50 2 Agent-Based Modeling
necessarily mean a group of higher animals that have a group structure of some
complexity; instead, it simply means that there exists a population with some form
of interaction between its members.
As an example, one might think of E.coli bacteria. Under starvation conditions,
some strains of these produce siderophores. These are a class of chemicals that make
iron soluble, which enables the bacteria to scavenge the metal from the environment
where they live—normally the guts of a host. Siderophores are simply excreted into
the host environment by the bacteria. The concerted action of the group facilitates
the release of significant amounts of iron to the benefit of all group members. The
simultaneous release of siderophores by all bacteria can be seen as a kind of coop-
eration. Each cell participates in constructing a small amount of the chemical, but
only the collective effort leads to a reasonable and useful amount of dissolved iron.
So far so good. The problem starts when one considers that a cooperation of this
sort comes at a cost. In order to synthesize the siderophores, the bacteria have to
use energy. They do this, of course, in the “expectation” that their “investment” will
reap an adequate return. The energy and resources the bacteria exert on producing
siderophores could alternatively have been invested in growth and production of
offspring. However, if an individual cell stops producing the siderophores it will
still be able to benefit from those released into the shared environment by other cells
and continue capturing iron. At the same time, unburdened by the cost of producing
siderophores it would grow faster and produce more offspring. Evolutionarily, it
would be better off.
The situation here is similar to that of a shared coffee-making facility as is com-
mon in some university departments. Assume that the purchase of new coffee beans
is funded through the contributions of coffee-drinkers. Each time somebody takes a
cup of coffee she is expected to contribute a small amount of money to the commu-
nal coffee fund. Normally, such an arrangement is unenforced, in the sense that it is
fully possible to drink the coffee without paying for it. A coffee scheme run in this
way relies on the honesty of the coffee drinkers for its continued functioning. If a
large number of drinkers suddenly failed to pay their expected fees, there would be
no money left to purchase new coffee once supplies run out. In this case, anybody
who wanted a coffee would have to go to the campus café, where a coffee costs
considerably more (furthermore, for busy academics the time investment would be
even more punishing). In this sense, the communal coffee scheme relies on the cof-
fee drinkers cooperating; all drinkers are better off as long as everybody contributes
their share.
The crucial point is that, as long as most members are honest, an individual is
better off not paying. Using such a “cheating” strategy means they get to drink
coffee for zero cost—we can assume that the system has enough slack to withstand
small shortfalls of payments due to some dishonest drinkers; too many of those
would lead to a breakdown of the system, forcing everybody to pay the price of a
coffee in the café.
In the realm of bacteria and siderophores, the situation is similar but worse.
Unlike dishonest coffee-drinkers, bacteria that fail to contribute their share of
siderophores will tend to reproduce faster than their honest conspecifics. Assum-
ing that the dishonesty in bacteria is an hereditary trait, non-cooperators will tend to