Woodward Bob. Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account of the Decision to Invade Iraq

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was convinced of the historical duplicity of the Swedes, who had invaded Norway in 1814 and ruled the country

until 1905. There was a long-standing grudge and it was a running joke between the president and Rove.

In late December, Rice gave the president another Blix debrief. Not much was getting done. The

inspectors were opening warehouses that had obviously been sanitized. In addition, the inspectors were taking

time off for Christmas and the other holidays. The sensitive intelligence coverage showed that Blix and his team

were not conducting the kind of aggressive no-holds-barred inspections Bush envisioned.

Bush was growing increasingly angry at the process. It was getting worse by the day, he said. The

ressure tactic on Saddam was dubious. “I’m not so sure this is going to work,” he said. They had set up an

inspections system that they hoped would place the burden of proof on Saddam. The Iraqi leader had to declare

his weapons, account for them, turn them over, prove he had disarmed. This turned the American notion of

ustice on its hea

—the accused had to prove his innocence. The world was not buying it. Maybe war was the

only alternative.

“What do you think?” the president asked Rice. “Should we do this?” He meant war. He had never before

ressed her for her answer.

“Yes,” she said. “Because it isn’t American credibility on the line, it is the credibility of everybody that

this gangster can yet again beat the international system.” As important as credibility was, she said, “Credibility

should never drive you to do something you shouldn’t do.” But this was much bigger, she advised, something

that should be done. “To let this threat in this part of the world play volleyball with the international community

this way will come back to haunt us someday. That is the reason to do it.”

Bush didn’t respond.

A YEAR LATER

, the president recalled, “I was very concerned about the process, that we’d get wrapped up in a

rocess and Saddam Hussein would grow stronger. I was concerned people would focus on not Saddam, not the

danger that he posed, not his deception, but focus on the process and thereby Saddam would be able to kind of

skate through once again…he would escape the trap again. And would be even stronger. And so there was

anxiety about that.” He was determined to deal with Saddam and not let him elude them again.

“I would constantly talk to Condi,” Bush recalled. He would get updates on the latest inspections and on

Blix. “I’m on the phone all times saying, all different times saying, you know, ‘What the heck’s going on?’

“There was a lot of stress,” the president said. “Yeah, I felt stressed.” All of the holiday parties at the

White House added to the difficulties at the end of 2002. “My jaw muscles got so tight. And it was not just

because I was smiling and shaking so many hands. There was a lot of tension during that last holiday season.”

Other than Rice, Bush said he didn’t need to ask the principals whether they thought he should go to war.

He knew what Cheney thought, and he decided not to ask Powell or Rumsfeld. “I could tell what they thought,”

the president recalled. “I didn’t need to ask them their opinion about Saddam Hussein or how to deal with

Saddam Hussein. If you were sitting where I sit, you could be pretty clear. I think we’ve got an environment

where people feel free to express themselves.”

“Did you ever ask Powell? Did you ever say, Would you do this if you were sitting here?” I asked.

“No,” the president said.

One person not around was Karen Hughes, one of his top advisers and longtime communications director.

Hughes, who had resigned the previous summer to return to Texas, probably knew how Bush thought and

talked as much as an

one. “I asked Karen,” the

resident recalled. “She said if

o to war, exhaust all

opportunities to achieve [regime change] peacefully. And she was right. She actually captured my own

sentiments.”

*A nickname.

ICE WENT TO HER AUNT’S

for Christmas, then to the president’s ranch in Crawford, the barren Texas plain

where she seemed to have spent a significant part of her recent life. She had a sense that things were changing,

that Bush was increasingly seeing that the pressure points—diplomacy, covert action, speeches—weren’t going

to work. He didn’t say anything directly, and she didn’t push, since she had already recommended they go to

war.

Then on either the Thursday or Friday after New Year’s, Rice had a private moment with the president.

“This pressure isn’t holding together,” the president said to her. The effort to get U.N. inspections on an

aggressive track to make Saddam crack was not working. Saddam was getting smarter about how to deal with

Blix. The unanimous international consensus of the November resolution was beginning to fray.

The press reports of smiling Iraqis leading inspectors around, opening up buildings and saying, “See,

there’s nothing here,” infuriated Bush, who then would read intelligence reports showing the Iraqis were

moving and concealing things. It wasn’t clear what was being moved, but it sure looked like Saddam was up to

his old tricks and was about to fool the world again. Bush noted that the antiwar protests in European cities and

in the U.S. would fortify Saddam and make him think the U.S. would never invade. “How is this happening?”

Bush said. “Saddam is going to get stronger.”

Blix had told Rice, “I have never complained about your military pressure. I think it’s a good thing.” She

relayed this to the president.

“How long does he think I can do this?” Bush asked. “A year? I can’t. The United States can’t stay in this

osition while Saddam plays games with the inspectors.”

“You have to follow through on your threat,” Rice said. “If you’re going to carry out coercive diplomacy,

you have to live with that decision.”

The president was concerned about the CIA assertion that sources and operations would get rolled up if

there was too much delay. The military buildup was in full swing, incremental but real. They couldn’t keep all

those forces deployed forever. Morale and good logistics support could not be kept high. There wasn’t endless

time. He was trying to read Saddam. “He’s getting more confident, not less,” he said. “He can manipulate the

international s

stem a

ain. We’re not winnin

“Time is not on our side here,” Bush said. “Probably going to have to, we’re going to have to go to war.”

In Rice’s mind, this was the president’s decision on war. He had reached the point of no return. Many

questions remained, including when and how to force an endgame.

Bush was now enveloped in a contradiction: he had privately decided on war, but publicly he was

continuing the diplomacy. It was a world of more dilemmas, dissonance and hedging.

ROVE WAS ALSO FLOWN

to Crawford for part of the holiday. He had been quietly working on the confidential

lan for Bush’s 2004 reelection campaign. In fact Rove had been devoted to this project since Bush had been

declared the winner in 2000. Rove believed in learning from history, and he had been doing in-depth research

on how recent Republican presidents had campaigned for reelection. Nancy Reagan gave him access to

Reagan’s papers. Rove sent trusted staffers to the Ford Library to see what he had done in 1976. Bush’s father

opened some boxes for them, and Jim Baker, who had been Bush senior’s 1992 campaign manager, gave them

his personal papers.

Rove had with him a PowerPoint presentation on the strategy, themes, timetable and an overview plan to

win reelection. The essence of the message for the president was: Pay attention man, it’s coming.

He found some time alone with the president to brief him at his ranch house. Laura Bush was on the couch

reading a book, pretending to pay no attention. Rove could see she was paying complete attention.

Opening his laptop, he displayed for Bush in bold letters on a dark blue background:

PERSONA

Strong Leader Bold Action Big Ideas Peace in World

More Compassionate America Cares About People Like Me

Leads a Strong Team

On page two:

VALUES

Compassion Moral Clarity Responsibility

Opportunity Ownership

On page three:

ISSUES

Primary: WOT [War on Terrorism] Homeland Always Economy

Subordinate: Education Compassion Agenda Health

ortunit

Environment

Rove said that he expected the campaign to be as close as it was in 2000, that the country was as narrowly

divided as it was then.

All things being equal, the president asked, when would you like to begin?

Rove noted the first Bush campaign had filed on March 8, 1999, and that it had been difficult to reach

their budgetary target, though they did. In a practical sense they had not begun until June 1999. He said he

wanted the president to start in February or March of this year and begin the process of raising the money,

robably $200 million. He had a schedule. In February, March and April, there would be between 12 and 16

fund-raisers.

“We got a war coming,” the president told Rove flatly, “and you’re just going to have to wait.” He had

decided. It was the president’s version of Pay attention man, it’s coming. War was the only option now. “The

moment is coming,” he said. The president did not give a date but he left the impression with Rove that it would

be January, or February or March at the latest.

“Remember the problem with your dad’s campaign,” Rove replied. “A lot of people said he got started too

late.”

“I understand,” Bush said. He had been there. But this was decided and this was the way it was going to

be. So the early fund-raising was out. He couldn’t campaign if he was getting ready to start war. Rove’s plans

would have to be flexible. “I’ll tell you when I’m comfortable with you starting.”

Oh, nooooooooo, Rove thought. But he knew there was nothing he could do. With war coming, there was

no way he was going to try to convince Bush he needed to go to a fund-raiser in Altoona or anywhere for that

matter.

THE PRESIDENT

, back in Washington, met with his full cabinet, the 15th such meeting in two years, at

3:30

P.M.

on January 6. This was not the group that would make important decisions on war. “If we don’t have a

case to make, I won’t send in the troops,” he told the group. Later in a public exchange with reporters, he acted

conciliatory about Saddam. “Thus far it looks like he hasn’t complied. But he’s got time, and we continue to

call upon Saddam Hussein to listen to what the world is saying.”

Two days later the president met with congressional leaders of both parties. “Sometimes it requires a little

muscle to secure good diplomacy,” he said. “Before I make a decision I will make that reason known to the

Congress and everyone in America.”

Later, at 5:20

P.M.

, he met in the residence with Republican leaders only, and was more candid. “There’s a

good chance I’ll have to address the nation and commit troops to war. It’s clear Saddam Hussein is not

disarming. I want the process to work before I ratchet up the noise.”

On January 9, Franks came to Washington to give the president the latest on the war plan. The main topic

was Turkey, which continued to waffle on whether to allow staging of U.S. combat forces. The delay meant

Franks’s northern front was off the table.

The general also said he was worried about a potential loss of support from Jordan and Saudi Arabia. King

Abdullah of Jordan had met that week with the leaders of Turkey, Egypt and Syria to coordinate efforts to

revent a war, though the king was secretly committed to support the war effort. Tenet had a close relationship

with the king. The CIA subsidized the Jordanian intelligence service with millions of dollars a year. But the

kingdom’s population is majority Palestinian and overwhelmingly pro-Saddam. Most of Jordan’s oil came from

Iraq. Iraq was also running agents into Jordan. Abdullah was in jeopardy, and in Tenet’s view had taken on the

urden of the centur

in a

reein

to su

ort a war.

Bush asked Franks, If Saddam attacked or did something provocative tomorrow, what exactly could be

done?

The answer was an almost immediate air attack using the approximately 400 aircraft in the region, and

15,000 U.S. forces on the ground in Kuwait.

As he reviewed the decision cycle for the Hybrid Plan, Franks said C-Day was when the president would

decide to deploy forces. But since they had already been deploying for some time, they had already passed some

of the major milestones. Those deployments could continue, and the president did not have to commit to combat

operations.

“What’s my last decision point?” Bush asked. “When have I finally made a commitment?”

Once you put U.S. Special Forces on the ground inside Iraq for offensive combat operations, Franks

replied. These would be the planned operations to protect against Scud missile firings and to protect Iraq’s

southern and northern oil fields.

Franks said he would be ready to execute in about three weeks. “I’d be ready in early February, but I’d

really like the 1st of March,” he said.

2:15

P.M.

on January 10 Bush and Cheney met privately with three leading Iraqi dissidents in the Oval Office.

The president was blunt. “I believe in freedom and peace. I believe Saddam Hussein is a threat to America and

to the neighborhood,” he said. “He should disarm but he won’t, therefore we will remove him from power. We

can’t make him change his heart. His heart is made of stone.”

It was close to a declaration of war.

Rend Francke, the director of a foundation promoting human rights and democracy in Iraq, said, “I believe

the Iraqi people can practice democracy if given the opportunity.”

The president told them he was interested in their personal stories.

Hatem Mukhlis, who is originally from Tikrit, said, “Saddam killed my father. My family’s been involved

in politics in Iraq since the ’20s. I’m a doctor. All the Iraqis are ready to get rid of Saddam Hussein. The fear is

what comes after. The difference is the participation of the Iraqi people. I had democracy in the ’50s. My job is

to save lives. I’d like to save Iraq and American lives. They’re both my people.”

“Does the average citizen in Iraq hate Israel?” Bush asked.

“No,” the doctor said. “They’re so self-absorbed, they’re just inward-focused.”

Author Kanan Makiya, who wrote

Republic of Fear,

the most credible account of torture and the sadistic

nature of the Baath Party and its rise to power, said he was now researching the regime’s war crimes. “You’re

going to break the mold,” he said. “You will change the image of the United States in the region. Democracy is

truly doable in Iraq. Force for destruction can be turned to a force for construction. Iraqis are a technically able

eople. They are literate with electricized villages.”

“We’re planning for the worst,” Bush said.

“People will greet troops with flowers and sweets,” one said.

“How do

ou know?” Bush asked.

They all said the information came from people inside Iraq.

On Saddam, one said, “I think Iraqi people themselves will find him and bring him to justice.” Another

qualified that, saying it was likely they would find Saddam, but not certain.

“What will the Iraqi people need for the future?” Bush asked.

They mentioned currency, medical facilities and immediate humanitarian relief.

“Is there starvation?” Bush asked.

No, but there was malnutrition.

The split between the ruling minority Sunnis and the majority Shiites was not as violent or pronounced as

eople outside Iraq generally thought, one said. Saddam’s method was to divide and conquer.

“What are the elite like?” Bush asked. “Are they well educated? Are there many left or have they been

urged like in China?” He then said, “Let’s say Saddam Hussein is gone. Now there’s a void. What’s your

vision?”

Cheney, who had said little as usual, interjected, “We need to have a light hand in the postwar phase.”

It was important to find the right people now to fill the void, the Iraqis said.

“Will the Diaspora head back?” Bush asked, referring to the Iraqis living out of the country.

Yes, one exile said.

“The democratization of Iraq will be more likely if Iraqis who understand and lived under a democracy

fled back,” the president asserted. “How long will the military have to stay?”

Two to three years, one estimated.

“How do we deal with the impression the U.S. is bringing a leader in, imposing our will?”

They did not have an answer.

“How do people in Iraq hear things?” Bush asked. “Is it e-mail?”

There were the overseas services of the BBC and the Voice of America, one said. Internet servers were

government-owned, so anybody who tried to get onto an Internet service to look up an opposition group would

be killed.

One exile said they needed an Iraqi leader modeled on Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan, and a governing

council of some sort, plus access to the Internet, entertainment and food.

“We haven’t reached conclusions,” the president told them, ending the meeting. “I view you and the

Diaspora as partners. Your job is to gather the people who want to help and rally their hearts and souls. My job

is to rally the world and win the war. I’m not sure my job is to pick” the new leader for Iraq. “I truly believe out

of this will come peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Maybe one year from now we will be toasting

victory and talking about the transition to freedom.”

RUMSFELD DIDN

’

T WANT

to walk into the Oval Office one day and say to the president, “Well, today is the day.

From here on the credibility of our country is at stake and we were putting people in jeopardy.” So he had been

trying to put himself in the president’s shoes, attempting to make sure that Bush didn’t get so far out in words,

body language or mental state that he couldn’t get back from a decision to go to war. On the other hand, he felt

there was a time when the president should not want to walk back, and really could not. That time would be

well before Bush had to decide to put Special Operations Forces inside Iraq, the point of no return identified by

Franks. “I can remember trying to give him as early a clue as possible that that was coming down the road,”

Rumsfeld recalled.

“There comes a moment as all these things are happening,” he added, “when we have to look a

neighboring country in the eye and they have to make a decision that puts them at risk. And at that moment the

resident needs to know that.” With the U.S. moving forces at an increasing rate, and the CIA taking more

chances, the neighboring countries were increasingly at risk—especially Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

Rumsfeld told the president, “The penalty for our country and for our relationships and potentially the

lives of some people are at risk if you have to make a decision

not

to go forward.” The only way the damage

would be mitigated, he said, is if “there is some very highly visible reason not to go forward, like the

capitulation or the departure of Saddam Hussein or something like that.” The president was rapidly losing his

option of not going to war, Rumsfeld was saying. The real threshold for war was when people and countries put

themselves at risk in this way on behalf of the United States. Foreign countries in the region who were

supplying sub-rosa assistance to the U.S. were about to make decisions that would put them at even greater risk,

he said. More lives would be in danger. The point of no return was approaching.

The president took him aside one day in early January. “Look, we’re going to have to do this I’m afraid,”

he said. Saddam was diddling them. “I don’t see how we’re going to get him to a position where he will do

something in a manner that’s consistent with the U.N. requirements, and we’ve got to make an assumption that

he will not.”

It was enough of a decision for Rumsfeld. He asked to bring in some key foreign players.

The president gave his approval, but pressed Rumsfeld again, When is my last decision point?

“When

our

le, Mr. President, look

le in the e

e and tell them

ou’re

oin

.”

ROM THEIR ALMOST

daily conversations, Cheney had come to realize that the president had made his

decision. The vice president believed that other governments would not be willing to step up until they were

convinced that the United States meant business. He agreed with Rumsfeld that they had to look people in the

eye and say, This is going to happen. They could not leave them high and dry out there with the United States

having stirred things up, only to pull back and abandon them to live in the neighborhood with a very bad actor.

Cheney felt that once the president had laid out his objective of regime change, and begun the process of

troop deployments and CIA work, then if they didn’t follow through, they would be like Clinton—a lot of bold

talk and not much action.

One key country that had to be notified and brought along was Saudi Arabia. The prospect of losing its

support, a possibility Franks had raised several days earlier, was very troubling. Saudi Arabia was in a

articularly precarious position in the Muslim world. Bin Laden had started his al Qaeda movement in large part

y charging that the Saudi king, who in the Muslim world is officially and spiritually known as the Custodian o

the Two Holy Mosques at Mecca and Medina, had let in the infidels, the U.S. military, before, during and after

the 1991 Gulf War. Its continued collaboration with the Americans was fueling the extreme fundamentalist

movement. Saudi participation in a Gulf War II against Saddam, particularly if it did not end his rule, was

enormously risky.

Cheney wanted personally to communicate a decision to the Saudis, and he had a memorable precedent

for doing so. More than a dozen years earlier, on Friday, August 3, 1990, just after Saddam had invaded Kuwait

and was threatening to move into Saudi Arabia, Cheney, then secretary of defense for Bush’s father, had

summoned Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar to his Pentagon office. Joining them were Powell, then chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Paul Wolfowitz, then defense undersecretary for policy.

President George H. W. Bush had directed Cheney to brief Bandar on the U.S. war plan for protecting

Saudi Arabia and driving Saddam from Kuwait. As the group huddled around the small round table in the

secretary’s Pentagon office, Cheney told the prince that they were serious. He produced copies of high-

resolution, Top Secret photographs showing Iraqi divisions pointing at Saudi Arabia. Powell summarized the

U.S. war plan, which would include more than four divisions, three aircraft carriers, plus many Air Force attack

squadrons—a force of between 100,000 to 200,000 at first. “Well, at least this shows you are serious,” Bandar

said. Cheney and Powell wanted permission to deploy the forces through Saudi Arabia, and Bandar pledged that

he would be an advocate with Kin

Fahd.

After Bandar left, Wolfowitz proposed that they start alertingU.S. forces.

“He blows smoke,” Powell said, urging that they wait.

U.S. forces soon deployed into Saudi Arabia.

THIS TIME CHENEY

invited Bandar to his West Wing office on Saturday, January 11, 2003. Rumsfeld and JCS

Chairman General Richard B. Myers were also there.

Bandar considered Rumsfeld the toughest secretary of defense the U.S. had ever had, more so than even

Cheney. This, in Bandar’s estimation, was because Rumsfeld had nothing to lose. He was older, it was his

second time in the job, and he already had achieved a great deal. There was a confidence, even an

overconfidence, that made him the guy you wanted to lead the charge.

One purpose of the meeting was to convince Bandar that U.S. forces would have to be sent through and

from Saudi territory into Iraq. Rescue, communication and refueling support was not going to be enough. Of the

five other countries on Iraq’s border, only Kuwait and Jordan supported a military operation. The 500 miles of

Saudi-Iraqi border were critical. Without it there would be a giant gap in the middle between Kuwait’s small

150-mile border with Iraq and Jordan’s even smaller 100-mile border.

Sitting on the edge of the table, Myers took out a large map labeled TOP SECRET NOFORN. The

OFORN meant NO FOREIGN—classified material not to be seen by any foreign national.

Myers explained that the first part of the battle plan would be a massive air bombing campaign over

several days that would use three to four times more explosives than in the 42 days of the Gulf War. The main

targets would be the Republican Guard divisions, the security services and Saddam’s command and control of

his forces. A land attack would follow through Kuwait, plus a northern front through Turkey with the 4th

Infantry Division if Turkey approved it. Included was massive use of Special Forces and intelligence

aramilitary teams to secure every place in Iraq from which Saddam could launch a missile or airplane against

Saudi Arabia, Jordan or Israel.

“You know, Prince, we have assets already in,” Myers said, referring to the CIA paramilitary teams.

“Yes, I’ve been briefed,” Bandar said.

Special Forces and intelligence operatives would distribute $300 million to local Iraqi tribal leaders,

religious leaders and the Iraqi armed forces.

We’ve lost strategic surprise after getting stuck in the U.N. process and we are losing the tactical surprise,

Myers argued. However, General Franks has come up with ideas that will make surprise largely irrelevant.

The 500-mile Saudi-Iraqi border would have to be covered. Special Forces, intelligence teams and other

strikes would have to be launched from there. If there were alternatives, Myers said, they would not be asking

the Saudis.

Bandar knew that his country could create a cover for the arrival of U.S. forces by closing a civilian

airport at Al Jawf in the northern desert, flying Saudi helicopters day and night as a routine border patrol for a

week, and then withdrawing. The U.S. Special Forces could set up a base there that might not attract much

attention.

Staring intently at the 2-by-3-foot Top Secret map, Bandar, a former Saudi fighter pilot, asked a few

uestions about air o

erations. Could he have a co

of the lar

e ma

so he could brief the crown

rince? he