Danver Steven L. (Edited). Revolts, Protests, Demonstrations, and Rebellions in American History: An Encyclopedia (ENG)
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1767, the rulers of Portugal, Spain, France, Parma, and the Two Sicilies (Naples)
decided to suppress the order and banish all Jesuits from lands they controlled.
—Justin Corfield
Further Reading
Ewing, Russe ll C. “Investigations into the Causes of the Pima Uprisings of 1751.”
Mid-America 23 (April 1941): 138–151.
Salmo
´
n, Roberto Mario. “A Marginal Man: Luis of Saric and the Pima Revolt of 1751 .”
The Americas 45, no. 1 (July 1988): 61–77.
Oacpicagigua, Luis (d. 1755)
Luis Oacpicagigua was the leader of the Pima Revolt; little is known about his life
before 1751. He had been appointed by the Spanish as the “Indian governor” of the
province of Sa
´
ric, and t his obviously mea nt that they trusted him. Undoubtedly,
Oacpicagigua must have spoken Spanish and been able to study some of their mili-
tary tactics. He also had c ontact with the Seri, which helped him coordinate his
attack on the Spanish. It is also recorded that he spoke many of the dialects of
the Pim a I ndians, and this gave him an advantage in get ting people from other
tribes together to attack the Spanish.
The outbreak of the revolt was the meeting Oacpicagigua held on November 20,
1751, where he outlined his plans to attack the Spanish. This shows that he clearly
expec ted Spanish reprisals, and taken the precautions of moving the women and
children in to the mountains of Baboquivari so that they would not be a ble to be
attacked when the revolt started. Certainly the first attack on the Spanish—
the massacring of the 18 settlers when they came to visit Oacpicagigua at his
house in Sa
´
ric, showed that he recognized the need to have an incident to show that
the revolt had started. However, the very lackluster nature of the subsequent attack
on the nearby mission, and then the rapid collapse of any really organized attack
on the Spanish, points to anothe r possible interpr etation into the cause of the
revolt.
Oacpicagigua certainly knew about th e war between the Spanish and the Seri,
and he was well known to Diego Ortiz Parilla, who may have even encouraged
him in his resentment of the Jesuits. Luis may also have known that the Spanish
were planning to expand their settlements on the Gila and Colorado rivers, and felt
he had to strike before this took place. In spite of this, Luis would have needed to
persuade many people uncertain about attacking the Spanish to take part in the
revolt, and it might also have been that the killing of the first settlers in
104 Pima Revolt (1751)
Oacpicagigua’s own house was to show to them his commitment to the cause.
Nevertheless, in spite of this, the revolt petered out fairly quickly. It failed to draw
many of the Native Americans from Spanish settlements into it, and Luis Oacpica-
gigua seemed to have recognized quickly the futility of any other major attacks,
although isolated ones continuing for months.
It seems that his former friendship with Diego Ortiz Parilla had caused Luis
Oacpicagigua to finally turn himself in. In May 1753, Oacpicagigua and another
Pima Indian leader, Luis of Pitic, were asked to meet with the Spanish authorities.
They were immediately arrested a nd brutally interrogated by the Spanish. Both
tried to commit suicide in prison, but remained alive—Oacpicagigua remaining a
prisoner until his death at Horcasitas Jail in early 1755.
—Justin Corfield
Further Reading
Salmo
´
n, Roberto Mario. “A Marginal Man: Luis of Saric and the Pima Revolt of 1751.”
The Americas 45, no. 1 (July 1988): 61–77.
Waldman, Carl. Who Was Who in Native American History. Indians and Non-Indians from
Early Contacts through 1900. New York: Facts on File, 1990.
Parrilla, Diego Ortiz (c. 1715–c. 1775)
Diego Ortiz Parilla was a Spa nish governor of Nuevo Reyno de Andalucia (Sina-
loa and Sonora) at the time of the Pima Revolt of 1751. Little is known about his
early life except that he was born in about 1715, at Villa de Lu
´
car, near Almeria,
in the south of Spain, and was the son of Toma
´
s Ortiz Parrilla y Montoya and Don
˜
a
Andrea Parrilla y Montana, both of whom were from the Spanish nobility. In 1734,
he was commissioned as an alferez (second lieutenant) in the Almanza Dragoons,
and sent to Cuba where he served under Juan Francisco de Guemes, Conde de
Revillagigedo. When the count was appointed as Viceroy of New Spain, Parilla
moved with him to Mexico, and was captain of the dragoons at Veacruz. In 1747
he was involved in putting down a revolt by the local people at Puebla de los
Angeles, and in June 1748 he was promoted to lieutenant colonel.
The next appointment was on March 27, 1749, when Parilla was appointed as
governor and captain-general of Nuevo Reyno de Andalucia (Sinaloa and Sonora),
and also captain of Presidio del Pitic. He took his oath of office on September 12,
and his first task was to take part in the crushing of the Seri revolt, his earlier
involvement in putting down another revolt being why he was promoted at this dif-
ficult juncture. Parilla led the Spanish on an attack on Isla de Tiburo
´
n, and was also
Pima Revolt (1751) 105
involved in mapping the region—his maps providing some of the earliest surviving
charts of the region.
There is some controversy about Diego Ortiz Parilla’s friendship with Luis Oac-
picagigua, the leader of the Pima Revolt, and it now seems certain that he did
encourage Luis and other Pima in their opposition to the increasing influence in
the region of the Jesuits. It was perhaps because of that friendship that Parilla
did not le ave sufficient garrisons when he took the Spanish troops off to fight the
Seri, and this provided the opportunity for Oacpicagigua to a ttack. However it
was this friendship with the Native Americans which seems to have prevented
many more taking part in the revolt, and also the s ubseq uent surrender of Luis
himself.
Subsequently, Diego Ortiz Parilla was involved in other a ctions against t he
Native Americans, and from June 1764 until December 1765, he was interim gov-
ernor of Coahuila (now a part of Mexico). After this, he was sent to start mapping
some of the Texas Gulf Coast. In 1766, the Spanish were worried about a possible
British invasion, and he organized engineers to map the region up to Galveston
Bay. However, in 1774, Parilla finally agreed to reque sts that he return to Spain,
and he was appointed as a brigadier in Valencia by November of that year. He died
between then and November of the following year.
—Justin Corfield
Further Reading
Bannon, John Francis. The Spanish Borderlands Frontier 1513–1821. Albuquerque: Uni-
versity of New Mexico Press, 1974.
Weddle, Robert S. “Diego Ortiz Parrilla,” The Handbook of Texas Online, www
.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/OO/for12.html (accessed November 10,
2008).
Weddle, Robert S. The San Saba
´
Mission. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964.
Tohono O’odham
The Tohono O’odham, or “People of the Desert,” are aboriginal American people
who live in the Sonoran Desert in northwestern Mexico and the southwestern
United States. The name was first applied to them by the Spanish, and the people
were forced north by the Apa ches from t he early 17th century. However it was
not long before, by the early 18th century, the Apache started to make common
cause with the other Native American peoples to prevent the Spanish from estab-
lishing settlements in their region.
106 Pima Revolt (1751)
During the Pima Revolt of 1751, the Pima also sought an alliance with the
Tohono O’odham, who had been h eavily subject to missionary influences of the
Jesuits, which some of them had tried to reject. Eusebio Kino (d. 1711), born in
Italy and trained in Germany, had arrived in Mexico in 1681, hoping to work with
other Jesuits in China. However, he remained in Mexico, and in the northern parts,
he was involved in establishing the Mission San Xavier del Bac, near the present-
day city of Tucson. Although some of the Pima and other people were converted to
Catholicism, many of the Tohono O’odham resisted fiercely. This was partly
because they resented the Spanish settlements, preferring their own isolated vil-
lages. In the 1660s, they had staged a major rebellion against the Spanish who
had ruthlessly crushed them, and it was not until the 1750s that they were able to
stage another large revolt coinciding with the Pima Revolt. This was called the
Papago Revolt, the Tohono O’odham being known at the time by the Spanish as
the Papago.
The advantage that the Tohono O’odham had was that they were able to launch
isolated attacks against the Spanish. However, the Spanish were initially able to
tolerate these, prior to embarking on their own counteroffensive by sending large
numbers of soldier s against the Tohono O’odha m. The sheer inhospitableness of
the terrain initially hampered the Spanish, but also meant that once the Tohono
O’odham villages were destro yed, the pe ople were unable to easily reestablish
themselves.
Following the defeat of the Tohono O’odham, the Spanish worked more heavily
on establishing missions run by the Franciscans, and these helped extend the level
of integration of the people int o European frontier culture. During the 1770s, the
Tohono O’odham were also involved in winning a series of battles against the
Apache.
—Justin Corfield
Further Reading
Erickson, Winston P. Shaping the Desert: The Tohono O’odham in History. Tucson: Uni-
versity of Arizona Press, 1994.
McIntyre, Allan J. The Tohono O’odham and Pimeria Alta. Charleston, SC: Arca dia
Publishing, 2008.
Pima Revolt (1751) 107
Pontiac’s Rebellion (1763)
The fall of Montreal in 1760 marked the effective end of the Seven Years’ War in
the Upper Ohio Valley and the Great Lakes regions. The defeat of their French
allies left many of the natives forced to negotiate peace agreements with the
British. General Amherst, commander in chief of British forces in North America,
set the stage for the parlays in 1761 by forbidding the c ustomary practice of gift
giving to native leaders. Amherst also raised the prices for most trade goods, mak-
ing it difficult for native peoples to get needed supplies. Trade for certain items,
most notably gunpowder, was severely restricted. Amherst’s actions angered and
offended native l eaders and their followers. The Sene ca in New York attempted
to seize upon native dis illusionment by calling in 1761 for the creation of a con-
federacy, but their call for war did not elicit the desired response. De spite advice
from people experienced in native affairs, such as Sir William Johnson and George
Croghan, Amherst continued to sow seeds of discontent. He ordered the construc-
tion of a number of forts and then encouraged British colonists to build commun-
ities around the structures.
The growing presence of British colonists and soldiers and an outbreak of fam-
ine and disease during the early 1760s were used as evidence by Neolin, the
Delaware Prophet, that native peoples needed to rid themselves of European influ-
ences and return to traditional ways. Neolin’s religious message resonated among
native peoples of many groups because it helped explain their continued suffering
and gave them hope for a brighter future. At a meeting convened on the Ecorse
River during April 1763, attended by the Wyan dot, Ottawa, Potawatomi, and
Ojibwas, Pontiac embra ced Neolin’s doctrines with the condition that the French
be the exception to the rejection of Europeaninfluences.Hethencalledonthe
respective native groups to join him in expelling the British from their homelands.
With Neolin’s assistance, Pontiac subsequently utilized the Delaware Prophet’s
existing intertribal religious revitalization movement to help craft a loosely organ-
ized Native American military confederacy.
On May 7, 1763, Pontiac and a force made up of Ottawa, Potawatomi, and
Huron warriors initiated the conflict known as Pontiac’s Rebellion when they
attempt ed to take Fort Detroit through subterfuge . They had made arrangements
with Major Henry Gladwin to s tage a ceremonial dance within the fort with the
intent of attacking its unsuspecting defenders with concealed weapons. Someone
109
forewarned Gladwin of the pl ot, thus he and his men were f ull y armed and p re-
pared. Upon seeing the readiness of the fort’s defenders when he entered the fort,
Pontiac called off the planned attack. Pontiac’s decision infuriated the warriors. To
placate his critics, he then attempted to lure Gladwin outside the fort under the pre-
tense of negotiations to force his surrender, but that ploy also failed. Since native
warriors were leery of sustaining heavy casualties in a direct assault on Fort
Detroit, Pontiac opted to besiege the fortified post.
Trickery proved an effec tive tactic for other Native Amer ican leaders early in
the conflict because intercultural relationships were everyday occurrences at
British posts. Native American warriors utilized this familiarity and feigned
friendships to further their military aims. Fort Sandusky fell on May 16 after its
defenders agree d to a council with war leaders of a force comprised of Ottawas
and Hurons. At the onset of negotiations, the warriors overpowered the small gar-
rison and claimed an easy victory. Fort Miamis was taken on May 27 with the aid
of the native mistress of ensign Robert Holmes, the fort’s commander. She enticed
her lover to leave the fort to help bleed a native woman who had fallen ill. Holmes
was slain as he exited the fort, and his garrison was quickly overwhelmed.
The final fort to fall as a res ult of decept ion was Fort Michilimackinac. On
June 2, Ottawa, Ojibwa, and Sauk warriors engaged in a game akin to lacrosse out-
side o f the fort. The spe ctat or s included t he fort’s defend ers, who felt so secu re
that they did not even close the fort’s entrance during the event. During the game,
110 Pontiac’s Rebellion (1763)
Pontiac's men release captives taken
during Pontiac's Rebellion, an outgroth of
the French and Indian War. (Library of
Congress)
which had already lasted several hours, someone slung the ball into the fort. As
they entered the fort to ostensibly retrieve the ball, the warriors were handed weap-
ons that had been concealed by native women under blankets. Fifteen of the garri-
son’s 35 defenders were quickly killed, as was a trader. The remaining colonists in
the fort were taken prisoner. The loss of Fort Michilimackinac was particularly
damaging because it had not only been strategical ly located at the confluenc e of
Lake Michigan and Lake Huron, but its storehouse of supplies contained firearms
and a significant amount of gunpowder.
Following so many examples of native creativity in attacking British forts, word
was sent to the remaining British garrison to be on their guard. The warning to Fort
Venango was ignored by its commanding officer, Lieutenant Francis Gordo n.
When the Seneca chief Kayashuta approached the fort with a force that included
Shawnee and Delaware warriors on June 13, they were welcomed into the fort.
The native warriors quickly killed the fort’s defenders, leaving only Gordon alive.
Gordon was then forced to document Kayashuta’s grievances, which included the
presence of British forts on native lands and the deliberate effort of British officials
to deny native peoples access to gunpowder. Once his task was completed, Gordon
was tortured until he died.
Kayashuta’s force was then joined by another war party comprised of Ojibwa,
Ottawa, Huron, and Mississauga warriors for an assault a week later at Fort Pre-
sque Isle. The fort’s defenders were forced to surrender the post on June 23 after
two days of fighting. The Senecas then turned their attention to Fort Le Boeuf.
The attack was launched on June 18. During the fightin g, the fort’s blockhouse
caught on fire. The smoke helped cover the retreat of the British soldiers as they
fled into the night to Fort Pitt.
Mid-June 1763 marked the height of the Nativ e American offensiv e. Nativ e war-
riors had taken eight forts, including Fort St. Joseph and Fort Ouiatenon. Their mili-
tary successes had for ced the abandonment of Forts Burd and Edward Augustus.
Activ e sieges were underway at Forts Pitt, Ligonier, Bedford, and Detroit. The ease
of so many of the victories had obscured the problems that were beginning to af fect
the war effort. Epidemic diseases, most notably smallpox, had begun to ravage
Native American communities. Also, the long-desired support from the French had
failed to materialize. While limited supplies were flowing to native forces from
French outposts in Illinois, virtually no support was coming from Canada. The
French in Canada justifiably feared that any assistance to the native cause would
result in se v ere retribution by Great Britain. Pontiac’s confederates were also unable
to gain the support of the majority of the six nations of the Iroquois. Although the
Seneca took part in the conflict, the Oneida, Mohawk, Onondaga, Cayuga, and T us-
carora followed the advice of Sir William Johnson and used their demonstrated
friendship to forge closer economic and military ties with Great Britain.
Pontiac’s Rebellion (1763) 111
Although it was obvious by mid-July 1763 that Gener al Amherst had grossly
underestimated the capabilities of his native opposition, he placed the blame for
the fall of so many forts on the commanders and soldiers at the respective posts.
He was incredulous that so many of his subordinates had been so gullible as to fall
for the number of incidences of subterfuge that occurred, considering that he him-
self had constantly warned them of what he believed to be the duplicitous nature of
Native Americans in general. Amherst believed that the forts reflected the military
might of Great Britain and thus their loss served to give the native warriors the
mistaken impression that the British were militarily impotent on the frontier.
Regardless of Amherst’s views, the British were incapable of protecting their
interests in both the Ohio Valley and the Great Lakes region. The common thread
in all of the fo rts that were either taken or abandoned in the early weeks of Pon-
tiac’s Rebellion was that they were all defended by 35 men or fewer. The forts that
were well manned, such as Forts Pitt and Detroit, were able to repel repeated
assaults by native warriors. Given the state of affairs, Amherst determined that
the only solution was to annihilate the opposition by any means necessary. The
depths of the British resolve toward that end became evident at Fort Pitt on
June 24, 1763.
Fort Pitt had been forewarned of a native attack on May 30, when the survivors
from another fort began straggling in with tales of butchery. Believing that they
would receive no quarter from native warriors, the fort’s defenders determined to
fight to the finish once they were finally attacked. They then began destroying
the outbuildings in the vicinity of the fort so that they could not be used by attack-
ers. The soldiers also commenced hoarding supplies and food in preparation for a
siege. Delaware warri ors assailed the fort on June 22 with little success. On
June 24, Delaware negotiators Turtle’s Heart and Mamaltee were received outside
of the fort under the pretense to discuss possible resolutions to the conflict. In
truth, Fort Pitt’s commander, Captain Simeon Ecuyer, wanted to negotiate with
the Delaware so that he could present them wit h blankets and handkerchiefs that
had been i ntentionally retrieved from smallpox patients who were being treated
in the fort’s hospital. It was hoped that the vestiges of smallpox on the linens
would spark an outbreak of smallpox among the warriors. Whether coincidental
or a result of Ecuyer’s gift, a smallpox outbreak did erupt among the native peo-
ples in the vicinity of Fort Pitt by the end of the month. Curiously, the native vic-
tims of the epidemic did not include Turtle’s Heart. Amherst was subsequently
blamed for the stratagem of using smallpox for germ warfare, but evidence sug-
gests that he approved of the action after it had actually occurred.
Following the initial Native American victories, the second phase of the conflict
turned to British efforts to reinforce and resupply their besieged garrisons at Forts
Detroit and Pitt. Pontiac’s warriors were able to prevent access to Fort Detroit by
112 Pontiac’s Rebellion (1763)
land, thus the British resorted to moving personnel and supplies through Lake Erie
and the Detroit River. The British used t wo ships, the Huron and the Michigan,
during the siege. Both ships carried enough cannons and guns to prevent assaults
on Fort Detroit by water. The warriors under Pontiac’s command attempted to
catch the ships on fire by floating burning rafts towards them, but the effort went
for naught. During the month of July, the British were able to expand their domi-
nance on the water with the addition of four gunboats. As the siege of Fort Detroit
wore on, it was Pontiac who began having supply troubles. Native warriors who
had begun to question Pontiac’s leadership from the time he had aborted the initial
attack on Fort Detroit saw his inability to acquire needed supplies from the French
as further evidenc e of his ineffectiveness in the field. Disillusioned, they quit the
fight and began returning to their home communities. By November 1763, the
siege had been abandoned, and Pontiac had retreated to a village on the Maumee
River.
On July 7, Amherst ordered Colonel Henry Bouquet to gather troops to relieve
the garrison at Fort Pitt. While en route, Bouquet’s soldiers helped break the sieges
at Forts Ligonier and Bedford. The relief column was attacked by Delaware,
Huron, Mingo, Shawnee, and Wyandot warriors on August 5 at Bushy Run. During
the two-day Battle of Bushy Run, Bouquet sustained heavy casualties but ultimately
succeeded in driving off his attackers. Bouquet’s force arrived on August 10 at Fort
Pitt with much needed supplies and reinforcements. The ability of the
British to break the native siege led to the abandonment of the native effort to seize
Fort Pitt.
Pontiac’s Rebellion was ultimately brought to a conclusion using the traditional
diplomatic methods that Amherst had eschewed from the time he had first arrived
in North America. Sir William Johnson took the lead in using diplomacy to break
the Native American confederacy. Through his experiences with native peoples,
especially the Iroquois, Johnson knew that individual native leaders had joined
the conflict to fulfill their personal agendas. Johnson had counseled Amherst o n
how to use diplomacy to mollify individual native groups, but Amherst had stub-
bornly insisted on bringing them to submission militarily. Belatedly realizing that
Amherst himself was largely responsible for the outbr eak of the conflict, British
officials recalled him to London during November 1763. Sir William Johnson
was subsequently empowered by General Thomas Gage, Amherst’s successor, to
address the grievances of the respective native groups in the traditional fashion.
Being an astute diplomat, Johnson had anticipated t hat he would eventually be
given that power and had acted accordingly.
In meetings held with Iroquois delegations during the months of June and
September 1763, Johnson managed to convince them to aid the British effort to
end the conflict. Amherst had disapproved of the negotiations because the Seneca
Pontiac’s Rebellion (1763) 113