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resistance, supported, very ironically in the
light of later developments, by the United
States. On 2 September 1945, the Viet Minh’s
leader Nguyen Ai Quoc, better known as Ho
Chi Minh, proclaimed the independence from
France of the Republic of Vietnam; a move
which, following the breakdown of negotia-
tions between the two sides, was to lead di-
rectly to war. After an eight-year jungle con-
flict, the French army was catastrophically
defeated at Dien Biên Phu on 7 May 1954.
Although the peace agreements that sealed the
French withdrawal were signed before the end
of July, neither Vietnam nor France would be
at peace for long: Vietnam would soon be
obliged to engage the military might of the
United States as the priorities of the Cold War
replaced the latter’s erstwhile decolonizing
zeal; France, for its part, would end one colo-
nial war only to embark on another.
The Algerian war represents the greatest fail-
ure of French colonial policy after 1945. The
effective autonomy enjoyed by the governing
coalition of settlers and soldiers in Algeria meant
that even the most moderate reforms belatedly
proposed by Paris could without difficulty be
blocked or circumvented on the ground. In the
face of such intransigence, the Algerian nation-
alists—including many who, like future presi-
dent Ahmed Ben Bella, had wartime experience
in the French army—had little option but to
launch an armed struggle for independence.
When the war of national liberation finally be-
gan on 1 November 1954, Algeria’s special sta-
tus as France’s most economically, politically,
administratively and psychologically assimilated
overseas territory meant that the government
of Pierre Mendès France, recently elected pre-
cisely to extricate France from the débâcle in
Indochina, opted without hesitation to use force
in response to the nationalists’ demands. Such
was the determination of François Mitterrand
(Minister of the Interior at the time) to defend
Algérie française that he ordered the mobiliza-
tion of conscripts for military service in Alge-
ria, something which had never been done in
Indochina. Once set on this course, it proved
impossible for the chronically unstable govern-
ments of the Fourth Republic to overcome the
momentum generated by the war, as the Mollet
administration’s involvement in the Suez fiasco
of 1956 graphically demonstrated. So, whereas
Morocco and Tunisia were permitted to accede
to independence with relative ease in 1956,
France’s principal colony was to remain gripped
by a conflict which is still a source of heated
debate in France and which may straightfor-
wardly be linked to the vicious civil war being
waged in Algeria today between the successors
to the FLN and Islamic fundamentalists.
It was only with de Gaulle’s return to
power in 1958 that a way out of the Algerian
impasse became possible. The ability of de
Gaulle accurately to identify the stalemate in
Algeria, coupled with his determination to
shift metropolitan public opinion decisively
away from an imperial conception of French
grandeur and towards a modern and Europe-
centred one, meant that he was ultimately
able to prevail over the supporters of Algérie
française. De Gaulle was undoubtedly helped
in this task by the series of revelations which
had been made concerning the abhorrent
‘pacification’ methods used by the army in
Algeria—often by returning conscripts and re-
layed by sections of the French press, despite
strict government censorship—and which led
to concerted antiwar campaigning by such
contrasting intellectuals as Sartre and
François Mauriac.
The Évian agreements which eventually
concluded the war included temporary guar-
antees for preferential French access to newly
discovered oil and gas deposits in the Sahara
desert, as well as the continued use of certain
military and naval installations. They also in-
cluded provisions for the future of Algeria’s
European population. However, the scorched-
earth policy implemented by the European ter-
rorists of the Organisation Armée Secrète
(OAS) rendered inevitable the exodus of a mil-
lion settlers in considerable confusion and
panic. Never envisaged by de Gaulle or his
negotiators, this massive transfer of popula-
tion was only made possible by the booming
French economy. In a period of full employ-
ment, the pieds-noirs were assimilated remark-
ably rapidly into metropolitan French society.
decolonization