Weingast B.R., Wittman D. The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy

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1092 subject index

United States Supreme Court: (cont.)

and Minnesota vs Clover Leaf Creamery Co

(1981) 347

and Munn vs Illinois 350

and Nebbia vs New York (1934) 350

and NewYorkTimesvsSullivan(1964) 345

and Penn Central Transp Co vs New York (1978) 353

and Penn Central vs New York (1978) 353

and Pennsylvania Coal Co vs Mahon (1923) 352–3

and Plessy vs Ferguson (1896) 346

and protection of contract and property 347

contracts aﬀected with the public interest 350–1

contracts clause 347–8

economic liberties 348–50

takings clause 351–4

and Reed vs Reed (1971) 347

and Slaughterhouse Cases (1872) 348, 349

and Smyth vs Ames (1898) 350

and social and moral issues:

equal protection of the laws 346–7

freedom of speech 344–6

and Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc vs Tahoe

Regional Planning Agency (2002) 354

and Truax vs Raich (1915) 349

and United States vs Addyston Pipe & Steel Co

(1899) 349

and Usery vs Turner Elkhorn Mining Co (1976) 348

and Virginia Board of Pharmacy vs Virginia

Consumer Council (1976) 346

and West Lynn Creamery vs Healy (1994) 351

and Yee vs Escondido (1992) 351

urban economics 739

utilitarianism 983, 988

utility maximization 4

and voting behavior 38–9

valence issues:

and candidate divergence 36, 926

and spatial theory of voting 32–5

varieties of capitalism 614–17

and coordinated market economies 615

and institutional complementarity 615

and liberal market economies 615

and relationship of economic/political

institutions 616

and role of economic institutions 614–15

and state’s economic role 650–1

and welfare state 615–16

veil of ignorance 1035–6

Venezuela 319, 701

vengeance 18

veto rights/powers:

and American presidency

new separation-of-powers approach

202–4

political economy approach 242, 245–7, 250–1

and negative agenda power 149–50

gridlock 151–2

reactions to gridlock 152

roll rates of veto players 153

Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms 384–5

and allocation of public goods 487–92

Virginia School 455

virtual representation 303–4

voice, and ﬁscal competition 512–14

vote motivation, and monetary policy 534–5

voting, and allocation of public goods

in large Bayesian environments 495–6

in large environments 497

majority rule 485–7, 489–91

voting behavior:

and citizen duty 40–1

and consumption approach 42

and deterministic voting 67–8

oﬃce motivation 68–70

policy motivation 70–2

and economic voting 548

and electoral framework 66–7

and expressive activity 333–5

and expressive voting 41

and game theory 910–12

and group rule utilitarianism 41

–2

and impact of electoral rules 527

and information aggregation 15–17, 928–9

and information revelation 11–15

candidate quality 15

election-timing 12

pressure group ﬁnance 12–14

and laboratory experiments on elections 922

asymmetric contests 926

candidate convergence 923

median voter theorem 923–4

multicandidate elections 924–5

retrospective voting 923–4

andmedianvotertheorem 29, 31

and paradoxes of rationality 43, 304, 333

attempted resolutions of 40–2

rational ignorance 39–40

rational non-participation 38–40

and party identiﬁcation 997

and political advertising 12–13, 45–6

directly informative 57–9

indirectly informative 53–7

role of 455–6

and political-economic cycles:

electioneering 545

partisaneering 545–6

and probabilistic voting, stochastic partisanship

model 72–3

vote motivation 73–

win motivation 75–7

and probabilistic voting, stochastic preference

model 77–8

policy motivation 80–1

vote motivation 78–9

win motivation 79–80

and prospective voting 569–71, 572–5

and rationality 333–4, 335, 550–1

and retrospective voting 468, 569–71, 575–8, 923–4

and sources of information 43–6

and spatial theory of voting 29–30

candidate divergence 35–8

criticisms of 30–1

cut-points 33–4

valence issues 32–5

and strategic voting 102, 110

and turnout 929–32

subject index 1093

see also economic voting; median voter theorem;

voting theory

voting paradox 38–42, 304, 333, 971–2

voting theory 390–1

and antiplurality voting 392

and Arrow’s theorems 405–6

and axiomatic representations 397–400

chaotic dynamics 399

ranking consistency 399–400

ranking paradoxes 398–9

shortcomings of 398

and Borda Count 392, 399–400, 403

and determining ‘will of the voters’ 400–3

conﬁguration of preferences 400–1

neutral Condorcet requirement 401–2

neutral reversal requirement 401

and plurality voting 392

and representing proﬁles 391–3

approval voting 396–7

creating proﬁles/proﬁle lines 394–6

procedure lines 393–4

and Sen’s theorems 405

and strategic voting 403–4