The Wrst, historical, was stimulated by Wenskus’ Stammesbildung
und Verfassung.5 It seeks to understand the nature of the Germanic
peoples who eventually took over the western Empire. Its practi-
tioners reject nineteenth and early-twentieth-century interpretation
of Germanic groupings as discrete ‘tribes’ or ‘peoples’, the ancient
creators and hereditary transmitters of eternal and heroic folk values
and institutions, moving into the Empire from the heart of Europe.
Rather, they see them as the consequence of a continuing process by
which a wide variety of communities continually dissolved and
re-formed to create new aggregations of peoples: the process of ‘ethno-
genesis’.6 Ethnogenesis has generated controversy, becoming part of a
much wider debate with important contemporary political reson-
ances, over ‘ethnicity’.7 I will touch on aspects of this below. For the
moment, however, it is suYcient to say that in dealing with the
Alamanni, ethnogenesis is a useful concept. In particular, it frees us
from notions of mass migration.
5 Wenskus (1961). See also Pohl (2000: 103), (2002a: 17), (2002b: 223–5).
6 Seminally, Wolfram (1979); most recently concerning the western Germani, Pohl
(2002a: 18–20). For discussion and acceptance of the views of Wenskus and Pohl in
this respect, see, e.g. Keller (1998: 584–9); Steuer (1998: 272, 283). As far as anglo-
phone scholarship is concerned, ethnogenesis has provoked a mixed reaction. Hea-
ther rejects it (1991: 317–30), but cf. his qualiWcation in 1998 (107); Amory (1997)
accepts it (see 34–5 for a useful summary), but signiWcantly modiWes—in his words,
‘complicates’—it (13). This he does by stressing the importance of existing local and
institutional allegiances within the Empire. These allegiances became the building
blocks of shifting political identities, as late Roman leaders adapted their deWnitions
of insiders and outsiders—Amory’s ‘ideologies’—to meet diVering circumstances. All
this involved no racial or even loosely ‘ethnic’ aYliations: there was no—not even
‘non-tribal’—movement of barbarians over the frontier and so no ‘Roman/barbarian’
divide. Rather (e.g. 26–32), following Whittaker (1994), Amory sees what happened
as the result of the expansion of the ‘frontier zone’, the newly powerful inhabitants of
which were cast as Germanic ‘peoples’ by the educated classes of the centre. Amory is
persuasive, but I do not follow him here because I believe that there was new
‘Germanic’ settlement (despite Amory’s criticism of the term as linguistic, not
cultural or ethnic (xv, 33), we have to call these people something) east of the
upper Rhine and north of the upper Danube, and because I have doubts about the
validity of the ‘frontier zone’ (see below 35–40, 349, 354).
7 See, e.g. Graves-Brown, Jones, and Gamble (ed.) (1996); the very useful survey
oVered by Geary (1999); and, most recently, the Wercely hostile assessments of the
work of Wenskus and his pupils in Gillett (ed.) (2002a). The basic problem is, as
Amory (1997: 15) observes, the inevitable association of ethnicity with race, and
racism: its ‘insidious sub-text’.
2 Introduction