Drinkwater J.F. The Alamanni and Rome 213-496 (Caracalla to Clovis)
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oYcers and for his promotion of Alamanni, and to Ammianus’
strong bias in favour of Julian. The latter came from both Ammianus’
own feelings and his sources, comprising a discrete and easily recog-
nizable pro-Julian tradition.4 Other earlier work on the same lines,
for example by Bitter and Rosen, has been collected by Zotz.5 This,
again, tells against Ammianus’ objectivity with regard to Alamanni,
whom he consistently portrays as a constant and untrustworthy
enemy. More recent investigations have pursued the same vein.
Barcelo
´
registers the same hostility to Constantius II and the same
‘Tendenz’ in favour of Julian.6
But few historians have carried criticism of Ammianus on the
Alamanni to its logical conclusion.7 They have noted Ammianus’
Xaws, but have accepted the broad accuracy of his account and the
general validity of his argument. So, for example, Rosen, Barcelo
´
and
Zotz, while conceding that Ammianus’ narrative needs qualiWcation,
are ready to accept the reality of the Franco-Alamannic threat.8
Acceptance of barbarian ‘pressure’ has most recently been expressed
by Heather, despite his contention that barbarians were susceptible to
‘management’ and his identiWcation of aspects of Rome’s dealings
with them which allow a diVerent interpretation. These are: age-old
hostility to barbarians which justiWed and even encouraged the
perpetration of atrocities against them; emperors’ need for successful
wars; and the fact that major barbarian attacks tended to occur only
when the Empire was damaging itself through civil war.9 Bluntly, as
far as the Alamanni and Rome are concerned, Ammianus grossly
exaggerates the danger posed by the former to the latter. His admir-
ation of Julian was profound, and led him to present him in the best
possible light and to give the worst impression of his enemies. So he
depicted Alamanni as formidable foes, able to get the better of
Constantius II but unequal to Julian’s military genius.10
4 Stroheker (1961: 50). Cf. Guzma
´
n Armario (2002: 542 and, esp. on Ammianus’
hatred of the barbarians as a moral menace, 218, 228, 285, 539–42).
5 Zotz (1998: 385–7, 400–4).
6 Barcelo
´
(1981: 24, 31–3).
7 Recent exceptions are Burns (2003) and Guzma
´
n Armario (2002).
8 Rosen (1970: 91); Barcelo
´
(1981: 12, 26, 37); Zotz (1998: 384–7).
9 Heather (2001: 18–20, 50–2, 54).
10 Cf. below 204–5, 209.
178 ConXict 285–355
Hostility to the barbarians and a genuine, if misguided, conviction
that they posed a real danger to the Empire is evident in all our
sources, epigraphic and numismatic quite as much as literary. The
Empire needed external enemies to bind it together. In particular, the
notion of ‘barbarian pressure’ helped justify the imperial administra-
tive and military structure in the west, and the taxation that was
necessary to sustain it.11 The Empire needed its bogeymen; and so,
apparently, does modern scholarship.12 The reason for this is some-
times evident when we consider historical context. Camille Jullian, for
example, a patriotic Frenchman, published the last two volumes of his
monumental Histoire de la Gaule in 1926 when, after the humiliation
of the Franco-Prussian War and the agony of the First World War, the
threat from Germany was a painful memory and a potential reality. In
discussing the Rhine barbarians, he deals with Franks, Saxons and
Alamanni. However, it soon becomes clear that the villains of the
piece are the Alamanni. Here we can see the resonance of Alamanni/
Alamannia, ‘les allemands’/‘Allemagne’. While the Franks were soon
cooperating with the Roman Empire and manifesting signs of a
greatness that would Wnd its Wrst embodiment in Clovis, the
Alamanni were hostile to Greco-Roman culture, arrogant, and intent
on conquest: dangerous.13 On the other hand, it is less easy to explain
why historians of the era of the European Union Wnd it diYcult to
abandon the concept. There can be no doubt that the impression of
the Germani as numerous, warlike, only temporarily cowed by
Roman campaigns of retribution and ever ready to renew wide-scale
plundering and devastation retains enormous strength.14
I will deal with Romano-Alamannic conXicts in chronological
order, establishing a narrative and indicating how events may have
been ‘spun’ for the beneWt of imperial politics, beginning with the
period 285–355—from the accession of Diocletian to Julian’s arrival
in Gaul.
For all its problems, Ammianus’ account remains our only exten-
sive source. Until we reach its Wrst extant book (Book 14), which
11 Drinkwater (1996: 26–7); see also now Heather (2001: 51). See esp. below 361.
12 Below 359.
13 Jullian (1926: 169–71, 174–6).
14 e.g. Germanen (1986: 340–1); cf. Drinkwater (1997: 1).
ConXict 285–355 179
concerns the events of 353/4, we have to rely on lesser authors,
inscriptions and coins. This causes problems. For example, the
reconstruction of campaigns from imperial titles found on inscriptions
has attracted criticism.15 However, the situation is not quite as bad as
these observations may suggest. Down to 321 we are fortunate to
have the evidence of nine Latin panegyrics: speeches in honour of
emperors or (in one case) imperial oYcials. Given that these take a
close interest in campaigns, and that they are at pains to relate events
of the present to those of the past, by frequently employing the
Xashback, we may be fairly conWdent that we know the major
incidents on the Rhine in this period, even if their details are often
obscure. Further, the little that we do know about Rome’s dealings
with the Alamanni can be made to yield more when seen in the
context of Rome’s dealings with Rhine barbarians in general, espe-
cially the Franks. Overall, the broad peaks and troughs of Romano-
Alamannic interaction in this period may be accepted as authentic
historical phenomena, and not condemned as the deceptive creations
of the source material.
Diocletian began his challenge for the throne in the east in 284,
and by 285 was leader of the whole Empire. He sent Maximian into
Gaul as commander of the west, and before the end of the year
had recognized him as Caesar. In 286 he made Maximian fellow
Augustus: the ‘dyarchy’ (rule-of-two) was born.16 Maximian was
sent to Gaul in the Wrst place to deal with Bagaudae, not Franks or
Alamanni. The Bagaudae were internal dissidents, created by the
dislocation of the third-century ‘Crisis’ and by government measures
intended to overcome it.17 Only after these had been suppressed did
he turn to deal with the ‘Germanic problem’.
Late in 285 or early in 286, he supposedly faced serious bar barian
invasion.18 A panegyric of 289 tells us that the invaders were in two
groups: Chaibones and Heruli; and Burgundians and Alamanni.
Maximian left the Burgundians and Alamanni to succumb to hunger
and disease, but engaged the Chaibones in person, though with only
15 Lippold (1981: 362–3).
16 Kienast (1996: 272).
17 Jullian (1926: 51); Stroheker (1975: 26); Drinkwater (1984: 364–8).
18 Pan. Lat. 2(10).5.1. Date: Barnes (1982: 57); Kolb (1987: 41); Nixon and
Rodgers (1994: 61 n.23).
180 ConXict 285–355
part of his forces.19 The panegyrist’s naming of Chaibones and Heruli
is odd, since the Wrst are otherwise unknown and the second a long
way from their normal geographic location. They are, however,
mentioned again in a panegyric of 291.20 It is probably best to treat
both as being associated with the Franks on the Lower Rhine.21
Maximian gave another dramatic demonstration of his energy and
personal courage on 1 January 287, the date of his inauguration into
his Wrst consulship, at Trier. Receiving news of barbarian raiders in
the vicinit y, he dashed out to deal with them in person, returning
victorious on the same day.22 It is reasonable to suppose that these
raiders, too, were Franks.23
Each of Maximian’s Wrst two ‘campaigns’ may be explained as
resulting from his desire to re-establish his reputation as a general.
Success against the Bagaudae was admirable, but it was success
against fellow citizens and simple peasants to boot: not something
to boast about. Real success could be gained only through victories
against external enemies, leading to recognition as ‘conqueror of the
barbarians’ (debellator gentium barbararum: Constantine I) or even
(to draw on the vocabulary of modern Wlm) ‘terminator of the
barbarians’ (barbarorum extinctor: Julian).24 However, both these
early eVorts were small-scale and unfocused.
Maximian showed that he had identiWed a more promising target
when, later in 287, he campaigned over the Rhine.25 If this is the same
expedition in which Constantius I participated before he became
Caesar, it took Roman forces from Mainz to Gu
¨
nzburg26 (Fig. 4).
Maximian thus traversed Alamannia. His campaign was bloody,
destructive and triumphalist.27 Two years later, a Gallic orator, cele-
brating the emperor’s success, declared, ‘All that I see across the
19 Pan. Lat. 2(10).5.2–3.
20 Pan. Lat. 3(11).7.1.
21 Jullian (1926: 60–1, as ‘allies’).
22 Pan. Lat. 2(10).6; Nixon and Rodgers (1994: 42–3).
23 Drinkwater (1996: 22 n.10); Runde (1998: 660).
24 RIC 7, Trier no. 356; AE 1969, 631 (¼Quellen 6, Inscriptions no. 66).
25 Pan. Lat. 2(10).7.2–3.
26 Pan. Lat. 4(8).2.1. Stroheker (1975: 26–7); Nixon and Rodgers (1994: 110 n.6).
27 Pan. Lat. 2(10).7.6; 3(11).5.4, with Nixon and Rodgers (1994: 89 n.33); Pan. Lat .
4(8).2.1.
ConXict 285–355 181
Rhine is Roman.’28 Also in 287, probably just before the Alamannic
campaign, Maximian was involved with Franks on the Lower Rhine,
leading to the submission of king Gennobaudes. This appears to
have been achieved through intimidation more than force.29
Gennobaudes may have sensed that Maximian was looking for
trouble and prudently avoided a full-scale war with him. Others
may have followed suit, perhaps after a token show of strength, as
is hinted at in a brief notice of Constantius’ capture of another
Frankish leader.30 We hear of Gennobaudes probably only because
Maximian needed a ‘royal’ supplication to match that by the king of
Persia to Diocletian.31 For all its display of his Herculean ‘vigour and
activity’,32 Maximian’s success was already hollow. Probably even
before he had set out on his Alamannic campaign, a major crisis
had erupted in the west.
This was the usurpation of Carausius, probably during the winter
of 286/7.33 Carausius’ rebellion was dangerous not so much because
it posed an immediate militar y challenge—he showed himself eager
to cooperate with his imperial ‘colleagues’—but because it threa-
tened Diocletian’s new political order. The uncontrolled proliferation
of rulers risked a return to the recent Crisis. The imperial collegium
was not open to gate-crashers.34
Diocletian returned from the east at this time. In 288, he fought his
own campaign against the Alamanni, attacking ‘that part of Germany
which lies opposite Raetia’.35 From a later reference to the borders of
28 Pan. Lat. 2(10).7.7: quidquid ultra Rhenum prospicio Romanum est.
29 Pan. Lat. 2(10).10.3–6, cf. 3(11).5.4.
30 Pan. Lat. 4(8).2.1; Nixon and Rodgers (1994: 110 n.6).
31 Pan. Lat. 2(10).10.6, with Nixon and Rodgers (1994: 68 n.36), and Drinkwater
(1996: 28 n. 35). Cf. below 188.
32 Rees (2002: 47).
33 Nixon and Rodgers (1994: 107): 286; Kienast (1996: 278): late 286 or winter 286/
7. The dating is diYcult. One might suppose that the occurrence of Maximian’s
Alamannic war during the campaigning season of 287 oVers a reliable terminus post
quem for the rebellion, on the grounds that Maximian would not have embarked upon
such a venture with danger threatening him in the rear. But the earlier dating, however
imprecise, seems well founded, and what happened provides further evidence of
Maximian’s characteristic impetuosity.
34 Kolb (1997: 44); Rees (2002: 65, 91–2).
35 Pan. Lat. 2(10).9.1; 3(11).5.4. Date: Quellen 6, 43; Stroheker (1975: 26–7);
cf. Nixon and Rodgers (1994: 66 n.31) 288 or 289.
182 ConXict 285–355
Germany and Raetia being extended to the source of the Danube
(ad Danubii caput) in this period, it would appear that Diocletian
was operating to the west of Lake Constance, presumably—like
Constantius II in 356—moving from Italy into Raetia and Maxima
Sequanorum, where he crossed the Rhine.36 The precise extent of
Diocletian’s foray and the reason for it are nowhere explained. Given
the emphasis on imperial harmony and ‘similar virtue’ at this still
very early—and now, thanks to Carausius, rather tense—stage in the
development of the dyarchy, he may have wished to show his
approval of Maximian’s Alamannic venture.37 In practical terms, he
may have intended to extend the lesson taught by Maximian to the
area west of Gu
¨
nzburg.38 The two emperors conferred. The precise
date and even the venue of this meeting are unknown, but its main
business is evident: how to deal with Carausius.39
From 288 and into 289 and possibly 290, imperial attention was
focused on defeating Carausius. Preparations consisted of the build-
ing of an invasion Xeet on Gallic rivers, and action against Franks on
the Lower Rhine. The former Maximian supervised himself, the
latter he left to his generals.40 The Frankish campaigns show how
attention had been diverted from the Alamanni, and demonstrate
how Romano-barbarian relationships could be shaped by Roman
perceptions of a threat rather than by the real nature of the threat
itself. The panegyrics down to 313 consistently portray Franks as
ferocious and untrustworthy demons, a fair target for savage Roman
reprisals: bogeymen par excellence.41 For the most part, this resulted
36 Pan. Lat. 4(8).3.3. Below 208–9 and Lippold (1981: 352); cf. below 294.
37 Cf. Rees (2002: 55, 60–4, 67).
38 Below 189.
39 Date: Barnes (1982: 51): 288, following Diocletian’s Raetian campaign; Nixon
and Rodgers (1994: 43, 66 n. 32): summer/autumn 288, before Diocletian’s Raetian
campaign. Location: Nixon and Rodgers (1994: 66 n.32).
40 Pan. Lat. 2(10).12.3–5; 2(10).11.4, with 2(10).11.7. Nixon and Rodgers (1994:
71 n.39).
41 Pan. Lat. 2(10).11.4 [289]: ‘that pliant and treacherous race of barbarians’;
5(9).18.3 [298]: ‘Frankish ferocity’; 6(7).4.2 [307]: ‘the slippery faith of the whole
race’; 7(6).10.1 [310]: the Franks as ‘contemptible’ perpetrators of ‘brigandage’;
7(6).11.2 [310]: Frankish ‘audacity’; 7(6).11.4 [310]: the Franks as possessors of
‘that famed ferocity. . . that ever untrustworthy Wckleness’; 7(6).21.1 [310]: the Franks
as practitioners of ‘barbarian perWdy’; 9(12).22.3 [313]: the Franks as ‘Wckle and
Xighty’; 9(12).24.2 [313]: ‘The grim Frank Wlled only by the Xesh of wild beasts’.
Nixon and Rodgers (1994: 137 n.60); Drinkwater (1996: 22).
ConXict 285–355 183
from wilful confusion between Carausius and the Franks. Carausius
was a Gaul, a Menapian, from an area north of his Continental
bridgehead at Boulogne (Fig. 17). Still further north, between the
Waal and the Rhine, lay Batavia, now being occupied by Franks.42 By
the end of the third century, it was normal for the Roman army to
recruit Germanic troops in various ways.43 It comes as no surprise to
learn that Carausius’ forces contained Frankish elements.44 Given his
agreements with rulers such as Gennobaudes, Maximian’s army must
have done the same. However, imperial rage, picked up and articu-
lated by the panegyrists, caused the position to be presented entirely
diVerently. Carausius’ revolt was politically intolerable, but for a long
time nothing could be done to end it. The emperors’ frustration
caused Carausius to be viliWed. The admiral whose command had
been against pirates was himself labelled a ‘pirate’. And the provincial
whose homeland lay close to the Franks of the Lower Rhine was
accused of recruiting Franks as allies and fellow pirates. The war
against Carausius thus became a war against the Franks, and vice
versa.45 This made Frankish communities at the Rhine mouths fair
game for Roman military action. In other words, Maximian sent his
generals against these people mainly because this was the only way in
which he could demonstrate that he was doing something against
Carausius, not because they were, in fact, Carausius’ particular allies.
However, all these preparations, and the accompanying brave
anticipation of victory,46 were in vain. The panegyrics, naturally,
say nothing about what occurred but, in 289 or 290, the strike against
42 Pan. Lat. 7(6).5.3. Cf. below 200.
43 Above 145.
44 e.g. Pan. Lat. 4(8).17.1–2.
45 Pan. Lat. 2 (10).12.1; 3(11).7.2, with Nixon and Rodgers (1994: 92 n.49); 4(8).6.1,
with Nixon and Rodgers (1994: 120 n. 27). Cf. 2(10).11.4, with Nixon and Rodgers
(1994: 71 n.31); and 5(9).18.3, with Nixon and Rodgers (1994: 169 n.71): the close
association of events in Britain and Gaul; 7(6).5.3: the Frankish occupation of Batavia
was ‘led’ by Carausius. Later reference to the third-century ‘Batavian’ destroyers of
Autun (Pan. Lat. 5(9).4.1; cf. 5(9).21.1–2, with Nixon and Rodgers (1994: 172, n.80))
may be seen as an anachronistic reference to these Franks. Other, unpleasant, Frankish
memories that were being stirred at the time included recollection of ‘cheeky’ Frankish
piratical raiding under Probus (Pan. Lat. 4(8).18.3. Cf. Zosimus 1.71.2; Historia
Augusta, V. Probi 18.2–3), perhaps w ith the implication that similar raiding would
have come out of Britain if Carausius had not been defeated. Cf. Pan. Lat. 4(18).4–5:
Carausius could have attacked Gaul, Spain, Africa; Drinkwater (1996: 22–3).
46 Pan. Lat. 2(10).12.8.
184 ConXict 285–355
Seine
M
arne
Rhône
Rhône
Saône
Swiss plateau
Splügen Pass
Scheldt
Po
Meuse
DALMATIA
PANNONIA II
NORICUM
PANNONIA I
ILLYRICUM
Racetia I
Racetia I
RAETIA I
Racetia I
Racetia I
RAETIA II
ANNONARIA
ITALIAITALIA
Sequanorum
Maxima
Germania
GERMANIA
II
Germania
GERMANIA I
Belfort Gap
Fig. 17 The north-western provinces, fourth century.
ConXict 285–355 185
Carausius failed or was permanently postponed.47 The intolerable
had to continue to be tolerated. In the west, all major military
activity was suspended.48 There is a possible hint of the defensive
attitude that this provoked in a panegyric delivered to Maximian in
291. With its emphasis on the dyarchy rather than on Maximian’s
personal qualities, this is much more subdued than that of 289.49 The
speaker claims that it is of no concern that Diocletian and Maximian
are both away from the frontier.50 Referring to their previous cam-
paigns, he claims that further action is anyway unnecessary, since the
barbarians are tearing themselves to pieces: ‘. . . inspired by madness,
they re-enact on each other your expeditions in Sarmatia and Raetia
and across the Rhine.’51 He continues: ‘The Goths utterly destroy the
Burgundians . . . The Burgundians have taken over the land of the
Alamanni but obtained it at great cost to themselves. The Alamanni
have lost the land but seek to regain it.’52
One cause of imperial absence from the frontiers was a second
summit meeting in Milan, at the end of 290 and the beginning of
291.53 We do not know what Diocletian and Maximian discussed, but
it must have included Carausius.54 The meeting may also have led to
the formation of the Tetrarchy, though this is debated.55 Certainly,
however, the situation was radically changed in March 293, when the
rule-of-two became the rule-of-four (tetrarchy), with Constantius I
and Galerius being appointed as the imperial helpmates of Maximian
and Diocletian. Shortly afterwards, in a brilliant campaign which
must have been long in the planning, Constantius took Carausius’
base at Boulogne, and then started building a new invasion Xeet on
the Seine.56 In the meantime, as Maximian had done, he attacked
47 Nixon and Rodgers (1994: 73 n.45, 102 n.90, 130 n.46). Date: Barnes (1982: 58);
Nixon and Rodgers (1994: 42, 79, 93 n.53); Kienast (1996: 272).
48 Barnes (1982: 58); Nixon and Rodgers (1994: 79); Rees (2002: 69). Contra
Lippold (1981: 351, from Ensslin): that Maximian campaigned against the Alamanni
c.292.
49 Rees (2002: 76, 92).
50 Pan. Lat. 3(11).14.1.
51 Pan. Lat. 3(11).16.1.
52 Pan. Lat. 3(11).17.1, 3. Below 189.
53 Pan. Lat. 3(11).11.3–4. Barnes (1982: 58); Nixon and Rodgers (1994: 74 n. 46).
54 Nixon and Rodgers (1994: 80, 93 and n. 53).
55 Nixon and Rodgers (1994: 70 n.38).
56 Pan. Lat. 4(8).6.1, 13.1; 4(8).7.3, 14.4.
186 ConXict 285–355
Carausius’ purported Frankish allies, named as Chamavi and Frisii,
on the Scheldt and Lower Rhine, defeating them and settling the
survivors in Gaul.57 In Britain, Carausius, having lost Boulogne, had
been overthrown by Allectus. Allectus fell in 296, when Constantius
Wnally retook Britain. ViliWcation of the enemy and his barbarian
allies persisted to the end. Allectus’ troops were described as barbar-
ian or, at least, dressed like barbarians.58 Franks are speciWcally
described as being slaughtered by Constantius’ forces when they
took London.59 During the recovery of Britain there was, we are
told, no trouble on the Rhine, secured by the presence of
Maximian.60
On his return to Gaul, Constantius put his energy into civil
projects, aimed at restoring morale and prosperity.61 He may also
have sanctioned Frankish occupation of Batavia.62 In a panegyric of
310 there may be some hint that Constantius fought Franks on his
return from Britain, but this is brief and obscure. If a campaign took
place, it cannot have been on any grand scale.63 Then come clear
references to severe Wghting with Alamanni.
A panegyric of 310 relates that, though wounded, Constantius won
a great victory among the Lingones; that he left the Weld of Windisch
strewn with enemy dead; and that he defeated a ‘huge multitude of
Germans from every nation’ venturing onto the frozen Rhine.64 This
report is supplemented by Eutropius, who records that Constantius,
campaigning near Langres, was suddenly overwhelmed by invading
barbarians. Seeking refuge in the city he found its gates closed and
had to be hauled over the walls on a rope. However, on the same day,
the arrival of the Roman army allowed him to kill almost 60,000 of
the enemy.65 Eutropius identiWes these as Alamanni, which squares
with the panegyrist’s reference to Windisch as the site of another
57 Pan. Lat. 4(8).8.1, 4; 9.3; 6(7).4.2.
58 Pan. Lat. 4(8).16.4.
59 Pan. Lat. 4(8).17.1.
60 Pan. Lat. 4(8).13.3.
61 e.g. Autun: Pan. Lat. 4(8).21.2; 5(9).4.1–3, 14.4, 18.1.
62 Jullian (1926: 85–6).
63 Pan. Lat. 7(6).6.2; Barnes (1982: 61) dating it to 300 or 301; Nixon and Rodgers
(1994: 225 n. 24) dating it to c.296.
64 Pan. Lat. 7(6).4.2, 6.3–4.
65 Eutropius 9.23.1.
ConXict 285–355 187