The Yield Curve, Bond Yield, and Spot Rates 309
Strips Trading Strategy
Market makers who strip Treasuries earn their profi ts through arbitrage
that exploits the mispricing of the coupon bond. To preclude arbitrage
opportunities, the bid price of an issued Treasury must be lower than the
offer price of a synthetic one—that is, one reconstituted from a bundle of
coupon and principal strips—and the Treasury’s offer must be higher than
the synthetic’s bid. Otherwise, a risk-free profi t can be obtained by selling
one instrument while simultaneously buying the other and pocketing the
difference.
The potential profi t from stripping a Treasury coupon depends on
current market Treasury yields and the implied spot yield curve. Consider
a hypothetical 5-year, 8 percent Treasury trading at par—and therefore
offering a yield to maturity of 8 percent—in the yield curve environment
shown in fi gure 16.2. A market maker buys the Treasury and strips it with
the intention of selling the resulting zero-coupon bonds at the yields indi-
cated in fi gure 16.2.
FIGURE 16.7 on the following page shows the present values of the
Treasury’s cash fl ows, each discounted using the relevant market interest
rate, and the present values of the strip cash fl ows, each discounted using
the observed market yield corresponding to its maturity. A comparison of
the two sets reveals an opportunity for arbitrage profi t.
The fourth column shows how much the market maker paid for
each of the cash fl ows by buying the entire package of them—that is,
by buying the bond at a yield of 8 percent. The $4 coupon payment
due in three years, for instance, cost $3.1616, based on the 8 percent
(4 percent semiannual) yield. But if the assumptions embodied in the
table are correct, investors are willing to accept a lower yield, of 7.30
percent (3.65 percent semiannual), for this maturity and pay $3.2258
for the three-year strip corresponding to the coupon payment. On
this one coupon payment, the market maker thus realizes a profi t
of $0.0645, the difference between $3.2258 and $3.1613. The total
profi t from selling all the strips is $0.4913 per $100 nominal of the
original Treasury.
What if, instead of the observed yields to maturity, investors required
the theoretical spot yields from fi gure 16.3?
FIGURE 16.8 shows that, in
this case, the total proceeds from the sale of the zero-coupon Treasuries
would be approximately $100, representing no profi t and thus rendering
the stripping process uneconomical. These two scenarios demonstrate that
profi t opportunities exist where strip yields deviate from theoretical ones.
In practice, strip yields do differ from theoretical yields, indicating
that there are (often very small) differences between derived and actual