again faced Frankish raiding.96 The order of events is
diYcult to establish. Some follow Lactantius in having Constantine face
Frankish trouble before the revolt of Maximian. 97 However, Lactantius’
account is contrary to the panegyric of 310 and is highly tendentious,
determined to denigrate Maximian. It is more plausible to place the
Frankish attack after Constantine’s move to southern Gaul, causing
him to return hotfoot northwards.98 The severity of this ‘attack’ must
have been minimal. In the event, the danger simply evaporated, allow-
ing Constantine to visit the shrine of Apollo at Grand, where he enjoyed
a vision of the god.99 This looks like more exploitation of the
Frankish ‘threat’. Invocation of Frankish ‘perWdy’ allowed Constantine
to distance himself from his embarrassing prisoner at Marseille, and to
be absent from the scene of Maximian’s suspicious end: he was found
hanged.100 Other than this, Constantine’s military concerns may have
taken him to Britain in 307 and 310.101
We know of no conXict between Constantine and the Alamanni
in the period 306–12. In the panegyric of 310 the emphasis is still on
the Frankish bogeyman. There is no mention of the Alamanni apart
from the references to Constantius’ victories years earlier.102 It is
signiWcant that there were no barbarian attacks when Constantine
moved against Maxentius in Italy, in 312.103
In 312, Constantine defeated Maxentius at the battle of the
Milvian bridge and became ruler of the western Empire. Until 324, he
96 Pan. Lat. 7(6).21.2.
97 Lactantius, De mort. pers. 29.3. e.g. Jullian (1926: 103); Barnes (1982: 70).
98 So Barcelo
´
(1981: 15).
99 Pan. Lat. 7(6).21.3–4. Nixon and Rodgers (1994: 247–8 nn.89, 91).
100 Lactantius, De mort. pers. 30.5.
101 Barnes (1982: 69–70); Kienast (1996: 298).
102 Pan. Lat. 7(6).5.3–6.4; 11.
103 Jullian (1926: 105).
ConXict 285–355 193
continued his Frankish campaigns. In 313, he fought Franks after
returning to Gaul from Italy.104 As usual, the Franks were condemned
as‘Wckleand Xighty’ breakers of their word;105 the Wghting was punitive
and patently contrived to give Constantine a great victory.106 His
prisoners were put to death in triumphal games.107 These details
come from a panegyric of 313. A later treatment, of 321, oVers further
particulars, including the names of the barbarians involved: Bructeri,
Chamavi, Cherusci, Lancionae, Tubantes and (actually Wfth in this
list) Alamanni.108 Though some have been prepared to take this
additional information about the 313 campaign seriously, it is best to
treat it as a rhetorical Xourish.109 The speaker, Nazarius, is more
concerned with atmosphere than accuracy, confusing events of the
distant past w ith those of the present to underline the Frankish
threat.110 His list should be seen as an imaginative hotchpotch, made
up of tribal names that he believed were appropriate to the area. None
can be given credence, least of all that of the Alamanni. These are most
unlikely to have been involved in the Wg hting.111 As was so often the
case, the 313 campaign suggests Roman exploitation of, not vulner-
ability to, the Frankish menace. For Romans a ‘good’ foreign war was
the best remedy for the bitter taste in the mouth left by civil strife,
however successful; and Constantine’s presence in Italy would have
been repugnant to Licinius.112 It would have been in Constantine’s
interest to move to conWrm his reputation as a general able to
defeat foreign foes, and to integrate elements of Maxentius’ army
into his own.
Inevitably, Constantine’s attention was increasingly drawn to the
wider Empire. In 315–16, he wintered for the last time in Trier.113
Supervision of the north-western provinces was delegated to his son,
104 Pan. Lat. 9(12).21.5–22.5. I take the date from Nixon and Rodgers (1994:
326 n.138, 328 n.145); Barnes (1982: 71–2) suggests 313 and 314.
105 Pan. Lat. 9(12).22.3.
106 Pan. Lat. 9(12).22.3–6; Barcelo
´
(1981: 17).
107 Pan. Lat. 9(12).23.3.
108 Pan. Lat. 10(4).18.1.
109 Barcelo
´
(1981: 18).
110 Pan. Lat. 10(4).17.1: Franks in Spain; cf. 4(8).18.3.
111 Jullian (1926: 112 and n.1). For further references and general discussion see
Nixon and Rodgers (1994: 363–4 and nn. 79, 81).
112 Nixon and Rodgers (1994: 326 n.137 and 295 n.7).
113 Barnes (1982: 73); cf. Heinen (1985: 228).
194 ConXict 285–355
Crispus (born c.300 and proclaimed Caesar in March 317).114 Before
321, Crispus had successfully fought against Franks.115 The details,
from Nazarius, are again obscure. All that we are told is that Crispus
gained ‘the Wrst fruits of an enormous victory’.116 It is likely that
Franks were used to enable the young prince to win his spurs, to
conWrm his right to imperial oYce, and to secure his family’s trad-
itional Gallic power base.117 It is immaterial whether the credit for
the victory should go to Crispus or to the experienced generals who
must have been advising him.118
After Nazarius’ speech of 321 there is a gap of over 40 years until
the next panegy ric, that of Mamertinus to Julian. Until we reach the
beginning of Ammianus’ extant narrative, with the events of 353/4,
we have to infer Rome’s dealings with the western Germani from
coins, rare inscriptions and odd scraps of information from lesser
literary sources.
Coins produced in Trier from 322 to 323 suggest contemporary
campaigning on the Rhine. Gold pieces (solidi, with fractions and
multiples) hail Constantine I as ‘conqueror of the barbarians’ (debel-
lator gentium barbararum).119 Others associate him and Crispus with
named representations of Alamannia and Francia, defeated and
dejected, and the triumphalist legend ‘rejoicing of the Roman People’
(gaudium Romanorum).120 Barnes has used these types to propose
campaigning by Crispus against both Franks and Alamanni around
323.121 This is odd, given that the panegyrics indicate that there had
been little or no trouble between Rome and the Alamanni for almost
a generation. It becomes odder when we take into account that the
gaudium Romanorum/vanquished Alamannia and Francia types were
introduced much earlier than the 320s, from 310 to 313, when Trier
issued them on solidi in the name of Constantine I.122
114 Kienast (1996: 305–6).
115 Date: Nixon and Rodgers (1994: 362 n.77).
116 Pan. Lat. 10(4).17.2.
117 Cf. Pan. Lat. 10(4).37.1–4.
118 Barcelo
´
(1981: 18); Nixon and Rodgers (1994: 362 n.77).
119 RIC 7, Trier nos 356–7.
120 RIC 7, Trier nos 365 [Constantine I: Francia]; 362–3, 366 [Crispus: Alamannia
and Francia].
121 Barnes (1982: 83).
122 RIC 6, Trier nos 823–4.
ConXict 285–355 195
Serious Wghting between Rome and Alamanni, as well as Franks,
from relatively early in Constantine I’s imperial career is unlikely.123
The slight literary evidence we have to support this interpretation is
garbled.124 The established ‘default’ position of the late-third and
early-fourth-century rulers vis-a
`
-vis Franks and Alamanni was to
harass the former and, unless severely provoked, to leave the latter
alone. In 309/10, with events coming to the boil in his relationship
with Maximian and other rulers and pretenders, it is improbable that
Constantine would have embarked upon any major new military
initiative over his own borders. Finally, the solidus was no ordinary
coin. It was a new denomination, introduced from 309. At 72 to the
Roman pound, it was slightly lighter than the old aureus (at 60 to the
pound), and it suVered a shaky start: but it recovered and went on to
become the keystone of the Empire’s monetary system throughout
the fourth centur y and beyond. It was an important coin, and the
bulk of its initial series celebrated important imperial achievements:
the subjection of Alamannia and Francia; Constantine’s defeat of
Maxentius; and his welcome from the Roman senate.125 Barcelo
´
’s
explanation—that the coins referred to successes by Constantine’s
generals, which therefore did not receive mention in the pane-
gyrics126—is therefore unpersuasive. The Wrst numismatic references
to Alamannia and Francia were probably retrospective. Constantine
needed to impress upon the political nation of the north-western
provinces that the frontiers were secure, and would stay so if
and when he moved from the Rhine to Italy. This security came
from both his own activity, against the Franks, and that of his
father, Constantius I—the darling of Gaul—against both Franks
and Alamanni. Alamannia devicta and Francia devicta were faits
accomplis, not contemporary achievements. From 306 to 312, there
was general peace with the Alamanni.
A further series of gaudium Romanorum/vanquished Alamannia
and Francia solidi and multiples in the names of Constantine I and
Crispus was issued from Trier in 319–20. In these, Constantine is
123 Thus contra Stroheker (1975: 27 and n.12); Nixon and Rodgers (1994:
364 n.81).
124 Pan. Lat. 10(4).8.1 (above 195); Eutropius 10.3.2. Barcelo
´
(1981: 18–19).
125 RIC 6, 40–1, 100, 158. Jones (1964: 439–44); Demandt (1989: 77).
126 Barcelo
´
(1981: 20).
196 ConXict 285–355
associated with Alamannia, Crispus with Francia.127 Crispus’ types
appear occasioned by the Frankish victory celebrated by Nazarius,
hence the usual dating of this campaign to around 319.128 However, a
similar explanation cannot be applied to Constantine’s types, since
during this period he was in the Balkans.129 As both types form a long
established numismatic pair they should be explained as such. I
propose that, as in 309–13, they merged past and present. They
proclaimed that the Rhine frontier was safe in the hands of the new
Caesar, whose father and grandfather had done sterling work in
pacifying neighbouring barbarians and in whose steps the young
prince, through his current success over Franks, was following.
Returning to the 322–3 coins, the idea that they indicate contem-
porary warfare should be treated with equal circumspection. Again,
wider political events were coming to a head, as the decisive conXict
between Constantine I and Licinius drew near in which Crispus would
play an important role as a naval commander. It was probably in
preparation for this that Constantine ‘brought on’ Crispus’ much
younger half-brother, Constantine II (born 316/17, created Caesar
317130) on the Danube, in a war against the Sarmatians.131 Crispus,
in the meantime, settled the Rhine frontier. He may have made contact
with Frankish and Alamannic chieftains, but in receiving homage not
waging war. All this was put out on martial coin-types as the subjec-
tion of Sarmatia, Alamannia and Francia. It follows that the gaudium
Romanorum/Alamannia, Francia issues from Trier—supposedly more
sympathetic to the conquered than those of Pavia and Sirmium—
should not be taken as promoting a local policy of persuading leading
Franks and Alamanni to integrate into the Empire. Such cultural
sensitivity was not a feature of imperial Rome.132 Whatever their
meaning, the designs on the Trier solidi were aimed at imperial not
barbarian users.
127 RIC 7, Trier nos 237–9, 243, 240–1.
128 Nixon and Rodgers (1994: 362 n.77); cf. Barcelo
´
(1981: 20–1).
129 See Barnes (1982: 74).
130 Kienast (1996: 310).
131 RIC 7, Trier nos 358–61, 364, 364A, 367 [Constantine II receives credit for his
father’s Sarmatian victories].
132 RIC 7, Ticinum nos 28, 37 [315], Sirmium nos 49–52 [324/25]. Contra Martin
(1998: 409). Cf. Drinkwater (1998b: 235).
ConXict 285–355 197