Cornwall M. The Undermining of Austria-Hungary: The Battle for Hearts and Minds

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.

194 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

support for the freedom of the `oppressed nationalities' and their right to form

independent states. In line with Finzi's note to Pivko, and regardless of Son-

nino's ban on certain phrases, the propaganda informed Slav and Romanian

soldiers that Italy had recognized their right to unite in independent states, and

had agreed with the e

migre

leaders that prisoners or deserters of those nation-

alities would

be treated like Italian soldiers. Although these were half-truths,

there was some substance to back them up. The Czechs could be told that Italy

had now recognized the Czecho-Slovak army, `fighting by our side under the

glorious flag of the ancient independent kingdom of Bohemia'.

The Yugo-

slavs were

assured, rather less convincingly, that

There will

be a southern Slav state! All Serbs, Croats and Slovenes will be free

and happy under one flag and one government. International agreements

have now crowned the irresistible movement which your political leaders

and your women have organized in your homeland. The Serbian Prime

Minister Pas

, when he opened the Skups

tina [Parliament] on Corfu,

announced that Italy like the other [western] Powers is in agreement with

Serbia over the formation of a Yugoslav state.

This, of course, was not true, for Orlando's government would never commit

itself in this direction. But this type of leaflet matched the priorities of the

propagandists who simply wanted a broad, Yugoslav statement to send across

the trenches. Whether such a Yugoslav statement also matched the mentality

of Serb, Croat and Slovene soldiers opposite was, as we will see, more question-

able: it

would always be an extra pitfall in the effectiveness of Italy's southern

Slav propaganda.

Although the

manifestos had been hurriedly produced by 8 April, the full

`offensive' was not yet launched as some historians have suggested. In his

private report, though not in his memoirs, Steed admitted that bad weather

in early April hampered the propaganda campaign for almost a fortnight and

prevented distribution.

Consequently, any claims by Steed that the campaign

quickly forced the enemy to replace Slav troops opposite the Italian 6th army

with Magyar soldiers (let alone that it was responsible for thwarting an Austrian

offensive) must be discounted. What is clear is that the Italian military thought

that an exchange of troops had taken place, not because of the new leaflet

campaign but because of Pivko's efforts at Stoccareddo. This, as we have seen, is

in itself questionable. But that it was believed on the Italian side is evident from

a rare leaflet in Hungarian which was thrown over in that sector by an Italian

patrol on 21 April. It explained to the `Hungarians opposite' why they had

had to relieve the Czechs and then reminded them of Italy's common struggle

of 1848 with Hungary against the Austrians. (Why, with the Russian threat

removed, were the Magyars not at home with their families rather than `here

Italy's Campaign against Austria-Hungary 195

on the snowy mountains, hungry, without bread and half-frozen!'?)

Here

again, the rumour of success with the propaganda weapon was as important

as the actual reality in stimulating new efforts. The CS, partly because of the

`proof' in early April that front propaganda was effective, was increasingly

optimistic about the new weapon. All the more so, because at this time the

French were urging Diaz to launch some attack in order to relieve pressure on

the Western Front. The CS might point to psychological warfare as a temporary

substitute for what it feared would be costly operations if they used Italian

troops with shaky morale. The Serbian liaison officer at Abano, Major Filip

Hristic

, summed up the prevailing mood: while propaganda had previously

been organized irregularly with insufficiently defined principles, the Intelli-

gence officers

were now better prepared and much was expected of the inter-

Allied propaganda commission which had been coordinated on Steed's

initiative.

The basic arguments for the imminent campaign had also been

enhanced by the Rome Congress of Oppressed Nationalities.

Preparations for

the Rome Congress had accelerated in the weeks after the

signing of the Torre±Trumbic

agreement in London. Since then Borgese, Amen-

dola and

Torre had submitted the agreement to the e

migre

s in Paris for

approval and slight modification, and had persuaded the Poles to attend the

Congress even though Germany and not Austria was their principal enemy. All

of the `oppressed nationalities' were to be represented except the Ruthenes

(Ukrainians): Polish±Ukrainian rivalry over Galicia made any Ruthene presence

anathema to the Poles and would later seriously limit the amount of propa-

ganda material

which could be directed at Ruthene soldiers on the Italian Front.

Roman Dmowski's Polish National Committee, however, sent representatives

for the three partitioned regions of Poland, while the Yugoslav delegation,

though containing no Slovenes, had been authorized to represent them and

also included 12 deputies from the Serbian Parliament. For the future `Czecho-

slovakia' there

came, apart from Benes

tefa

nik and Hlava

ek, Antonõ

n Papõ

cnõ

who was about to relieve Hlava

ek of the Rome office,

and Jan S

eba who

had been sent by Masaryk to organize the Czech army in Italy. For the Roma-

nians, who

until October 1918 possessed no e

migre

organization comparable to

the councils of the other nationalities, there came delegates representing both

the Romanian Parliament and their compatriots in Transylvania. Steed and

Seton-Watson were unofficial representatives for Britain; Franklin-Bouillon,

tienne Fournol and the socialist Albert Thomas for France, and the historian

Nelson Gay for the United States. But it was the Italian delegation which proved

to be most impressive. It contained men from all shades of the Italian political

spectrum, from Salvemini, De Viti De Marco and Ojetti who favoured a detailed

agreement with the Yugoslavs, to nationalist members of the Fascio such as

Barzilai and Di Cesaro

. All were now uneasily united in believing that a public

manifestation of Italy's new policy would provide material for propaganda

196 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

against the enemy and accelerate Italy's path to victory. Not all, however,

shared by any means the e

migre

delegates' hope that the Congress would

additionally pave the way for Allied recognition of independence for the

peoples of the Habsburg Monarchy. The comment of one Italian nationalist,

who witnessed the arrival of the e

migre

delegates at Rome station on 7 April,

reveals the reality behind the unity which the Congress was about to proclaim:

```As long as the war lasts . . . we'll utilize these people; when the war is over

and victory is ours, we'll ______ them''. Thus saying he raised one of his arms in

the obscene gesture which was not yet the Roman salute.'

However, for the purpose of propaganda against Austria-Hungary the gath-

ering in

the Campidoglio on the Capitoline Hill on 8±10 April proved to be a

remarkable success.

For the first time representatives from the oppressed

nationalities and the Allies had come together to proclaim publicly, by en-

dorsing the

Torre±Trumbic

agreement as the `Pact of Rome', the need to form

a united front to dissolve the Habsburg Empire and build new states on its

ruins. Apart from the unanimous approval of these joint resolutions, which

included the Italo-Yugoslav clauses, individual delegates publicly explained

their national causes. Trumbic

in particular received acclaim with a `tactful

and impressive speech', emphasizing that `the main preoccupation of us all is

to secure victory over the common enemy'.

While this was what the Fascio

delegates especially wanted to hear, the Slavs and Romanians were themselves

pleasantly surprised by the response of `official Italy'. True, no member of the

Italian government attended the proceedings, but Sonnino, while refusing to

abandon the Treaty of London, permitted Steed to announce to the assembled

that the whole Italian government, without exception, was `in hearty sympathy

with the aims of the Congress and desire the success of its efforts'. The good

effect on the national delegates was reinforced on 11 April when their leaders

were warmly welcomed by Orlando. He accepted the Congress's resolutions

with the observation that `the history of Italy, now completed, is simply your

history now awaiting completion'. Assuring Steed that this acceptance could be

taken as Italian official sanction of the nationalities' declarations of independ-

ence, Orlando

told him to carry out propaganda on these lines.

No less sensational than the public pronouncements of the Congress were

the private discussions on 9 April of three committees dealing with future

propaganda and policy. Their substance remained confidential but was in fact

the meat on the bones of the Pact of Rome.

The first committee was the most

significant in that it discussed what had so far been organized against the

Central Powers, especially on the Italian Front. Steed and Franklin-Bouillon

explained the Allies' plan and Steed's mission. This was firmly commended by

the committee with a final resolution that the e

migre

s should be able to fully

participate in the campaign at the front, where propaganda would proclaim the

Allied governments' full support for their aspirations. The second committee

Italy's Campaign against Austria-Hungary 197

considered the plight of those members of the oppressed nationalities who were

prisoners of war, resolving to do everything possible to free them, and to give

special attention to Romanian prisoners (since the Czech and Yugoslav causes

had already gained some advantages). The third committee dealt with future

publicity in Allied lands, proposing to hold another Congress in Paris as soon as

possible, and recommending that representatives of the Allies and the national-

ities should

form a `permanent committee' in each Allied capital; the perman-

ent committee

which was formed in Rome under Andrea Torre had the

specific task of furthering the principles of the Pact of Rome and the resolutions

of the first and second committees. Much of this future organization would

remain on paper only, but at the time the e

migre

leaders could view the future

with real optimism. As Trumbic

noted later, the Congress had provided a

platform from which they could proclaim their message to both enemies and

allies. It had also laid down `a path to follow on the basis of common action'

which the e

migre

s hoped would soon lead to Allied diplomatic recognition of

their national organizations.

On 14 April Steed arrived back at the front with Seton-Watson and Emanuel.

Delme

-Radcliffe noted in his diary, `they had a conference with Badoglio in the

afternoon. Czech, Jugo-Slav propaganda arrangements going well.' Steed's

mission had returned to the war zone in order to make the final arrangements

for the `Central Inter-allied Propaganda Commission' (hereafter referred to as

the Padua Commission). This body, which was to be based in Padua itself within

easy reach of the CS at Abano, had been decided upon in principle at the

coordinating meeting of 30 March. At that time Steed had, according to Gran-

ville Baker,

insisted that Italians should be preponderant on the Commission

since its efforts would be directed from the Italian Front against Italy's

immediate enemies. The Commission was to form part of a `Press and Propa-

ganda Office'

presided over by a Colonel Grossi and his deputy, Colonel Dome-

nico Siciliani

(head of Intelligence at the CS), with an Italian clerical staff and

Allied representatives. Baker was to represent Britain and also serve as North-

cliffe's envoy; an Alsatian, Major Gruss, was delegated by the French Military

Mission; and Ugo Ojetti was to act as the Italian `liaison officer'. All three had

just attended the Rome Congress and mingled with members of the oppressed

nationalities.

Ojetti's appointment in the capacity of liaison officer reflected a typical

compromise by Orlando between the ambitions of Gallenga and Ojetti, both

of whom now expected to be given the leading role in supervising propaganda

against the enemy. Ojetti was hardly satisfied with Gallenga's idea that, while

serving as a liaison between the Prime Minister and the CS, he should carry out

his propaganda work as a member of Gallenga's ministry. The result was that

while Gallenga in theory was left in overall charge of `Italian propaganda',

Orlando singled out Ojetti for a special role. He was appointed on 11 April as

198 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

Orlando's political representative or liaison officer on the Padua Commission

with the task of coordinating the propaganda offensive with the political

designs of the government. This meant that Ojetti was directly subordinate to

Orlando (not Gallenga), and in the wake of the Prime Minister's show of

support after the Rome Congress, he was also specifically entrusted with super-

vising Italy's

relations in the war zone with the e

migre

national councils, their

volunteer forces and their prisoners of war. It was a role which left Ojetti with a

great deal of potential influence, and slightly worried Diaz because of the

degree of political interference in `military matters'.

It is clear from a recently published letter that Ojetti intended to take full

advantage of his personal `investiture' by Orlando (as he termed it). He was

prepared to pay lip-service to Gallenga's position as head of Italian propaganda,

but intended himself to oversee any aspects of that work which might consti-

tute propaganda

against the enemy.

100

From the start he saw himself as the key

personality in the Padua Commission, rather than as an Italian representative

on an Allied body, and his own perception quickly became reality because

when the Commission began work its nominated heads faded into the back-

ground. Both

Baker and Ojetti agreed that Colonel Grossi, though a pleasant

individual, had no competence in propaganda work; he soon handed over his

presidency to Siciliani who was himself more interested in his Intelligence

duties than in psychological warfare. As a result it was Ojetti who became

unofficial leader of the Commission, subject to Orlando and the CS, and the

lynchpin of what was a military and political propaganda campaign. Although

it is clear that Steed realized that Ojetti's role would be crucial, the ambiguities

of Ojetti's position allowed him to impose his own independent, Italian stamp

upon the campaign in a way which he had envisaged when first approached by

Orlando. Because of this, the degree to which it was an Allied enterprise would

soon be sharply called into question.

Before leaving

for Paris on 16 April Steed and Seton-Watson had another

conference with the Intelligence heads and then took leave of Diaz who

`thanked them warmly for the excellent work of the mission'. It had been

decided on 30 March that representatives of the oppressed nationalities

would form part of the Commission to act as translators and `political super-

visors' of

the manifestos, a notion which had been confirmed in the first

committee of the Rome Congress. On the eve of his departure, therefore,

Steed urged Gallenga to send Polish and Czech representatives to Padua, and

pressed Trumbic

to visit the front together with `an intelligent Yugoslav

officer'.

101

When passing through Milan, Steed wrote again to Trumbic

on note-

paper of

the Corriere della Sera, advising him on his arrival at the front to contact

Radcliffe, Siciliani and the Intelligence heads, particularly Tullio Marchetti

since he already had some Yugoslav officers working for him and was `excep-

tionally well-informed

about everything'. Ojetti was to arrive from Rome on

Italy's Campaign against Austria-Hungary 199

the 17th `to take everything in hand' and, Steed concluded, although it would

take some time to organize the work, `the mood of everybody is excellent'.

102

Steed himself was in buoyant mood as he travelled back to England via Paris.

At a luncheon at Versailles on the 20th his optimism was well observed by one

British officer bound for Italy: `Various people were present including a man

called Steed, a Propaganda man. He never ceased talking. Interesting, but I

should say inaccurate and he talks too much. If his advice is followed the war

should soon be over!'

103

If Steed's confidence owed much to the success of the

Rome Congress and arrangements at the front, it also stemmed from his sincere

though mistaken belief that the new propaganda had already forced the enemy

to postpone their offensive and withdraw unreliable troops from opposite the

Italian 6th army sector. In Paris, on the last stage of his mission, and later with

the British government, Steed made much of this `evidence' when pressing the

Allies to make a more definite commitment towards the oppressed nationalities

so that the proven success of the propaganda weapon could continue. For

example, when visiting Versailles with Benes

on 22 April, he enumerated for

the British military the benefits which would accrue. The Austrian offensive

could be prevented altogether and within the Habsburg Empire, especially

Bohemia, rebellious elements could be pushed into open revolt: `It is only

because the wobbling policy of the Allies in titivating for peace with Austria

and in supporting the Austrian Empire has made their [the Czechs'] position

uncertain, that they have not been able to do more.'

Steed argued

that it was now essential in using the propaganda weapon, as

with any military campaign, for the authorities to have a clear plan or policy so

that propaganda could be `directed into the best channels to attain the objects

desired'.

104

As usual he was pressing for Allied policy to keep up with the more

radical propaganda agenda. Yet so far, Allied commitment to emancipating the

subject races and destroying Austria-Hungary had been minimal, evident only

by implication. Even in early April during Germany's spring offensive the

British and French governments had merely agreed, on Steed's prompting, to

the idea that proclamations of independence could form part of the propa-

ganda offensive

on the Italian Front. Orlando had gone slightly further by

publicly endorsing the resolutions of the Rome Congress, but Sonnino blocked

a more substantial commitment and no broader Allied support for the event

was forthcoming.

105

It was now a principal task of both Steed and the e

migre

to sustain governmental interest and particularly, with the propaganda cam-

paign and

the Czechoslovak volunteer forces as their bargaining counters, to

press for a joint Allied declaration recognizing the independence of Austria-

Hungary's nationalities. While Steed and Seton-Watson returned to London

on 26 April, such an idea was being avidly discussed in Paris by e

migre

rep-

resentatives under

the guidance of Albert Thomas' `Socialist Committee of

Understanding between the Oppressed Nationalities'. The agitators had been

200 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

enlivened by socializing and exchanging ideas in Rome: they were optimistic,

spurred on by each other. As Ivo de Giulli wrote to Trumbic

All who

have returned from Rome are satisfied with the success of the

Congress and how things are going. . .

. Thomas is wholly of the opinion

that the government declarations must follow as quickly as possible, and

that we must forge while the iron is hot. Clemenceau is said to be in favour.

Steed also thinks that we mustn't delay. Only Franklin-Bouillon would like

to wait for the [Paris] Congress, but he has his own reasons for that. At any

rate, the preliminary work must begin right now and as fast as possible.

106

For the British propagandists, the emissaries of the EPD, their key contribu-

tion to

the Italian propaganda campaign had now been completed. The main

role of Steed's mission had been to synthesize at a crucial moment the various

Italian military and political strands which were in favour of a broad propa-

ganda offensive:

the result was the Padua Commission. From this point, Brit-

ain's role in the campaign reverted to being chiefly indirect rather than direct.

The campaign would never be run from Crewe House, nor could any successes

which it might have in the future be ascribed to the EPD, except to the extent

that it was Steed who had helped to coordinate its organization at Padua.

During the eight months of its existence in 1918, the EPD can best be char-

acterized as

an umbrella organization which served as a cover for a wide range

of activities associated with influencing enemy morale or undermining the

stability of the Central Powers. In some of these activities Crewe House had

more control than others. Indeed, it was one of the real `secrets' of Crewe House

that the EPD's publicized image, in 1918 and afterwards, did not match the

realities. The image was of a tightly run organization, while the reality was a

very loosely coordinated body. The image was that it was Lord Northcliffe's

vehicle to undermine the enemy. The reality was that Northcliffe was only

nominally in charge, ill and absent from Crewe House until August, his direc-

torship passing

chiefly to his deputy, Campbell Stuart, who, together with

Steed, Seton-Watson and other key individuals like Austin Guest, dealt with

the everyday decisions of the organization.

To oversee

the general direction of the EPD's work, Northcliffe appointed a

number of prominent publicists and politicians to an advisory committee.

It was destined to meet 14 times before the end of the war, chiefly to hear

and endorse reports from the various sections of Crewe House.

107

Of these

sections, it was the Austro-Hungarian branch under Steed and Seton-Watson

which was undoubtedly the most active and which in the postwar period

gained most publicity. But in terms of direct influence upon front propaganda

it was probably the `German section' of Crewe House which had the most

impact in the last months of the war. The section was at first directed by

Italy's Campaign against Austria-Hungary 201

H.G. Wells, who meticulously elaborated the type of propaganda which should

be directed against Germany, and then by the journalist Hamilton Fyfe; by August

1918 it had taken over most of the propaganda work hitherto done by MI7(b) of

the War Office and was composing and printing its own material for despatch

to France. Its particularly intensive activity from August rapidly attracted the

German military's attention and appears to have far exceeded anything prac-

tised by

the French on the Western Front.

108

In contrast, Crewe House's `Bul-

garian section'

did little and was prepared to leave most work to the French on

the Macedonian front; plans to send a former British consul in Sofia (Captain

W.B. Heard) to

Salonika in a similar vein to Steed's mission to Italy were never

realized.

109

As for propaganda against Turkey, Crewe House was even less

involved. From July 1918 the work was left to an American journalist in

Beaverbrook's Ministry of Information who worked through British Intelli-

gence contacts

in Switzerland and the Aegean to scatter manifestos over the

Turkish mainland.

110

After the war it was to be the `Austrian campaign' of the EPD which gained

most attention. In Secrets of Crewe House, Campbell Stuart went so far as to

observe that `the conception of the whole propaganda campaign ± its policy, its

scope, its application', had been formulated by the Austro-Hungarian section.

Just as this was a gross exaggeration which belittled Italy's major initiatives, so

it was incorrect to suggest that the campaign from April 1918 was directed from

London by Steed and Seton-Watson.

111

Although they received regular reports

from Baker and Delme

-Radcliffe and instructed Baker accordingly, they had

no direct involvement in the Italian campaign of the kind eventually exercised

by the EPD's German section on the Western Front. Instead, the Austrian sec-

tion of

the EPD, synonymous with the persons of Steed and Seton-Watson, was

a department which provided them with an official status from which in

the summer months they persistently tried to modify Allied policy towards

the Habsburg Monarchy. With their base at Crewe House, they employed as

a secretary for their activities a former employee of the censor department,

Dorothy Cocking. She, like Granville Baker, was a sympathetic and informed

recruit: until February 1918, she had been interned at Raabs in an Austrian

prison camp, and her parents (her father was allegedly `well-informed on

Austrian military affairs') still remained there in miserable conditions.

112

With her industriousness and personal commitment at their disposal, Steed

and Seton-Watson contributed to the propaganda offensive against Austria

chiefly in an indirect manner, by agitating successfully among the Allied

governments and thereby providing new arguments for the campaign on the

Italian Front. Just as their role in early 1918 had been one of coordinating Allied

use of the propaganda weapon, so it continued to be so until the end of the war.

The EPD retained its prestige as a propaganda centre among the Allies. But the

actual propaganda offensive against Austria was based elsewhere, centred for

202 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

its preparation and execution in northern Italy in the hands of the Padua

Commission.

6.3 The Padua Commission

In the thinking of the Italian High Command at this time, the propaganda

weapon was viewed chiefly as a kind of pre-emptive strike at the enemy. In late

March, Diaz and Badoglio had responded warmly to Steed's mission since they

were convinced that an Austrian offensive was imminent, and were persuaded

by the Intelligence officers and political pressure to believe that intensive

propaganda might sabotage the enemy's plans in advance. When the offensive

did not occur (and the propagandists already claimed some credit for the

`postponement'), the CS did not alter its view of the task which had been

entrusted to propaganda. Military Intelligence continued to suggest, especially

from late April, that the Austrians would soon attack. With this uncertainty, the

CS preferred to wait on events: completing the reorganization of Italian forces

which Badoglio had supervised since the spring, making occasional raids into

enemy lines, but not launching any larger strike which the enemy might

exploit. In Badoglio's words, `we have to keep hold of all our cards and play them

without any hesitation'.

113

This was frustrating for the French who wanted

some relief from German pressure in the West, and also for Lord Cavan who

was expecting until late May that his forces would be allowed to make a local

thrust on the Asiago plateau in order to boost British troop morale. When the

CS called off Cavan's operation, because of clear evidence of the impending

Austrian attack, Cavan reported to London with some irritation: `If the big

Asiago offensive is not to take place, I am sure that better results will be

obtained by a series of vigorous but short armed blows than by trusting to

propaganda and intrigue amongst disaffected men.'

114

This was not the view of

Badoglio who clearly envisaged the new weapon as part and parcel of Italian

strategy. Although in June the CS conceded the need for some small attacks,

it continued to expect significant results from playing the propaganda card.

Hopefully, the work of the new Padua Commission together with increasing

activity by Slav propaganda patrols would rapidly bear fruit, helping to weaken

the impending Austrian attack, but also paving the way for a major Italian

armed response when the time was right.

The first

meeting of the Padua Commission was held on the afternoon of

18 April at 1, Corso del Popolo, where the CS had set aside 15 rooms for the

Commission's work. Chaired by Siciliani, the meeting was attended by Ojetti,

Baker, Gruss and also a number of visitors invited by Baker: Hristic

(Serbian

liaison officer to the CS), Trumbic

and two other members of the Yugoslav

Committee, Dinko Trinajstic

and Julije Gazzari, who were to direct the Com-

mittee's newly opened branch in Rome. According to Baker, the Italians

Italy's Campaign against Austria-Hungary 203

resented this Yugoslav presence and `thus gave the first indication of the

conduct they intended to adopt towards the representatives of the oppressed

races for whose liberation such perfervid perorations had resounded from the

Roman Capital'.

115

While this may have been true for Siciliani, who later

proved to be a `Sonnino man', it was not the case for Ojetti, who summarized

his conversation with Trumbic

on this occasion as being `practical, clear,

detailed: in agreement on everything'. But Ojetti was already irritated by

Baker's attitude. At the meeting, Siciliani emphasized bluntly that the Com-

mission was

going to be purely under Italian control with the British and

French representatives acting only as advisers. Baker, however, had already

shown initiative in inviting the Yugoslavs, and then had proceeded to sit

through the meeting in silence, remarking only (as Ojetti scornfully noted)

that he knew how to paint in watercolour.

116

The tension between Ojetti and

Baker, stemming from the different ways in which they viewed each other's

role on the Commission, was already clear. The seeds of serious friction had

been sown.

While Ojetti

industriously set about organizing `his office', the Italian milit-

ary resumed

the distribution of manifestos over the enemy. Since the weather

improved in late April, it was finally possible to scatter from the air the leaflets

which had been composed at the Intelligence offices. At the same time the

army presses now produced new material which reflected more precisely Italy's

commitment to nationality politics, recalling the Rome Congress and its resolu-

tions

117

or presenting personal messages from the head of the Yugoslav Com-

mittee. These

leaflets, which Steed had urged Trumbic

to compose, included

one in which Trumbic

told Yugoslav soldiers about his long and `very satis-

factory' chat

with General Diaz at the front:

There will

come a day when you too will know what they talked about.

118

You will be convinced of how Dr. Trumbic

with the Yugoslav Committee

cares about the happiness of our nation. They are moved to tears when they

think how close they are to you, yet cannot embrace you because your

enemy has you in his grasp. Don't lose hope. The sun will rise before our

door as well. The day will dawn when you will be free from the Kraut

[

vapskih] and Magyar barons and counts who oppress our people. Long

live the united and liberated homeland of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes!

119

When such material, usually printed on brightly coloured paper, was spread

over the Austrian positions and southern Dalmatia, it made an immediate

impact on the enemy. In early May, Conrad von Ho

tzendorf

himself was

already alarmed at the idea in many manifestos that Italy was releasing her

Slav prisoners, since (if true) it was `an extremely dangerous form of propaganda

which might have a demoralizing effect on the men of Slav nationality and lead