Cornwall M. The Undermining of Austria-Hungary: The Battle for Hearts and Minds

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214 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

state, ever mindful of their glorious history and the need to avenge their sub-

jugation by

the Habsburgs at the Battle of the White Mountain (1620).

Meanwhile, Padua

had strong proof to support its argument that Italy sup-

ported this

Czech mission. While in the Yugoslav material no evidence could be

provided of Yugoslav troops on the Italian Front (only on the Salonika

Front),

160

the creation of a Czechoslovak Legion in Italy was the most promin-

ent and

natural theme in Padua's Czech propaganda. Many of the early mani-

festos were

signed by S

tefa

nik or by `volunteers of the Czechoslovak army'

and announced that Italians and Czechs were now shedding their blood

for the same cause and would welcome deserters into their ranks.

161

One long

piece, an emotional article by Hlava

ek, was reproduced to describe the atmo-

sphere in

the war zone where Czech soldiers wandered happily through

Italy's romantic medieval towns, mingling with an admiring native popula-

tion.

162

But the most notable event for the Czech cause in Italy took place

on 24 May. At a solemn ceremony in Rome, on the third anniversary of Italy's

entry into the war, `brothers' of the 34th Czechoslovak regiment were handed

their colours in the presence of Orlando, Sonnino, Bissolati and the ambas-

sadors of

the Allied powers. Padua provided a fervent and rather verbose com-

mentary, declaring

it to be a baptism for the new state, with Orlando acting as

the godfather:

For years

to come, as long as the bright sun of freedom shines on us, [the

brothers] will tell their friends and children about this day of euphoria and

fraternity between two peoples. One of them great, free, so exalted by culture

and the past that it has always stood in the forefront of humanity; the other,

reckoned to be modest, subjugated, desiring freedom so that it too could

exercise all its typical racial attributes in order to further develop a human-

itarian civilization

and culture. For after all, it is full sympathy, respect,

sincere fraternization which has vitalized everything which was said and

done on the soil of the eternal city.

After speeches

by S

tefa

nik and General Graziani, Italian commander of the

Legion, the Czech national anthem was played and the troops marched off to

the Campidoglio. The propagandists, possibly Ojetti himself, penned some

concluding words: `In these marvellous days the eyes of Czechs are melting

with joy. In Austria our brothers and friends are executed, but here in a foreign

country, they overwhelm us with demonstrations of love and friendship.'

163

While the Legion in itself seemed to be proof of Italy's commitment to the

Czech cause, Padua could never quite suggest that Italy was actually fighting to

create an independent Czechoslovakia. Here Polish propaganda had a slight

advantage. For on 3 June in their Versailles Declaration, the Allies gave a new

pledge, singling out the creation of a united and independent Poland as `one of

Italy's Campaign against Austria-Hungary 215

the conditions of a solid and just peace'. Jan Zamorski, whose signature regu-

larly accompanied

the early Polish manifestos, commented that Polish soldiers

had a choice between this freedom which was guaranteed by an Allied victory

and the slavery which would continue after a Prussian-Austrian victory: `I

demand of you as a brother and compatriot, as an MP and chairman of the

Christian People's Party, as a Pole and true son of the fatherland, throw away

your Austrian weapons and surrender, all of you, to the Italians.'

164

In a subsequent leaflet Zamorski suggested, falsely as far as one can tell, that

217 Poles had indeed succumbed to his invitation and crossed the trenches.

165

The reality was that, in contrast to Czech exploits in the Italian war zone,

Zamorski had no comparable examples to relate in his material; there was as

yet no sign of a Polish legion, and only Tullio Marchetti had recruited a dozen

Polish volunteers as patrols on the lst army front. Zamorski therefore made the

most of limited evidence. He recalled the historic examples of Polish heroes

who had formed legions in Italy: Adam Mickiewicz and Henryk DaÎ browski

(who fortuitously had died 100 years before on 6 June 1818).

166

And when on

9 June one of Marchetti's Polish volunteers was killed in the front line,

Zamorski, after accompanying Ojetti, Rybka and Kujundz

to the funeral,

wrote a manifesto which contrasted the dead volunteer's ideals with those of

the Austrian, possibly Polish, `slave' who had fired the fatal bullet.

167

But perhaps the strongest arguments in Zamorski's propaganda came from

enemy sources, emphasizing a message of despair to be contrasted with the

hope which the Allies were offering. In his key speech at the Rome Congress,

Zamorski had stated that Germany was the main opponent of the Poles who

had to be defeated.

168

In his propaganda it was regularly the German or Prus-

sian threat

which he highlighted. Padua's first Polish manifesto told of a

legendary exploit which Poles ought to emulate. It recalled how at the battle

of Grunwald (1410) the valiant Wøadysøaw Jagieøøo with Polish, Lithuanian and

Russian armies had defeated the Teutonic Knights and freed Poland from the

Germans; 500 years later, statues to Jagieøøo and his cousin Witold had been

unveiled in Krako

w, and now the people made daily pilgrimages to the monu-

ment, lighting

candles and offering prayers that a second Grunwald might be

unleashed on the Germans. Yet, the leaflet stressed, the `Teutonic reptile' was

the same whether in Berlin or Vienna.

169

It was the same German who forbade

anniversary celebrations for DaÎ browski in Posen; who sent troops to Palestine

to help the pagan Turk retake the Holy Places (a matter naturally dear to every

Catholic Pole); or who fired on women and children in the streets of Krako

When Poles

thought of the Habsburg Empire, Zamorski warned, they ought

to remember their starving families in Galicia, or the `treason' committed by

the Austrians earlier in the year when they had announced the partition of

the province in return for their worthless `Bread-Peace' with the Ukraine.

170

Especially, they ought to remember the subsequent course of events: how

216 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

General Haller and his Polish legionaries had revolted and deserted en masse

to the Russians, leaving 117 legionaries to be dispatched to a `German court' and

the rest to be sent back to the front line as `German excrement'. Many of

Zamorski's leaflets specifically targeted those former Polish legionaries who

had been transferred to the Italian Front, reminding them of their comrades'

dismal fate (even suggesting incorrectly that Haller under German pressure had

committed suicide) and demonstrating that `there is no place for Polish soldiers

in the Austrian ranks'.

171

If the Poles had historic models in Jagieøøo and

DaÎ browski, they had some modern models in Haller or even in Austria's Polish

MPs who, after 50 years' loyalty to the Habsburgs, had moved into opposition

in the Reichsrat.

172

The example to emulate was clear. It was perhaps, however,

an example which insufficient Polish soldiers had followed before June 1918.

Hence Zamorski's persistent calls for desertion (far more than in the propa-

ganda to

other nationalities); hence too the message of one manifesto, that it

was only really Poles, Germans and Magyars who were holding the Habsburg

Empire together.

173

Padua's Romanian propaganda could not match this range of arguments.

Certainly it suffered because the Romanian delegates, De Luca and Cotrus,

were more firmly under Ojetti's control; and he soon started to use Cotrus to

write leaflets in Hungarian instead. But Padua also simply lacked sufficient

evidence about Romanian agitation at home or abroad. To show Allied sym-

pathy, the

manifestos reported Romanian participation in the Rome Congress

and especially the work of two e

migre

s from Romania who were active in Italy:

Gheorghe Mironescu (a future Romanian Prime Minister) who was visiting

Romanian prisoners of war, and Simeon Mõ

ndrescu who was leading negotia-

tions with

the Italian government on behalf of the `Society of Romanians from

Transylvania, Banat and Bukovina'.

174

But the propaganda could contain no

evidence of actual unrest among the Romanians of Austria-Hungary. It often

resorted to reproducing disquieting news about other parts of the Empire in

order to fill up the columns of the Romanian newssheet, Neamul Roma

nesc.

This

accurately reflected the reality of Romanian political passivity in the Monarchy

until after the Central Powers had signed the Peace of Bucharest with Romania

(7 May), for from late 1916 the Magyar authorities had effectively stifled any

Transylvanian agitation and left Padua little substance to work with. The best

that Padua could achieve was to condemn the peace, and instruct Romanian

soldiers in florid language about how the Central Powers were exploiting the

riches of the Romanian kingdom:

The ancient

forests which cover the Carpathians, the oil-wells which are

inexhaustible, the rich fields of the plains which lie in Wallachia ± all have

been handed over to the control of Hungarians and Germans! The grain of

Romanian producers is being bought at a price which serves simply to

Italy's Campaign against Austria-Hungary 217

subsidize the greedy and implacable oppressors of the nation! Thus for a long

time Romania has been strangled by the Germans, Hungarians and Bulgar-

ians! For

God's sake! This shame must be washed clean! Italy, France, Eng-

land and

America have pledged it! . . . Brother Romanians! Your fate is now in

your own hands! As rescuers of your brothers on the Danube, go and com-

plete their

salvation!

175

This was probably a vain plea since most Romanian soldiers, at least according

to British military Intelligence, had little interest in the idea of a greater

Romanian state. It was probably more productive for Padua simply to appeal

to anxiety about Hungarian oppression in Transylvania or about the futility of

Romanians fighting any longer for `Prussians and Magyars'. Thus, in one vivid

proclamation, Traian Vuia (a famous Transylvanian scientist who headed a

National Committee of Romanian e

migre

s established in Paris on 30 April),

urged Romanians to `rise up against your exploiters and hasten the time of their

defeat which will be your salvation from the two calamities, war and the

Hungarian yoke', for with Allied help the future was bright: `like a putrid

body, riddled with an unpleasant disease, Austria is about to decompose'.

176

If Padua at this time could target its arguments better towards some nation-

alities than

others, there were two events occurring in the Monarchy in May

1918 which above all served to confirm the theme of national polarization

which was at the very heart of the propaganda. Their supra-national signific-

ance made

them suitable as a subject in leaflets addressed to all elements in

the opposing army. The first event was Emperor Karl's `Canossa' or journey of

repentance to the German GHQ at Spa following revelations that he had been

secretly involved in peace negotiations with the West (the notorious `Sixtus

Affair'). On 12 May, the two Kaisers signed an agreement which included a

Waffenbund, binding together the German and Austro-Hungarian military

machines more closely than ever before. Although the agreement was actually

dependent on a solution of the Polish question, and was not a new `25-year

alliance' as Italian propaganda maintained, its terms certainly suggested a future

empire of Mitteleuropa. In that light they were triumphantly interpreted by

the Austro-German press, the Neue Freie Presse extolling them as a victory of

Germans over Slavs, while the Frankfurter Zeitung noted calmly that `with the

new alliance Austria-Hungary ceases to be an independent state and becomes a

region of the German Empire'. In quoting these views, Padua could instruct

Yugoslavs and other `oppressed' that Karl's behaviour at Spa removed the last

vestige of any obligation towards a state or dynasty which had sold itself to the

German Reich.

177

Padua also proceeded to write in the same vein in the few German and

Hungarian manifestos which were issued prior to the June offensive. German-

Austrian soldiers were told (inaccurately) that in the wake of the Spa treaty the

218 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

brutal General Max Hoffmann who had enforced the Diktat of Brest-Litovsk in

the East was now about to take over and prussianize the Austrian army: `Aus-

trians' should

begin to think about the fate which befell the citizens of Bavaria

and Wu

rttemberg!

178

As for Magyar soldiers, they could be sent some propa-

ganda when

Ojetti had found a Hungarian translator. In the first such leaflets,

Padua quoted the views of the German and Magyar press about the Waffenbund,

and notably those of the outspoken head of the `Independence Party', Count

Miha

ly Ka

rolyi; on 15 May he had railed against Germany's expansionist aims,

German responsibility for the war, as well as his own discovery of a plot by

German Intelligence to discredit him.

179

The Magyars could also be given, as

in Finzi's progressive leaflets a few months earlier, some historical figures of

their own to emulate (Ra

czi and Kossuth). They were now advised to revolt

against their subjection to Germany in line with the old Hungarian saying,

`the German is a scoundrel and the Devil take him!'

180

It was the start of an

increasingly sophisticated campaign directed at Hungarian soldiers, a scheme

which Ojetti could only fully implement from June when Cotrus had joined the

Commission.

Against the Spa

agreement and its message of germanization, Padua could set

a second major event which occurred in May. It too seemed of relevance to all

nationalities, but in this case there seemed to be a hopeful message, that the

peoples of the Monarchy were indeed taking up the `liberationist struggle'

which the Allies were trying to encourage. The celebration in Prague from

16±18 May of the 50th anniversary of the Czech National Theatre was presented

in Padua's propaganda as a direct echo of the Rome Congress a month earlier.

There was some truth in this. Partly as a result of suggestions from the Czech

migre

s, the organizers of the theatre anniversary turned the event into a mass

demonstration by domestic representatives of the `oppressed peoples' of the

Monarchy. Czech and Slovak politicians and literati such as Karel Krama

ÂÏ

r, Alois

Jira

sek and Pavel Hviezdoslav were joined by prominent Slovene, Italian and

Polish delegates who openly proclaimed self-determination and unity in the

face of German-Magyar injustices.

181

In the words of one Yugoslav manifesto,

`that which the representatives of those peoples spoke in the Campidoglio,

these delegates affirmed in Prague: ``only on the ruins of Austria is our freedom

and unity possible'''.

182

The Czech events thus had a supra-national signi-

ficance, matching

that of the Rome Congress. Padua could not only give a

particular nationalist slant to each description presented to the individual

nationalities, but could even quote a German journalist who himself empha-

sized the

Prague±Rome connection when writing that the Prague Congress had

`an international and world historical significance'.

183

As for the specifically

Czech dimension to the events, Padua's propaganda exploited it fully. The

second edition of C

eskoslovenska

Samostatnost was dominated by references to

the new historic connection between Rome and Prague, two cities which

Italy's Campaign against Austria-Hungary 219

had formerly had no links due to unhappy Czech memories of the Vatican.

Suddenly in the wake of the Rome Congress the link was made by the Prague

celebrations which, `like a flash of lightening in front of an amazed foreign

audience, lit up the darkness which had been engulfing Austria'.

The way

in which this propaganda was prepared and presented to Czech

soldiers is an interesting example of Italy's newly integrated propaganda

machinery at work. After the Prague events, the Austrian authorities had sup-

pressed editions

of the Czech daily, Na

rodnõ

Listy, which had carried full texts

of the speeches of Krama

ÂÏ

r and others. However, Luigi Granello at the Berne

bureau managed to secure copies of these editions from the Czech community

in Switzerland and passed them on to his former Intelligence head, Tullio

Marchetti. Marchetti thereupon composed and printed for Ojetti an account

of the speeches and accompanied them with the front page of the last (cen-

sored) edition

of the newspaper. As manifesto number 66 it was a powerful

image, which Marchetti later claimed to have reaped some success, and it was

one which was firmly based on the reality of what had occurred in Prague.

184

But it was also always presented by Padua alongside a misleading and exagger-

ated account

of how the Austrians had actually reacted. The leaflets asserted

that the authorities had used grapeshot and gallows so that `our blood has

begun to flow in the streets of Prague and masses of innocent of people are

lying in the prisons'. In fact, the demonstrations had passed off relatively

peacefully. There was no bloodshed or use of troops, even though alarming

rumours were circulating in Vienna about what had actually happened.

185

Padua's early propaganda set the tone for the language and imagery of its

later material. The language was usually literary and emotional, and at times

florid or violent. The appeal tended to be `personal' with a distinct character-

istic of

supplying historic examples and making each nationality conscious of

the sweep of their heroic destiny. While the four main oppressed peoples ± the

Czechs, Poles, Yugoslavs and Romanians ± were the chief targets, Ojetti had

already discovered that the material which he could use against the four was

very uneven. The Czechs undoubtedly supplied the strongest case and the

Romanians the weakest. Perhaps rather surprisingly, however, it tended to be

news items about disruptive events in Austria-Hungary which so far provided

the best propaganda arguments; items about Italy's or the Allies' increasing

solidarity with the nationalities were less prominent in the material, and rarely

suggested any real commitment to their independence. This uneven balance

accurately reflected the fact that, as Padua began its campaign, nationalist

agitation was fortuitously taking a more radical direction in the Monarchy,

whilst in Italy the momentum of the Rome Congress was not being maintained

as the national e

migre

s had expected. The natural danger was that this discrep-

ancy might

undermine Padua's campaign altogether (just as the Austrians' own

propaganda efforts were coming increasingly unstuck through their inability to

220 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

present a strong and stable picture of themselves to Italy). Not surprisingly,

therefore, the Padua Commission in its first months of operation was increas-

ingly scarred

by tensions which directly arose from creeping doubts about

Italy's real commitment to the spirit of the Rome Congress.

It was

not until June 1918 that these doubts and suspicions were fully con-

firmed. In

the weeks after the Congress there were regular signs of Allied

goodwill, and the e

migre

s could feel that their Allied friends and sympathizers

were at least managing to extract extra promises from Paris and London. In

Paris from late April, the national councils under the guidance of Thomas,

Franklin-Bouillon and others were working on separate declarations which

could be amalgamated into a general Allied statement and proclaimed at a

second Congress to be held in the French capital. The work proceeded slowly.

In the first place, the Yugoslavs under Ivo de Giulli were often completely out of

touch with Trumbic

(who was away on the Salonika Front for most of May), and

did not feel able to act without his authoritative presence or at least adequate

instructions. Secondly, Franklin-Bouillon and E

tienne Fournol seem to have

stalled for a time, possibly because they were especially keen for the Paris

Congress (postponed repeatedly) to be the scene for any Allied declaration,

and so regain for France that role of champion of the oppressed which it had

lost to Italy. In the event, the e

migre

s and the French did manage to present a

statement of their conclusions to the Quai d'Orsay by the end of May. They

thereupon hoped that the Allies would negotiate a declaration of recognition to

be proclaimed in early June at Versailles.

186

Meanwhile, the members and associates of the EPD were trying to push the

British and American governments in the same direction. Immediately after the

Italian±Czech convention had been signed on 21 April, recognizing a Czecho-

slovak Legion

on Italian soil, S

tefa

nik returned to the front and urged both

Delme

-Radcliffe and Granville Baker that the British should approve a similar

convention. Radcliffe enthusiastically telegraphed to his superiors that such a

move would `be valuable for propaganda purposes'. Baker went much further in

his report for Crewe House, emphasizing, with an eye to Czech military feats in

Russia, that `the recognition of a Czecho-Slovak state' would make `a consider-

able impression

in Austria-Hungary' and that he himself should be appointed

military attache

to the new Czechoslovak army.

187

Baker, Radcliffe and S

tefa

nik

also pressed their views on the new American Military Mission in Italy with the

result that its chief telegraphed to the US ambassador in Rome: `British mission

here attaches great importance to the United States recognizing the Czech-Slav

movement and recommends that the action . . . be taken if possible within the

next few weeks.'

188

This pressure, together with further entreaties from the US envoys in Italy

and Switzerland that their government should make some declaration of sym-

pathy for

the subject races and forget about trying to detach Austria from

Italy's Campaign against Austria-Hungary 221

Germany, eventually contributed to the US Secretary of State, Robert Lansing,

declaring on 29 May that the United States had followed the Rome Congress

`with great interest . . . and that the nationalistic aspirations of the Czecho-

Slovaks and Jugo-Slavs for freedom have the earnest sympathy of this Govern-

ment'. Even

so, such language was more important for its effect on the Allies

and on further diplomatic moves than for its use by the Padua Commission.

Ojetti clearly viewed it as too weak to merit more than a passing reference in his

manifestos, and concentrated instead on the strident speech which Wilson had

just delivered in New York.

189

It was when the EPD flirted directly with the British government that state-

ments were

forthcoming of a kind most useful to the Padua Commission. On 10

May, Steed introduced Benes

to Balfour and Robert Cecil at the Foreign Office.

Although Benes

, in common with the other e

migre

s after the Congress, was

now publicly committed to securing an Allied declaration which would benefit

all of the oppressed nationalities, he privately had qualms about adopting this

approach in view of both Allied and e

migre

disunity.

190

Benes

's realistic priority

was to secure full Allied recognition for the Czechoslovak army, arguing that

the French and Italian agreements were tantamount to recognition that the

National Council was the supreme organ of the Czech movement in Allied

countries. In his dealings with the Foreign Office Benes

went so far as to belittle

the role of the other peoples of the Monarchy, alleging that the Czechs had

`caused the military disasters of Austria' or that

the Czecho-Slovaks

have done much more harm to Austria-Hungary than

other nations in revolt . . . A manifestation of sympathy to our cause would

enormously increase the internal confusion in Austria-Hungary and would

considerably strengthen the force of resistance of the Czecho-Slovaks which

would hasten the internal collapse of Austria-Hungary.

191

It was Benes

's single-mindedness which secured from Balfour on 3 June a letter

recognizing the Czech army, but also (a significant advance on the French and

Italian position) acknowledging the Czechoslovak National Council as the

supreme organ of the Czechoslovak movement in the Allied countries. In

Padua's Czech propaganda, however, it was British recognition of the Czech

Legion which was viewed as the higher priority.

192

For the EPD the advance secured by the Czechs, though gratifying, was never

divorced from the need for a common Allied statement towards all the e

migre

organizations. Thus when Delme

-Radcliffe visited London in mid-May, a mem-

orandum which

Crewe House helped him to compose for the Foreign and War

Offices laid equal emphasis upon recognition of the Czechoslovak and Yugo-

slav causes.

Both movements could lead to `the complete paralysis in the

immediate future of the Austrian military machine', all the more so since (the

222 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

document boldly asserted) it was now entirely possible to coordinate them fully

with Czech and Yugoslav agitation within the Austrian ranks. What was vital,

therefore, was for the British, French and American governments to recognize

publicly the independence of the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav nations with

their e

migre

committees as provisional governments. Former experience with

the propaganda weapon was then emphasized: `This would be the most effi-

cient form

of propaganda and would constitute a straightforward means of

achieving in Austria results similar to those which Germany achieved in Russia

by foul means.'

193

While such language flowed naturally from the mouth of

Crewe House, it is clear that Delme

-Radcliffe himself was personally committed,

and increasingly active, in trumpeting the use of the new weapon on the Italian

Front, not least perhaps because of the opportunity to play a pivotal role in the

campaign. A number of observers noticed Radcliffe's `extreme optimism regard-

ing disaffection

among the Czechs'.

194

It was as a direct result of the Radcliffe-EPD memorandum that the British

Foreign Office's policy towards Austria-Hungary was finally clarified. On his

return journey to Italy, Radcliffe, interpreting his own brief rather widely and

with characteristic indiscretion, showed the document to Clemenceau who

then asked London if these were now the views of the British government. In

reply Cecil telegraphed on 21 May:

We feel

that policy of trying to detach Austria from Germany must be

abandoned as both inopportune and impracticable. Recent meeting of

Emperors has obviously led to bonds between two Empires being tightened.

We think that best plan is to give all possible support to oppressed nation-

alities in

Austria in their struggle against German-Magyar domination.

195

The following day Cecil spoke in the same spirit at a banquet at the Mansion

House to celebrate the third anniversary of Italy's entry into the war. The

speech, discussed with Steed beforehand, contained the first public approval

by the British government of the Rome Congress and Italy's new course towards

the oppressed nationalities; `we are', Cecil added, `anxious to see all these

peoples in the enjoyment of full liberty and independence'.

196

Steed, while

commenting mischeviously in The Times's leading article that it now remained

for the Allies to give `prompt and concrete expression to their common policy',

was able to inform the EPD committee at Crewe House that the speech `had had

an excellent effect in Italy and among the subject races of Austria-Hungary': it

was `being vigorously used for propaganda among the enemy troops'.

197

Certainly at the Padua Commission, Britain's statement delighted the Yugo-

slav representatives

in particular. According to Milivoj Jambris

ak, Cecil's speech

was `balm to his spirit as he was getting very anxious about the delay in making

such a pronouncement in England'.

198

Bogoljub Kujundz

too confirmed for

Italy's Campaign against Austria-Hungary 223

Delme

-Radcliffe that the speech had made a `remarkable impression': it was

`formal confirmation that England believes in carrying things through to the

end'. At the same time, however, Kujundz

was healthily suspicious of Cecil's

view that the main issue was not the dismemberment of the Monarchy but the

liberation of its oppressed peoples, for that could be taken to mean autonomy

rather than independence. Such a prospect the Bosnian Serb would not con-

template: `It

was not for nothing that I left home and family and went over to

the other side. Freedom and Austria are incompatible. Austria denies freedom

just as freedom denies Austria.' In this regard, he added cryptically, the British

were still `afraid of snakes of the trees and lizards'.

199

Even so, Cecil's speech suggested to the Yugoslavs that Britain was inclining

towards France's patronage of the oppressed nationalities, and that they could

expect a radical declaration at the next meeting of Allied leaders at Versailles.

200

As for the Italians' attitude, the Yugoslav e

migre

s did not now envisage that

they would prove an obstacle to such progress. Indeed, even Ante Trumbic

was

rather naõ

vely optimistic about the `revolution' which had taken place in Italy.

His private thoughts fully matched the propaganda statements which in April

had been scattered over the front in his name, implying that all Italians

accepted the idea of a united Yugoslav state. As he wrote to De Giulli on 2 May:

The old

atmosphere of mistrust is dispelled and a new atmosphere of trust is

being created . . . Italian public opinion is opening its eyes and only now is

realizing that the Yugoslav Committee is Italy's friend, for the very reason

that it is fighting for the independence of its own nation and for its freedom

from Austria-Hungary.

201

Italian official pronouncements in late May sustained this picture. On 24

May in Rome at the anniversary celebrations, Orlando in the presence of

Sonnino announced for the first time that Italy, in fighting for Trento and

Trieste, was `fighting in the same way for Warsaw, Prague and Zagreb. In that

lies our victory, that we do not carry on a war of egotism, but a war for all those

who are oppressed, who suffer the same as our unliberated brothers suffer.'

202

Leonida Bissolati added his voice, confirming that Italy had made war `for the

liberation of the Yugoslavs, Czechs and all oppressed nationalities of Austria-

Hungary'. Two days later in Milan he announced how, with the Allies and

especially Italy committed to Czech and Yugoslav independence and Austria's

destruction, `the war has entered into the fullness of its meaning and has

acquired that powerful rhythm which makes of it not a war for nationalist

interests but for the moral and juridical revival of the world and of nations'.

203

At Padua, Kujundz

rejoiced over this language. Even if (as a Serb) he noted

that Orlando might have mentioned Serbia as well, he described Bissolati's

Milan speech as `exceptional as a medium for our propaganda' and it was