Drinkwater J.F. The Alamanni and Rome 213-496 (Caracalla to Clovis)
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exaggerated, intended as usual to point up Julian’s success.123 Much
ink has been spilled in attempting to resolve the issue.124 I believe
that 35,000 is too high, in line with Ammianus’ emphasis on Ala-
mannic populousness at this point, a concept rejected above.125 What
it should be reduced to is impossible to say with certainty, but an
approximation may be made by taking into account the strategic and
tactical context.
Ammianus says that Barbatio’s army was 25,000 strong and Julian’s
13,000, giving a total of 38,000.126 These Wgures are comparable with
Libanius’ 30,000, 15,000 and 45,000 respectively,127 and are likely to
be more trustworthy than those for the Alamanni since the Roman
commanders and commissariat will have needed to know them, and
they will have been remembered by those concerned (and were per-
haps even available on record) when Ammianus did his research for
his ‘History’. If Constantius’ aim was to terrorize the Alamanni into a
peaceful withdrawal, he would have taken care to give Barbatio
and Julian overwhelming military superiority. Estimating this as an
advantage in manpower of at least 3:1, the maximum envisaged
Alamannic strength was c.13,000. Where were these men expected
to come from? Presumably, in the Wrst instance they would have been
recruited from the pagi of the seven kings and from those of the upper
and middle Neckar, leaned on by Constantius in 356: say nine pagi in
all. A third-century raiding-band was about 600 strong.128 Allowing
that more settled conditions may have increased numbers and pro-
vided the opportunity to draw on veterans, this Wgure may be raised
to around 1,000 Wghting men per pagus. This produces a ‘core’ force
of around 9,000. But a prudent commander-in-chief would also have
feared recruitment further aWeld in Alamannia and the Elbgermanic
triangle. Ammianus says that the army of 35,000 was raised ‘from
various nations, partly for pay and partly under agreement to return
123 e.g. Stroheker (1975: 36): ‘sicher u
¨
bertrieben’. Cf. Lorenz, S. (1997: 45); Guz-
ma
´
n Armario (2002: 167), citing Dubois (1912).
124 For useful reviews see Rosen (1970: 110–14); Lorenz, S. (1997: 45 and n.47).
125 Cf. AM 16.12.6: populosae gentes; above 141–2.
126 AM 16.11.2, 12.2.
127 Libanius, Orat. 18.49, 54.
128 Above 49.
238 ConXict 356–61
the service’.129 This does not suit the likely terms under which
full pagus lev ies followed optimates and reges, but Wts the wider
engagement of individuals and smaller bands,130 which gives the
extra 4,000. Numbers at Strasbourg turned out to be larger. The core
Wghters were joined by those of Vadomarius and Gundomadus,131 say
another 2,000, bringing the army opposing Julian to c.15,000: indeed a
larger force than his, but nowhere near three times its size.
The second issue is that of the Alamannic cavalry. The main body
of Alamanni at Strasbourg comprised infantry. Indeed, these troops
compelled Chnodomarius and other regales to dismount before the
battle.132 However, the Alamanni also deployed cavalry, which almost
broke the Roman line.133 The failure of his cavalry was a great
embarrassment to Julian, and his rallying and then exemplary pun-
ishment of these troopers Wgures prominently in the sources.134 This
was probably the reason for Aurelius Victor’s exculpatory reference
to Alamannic populousness and ability as horse-soldiers.135 Finally,
Ammianus’ report of Chnodomarius’ capture makes mention of the
large retinue that was taken with him—200 followers and three close
friends.136 This oVers a glimpse into the working of Alamannic
society.137 (It is likely that Chnodomarius’ colleague and nephew,
Serapio, was also taken prisoner at this time.138)
According to Ammianus, Strasbourg was a triumph of Roman
discipline and Julian’s inspired leadership over Germanic fury.
It was followed by the ethnic cleansing of the left bank: all
Alamanni were removed from ‘our’ territory.139 Constantius II, as
129 AM 16.12.26: ex variis nationibus partim mercede, partim pacto vicissitudinis
reddendae.
130 Above 163–6.
131 Above 156.
132 AM 16.12.34–5.
133 AM 16.12.21, 37–8. Elton, S. (1996a: 255–6).
134 AM 16.12.38–41; Zosimus 3.3.4–5; cf. Libanius, Orat. 18.56–9, 56. Rosen
(1970: 126); Lorenz, S. (1997: 48–9).
135 Above 141–2, 175–6.
136 AM 16.12.60.
137 Above 120.
138 Libanius, Orat. 18.67. PLRE 1.824; Lorenz, S. (1997: 50 and n.170); cf. below 253.
Whether the Wve other kings also fought themselves or only sent help is debated: Rosen
(1970: 112); Lorenz, S. (1997: 45 and n.142); cf. Zotz (1998: 395).
139 AM 17.11.2.
ConXict 356–61 239
commander-in-chief, ultimately responsible for all military activities
in the Empire, rightly took credit for his Caesar’s success;140 but he
did not go out of his way to celebrate the event. There is no sign of his
iteration of his earlier Germanicus Maximus/Alamannicus titles; and
at Sirmium, Constantius’ headquarters from 357 to 359, the imperial
mint produced no victory issues.141 This may indicate unease on
Constantius’ part: certainly at Julian’s success, but perhaps also at
Roman treatment of Alamanniwho had helped him defeat Magnentius.
The relatively lenient treatment of Chnodomarius as, later, that of
Vadomarius, both clients of Constantius, is to be noticed.142
But Julian was not finished. His continuation of his campaign
should not be eclipsed by Strasbourg. If he had been simply bent
on pursuing the survivors of Strasbourg,143 he should have crossed
the Rhine into the immediately adjacent pagi, the territories of
Chnodomarius, Serapio, Hortarius and Suomarius.144 His march
northwards, keeping to the left bank, will have convinced the Ala-
manni that he was leaving by the same route as he had taken the
previous year. His sudden foray over the Mainz bridge into the
Wetterau must have come as an enormous shock.
To judge from the chronology and pattern of their settlement in an
important military area and from the pattern of local coin use,145 it is
likely that the Alamanni of this region were very close to Rome. The
three kings who made peace with Julian had aided their neighbours
to the south only after the battle of Strasbourg.146 Libanius’ reference
to Julian’s restoration of ‘the two greatest cities’ of the Rhineland
must be to Cologne and Mainz.147 Assuming that it was the former
140 AM 16.12.68–70; cf. Aurelius Victor, Caesares 42.13.
141 RIC 8.346, 382.
142 Cf. below 251–2.
143 So Geuenich (1997a: 48).
144 Geuenich (1997a: 45): Chnodomarius and Serapio in the Ortenau, just
across from Strasbourg; Lorenz, S. (1997: 38): between Karlsruhe and Strasbourg.
Cf. below 243.
145 Above 83, 88–9, 129–30.
146 AM 17.1.13. I recognize that the orthodox interpretation of the phrase qui
misere victis apud Argentoratum auxilia is that it describes those ‘who had sent troops
to Chnodomarius at Strasburg’ (Elliott (1983: 82)). For auxilia as ‘aid’, not ‘military
support’, see de Jonge (1977: 33).
147 Libanius, Orat. 18.46.
240 ConXict 356–61
that was ‘in ruins as the result of a single recent attack’,148 we may
envisage the latter as having ‘been harried by countless inroads’ and
having ‘become completely destitute’, but not as having fallen under
barbarian control, that is local Alamanni had left it alone.149 Julian’s
attack threw them into total confusion, and exposed them to mind-
less raiding. This is the context of Roman destruction of ‘Alamannic’
villas, not far from the Mainz bridgehead, which may have been
Roman property.150
That Julian was operating in a normally paciWc area is also sug-
gested by his restoration of the fort. We know that this was not far
along his route (possibly the Friedberg road),151 and it had recently
been in use.152 This, and Julian’s regarrisoning of the place, suggests
that it could not have been impossibly remote or vulnerable.
Like Valentinian’s fortiWed beaching areas over the Rhine, it may
have been on a river—the Main or one of its tributaries—and there-
fore accessible to Roman warships.153 We should note Julian’s use of
the Main as a highway in his pincer attack.154 Lorenz’s location of the
structure in the vicinity of Frankfurt-am-Main is attractive.155
As Matthews has pointed out, its ‘Trajanic’ dating could well be
apocryphal.156 What we may have is evidence for a regular Roman
military presence in the Wetterau after the evacuation of the limes.157
The ‘peace’ that Julian secured was hardly wrenched from a mighty
enemy. His aim in terrorizing innocent Alamanni must have been to
demonstrate that he was now a power to be reckoned with. Even his
agreement with the Wetterau-Alamanni may be seen as threatening.
Ten months is an odd length of time; but it meant that the peace
expired around 1 August 358, at the height of the next campaigning
season: if the Alamanni did not abide by the agreement, Julian would
148 Cf. above 208, 214–15.
149 Above 84, 218–19.
150 Above 85, 134–5.
151 AM 17.1.8–9. Cf. above 129–30.
152 AM 17.1.11.
153 For Valentinian see below 295–302; for Julian’s appreciation of naval power see
Ho
¨
ckmann (1986: 414).
154 de Jonge (1977: 11); Lorenz, S. (1997: 51 and n. 178).
155 Lorenz, S. (1997: 52 and n.181).
156 Matthews (1989: 310).
157 Above 132.
ConXict 356–61 241
be back in force.158 An alternative explanation, equally aggressive, is
that the Alamanni were put under orders not to interfere with the
fort while it was empty in winter.159 Again, we see Julian beginning a
new phase in Romano-Alamannic dealings. He was not, as Lorenz
would have it, simply continuing Constantius II’s defensive strategy
albeit ‘with e
´
lan and verve’, but rather, as Jankowski and others have
said, going on the oVensive,160 as he did immediately against the
Franks and would do so against both Franks and Alamanni in 358.
In 358, Constantius fought Sarmatians and Quadi. He was less
violent than Julian was to be with Franks and Alamanni, controlling
not crushing his enemies, and making peace.161 In the same year,
Iuthungi ravaged Raetia. These are probably the ‘Suebi’, whose
attacks on Raetia were one of the reasons why Constantius left Rome
in 357.162 They were easily dealt with by Barbatio.163
In Gaul, Julian, wintering in Paris, was keen to come to grips with
the Alamanni, who were ‘not yet assembled into one body but were
all venturesome and cruel to the point of madness after the battle of
Strasbourg’.164 Not waiting until the opening of the regular cam-
paigning season, in July, Julian struck in late May or early June.165
First, however, he directed himself against the Salian Franks, now
settled in Toxiandria, whom he treated ver y roughly to obtain their
absolute obedience. Chamavian Franks, attempting similarly to settle
in the Empire, he expelled.166 He then repaired three for ts on the
Marne, but ran into trouble with his own troops because of food
shortages.167
Finally, he began his Alamannic campaign. He built a pontoon
bridge and crossed the Rhine, but was hampered by a loss of nerve on
158 Cf. Libanius, Orat. 18 .47: after apparently conflating the three kings of Ammianus’
account into one Alamannic leader , Libanius explains the short peace as ‘rendering him
better disposed thr ough fear of what might follow’.
159 Cf. below 301–2.
160 Lorenz, S. (1997: 50–1 and n.174 (with wider references), 53).
161 AM 17.12.
162 AM 16.10.20. Above 48.
163 AM 17.6.
164 AM 17.8.1: nondum in unum coactos.
165 AM 17.8.1–2.
166 AM 17.8.3–5. Cf. above 200.
167 AM 17.9.1–5.
242 ConXict 356–61
the part of Severus.168 Then Suomarius, an Alamannic king, turned
up with his force and, despite his previous hostility at Strasbourg,
made peace. He was allowed this on condition that he give up his
Roman captives and supply Roman troops with food, as required,
‘receiving security, just like an ordinary contractor’.169 After this,
Julian ferociously attacked the territory of Hortarius, another of
Chnodomarius’ helpers at the battle of Strasbourg, forcing him to
sue for peace. Julian granted this on conditions, relating especially to
the release of prisoners.170 But Hortarius held some back. Therefore,
when Hortarius was visiting him to receive gifts, Julian arrested four
of his comites,171 and in a personal confrontation, forced him to free
the rest. He was also compelled to promise carts and timber from his
own resources and those of his subjects. He could not supply grain
because of the damage done to his country. At the end of a successful
campaign, Julian went into winter quarters.172
The Alamannic phase of Julian’s campaign appears to have taken
place in late summer or early autumn 358.173 He crossed the Rhine
into Suomarius’ territory, probably just south of Mainz. He then
moved further south, up-river, into Hortarius’ territory, possibly the
Kraichgau, opposite Worms and Speyer. From the Rhine crossing this
route would have taken him to Groß-Gerau and then along the old
Roman highway by way of Ladenburg to beyond Heidelberg and the
border of the territory of Serapio174 (Fig. 20).
It appears that Julian was continuing to exploit the Alamanni to
win a military reputation and political strength. As the diYculties
over supplies revealed, despite his success at Strasbourg his troops
were still reluctant to follow him without question. He had the excuse
of needing to punish those who opposed him in 357, and was ready
to use it. However, there was no real danger from the Alamanni, who
proved easy targets. Julian’s ‘fear’ of continuing Alamannic savagery
168 AM 17.10.1–2.
169 AM 17.10.3.
170 AM 17.10.5–9.
171 AM 17.10.8: comites eius, quorum ope et Wde maxime nitebatur.
172 AM 17.10.9–10.
173 Lorenz, S. (1997: 54 and n.192).
174 Lorenz, S. (1997: 54–5). On the location of the pagi of Suomarius and
Hortarius see AM 18.2.8, 14 and below 249; for that of those of Serapio and
Chnodomarius see above 240.
ConXict 356–61 243
and a second attempt at joint action had no basis in reality, though by
stirring memories of the events of 357 (and possibly of those a
century earlier) he kept the bogeyman alive and justiWed whatever
he had in mind for the Alamanni. He operated double standards. The
Franks were subdued but not pursued, and some of them were
allowed to maintain their settlements within the Empire. The
Alamanni became again, as they had been under Constantine II,
the enemy of choice.
Details of Julian’s Alamannic campaign of 358 (as of that of 359)
invite consideration of Alamannic economy and society. Mention of
Hortarius’ comites is signiWcant, but more telling is Julian’s constant
interest in what could be wrung from the Alamanni in material
terms. We see constant insistence on the return of prisoners and
the supply of foodstuVs and raw materials. The prisoners have been
Fig. 20 The 358 campaign.
244 ConXict 356–61
dealt with.175 Greed for mate
´
riel suggests an awareness of its avail-
ability (not just of grain and timber but also of stone and iron, and
perhaps even salt),176 and knowledge that it could be easily trans-
ported. Carts are mentioned, but we can assume that these served
mainly to get bulky goods to waterways, for movement by boat or
raft. We seem to be faced with an established process. Suomarius’ and
Hortarius’ ready agreement to provide supplies (in the case of the
former ‘like a common contractor’, carefully documenting his deliv-
eries177) suggests that they had done so before, albeit under less
punitive arrangements. The location of their territories puts them
physically as close as they could be to the Empire. We thus return to
the notion of a zone of influence, exploitation and cooperation,
proposed earlier to explain the distribution of the coins.178
Within this context we may consider the outcome of Julian’s
dealings with Suomarius and Hortarius. These he had terrorized,
but not killed or removed from power. On the contrary, Hortarius
then expected to receive ‘customary’ gifts.179 No doubt the same had
already been given to Suomarius. Here, ‘customary’ cannot indicate a
long-standing arrangement between the principal parties, since
Julian had nothing to do with Hortarius down to 358. It signiWes
rather a general expectation: that Alamannic leaders took it for
granted that any peace agreement with the Romans would be accom-
panied by gifts at its inception and on its renewal. Thus Hortarius’
hoped-for gifts of 358 were to indicate the renewal of an earlier
agreement, with Constantius II. Since Julian imposed harsh new
terms on him, they marked a new treat y, with Julian in the name of
Constantius II.
These gifts were personal ‘presents’, not any subsidies in cash or
kind that may or may not have formed part of formal treaties. They
would have consisted of precious objects—jewellery, dress, weaponry
etc.—advertising the regard in which the recipient was held by the
175 Cf. above 137–9.
176 Above 133–5.
177 Cf. de Jonge (1977: 252).
178 Above 132.
179 AM 17.10.8: ex more.
ConXict 356–61 245
donor, with both parties being treated as social equals.180 Though
attention is usually directed to the use of such presents in foreign
relations, they also occur in dealings between members of the
imperial aristocracy.181 This looks very much like Heather’s ‘client
management’. The gifts would have added to the status of Rome’s
allies and, through their redistribution at the major hill-sites, have
enabled them to strengthen their local political positions.182 Julian
would have been pleased to follow the tradition. What he did should
not be regarded in any sense as buying peace from Hortarius. Having
established his immediate security, Julian and his advisers needed to
look further ahead. They will not have wished to have created
anarchy beyond the Rhine by the time Julian wanted to leave. The
support of friendly pagus leaders was essential, requiring them to be
supported in their turn. But this was still exploitation of Alamanni:
they did not pose a threat; stability in their lands could be created or
destroyed according to Roman interests.183
Julian’s Alamannic campaign of 359 is diYcult to understand and
rarely attracts the attention that it deserves. It occasioned Julian’s
deepest foray into Alamannic territory—the most extensive of any
fourth-century emperor after Maximian—and oVers much of inter-
est concerning Rome’s dealings with the Alamanni and their imme-
diate neighbours.
By 359, Julian had a new magister equitum, Lupicinus. Julian
decided on a surprise assault on the Alamanni because some pagi
were liable to attack, and therefore needed to be suppressed like the
rest.184 The tribune, Hariobaudes, was employed to spy out the land.
He went Wrst to Hortarius, ‘ostensibly as an envoy’, and then further
aWeld.185 Before Julian set out, he restored seven cities on the Rhine
below Mainz, using the Alamannic resources agreed in 358 (which
included timbers over 50 feet—c.15 m—in length).186
180 Cf. AM 17.5.15, 17.5.1: munera sent by Constantius II to the Persian emperor,
and vice versa. Heather (2001: 26).
181 See, e.g. Drinkwater (1987: 247) the case of T. Sennius Sollemnis.
182 Heather (2001: 25–6).
183 Below 263–5.
184 AM 18.2.1.
185 AM 18.2.2. On Hariobaudes, see above 149.
186 AM 18.2.3–6.
246 ConXict 356–61
To avoid distur bing territory paciWed in 358, Julian did not cross
the Rhine directly from Mainz, his rendezvous point, but moved
south.187 His crossing here was at Wrst prevented by a mass incursion
of Alamanni into the territories of Suomarius and Hortarius, forcing
these, too, into hostility.188 Julian moved still further south and then,
while opposite the territory of Hortarius, managed to cross by a ruse.
A party of 300 light infantr y was sent by boat downstream, landed
and panicked the enemy, causing them to withdraw and allowing the
building of a bridge.189 Julian passed peacefully through Hortarius’
territory, and then ravaged the lands of ‘hostile’ and ‘rebel’ kings.190
In this way, Julian reached the frontier with the Burgundians, marked
by ‘boundary stones’, the terminales lapides discussed above.191 Here
he wished to receive Macrianus and Hariobaudus, ‘full brothers and
kings’.192 On to the scene came Vadomarius, with a letter of recom-
mendation from Constantius. He sought personal reconciliation and
forgiveness for Urius, Ursicinus and Vestralpus (Chnodomarius’
allies at Strasbourg and, apparently, the ‘hostile’ and ‘rebel’
kings).193 Eventually, peace was granted to all—on the usual terms
concerning the return of captives.194
The 359 campaign probably had two objectives: the punishment of
the remaining principals of Strasbourg; and, more importantly, given
that Julian and his advisers must have anticipated that it would not
be long before they would have to leave Gaul,195 the securing of the
Main corridor. Crucial to understanding this campaign is the estab-
lishing of its route. I propose that Julian’s march of 359 took
him north-east. 196 He was concerned to deal with Macrianus and
187 AM 18.2.7.
188 AM 18.2.8, 13.
189 AM 18.2.9–14; cf. Libanius, Orat. 18.88–9 for a slightly diVerent version of
events.
190 AM 18.2.15: infesti ...rebelles.
191 AM 18.2.15. Above 110–12.
192 AM 18.2.15: germani fratres et reges.IWnd this too strong, because it is too
much at variance with the usual force of suscipere and its variants in Ammianus,
Rolfe’s translation (1963: 415) of ut . . . susciperentur as ‘with the design of capturing’.
Cf. de Jonge (1977: 228), (1980: 59).
193 AM 18.2.16, 18.
194 AM 18.2.18–19.
195 Above 228.
196 i.e. contra Lorenz, S. (1997: 59): south-east.
ConXict 356–61 247